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THE EXPOSITOR

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EIGHTH SERIES

Volume V

1913

HODDER AND STOUGHTON
WARWICK SQUARE, LONDON, E C

MCMXIII

Ser. 8
V. 5
1913:1

Butler & Tanner
The Selwood Printing Works
Frome and London

27357

THE EXPOSITOR

VOL. V.

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THE EXPERIENCE OF BALAAM AS SYMBOLIC OF THE ORIGINS OF PROPHECY.[1]

THE story of Balaam has engaged the genius and been illuminated by the expository powers of some of the greatest preachers of Christianity; conspicuous among whom (as we all know) are Bishop Butler with his sermon on the Character of Balaam and John Henry Newman in his discourse on Obedience without Love. Both of these classics display a rich sagacity and a solemn power of searching the heart. But they take different views of the character of this extraordinary heathen, and of his conduct upon first coming under the influence of the true God.

Such differences between high authorities, equally honest in seeking the meaning of Scripture, are to be explained by the discovery, made since their time, of the complex structure of the story, woven as it is from two differing and even contradictory traditions. We now, also, enjoy a fuller knowledge of the historical situation and the religious atmosphere in which Balaam is represented as acting. We are more able to place him on his proper stage in the history of religion—slowly making its long way up to Christ—and therefore more able to read the lessons which his story is fitted to afford us for our own faith and conduct.

[1] A sermon preached in King's College Chapel, University of Aberdeen, October 20, 1912, from these texts: *And when Balaam saw that it pleased the Lord to bless Israel he went not as at other times to seek for omens, but he set his face towards the wilderness* (Num. xxiii. 23). *Henceforth I call you not slaves, for the slave knoweth not what his lord doeth, but I have called you friends; for all things that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you* (John's Gospel, xiv. 15).

You remember the outlines of the story. Alarmed by Israel's defeat of Sihon, the king of the Amorites, Balak king of Moab sent across the Arabian wilderness for a distant prophet named Balaam, the son of Beor, to come and curse this people which threatened to devour the others. But under the influence of Israel's God Balaam, after some reluctance and doubt, refused to curse; and in four metrical Redes or Oracles he blessed Israel, acknowledging their irresistibleness under Divine Providence and predicting their dominion over their neighbours.

The prose narrative, which tells us all this, is one of the finest in the Old Testament. Partly from the language, partly from inconsistencies among the things told, it is clear that the writer has used (as I have said) two different traditions of the story and worked them, with some alterations, into the finished form which excites our admiration. His indifference to certain discrepancies of detail, which he has left standing, is the indifference of a powerfully dramatic spirit, absorbed by the conflict of rival religious influences, and by the victory, even in a heathen mind, of that purer and more potential faith with which Israel was identified. Our interest in so lofty an issue is not disturbed by the facts that Balaam is described now as an Aramean from as far away as the Euphrates, and again as an Ammonite riding into Moab upon his own ass from the immediately neighbouring province[1]; now as convoyed by the princes of Balak, and again as accompanied by only two servants; now as receiving God's permission to go to Balak, and again as exciting God's wrath by consenting to go. Indeed the last of these differences, and the most curious, may be due not to two

[1] Numbers xxii. 5a and xxiii. 7 from Aram; but the rest of xxii. 5 appears (from the Samaritan, Syriac and Vulgate) to have been originally to *the land of the children of Ammon*. For many other proofs of a double narrative see the commentaries, especially Prof. G. B. Gray's.

discrepant traditions, but to the naïve effort of one and the same narrator to convey the first confused effects upon Balaam's mind of a religious force purer than the spirit in which he was accustomed to perform his offices. Such an ambiguity would be natural in a man dazzled by his encounter with the new light; and the narrator was only following the methods of his age if he articulated that ambiguity into a tale of two opposite commands from God. It is curious that Balaam himself contradicts his biographer. *God,* he says in one of his Redes,

> *God is not man to belie,*
> *Neither man's son to repent.*[1]

This, however, is a subsidiary question, and cannot affect our reading of the writer's treatment of the mind and character of Balaam. In Balaam himself the writer is interested throughout. Recently this interest has been ignored or denied, as if Balaam's character did not matter much in the development of the drama. It is true that the religious interests of the story dominate the psychological. The main issue is between the purpose of God with Israel and the human powers which from Pharaoh to Sihon and Balak have sought to frustrate it. But this conflict is described —in detail and with zest—as being waged, and as issuing to the assurance of Israel's victory, within the mental experience of Balaam himself. I sympathise, therefore, with the older expositors who concentrate their attention upon the behaviour of this strange being, and take his character as the pivot of the story; only I agree that some of them have wrongly interpreted that character. Bishop Butler, for instance, treats Balaam as if his besetting sin were avarice. But except for an ambiguous statement—in only

[1] Num. xxiii. 9. So evident a contradiction testifies to the original independence of the poetical Redes and the prose narrative; and, so far as it goes, is evidence for the earlier date of the Redes.

one of the traditions—there is no imputation of avarice to Balaam. On the contrary, when Balak's promise of reward is repeated Balaam becomes only more decided not to disobey the word of God. Newman's explanation, that Balaam illustrates the insufficiency and the danger of obedience without love, is nearer the truth[1]; but it lacks a full intelligence of the issues. There is a conflict in Balaam's mind, but this is not between duty and avarice or ambition. It is a conflict between the habits and ideas under which the prophets of the heathen worked and the religious influence of a higher order which is represented as coming upon Balaam from the God of Israel. The issue is between the spirit of Israel's religion and the less rational tempers of the other religions of the time, and it is worked out in the experience of one of the prophets of these religions, when brought face to face with the facts of Israel's history.

Balaam is essentially an Arab seer of an early type—the type which combined the priest's office of ritual, the diviner's reliance upon spells and lots, and the prophet's use of ecstasy and trance. Some of these men rose to great fame in Arabia, and were frequently called from a great distance, as Balaam was called by Balak, to assist chiefs or tribes who were in difficulty. One of the principal functions for which they were employed was to curse the foes of their employers; and this was regarded as a sacred function of divine efficacy, and was accompanied by sacrifices and other rites and by the reading of omens and the casting of lots.

To such practices our text states that Balaam was accustomed. He himself directs the building of altars and the elaborate sacrifices which precede his oracles, and he goes to seek for omens. Observe also in chapter xxiii. that when

[1] Newman indeed denies that Balaam "made up his mind for himself according to the suggestions of avarice or ambition."

one site for these performances proves inauspicious and fails to compel him to curse Israel, he consents on Balak's motion to change the stage on the chance that his message may change with it. That is a resource characteristic of paganism all the world over ; and along with other features of the story proves the writer's fidelity to the religious conditions of the time.

But while continuing to try all these, his professional rites and shifts, Balaam holds true to one thing, that he will only speak the word which God shall speak to him. To this he is constant, making it plain both before he will consent to come with Balak's messengers and throughout the course of gambling artifices which after his coming are employed to influence his message. His faithfulness is rewarded and his patience to listen receives an answer. The word comes to him, and it is a word not to curse but to bless.

On what does Balaam base the conviction for which he has waited so impartially, and which when it arrives is strong enough to overwhelm his former practices and ideas ? He rests it on the fact that God has already blessed Israel. There is no use in him, Balaam, fighting against a Divine Fact. That is the whole matter—very simple and very clear.

He puts it in his opening words—

From Arám Balák doth bring me,
Moáb's king from hills of the East.
" Go curse thou me Jacob,
And go damn Israel ! "
How curse I, whom God curseth not,
How damn whom the LORD *hath not damned ?* [1]

* * * * *

Behold, to bless I have gotten,
And blessing I cannot reverse it ! [2]

[1] xxiii. 7–8. [2] xxiii. 20.

The facts are there, and in his various oracles he tells us how he sees them. The people of Israel already bears to his eye that strange aspect of peculiarity and aloofness which even through the centuries of their dispersion has marked them out as separate from the rest of humanity.

For from the rock's head I see them,
From the heights I behold them.
Lo, a people that dwelleth alone,
Nor reckons itself of the nations! [1]

There is nothing in their condition which is ominous of disaster, or which justifies a curse.

I mark nothing wrong with Jacob,
Nor see any strain on Israel— [2]

any trace of weariness or stress. He points to their great numbers—

Who hath measured the dust of Jacob,
Or counted Israel's myriads?— [3]

to their wonderful progress out of Egypt—

'Tis God out of Egypt that brought them,
And theirs is the strength of the wild ox;— [4]

to the goodly appearance of their camps, to their fertility, to the power of their movements, to the ease with which they defeat their foes :—

How goodly thy tents, O Jacob,
Thy dwellings, Israel!
Like valleys they spread,
Like riverside gardens,
Like cedars God planted,
Like oaks upon water! [5]

* * * * *

[1] xxiii. 9.
[2] xxiii. 21. [3] xxiii. 10 after the Greek. [4] xxiii. 22, xxiv. 8.
[5] xxiv. 5, 6 (the last two lines from an emended text).

Lo, the folk like a lioness riseth,
Like a lion uprears.
Nor will couch till he eateth the prey,
And drinketh the blood of the slain.[1]

And finally he, a stranger and alien to the commonwealth of Israel, appreciates the faith and enthusiasm with which the strength of this people is instinct.

The LORD *his God is with him,*
And the sound of a King is upon him.[2]

It is in these facts, obvious to the plain man but rhythmic and eloquent to the poet, that Balaam finds the Presence and the Will of God, with the substance of the message he is to give to those who have asked him for it. Against such a tide of reality what does it avail to set up bulwarks of altars, of ritual and of magic? Of what use are spells, enchantments and omens? You will observe that Balaam does not speak of morality. He has not the conscience of the later prophets, nor any idea of God's demands for penitence, purity and service from men. It is historical and obvious facts on which he insists. Yet Balaam has his own sense of religion and of the character of God. He is at least awake to the Divine consistency; and with some anticipation both of the religious faith and the rational science of still distant days—which is startling to find in so early and rude a figure—he affirms the regularity and faithfulness of all God's working:

Arise and hearken, Balák,
Give ear to me, son of Sippór!
God is not man to belie,
Neither man's son to repent.
Hath He said and doth not perform,
Or spoken and will not fulfil it?[3]

[1] xxiii. 24. [2] xxiii. 21. [3] xxiii. 18, 19.

There you have his whole equipment and character. Brought up in the irrational methods of heathenism, accustomed to believe in the omnipotence of rites and spells, and anxious to magnify his office, Balaam has yet a certain openness of mind to facts, a capacity of his own to read their consistency and rhythm and a courage to face their consequences, which prevail over the prejudices and interests by which he is swayed. There is a primitive integrity of mind and a primitive reverence in the man which grips our respect—grips our respect and also lets us see how God in all ages has chosen and equipped His prophets.

Nor is our appreciation of this mind, groping so far back there on the confines of light and darkness, lessened by the fact that it did not rise clear of all the passion of its time but is described as working heavily in trance or ecstasy.

Rede of Balaam, Beór's son,
Rede of the eye-sealed (?) man:
In vision he sees the Almighty,
Falling yet open of eye (?).[1]

In Israel the beginnings of prophecy were also in trance; and uncontrollable excitement has characterised the origins of genuinely religious movements within Christianity itself. Balaam has the servile temper which does not understand the fulness of the truth that has come to him and staggers beneath it. He grovels under the approach of his convictions, but he honestly utters them when they arrive. If I may take another Arabian prophet, upon much the same stage of development as Balaam, I would remind you that Mohammed behaved very similarly under the earliest impulses of his calling—a bemused, ecstatic, perhaps epileptic man: yet he lived to bring all Arabia to his feet.

[1] xxiv. 15, 16.

For this is the kind of man whom, though blinded and prostrate, God shall one day call to stand up and send upon his way in full control of his faculties. This is the spirit which, if it has been faithful as the slave of the truth, shall at last hear the glad words : *Henceforth I call you not slaves, for the slave knoweth not what his lord doeth but I have called you friends, for all things that I have heard of my Father I have made known to you.* In Balaam we have one end of that long course of gradual revelation of which the other is reached in Christ and His disciples.

For in no other way did God raise up the long succession of Hebrew prophets who led to Christ. In early Israel we see Prophecy so evidently rising out of the same low religious environment and by means of the same convictions of inspiration by God, that the experience attributed to Balaam may well stand as the symbol of the origins of Prophecy[1]; just as at the other end of the history of Israel the equally curious figure of Jonah is the symbol of some of the later experiences of prophecy. God picked His prophets man by man out of a state of religion little removed from heathenism, and educated their primitive power, to see and to be true to facts, into the clear knowledge of His nature and His Will. Like those of their Arab kinsmen the early Hebrew seers were engaged with a rude ritual—common to all the peoples of their race—with divination by omens and lots, with blessing the arms of their people and banning their foes ; while the trance and the dream were their frequent means of seeking the Divine Will. But gradually

[1] Several features both in the prose and in the poetry converge on the probability that the date of the story as we have it (whatever earlier elements it may contain) is that of the early kingdom of Israel when the nation was rich in instincts of power and growth, and when the new order of prophecy, recently arisen under Samuel, was emerging from its rudimentary conditions. See my Schweich Lectures before the British Academy on *The Early Poetry of Israel in its Physical and Social Origins*, 70, 71.

they discarded all these things. Under Samuel prophecy was separated from the ritual with its paralysing influences. From Samuel onwards prophecy repudiated divination and magic. With men like Elijah and Amos it threw off allegiance to political patrons; and in time it rose even free of ecstasy, till, as St. Paul says, the spirits of the prophets were subject to the prophets. And all these advances and emancipations depended on the individual prophet's own mental integrity, on his eye for facts and on his courage to face them: the facts of his people's history and the truth of their present condition; the facts of the moral world and their enduring and impregnable firmness. There, of course, the prophets soared into realms undreamt of by Balaam. It was this loyalty to facts which gave them their scorn of ritual and magic and their uncompromising courage against the political interests of kings and the vulgar unethical ideals of the people. It was this, and this alone, which to the last constituted the distinction of the true prophets from the false; who also claimed to speak in the name of God and many of whom, though stupid, were not insincere in the convictions they expressed. Personal character then, this mental integrity which saw the fact, moral or historical, and read it and was brave to be loyal to it, was the basis and condition of the true prophet.

Such men, bred like Balaam in more or less servile relations to the truth, subject in many ways to the superstitions and false science of their age, God lifted out of their slavery and, in the words of Christ, made them His friends. They enjoyed, as they tell us, a close communion with Himself. They were forgiven and they were trusted afresh by His Grace, past all their deserts or abilities. They were steeped in His purity, His patience and His love. He led them into the secrets of His nature and His will. He made them partners with Himself in His passion for en.

By their own sufferings for the sins of others, [1] He gave them an understanding of His very heart; and they felt how it was not only full of travail for the spiritual victory of His children, but itself bore to the uttermost weight the shame and the misery of their sins and defeats.

That was the friendship to which God lifted the prophets and Christ lifted His disciples, and that was the Gospel they won from it for all mankind.

For all mankind—you remember the prayer of one who was himself a great prophet: *Would God that all the* LORD'S *people were prophets, and that the* LORD *would put His spirit upon them!*

My brethren, for you and for me, the lessons of this long, slow and painful history of our religion are these.

God deals with us one by one on the ground and the temper of our own character. It is true that His Grace does meet and touch the very lowest—mentally and morally the very lowest. And of them he can make the highest, for He maketh all things new.

But He must have on our part a certain truthfulness, if even He is to work anything with us; a certain mental integrity, however ignorant; a heart, above all, for facts. He must have in us reverence and deep awe before the facts of His moral world; honesty and courage to face the facts of our own characters and conduct. For these things mean penitence, and with the penitent alone He can work. *Behold Thou desirest truth in the inward parts.* If that is there, the rest by His Grace shall follow. Of His slaves He shall make His friends, lifting us through Christ into His Love—into the freedom and the trustfulness and the security, which no sincerity, nor courage, nor any other strength of character may assure—however indispensable they all are; but which His Love alone and a daily communion with Him can bring to our weak wills and feeble hearts. GEORGE ADAM SMITH.

[1] As notably in the case of Hosea.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE HISTORICAL CHRIST.

Not long ago the favourite cry in advanced theological circles was Back to Christ. Christ, it was taken for granted, was the only authority and the only guarantee for Christianity. The religion which traced its origin to Him had become entangled, in the course of its history, with much which was indifferent or alien to the mind of the Master; and the one conclusive way of getting rid of all this was to return to the Master Himself. When it began to be realised that much of the theological lumber, as it was called, which some people wished to get rid of, had unquestionable roots in the New Testament, there were timid minds which began to have misgivings; but the bolder spirits in the new movement rather enjoyed the audacity of disparaging the apostles in the name of the Lord. What they wanted was to get behind them all, behind Peter and Paul and John, to the very man of Nazareth; the historical Jesus was their watchword; everything in the Christian religion was to be legitimated by appeal to Him alone.

Well, times change. There is no doubt something comforting in this idea of basing religion on the historical Saviour. History, we say to ourselves, is the region of fact, as opposed to speculation—of reality as opposed to fancy. When we are dealing with history we know where we are; we come in contact with things which make their own appeal, and evoke an appropriate but free and rational response. But when the mind devotes itself to history, in the sense of that which simply happened in the past, it has disconcerting experiences. Such experiences, which greatly disturb the assurance with which it embarked on the return to Christ, can be put in three ways.

(1) The sense of distance, which grows upon the mind as it thinks of things or persons simply as historical, weakens the impression they make on us, and therefore their value for religious purposes. As a historical person Jesus lived far away and long ago. Even if the gospel story of His life is literally true, how distant He is. He lived in the ancient world—further back than our national life or our language reaches, behind modern science and civilisation, behind the barbarian invasions and the fall of the empire, ever so far away. The sense of this, if it is left to itself, diminishes and may even extinguish any religious impression made on us by the historical Jesus; in spite of the hope with which we set out to return to Him, the end of our voyage finds us far from home; and no historical imagination, be it ever so lively, can bring us into a religious relation to a purely historical person. We can no more catch the glow of faith from a past so remote than we can warm our hands at the stars. A Christian reader of the gospels, of course, does not use them in this purely historical way. Christ is not for him a person who had His being in the past and who exhausted it there; He is a living and present person, with whom he enters into direct and immediate fellowship through the gospel story; it is not a distant past he is dealing with, but a present and eternal life. This, however, is a point of view which mere history cannot attain.

(2) But there is a second point of consequence here. To the merely historical student, there is no such thing as absolute certainty. *Ex hypothesi*, everything historical is problematical. It is a question as to what testimony is available, and no testimony amounts to demonstration. Whether Jesus spoke any given word, whether He did any given act, whether He had any given experience, is open to the same kind of historical uncertainty as if, instead

of Jesus, we were to put into such sentences Pericles or Julius Caesar. It may be quite true to say with Butler that probability is the guide of life; but we know very well that it was not historical probabilities about Jesus by which Christianity was inspired from the beginning, and that it is not such historical probabilities by which it is sustained now. That in our reading of the gospels historically we continually have to weigh evidence and balance alternative possibilities is quite true; but every Christian knows that the religious value of the gospels depends on something else. Whatever the historical explanation of it may be—and of that, meanwhile, I say nothing—he comes into an immediate fellowship with Christ through them in which there is nothing problematic: a fellowship in which everything in his life is involved that transcends doubt or questioning. This, again, is something beyond the reach of mere history.

(3) And to come to the third point, even if our knowledge of the past were complete and sure—even if we knew all about the historical Jesus with a certainty beyond the reach of doubt—we are haunted by philosophers who are themselves haunted by the relativity of everything in history. All that takes place passes. The past has had its day. It was there to be transcended, and it has been transcended. Nothing in it abides, nothing has absolute worth. Even if you got back to Christ ever so surely, it would be no gain; you would be face to face with something which had its value and significance for its own place and time, no doubt, but something which, like all things historical, has no more than a relative and transient importance, and cannot therefore supply the basis and rule of religion which you crave.

In one way or another, considerations of this kind have made their way into the common mind, perplexing it,

and damping its enthusiasm for history. Instead of staking everything on the historical Jesus, many people seem concerned to find a type of Christianity which shall be entirely independent of history. There has been a distinct revival, I will not say with greater insight, but with a greater parade of philosophical and historical demonstration, of Lessing's famous aphorism, that accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason. The assumption that the Christian religion consists of necessary truths of reason is perhaps pardonable in philosophers, who are naturally embarrassed by facts, but it is very astonishing to find it accepted by theologians. It is more than astonishing to find theological professors, men whose business it is to train the members of the Christian Church for its ministry, proclaiming and arguing that what they call Christian faith is not dependent on the historical Christ, and that it would make no difference to their faith though it were to be proved that Christ never existed. This has actually happened. Men who have given themselves to what they call the purely historical study of the gospels have been in some cases so disenchanted with the result that they have felt inwardly impelled to find a basis for their faith less open to disturbing questions. They started on the back to Christ adventure. Their idea was to make the historical original of Christianity its standard and its basis. As opposed to modern and even to apostolic conceptions of Christ they would have nothing but the historical Jesus Himself ; and now that they have had their way, the historical Jesus Himself is no better than an encumbrance to them. What they really want —or so it seems to them—is not a religion which owes all its contents and power to historical facts, but a religion which has nothing to do with history. It is some kind of absolute idealism they believe in, or want to believe in

—some system of thoughts which can be realised for all it is worth quite apart from the contingencies which are the warp and woof of history. What are we to say to this curious situation, to this complete swing of the pendulum, which has made men who once, in their religion, staked everything on history, now crave in their religion to be emancipated from history ?

To begin with, it is worth remarking that it is not the first time that historical religion has had this battle to fight. It is older even than the Christian era. When the religion of Israel came into contact with the higher mind of Greece, this was its position. The Greeks, in spite of their intelligence, in spite even of Thucydides, had no proper conception of history. Thucydides wrote memoirs of extraordinary political penetration, but the Greeks had no idea of a continuous and progressive purpose which was being wrought out in their national life and in which all those relations of man to God and of God to man were involved, which constitute religion. Their highest religious ideas were connected not with history but with nature, and with the conception of God as the soul, and the supreme law, of the world. They were metaphysical rather than ethical. But Israel's God was the great Being who had called the fathers, who had delivered the nation from Egyptian bondage and given it an inheritance in Canaan, who had taught it His law and through all the proud and all the dark hours of its life had dealt with it in justice and in mercy. It was tempting, and the attempt was made, to come to terms with the higher Greek religion by identifying the law of God as historically revealed to Israel with the life in harmony with nature as understood, e.g., by the Stoic philosophy ; in other words, it was tempting to let the historical religion melt and disappear in a religion of ideas. But though much Jewish-Hellenistic literature

represents a tendency of this kind, it was foiled in the long run. There is something irreducible and refractory in facts which gives them a value all their own, and in spite of what might seem contingent and dubious the events of Israel's history, understood as revealing God, had an endurance, a vitality and an inspiration in them with which no unhistorical metaphysic could long compete. And if we have to contemplate in our own day tension between an idealistic construction of religion, which makes it independent of uncertainty by making it independent of history, and the historic faith of Christians to which facts have hitherto been essential, I have no doubt we may look confidently to its having a similar issue.

Further, I think we may fairly point out, whether to theologians or philosophers who take this line, that Christianity is itself a fact, and a fact which fills a great space in human history. It does not remain for any one at this time of day to invent it, or to define it at discretion. Whoever deals with Christian religion or with Christian faith, deals with a *datum*; and it is not open to question that that *datum* involves matters of fact and history. It ought to be clearly understood that when anything is proposed to us in which no matter of fact or history is involved, whatever its value or respectability may be, it is not Christian faith; its sponsor has overlooked the *datum*; his eye is not on the object. We have every right to be suspicious when we are asked to recognise as genuinely Christian, ideas or convictions or faiths or whatever they are called whose representatives are nervously anxious to prove that they hold them without being in any sense debtors to a historical Christ. Probably in most cases they are simply mistaken: many a man is unconsciously Christ's debtor, like the man in the gospel of whom it is said, "He that was healed wist not who it was"; but it

is an ungrateful and unhappy ignorance, not a more spiritual mode of Christian faith.

Further still, we are entitled to protest, in the name of human nature and human worth, against that extraordinary disparagement of time, and all that men experience and learn in time, which is involved in the exclusion of history from religion. Time is evanescent, it is true, but it is also continuous; we can see that something is taking place in it which accumulates; literature is evolved in it, and art and science, and political and spiritual life; evanescent as the past is, it is not lost; it leaves something behind it which can be caught up and assimilated by the present and which can continue its life there; and it is on this that life depends for all that makes it rich. If you want a picture of spiritual beggary, contemplate the mind of man stripped of all its historical accumulations and sitting naked among the eternal truths of reason. This consideration should dispose us to caution when we are asked to believe that man's supreme interests and his final destiny cannot be supposed to depend on anything historical, but must be determined solely by ideas in which contingency has no place. As mere matter of fact, we do not know anything of such ideas unless perhaps in mathematics and formal logic, and no one has so far suggested that these interesting sciences contain the sum of saving knowledge. *All* our ethical and spiritual convictions have been historically mediated to us. But for the history whose heirs we are, we should have none of them; and if the past has this real relation to the present, this real place in it, throughout its whole extent, we have surely reason to hesitate if we are told that the very heart of the present, the religious faith which where it exists at all is the life of life and the dearest of all our possessions, must be independent of all historical relations. I admit

that to say this does not fix the place of the historical Christ in Christianity. It does not define the place He ought to hold, but it prohibits any one from saying that He has no essential place at all, and that His history, as such, has no religious interest. To say this, as I have already observed, is simply to overlook the *datum*. The facts recorded in the gospels—and we may summarily comprehend these as the fact of Christ—have had and have still an importance for Christian faith which cannot be overestimated. This is the fact about them, let them be on other grounds as distant, as problematic, as relative as you please. They have been the seat of spiritual life and force from the beginning, and they are so to this hour. There is a power of inspiration and of appeal in them with which nothing can compare. The gospel history was transacted far away and long ago, but it is not lost in time. The virtue has not gone out of it with time. Something appeals to us from it, which, though manifested at a given time, is independent of any particular time—in a word, is not merely historical, but superhistorical, not merely temporal, but eternal. This is the *datum* of Christianity, and when we are trying to determine the place of Christ—I mean the historical Christ—in the Christian religion we must not let it fall out of mind.

I will venture to use an illustration which any one who likes may deride, but which will nevertheless serve as a starting point for what I want to say about the peculiar place of Christ in Christianity. When I was in the University I read what is now, I suppose, a rather antiquated book, Merivale's *History of the Romans under the Empire*. I remember still the rather pompous sentence in which the author brings upon the stage "Caius Julius Caesar, the greatest name in history." Perhaps this description is justified. Certainly the first of the Caesars was an extraordinarily

great man. But in spite of the greatness of the man, in spite of his immense achievements, in spite of the vivid account of some of them which we have from his own hand, in spite of the fact that his name is the greatest name in history, it has become a proverb to say "as dead as Julius Caesar?" The influence of his life and work, like the influence of the life and work of the meanest of his contemporaries, who has no name in history at all, no doubt survives into our time, but no effort of imagination or enthusiasm can ever bring him from the past into the present. He is a great historical character and nothing else. But neither history nor philosophy nor profanity has ever been able, or ever will be able, to put into proverbial currency such a phrase as—"as dead as Jesus Christ." It is not a matter of opinion, but a matter of fact, that to read Caesar's Commentaries is one thing, and to read the gospels another; the relation of the reader to Caesar is a relation to a person who is historical and no more; his relation to Christ is a relation to a person who is historical, certainly, and who certainly died, but who is certainly not "as dead as Julius Caesar." He is far more living than that. In some way or other He belongs as truly to the present as to the past. The most stolid soul is conscious as he reads his history of incurring responsibilities the like of which he does not incur to any merely historical character. And this is just another way of saying that the historical Christ is more than historical: it is as present and eternal that He evokes repentance and faith in the soul, and asserts His abiding and essential place in the spiritual life. This, I repeat, is the *datum* of Christianity; and the man who disregards it is really not speaking of Christianity, but of something quite different. He may call it by the same name, but that does not make it the same thing.

Now what is the explanation of this more than historical character which attaches in Christianity to the historical Christ? How is it that He belongs, as ordinary historical characters do not, to the present as well as to the past? Partly it is due to the fact that the moral atmosphere in which we live in Christendom has been largely created by Him. It has come into existence through the lives and sacrifices of men who called Him Lord, and we feel instinctively as we contemplate Him in the gospel that it can only be maintained and purified—as it ought to be maintained and purified—by men who still take the same relation to Him, and recognise His personal supremacy as it was recognised by His earliest followers. This is one way in which we feel that Christ is not remote but intimately near, a historical person no doubt, but one to whose significance even in history time makes no difference. And this itself is explained in the New Testament by the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus, and by the working of His Spirit. This is what gives to the historical person a superhistorical importance, a present and eternal place in religion. There are those, of course, who tell us that the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus are ideas of which history, as such, can take no cognisance; they carry us out of the very world within the limits of which the historian works. If this were the final truth, we could only say, So much the worse for history. But it is not the final truth. It is only a matter of arbitrary definition. The one haunting error of all students of the special sciences —and history in the sense assumed is a special science— is that they unconsciously elevate that part or aspect of reality in which they are interested to be the measure of the whole. The physicist often thinks of the world in a way which makes history and morality, which nevertheless exist, inexplicable and impossible; and the historian,

in the case we are supposing, thinks of the world in a way which makes the Christian religion, which also nevertheless exists, inexplicable and impossible. But physicists must apply their categories with the limitations which leave room for history and freedom, and historians must apply theirs with the limitations which leave room for the presence and spiritual action of Christ in a mode transcending time : they must do this, or the actual world of Christian life, the reality they have to deal with, will be left unexplained. That the category of posthumous influence can take the place of the resurrection of Jesus and the operation of His Spirit let him believe who can.

After all this preface, which will no doubt seem superfluous to those who are not in the fight, it is possible to come closer to the place of Christ in Christianity. It is a historical Christ we are concerned with, but one who belongs to the present though He was manifested in the past ; and the question assumes this form—What is it which is vital to our religion in the present, but which we only know and possess through its historical manifestation in Jesus ? The answer, it seems to me, is very simple : it is Jesus Himself in His relations to God and man. We cannot know Jesus except through His history, but it is not necessary that we should know everything about Him and be acquainted with all the details of His history. As far as we can be informed about these they have interest, and they may, though we cannot say they must, have religious value. He Himself laid stress on the value of the passing hour. " As long as I am in the world I am the light of the world." It is through what He did in the days of His flesh, through the whole life which He lived then, and so far as we know through nothing else, that He illumines the world now. Still, the significance of His acts lay in the revelation they gave of His own character,

and of His relations to God and man. What we need now for our spiritual life is not information about the contingent details of His history, but knowledge of what He essentially was in these two vital relations. We can only get such knowledge through the gospels, but subject to the moral conditions under which alone it can be apprehended, we do get it in this way. We see Jesus; and to borrow an expression of Herrmann, to see Jesus is to see "the only untroubled manifestation of that which has full power over the soul." I was going to say we must admit, but perhaps I should rather say we are bound to assert, that history alone cannot give any man this vision. It is sadly possible to read the gospels and not to see Jesus as the apostles saw Him. Most of us who have read much in this field have read books which tempted us to say that the authors saw everything in the gospels except Jesus. They went over the canvas inch by inch with the microscope, saw every unevenness in the fibre, every grit in the pigments, but never had a glimpse of the picture. This is possible and we cannot explain it, any more than St. Paul could explain the melancholy fact which confronted him when He wrote—"All men have not faith." The want of faith or the blindness of some men, whatever its explanation—and it is not for us to judge them—or whatever its cure—and purely historical study will not cure it—cannot be pleaded against the experience of those who see. The Christian Church through all generations has seen Jesus in the gospels, has seen Him there only, and has seen Him in that very character His presence in which makes Him essential to Christian faith. I will venture to refer to the main elements of truth included in this vision—truth historically given in the life of Jesus, though the historian may be blind to it, yet raised above the reach of historical doubt, because not shut up to a distant past but present in a power which still reaches the soul.

(1) In the first place we see Jesus as the Son of God—Jesus manifesting the ideal relation of man to God by Himself living in it. This is not essentially a matter of titles or designations, it is a matter of fact. It is quite true that Jesus gave expression in words to His sense of His filial relation to God ; but what made His words convincing to those who heard them, what makes them overpowering still, is that there is no schism between His words and His being ; they are not, like our highest words about the spiritual life, a profession of what we would be or should be ; they are a revelation of what He is. It is a revelation I should never dream of reducing to a systematic form, or of binding down to particular words of Jesus, impressive and irresistible as these may be ; it has in it the variety and infinity of His whole life. There is not a word nor an act of Jesus, there is not an hour of temptation or of passion, in which He is anything else than the Son. It is this greatest of all truths about Him, the truth which makes us feel that our ideal relation to God is the filial relation, which we know most surely and, I venture to add, which we most truly understand. We may not know exactly what it covers, nor how we are to adjust our minds to it, when Jesus is represented as the Son of David, or the Messiah, or even as the Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven ; but we have an intuitive comprehension of the Son *simpliciter*, and our minds open through it to faith in the Father. To say this is not to give up the case which I am arguing for the essential place of the historical Christ in Christianity. Faith in the Father is not independent of Him in its origin, and it never becomes independent. The very same experience in which we see that sonship is the ideal relation of man to God shows us that it is a relation realised in Him, but waiting to be realised in us through Him. Jesus is conscious of the distance of other men from

God, but there is no trace anywhere of any consciousness of distance on His part. He is here to bring us to the Father. That this is one element in the broad truth of the gospel, which is spiritual indeed and eternal, but depends for its power to strike into our sinful souls on its flesh and blood reality, no one, historian or philosopher, who sees what is before our eyes in the evangelists, can possibly deny.

(2) In the second place, to bring out more distinctly another essential element in the truth, we see Jesus in the gospel as the Saviour of sinners. It is the historical Jesus we see in this character. Whatever the witnesses might have been mistaken about they could not be mistaken about Jesus' attitude to themselves in this particular. They could not possibly be misrepresenting Him when they represented Him as receiving sinners. There may indeed be people to whom this is of no interest, but for men convinced of sin it is the only interesting thing in the world. Life is worth nothing to them till they can get the conviction that sin is not final, that there is something in God which can deal with it and overcome it, that it does not permanently annul sonship and for ever exclude from the Father; and they get this conviction as they watch the Son of God receiving sinners. It is through Him they believe in forgiveness; it is through Him they receive it. This is the very thing for want of which they are perishing—a holy one who is as untouched by sin as God Himself and as inexorable to it, but who makes their sad case His own, and in a passion of love they can never fathom receives them to Himself and restores them to the Father. There may be righteous persons on whom this revelation is thrown away, but it is not thrown away on men with the sense of sin. Dr. Chalmers had a noble appreciation of the Pauline gospel that God justifies the ungodly, just because he had the simplicity to say What could I do if

God did *not* justify the ungodly? and a corresponding simplicity and humility are wanted to see that on one side the sum of the gospels is Christ receiving sinners. It is through this vision that faith arises in the characteristically Christian form of faith in Christ as the Saviour, and such faith depends absolutely on the representation of Christ by the evangelists. It attaches itself to something historical and clings to it, for that is the only reality which has an anguish in it answering to its own. What is absolute idealism, what are eternal truths of reason, to a man shut out from God by a bad conscience, and lost if he is left to himself? But to such a man the Son of God in flesh and blood receiving sinners like *him* is salvation; his conscience gives him an eye for the history and its meaning, and the inward and outward witness unite in an assurance which has history at its heart yet can never be impaired.

(3) And finally, one element of the truth which we see in the gospels, and without which the Christian religion could not be, is that Jesus in relation to men is not only Saviour but Lord. This, again, is a point on which no mistake of the witnesses is conceivable. They simply could not be under any misapprehension as to the attitude which Jesus assumed toward them or the attitude which they felt bound to adopt towards Him. It is not a question of particular claims made on one side, or particular responses on the other; it is not a matter of words or of occasions at all; it is a matter of the whole life of Christ and His whole attitude to men. His sovereignty is not claimed or asserted here or there; it is not acknowledged or disputed here or there; it is assumed and exercised from first to last in every word and act of His life. And this again is not a matter of titles, but a matter of fact. The indirect expressions of it in the evangelists are far more impressive than the direct. It is felt and acknowledged

perpetually where there is no explicit assertion of it, and though the consciousness of it, like that of the Sonship and the saving power of Jesus, is morally conditioned—for no man can call Jesus Lord but by the Holy Spirit—its historical certainty is entirely indubitable. And it is in the history of Jesus that its grounds, its meaning and its obligation are to be sought, just as it is in the same history that we are to find out what is meant by speaking of Jesus as the Son of God or the Saviour of men. One is almost ashamed to say such things, but it is not without cause. People for whom the obvious is uninteresting, no matter how true it may be, are busy persuading us just now that a great part of what is meant by the Son of God is to be traced to the *Divus* or *Divi filius*, applied to Roman Emperors, dead or living—that the conception of Christ as Saviour is to be connected with the application of σωτήρ to the gods of Greek mythology or the kings who were deified in the flattery of Egyptian and oriental courts—nay that the Lordship of Christ is not without relation to the *Dominus* applied to persons like Domitian. The late Dr. Davidson said the best thing to do with some propositions was just to deny them. But for propositions like these, this seems hardly adequate : one would like to throw them over the window. On the plea of finding out the historical relations of Christianity they are overlooking what is vital and indubitable in the historical fact of Christ, and what for that very reason must always be central and essential in the Christian faith.

The more we become familiar with this whole field of study, the more clearly the lines of cleavage in it appear. There are those who, to make Christianity independent of history, turn it into or rather replace it by an absolute idealism in which Jesus of Nazareth has no essential place. This is simply to ignore the *datum*, to shut our eyes to the

whole of the fact we pretend to explain. There are those, again, who, in order to give history all its due, shut up Jesus of Nazareth into a past growing continually more remote, and while they admit His posthumous influence do not distinguish Him otherwise from all who have lived and died upon the earth. This does not ignore the *datum* so completely as a pure idealism, but it does ignore a vast proportion of what it has to explain. And there are those who, in order to do justice to all the phenomena with which we have to deal, lay equal emphasis on the historical Jesus and on His exaltation into eternal life, and His perpetual presence with us through His Spirit in the very character which His history reveals. In the former cases, there is no Christianity at all; all that has ever been known to history under that name—the whole *datum* in the case—disappears. In the last, Christianity subsists on the same historical basis on which it has always rested, and the place of Christ in it is not doubtful. Still, as at the beginning, He fills all things. Unto Him be glory for ever.

JAMES DENNEY.

THE HISTORIC SETTING OF THE PASTORAL EPISTLES.[1]

IN certain respects these Epistles are second in value and interest to none in the New Testament. They are not, indeed, equal in quickening religious power to the earlier Pauline letters. But in historical suggestiveness, in the light they cast upon the problems which emerge after the first or evangelistic stage of the Gospel's progress gives place

[1] The substance of a lecture given at the Oxford Summer School of Theology on July 25, 1912, an origin which may perhaps be allowed to excuse the personal note which appears in certain passages.

to that of consolidation and secondary developments, they are perhaps as instructive as any.

They are essentially the missionary's *vade mecum* in all ages and in all lands, and are probably never so fully understood or appreciated as on the foreign mission field. A year spent on such a field of practical problems will give more insight into their strength and wisdom than a life-time spent amid the academic associations of a professorial chair. It is the fresh approach from the side of experience, by men who are in " touch with the realities " of human nature in all its variety, as well as at home in the historical background of society in the early Roman Empire, that has renovated the study of them and taken it out of the old ruts of criticism in which it has moved for the most part in modern times.

But while we owe much to the general influence of the comparative study of religion, whether learnt on the mission field or by historical research, for help to get beyond doctrinaire attitudes of mind, one must name with special gratitude the work of two English scholars of exceptionally large human outlook and culture. When one approaches these Epistles fresh from the few pages on them in Hort's *Lectures on Judaistic Christianity* and in *The Christian Ecclesia*, and from Sir W. M. Ramsay's recent *Historical Commentary on the Epistles to Timothy* in the EXPOSITOR,[1] one feels the subject has been lifted to a new level of reality [2] and that much criticism between Baur and Jülicher is simply out of date and irrelevant. For " most of the negative rea-

[1] Series VII., vols. viii.–ix., and Series VIII. 1.

[2] " Regarded in the proper perspective, they are historically perhaps the most illuminative of all the Pauline Epistles ; and this is the best and the one sufficient proof that they are authentic compositions. . . . No work whose composer makes his first object to assume the personality of another, can attain such historical significance ; it cannot express the infinite variety of real life unless it is written naturally and for its own sake " (EXPOSITOR, VII. viii. p. 1).

soning in regard to these Epistles is composed of statements and judgments from the wrong point of view." [1] In the recovery of the true point of view a vital element has been the newer conception of Paul himself and so of Paulinism. Paul the doctrinaire theologian, or at least the prophet of a one-sided Gospel repeated with fanatical uniformity of emphasis under all conditions, has largely given place to Paul *the missionary*, full indeed of inspired insight on the basis of a unique experience, but full also of practical instinct, the offspring of sympathy with living men of other types of training.[2] When the Pastorals are viewed anew in the light of this idea, half their difficulties disappear.

The fact is, that the time has come for a frank reconsideration of the Pastoral Epistles in a really historical spirit, one which strives only to reach the best *constructive* theory of all our present data, including those of common sense and religious analogy. There has been too much inconclusive polemic, too much piling up of objections to other men's theories, and too little thoroughness and responsibility in the way the critic's own theory is put forward. But this is not a truly critical attitude to a phenomenon so significant of something at least as are these documents, which come to us with good early external evidence in the name of the Apostle Paul. It is certainly not an attitude which can satisfy the historian. He must feel able to place them in a context in which they become truly natural and relevant in whole and in part, or he must leave them alone for the time, confessing his inability to frame any satisfactory theory at all.

Now I venture to say with some confidence that no theory has yet been framed of them on the basis of fictitious composition, as relative to a situation other than that claimed by

[1] Ibid. VIII. i. 263.

[2] Prof. Percy Gardner's recent study of *The Religious Experience of St. Paul* may be cited as a fruit of this larger and more humanly flexible view of Paul, even while one dissents from some of its special positions.

their ascription to Paul, which can bear without reduction to absurdity even half the amount of criticism which the traditional theory of authorship commonly undergoes preliminary to its dismissal. It is usually felt hardly worth another scholar's pains seriously to examine his neighbour's negative theory in detail, to see how far it proves a working hypothesis. There is not the breath of life and reality in any one of them : rather they are lay figures.

Take what may be called a moderate or average theory of this order, e.g., that the Pastorals were written somewhere midway between the death of St. Paul and the period of Ignatius—a *terminus ad quem* seemingly imposed by the external evidence and the absence of the monarchical episcopate which is central to the Ignatian epistles. But what of the absence of all polemic against either a Cerinthian or any other type of Docetic Christology, such as is presupposed by the Johannine Epistles ? And yet it is usually held that the Pastorals belong to much the same region and period as these, as well as those of Ignatius. Instead of Docetism, a reaction of the Hellenic mind upon the Gospel, what we have in evidence is chiefly a kind of trifling and scrupulous Legalism (comparable to that which meets us in Colossians), due to a recrudescence of Judaism, the influence of which generally preceded that of Hellenism—though of course the two operated in various degrees from the very first.

This is only a specimen of the criticism to which such a theory is open. But it would be premature to continue it further, until there is more consensus in favour of any given theory of the sort. It is more fruitful to examine the growing verisimilitude of the Pauline authorship proper, due to growing realisation of the actual conditions of life in and around the churches of Ephesus and Crete in the early sixties A.D.

What, then, are the objections of those who deny the

claim which these Epistles make for themselves? They "presuppose, if genuine, Paul's release from the Roman imprisonment, and he was not released. The diction and style are un-Pauline; and in what the Epistles say about false teaching and ecclesiastical organisation we find ourselves in a sub-Pauline atmosphere." [1] The first of these objections, that generally esteemed the most serious, will be fully dealt with in the sequel. The second, that which Dr. Hort thought alone formidable, while yet he did not regard it as fatal, is seriously compromised by the giving up of a like objection to the authenticity of the "Imprisonment Epistles," in whole or in part. As to the third, so far as the "false teaching and ecclesiastical organisation" themselves are concerned, the difficulties are mainly due to doubtful exegesis and are largely set aside by analogies afforded by the generally acknowledged epistles to the Colossians and Philippians.

The "false teaching," as Hort shows sufficiently in his *Judaistic Christianity*, is for the most part associated with a certain type of Judaism [2] of which we have varied and early evidence in the first century, and is parallel to the Colossian errors. Since Hort wrote, moreover, our realisation of what is now called "pre-Christian Gnosis," in Jewish as well as other circles, has grown very rapidly.[3] It is admitted that "no one system of 2nd century gnosticism is before the writer's mind," and that one cannot "detect anything except incipient phases of syncretistic gnosticism behind the polemical allusions" (*Encyc. Brit.*, xxvi. 1031 f.). The old objections to the "false teaching" of the Pastorals as

[1] This is Archdeacon Allen's summary, in reviewing Dr. Moffatt's *Introduction to the New Testament*, in the *Expository Times* for 1911.

[2] See also Wohlenberg's commentary (1906) in Zahn's series on the New Testament.

[3] E.g., through the writings of M. Friedländer and others; see Rev. G. H. Box's Survey in *The Review of Theology and Philosophy*, vi., esp. pp. 67 f., 74 f.

implying second century *gnosis*, are in fact simply out of date, and should cease to rank in the discussion of authenticity.

Similarly the "ecclesiastical organisation" argument might well be relegated to oblivion ; for, as Sir W. M. Ramsay has recently said,[1] "the organisation in the Pastoral Epistles is not apparently advanced one step beyond that of the Church in Philippi in A.D. 61," so far as they can be compared. But while there is really nothing sub-Pauline in the above phenomena, there is more *prima facie* force in the objections derived from the way in which they are treated, and more generally from the difference in religious method and emphasis in the exposition of the Christian life and its motives found in these Epistles as compared with those confessedly Pauline. This is a living issue ; and setting aside the exaggeration with which it seems often to be stated, its consideration is useful as tending to add to the discrimination and balance of our appreciation of Paul as a man and as a missionary.

On the whole, then, the considerations which still seem entitled to reckon seriously reduce themselves to these three :

(i.) Is their style and diction consistent with Pauline authorship ?

(ii.) Is their religion Pauline, or not ?

(iii.) Can situations be found for them within the known life of the Apostle ?

We shall deal with these in the above order, which is that of the degree in which they seem to challenge any finding in the affirmative sense. But before discussing them separately, it is needful to place ourselves at the right standpoint, so far as we have already won our way to it as the result of general advance in the historic spirit, with its concrete realism, and in its sense of the manifoldness of actual human life.

[1] EXPOSITOR, VII. viii. p. 17.

"Richer in historical points of view": that, as Harnack observed a quarter of a century ago, expresses our gain as compared with the age of the Tübingen school and its opponents; and it involves a radical revision of its findings, with results mostly favourable to the authenticity of early Christian writings, and in any case always more in keeping with common sense and religious experience. In particular, the Pauline Epistles have one after another emerged from the cloud of obscurity and suspicion into the daylight of historic verisimilitude. How? Mainly by the working out of the links of analogy shown to bind a suspected epistle to the nucleus of undoubted ones. But closely connected with this process, partly as effect, partly as growing co-factor, has gone the action of a new idea of Paul himself, and consequently of Paulinism, which reacts powerfully upon our sense of probability when we have to consider the epistles still in debate. The contrast between the notion of Paul which determined both older criticism and defence, and that which guides the new, may be put broadly as follows: To the one, Paul was ever the *theologian*; to the other, he is ever the *missionary*. The theologian of the older writers was far less than the missionary as now conceived. He was less human, less flexible, less considerate of the needs of actual men and women, that "by all means" he "might save some"; and far more the doctrinaire prophet, bent on putting things in terms of his own categories, even though he might find by experience that these often did not appeal to the average man in the same inspiring way as to himself, or that they were apt to be misunderstood and lead to practical abuse in certain cases. In a word, Paul the theologian was a human abstraction, with much that is the moral glory of manhood left out of account. Paul the missionary is a real man with a full-orbed humanity, determined in practical matters—which were nine-renths of his daily vocation—

mainly by the practical considerations of a sympathetic love, and " through constant watching " of human capacities and needs made " wise " as a pastor of souls.

The contrast in practice, in the behaviour natural to each of these two types under given conditions, is immense ; and it largely explains what was meant in saying above that it is full time that a serious attempt were made to reconsider the Pastoral Epistles in the light of our present outlook. For that outlook is quite different from that which gave birth to the negative estimate of their connexion with Paul that has become a dogma in certain critical circles, a dogma from which the life has largely gone out. Sir W. M. Ramsay has shown us in his *Paul the Traveller and Roman Citizen* how much more human reality there was in the Paul of Acts and the Epistles than had hitherto been realised. He did so because he was able to see the data through the eyes, as it were, of a Græco-Roman citizen of the Empire, moving amid the varied conditions which met a traveller in the days of Claudius and Nero. Not until we have added the insight into the same records which the experience of the foreign missionary in a highly civilised society like that of India or China is able to contribute, directly or indirectly, to the study in question, shall we begin fully to recover the experience lying behind the written words of the Pauline Epistles, and so be able to judge with something like objectivity, because with adequate knowledge, whether Paul the Missionary could or could not have so written, under certain conditions, to those whose personal welfare was his absorbing aim.

In the true Missionary there is a large emotional and sympathetic element, an element which enters indeed into every good as well as great personality, certainly into such an one as Paul ; witness the ties of affection between him and his readers to which all his Epistles testify. Of this side of the Apostle the older criticism largely made abstraction. Is it

surprising that it reached negative results as regards the probability of his authorship in cases touching which critics are now generally agreed on positive ones ? But it may well be doubted whether the process of applying a more human and humane conception of Paul to the problems connected with the Pauline Epistles has yet been carried out to the full ; [1] and whether it is not able to solve some of the difficulties hitherto felt as regards the Pastorals. We need to remember how the letter to Philemon helped to guide scholars to the right, namely, the positive conclusion as to Colossians ; for there is a Philemon element, an element of true human emotion and personality present in these Epistles, which can neither be ignored nor yet dissected out from the remaining matter.

VERNON BARTLET.

THE RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY AS PRESENTED IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

(1) IF we could with certainty assign the very words of the Great Commission in Matthew xxviii. 18–20 to the Risen Lord Himself, we might claim that He Himself put the doctrine of the Trinity in the forefront of the confession of Him in baptism. But this view is widely challenged to-day. " Perhaps," says Bruce, " it is not to be taken as an exact report of what Jesus said to His disciples at a certain time and place. In it the real and the ideal seem to be blended ; what Jesus said there and then with what the Church of the Apostolic age had gradually come to regard as the will of

[1] Among those whose work is largely influenced by the more flexible and human " missionary " view of Paul, I may instance not only scholars like Lightfoot, Ramsay, and Prof. P. Gardner, but also the younger German School represented by Weinel and Von Dobschütz. The question remains, however, whether the latter group have allowed their new standards sufficiently to modify the " critical " tradition as to the Pastorals.

their Risen Lord, with growing clearness as the years advanced, with perfect clearness after Israel's crisis had come" (*The Expositor's Greek Testament*, i. p. 340). "So also Meyer's commentary, revised by Weiss, is quoted by Bruce to the same effect. "Expressly not as words of Jesus walking on the earth, but as words of Him who appeared from heaven, the evangelist here presents in summary form what the Christian community had come to recognise as the will and the promise of their exalted Lord." "The Trinitarian formula," says Harnack, "is foreign to the mouth of Jesus, and has not the authority of the Apostolic age, which it must have had if it had descended from Jesus Himself. . . . Baptism in the Apostolic age was εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν, and indeed εἰς τὸ ὄνομα Χριστοῦ (1 Cor. i. 13; Acts xix. 5). We cannot make out when the formula εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος emerged" (*History of Dogma*, i. p. 79). Even if this conclusion is valid, it is evident that by the time the First Gospel was written the name of Christ had been expanded into the threefold name; and legitimately so, as the revelation of God in Him is that of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The creeds, which are an expansion of the baptismal confession, are all trinitarian. Probably one of the earliest, used in the Church at Jerusalem, is quoted by Cyril in lectures delivered in 348.

Πίστεύω εἰς τὸν Πατέρα,
καὶ εἰς τὸν Υἱόν,
εἰς τὸ Ἅγιον Πνεῦμα,
καὶ εἰς ἓν βάπτισμα μετανοίας.

The inward change, of which baptism was the outward sign, brought the believer into relation with God revealed as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

(2) If Christ did not use the Trinitarian formula, yet the revelation is already present in His teaching. (i) In Mat-

thew xi. 25–27 and Luke x. 21–22 we have the utterance in the Synoptic Gospels which most clearly reveals Jesus' self-consciousness. The saying about Father and Son is assigned by Harnack to the *Quelle* or, as it is sometimes called, the *Logia* in this form. "All things have been delivered unto Me by the Father, and no man knoweth (the Son save the Father, neither does any know) the Father save the Son, and he to whom the Son willeth to reveal Him." This contrast of Father and Son runs throughout the whole of the Fourth Gospel; and although it is impossible to regard that Gospel as giving the *ipsissma verba* of Jesus, yet it is not improbable that the consciousness of this relation of Himself as Son to God as Father filled a greater place in Jesus' inner life than the solitary confession in the Synoptists suggests. At least it can be held that the self-consciousness of Jesus did demand for its explication the later doctrine. (ii) So also in Jesus' ministry the beginnings of the doctrine of the Spirit can be traced. The Baptist foretold that the Coming One would baptize, not with water unto repentance, but with the Holy Ghost and with fire; and the Baptism of Jesus is best understood, whatever difficulties the narrative may present, as the endowment of Jesus Himself with the power of the Spirit of God, manifested especially as the record of the Temptation suggests, in the working of miracles. It may be said that here we are still within the circle of the Old Testament thought: but in the discussion in the Upper Room, as recorded in the Fourth Gospel, we find a distinct doctrinal advance. I find it impossible to believe that we have here only reflexions of the evangelist, without any basis whatever in his reminiscences of Jesus' teaching. Undoubtedly the evangelist's own peculiar terms are here used; but even if the discourses express the evangelist's own experience of the divine presence in comfort and help with himself, unfolding the meaning of

the life and teaching of his departed Lord, nay making him realise that the Father in the Son was with him still, surely some starting-point for that experience there must have been in some promises and assurances of the Master Himself. To me it seems probable that Jesus in His earthly life did anticipate the Spirit's presence in His community. We have in the Gospel according to Luke the command to the disciples to tarry in Jerusalem until they were clothed with power from on high (xxiv. 49), and in Acts that power is expressly identified with the Holy Spirit (i. 5, 8). The conception here, however, need not go beyond that of the Old Testament.

(3) Regarding the account of the gift of the Spirit at Pentecost there is wide difference of opinion. Scholars are generally agreed that the gift of tongues was not the ability to speak foreign languages ; and that in so representing it in the narrative either the author or the source has fallen into error. The abnormal psychic phenomena are such as accompany intense religious emotion, not uncommon features of a religious revival. The permanent characteristic of the Apostolic Church after Pentecost is described in the words "full of the Holy Ghost." This, Dr. Bartlet in his commentry on Acts suggests, might often, especially where the article is absent, be rendered "full of holy enthusiasm" (Note D, pp. 386–8). Certainty, confidence, courage were the inward signs of the presence and power of the Spirit. To the Spirit also were ascribed the varied gifts (not merely the abnormal phenomena of speaking with tongues, etc.) for the common service with which believers were endowed.

As Paul's full treatment of the subject in 1 Corinthians xii.–xiv. shows, while he recognised the existence and even the value of the abnormal phenomena, he subordinated these to less showy, but more useful gifts of ministry in the

Church ; and he in his teaching advanced beyond the common position in regarding the Spirit not merely as the Giver of varied endowments, but as the divine Agent in sanctification. By him the Spirit was contrasted with the flesh, and the fruit of the Spirit with the works of the flesh. "The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance" (Gal. v. 22). It is true that Paul often writes as though the distinction between the work of Christ and the work of the Spirit were for him not definitely fixed. Not only is the Spirit the Spirit of Christ as well as of God, but he even declares that "the Lord is the Spirit" (2 Cor. iii. 17). We must be always on our guard against forcing the rigid ecclesiastical dogma on the still fluid speech and thought of the Apostolic age. So closely was the life in the Spirit related to faith in Christ as Saviour and Lord, that in experience there could be no separation of the work of the Spirit from the work of Christ. While this must be maintained against a dogmatism which disregards historical exegesis, yet on the other hand the language of the New Testament forbids an identification of the Spirit with Christ, for there are several passages in which the doctrine of the Trinity is distinctly suggested.

(4) Although the spiritual gifts are regarded as the work of the Spirit, yet Paul associates the Spirit, the Lord, and God in dealing with the subject. "Now there are diversities of gifts ; but the same Spirit. And there are diversities of ministrations, and the same Lord. And there are diversities of workings, but the same God, who worketh all things in all" (1 Cor. xii. 4–6). Most significant is it that the most distinct expression of the threefold name is in the Apostolic Benediction. In 1 Corinthians we have the words "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ be with you" ; but in 2 Corinthians it is expanded into "the grace of the Lord

Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost be with you all." It is not as a burden to man's thought, but as a blessing to his soul, that the threefold Name is given. This is the doctrine of the Trinity in its religious aspect ; and we should study it most profitably in this connexion. (i) We may first of all notice that the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ contains as its antecedent the love of God, and as its consequent the fellowship of the Holy Spirit : in the Christian experience of Christ as Saviour and Lord the knowledge of the love of God and the consciousness of the fellowship of the Spirit are already given. It is from this historical reality that we must start to reach the eternal truths about God. It is not by speculation that the Doctrine of the Trinity is to be understood, for speculation has often misrepresented and distorted the truth ; it is by experience the truth can be known. (ii) Grace is the one word of inexhaustible significance that characterises the life, teaching, work and suffering of Jesus Christ. It is love stooping, seeking, suffering, saving, and blessing that is expressed ; but the total historical reality of what Jesus is and does is alone the adequate commentary on the word. If we may venture to apply our theological distinctions, grace is the transcendent love of God so immanent in the life of man as to share his sorrow, shame, suffering, death, darkness and desolation. It is love vicarious, sacrificial, and redemptive. It is God's emptying of Himself in Christ's becoming poor, to enrich and fill with the fulness of His blessing mankind. May I suggest in passing that divine *kenosis* is implicit in divine grace ? (iii) But the names of the subject of grace suggest a *plerosis* correspondent to the *kenosis*. Jesus is the name of the human Saviour, Christ is the title of the divinely promised Deliverer and Ruler, Lord is the recognition of Him not only as authoritative Teacher, but also as atoning sacrifice, and as supreme Head

of His Church, as exalted to God's right hand, as claiming the same honour and obedience as God Himself. "The primitive community," says Harnack, "called Jesus Lord, because He had brought the offering of His life for it, and because it was convinced, that He, awakened from the dead, was sitting at God's right hand" (*Das Wesen des Christentums*, p. 97). Paul's declaration of his monotheistic faith in 1 Corinthians viii. 6, "To us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto Him, and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through Him," shows clearly that the Lordship of Jesus Christ was so conceived as not to imperil such a unity of the Godhead as must be maintained over against the "gods many, and lords many." The relation of the one Lord to the one God, the Father, Paul, having Christ's own warrant, expressed in the word Son. In Colossians i. 13–17 Christ is described as "the Son of His Love" as well as "the image of the invisible God" and "the firstborn of all creation." (iv) If the phrase "love of God" does not expressly name God Father, the conception of love implies not only God's Fatherhood towards men generally, but as the phrase "Son of His love" suggests, to Christ uniquely. I must confess that I am not much attracted by any speculative constructions of the Trinity; but the attempt to show that God as love must be both subject and object and so embrace difference-in-unity seems to me to be the least open to any objection. To conceive God as eternal Love is impossible without recognising some such immanent relation in the Godhead. The Son is first of all the object of the love of God Himself, and then the channel of that love to mankind in His grace. The grace of the Son is the expression and exercise of the love of God. (v) Pentecost followed the Resurrection, and the fulness of the Spirit in individuals followed on the confession of Christ in Baptism. The special endowments and the

moral renewal of the believer were the distinctive work of the Spirit, but were conditional on faith in the love of God through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ. The word *κοινωνία* invites closer attention. The English "*communion*" expresses only one meaning of the word: the French "*communication*" another, and the German *Gemeinschaft* a third. Klöpper renders the word *Antheilnahme, Theilhabung.* From the sense *communion* we can pass to that of *community* by way of the meaning *joint participation,* and thence to *intimacy, intercourse,* and finally to *collection* as a *benefaction jointly contributed* (see Theyer's Lexicon). This study of the word is not unimportant. The *charisms* of the Spirit are not merely gifts to the individual, but gifts enjoyed only because jointly possessed. The participation in the Spirit or communication from the Spirit is within and not apart from the community of believers. We must remember Paul's *organic* conception of the Christian Church in 1 Corinthians xii. It is as the body of Christ and as severally members of it that believers enjoy the gifts of the Spirit. The Christian individual is complete spiritually only within the Christian society. Personality is fulfilled only as it transcends individuality as exclusive and separative, and becomes social, participation in the common life of a society. For me the Christian society does not depend on any external organisation for its organic unity, however desirable and advantageous such outward embodiment may be. But community of faith is the issue of the experience of God as Father, Son, and Spirit. The significance of this conclusion for the doctrine of the Trinity will appear in the subsequent discussion.

(5) The doctrine of the Trinity as it is presented in the New Testament is rooted in Christian experience. The threefold name of God corresponds to a threefold apprehension of God in the Christian salvation, as God in all,

through all, and over all, who to mankind is Father, as God incarnate to reveal and redeem in the historical personality of Jesus Christ the Son of God, as God imparting His own life in manifold spiritual gifts within the Christian community in the Holy Spirit. But the significance of this fact may be challenged on the ground that there are antecedents in Jewish thought for the entire doctrine. (i) Throughout the Old Testament the presence and activity of God in the world and man is ascribed to the Spirit. All exceptional endowments, especially the prophetic, are due to the Spirit of God. In later Jewish thought the Spirit is never altogether endowed with personality, but there is a slight tendency to personify. (ii) In the Old Testament also, especially the Wisdom literature, the Word or the Wisdom of God is personified. Philo, whose Jewish faith was affected by Greek philosophy, introduces the Platonic doctrine of ideas in his conception of the Logos. To remove God from direct contact with matter is the aim of his teaching : this is not the Old Testament attitude for which God is constantly and directly in the world. One sentence may be quoted, " God generated all things (out of matter), not touching it Himself, for it was not right for the Wise and Blessed to come in contact with indeterminate and mixed matter ; but He used the incorporeal powers whose real name is ideas, that each genus might receive its fitting form " (quoted in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, ii. 207). These powers or ideas are all comprehended in the Logos, which is almost represented as a person. The *Memra* in Palestinian Jewish theology is not so much the Divine Reason as the Divine Word, God active in nature or history, and this is personified, and almost hypostatised. (iii) While in the Old Testament the Messiah remains a human ruler, in the Son of Man of the Similitudes in the Book of Enoch he becomes a supernatural intermediate being.

(6) These facts being fully recognised, can the New Testament doctrine of the Trinity be regarded as merely the development of these ideas? Several considerations must be urged before an answer can be given. (i) We must carefully distinguish between the spiritual, eternal, divine reality that religious faith apprehends, and the intellectual forms in which it finds expression. Even if the Fourth Evangelist borrowed the term *Logos* from Philo, Philo's idea does not account for the impression the historical reality of Jesus, known to him, as I believe, as an eye-witness of the earthly ministry, made on him, an impression so great, that he must use this term to express the value for the thought and life of man of this personality whom he had known in the flesh. Even if Paul's representation of Christ as the Man from Heaven was affected by Apocalyptic Jewish ideas, yet these ideas do not explain his experience of salvation through the grace of Jesus Christ. The fact that phenomena analogous to the abnormal features connected with the Spirit's presence and power in the Apostolic Church were to be met with in contemporary Judaism, and that in religious revivals in the Christian Church similar experiences have been repeated, does not dispose of the new life, joy and hope that came to believers. It would be too much to say that the Christian Church borrowed only terms, and was uninfluenced in thought by its environment; but can its distinctive experience be so accounted for? (ii) But had the Christian Church borrowed even more than it did it remains to be proved that what was borrowed had no truth in it. If in the Old Testament and in Judaism there was the tendency to represent God's presence and operation in the world by such conceptions as Spirit and Word or Wisdom, we must not dismiss the idea as speculative, but must ask ourselves if the reality did not necessitate such modes of representation. If both poetry and philoso-

phy were led so to think of God, does that not suggest at least that God may be most fitly so thought of ? (iii) We must to-day test the truth of this conception of God for ourselves. Is the reality of our experiences of the world and of ourselves most adequately interpreted so as to answer not only the questions of our minds, but also to meet the needs of our souls by a Unitarian or a Trinitarian conception of God ? I shall attempt an answer in the last section of this paper; it is sufficient at present to insist that the question remains to be answered, even if the Christian Church in its doctrine was influenced by its environment.

(7) Before addressing ourselves to this question, we must glance at the ecclesiastical dogma of the Trinity based on the New Testament teaching. (i) The formula for the Trinity is three persons in one substance, as for the Incarnation, two substances (or natures) in one person. I have elsewhere minutely examined the terms used, and must not now go over the same ground.[1] All that for my present purpose I need say is that the formula seems to me to be as unsatisfying to piety as it is inadequate for theology. The term substance is both ambiguous and vague. It may mean both a single entity and the class to which it belongs. If it be urged that the idea of God itself implies solity, that of the divine class there can be only one, it may be pointed out that the term person is so ambiguous that it might suggest three individuals in one class of divine beings. The term substance, further, does not express at all that fulness of the divine life which would explain how within oneness there can be manifoldness. The term does not guard the unity of the Godhead, nor does it show how there may be difference-in-unity. The term person, as used in the Creeds, did not mean what it now means, as the conception of personality was undeveloped in Greek thought, and owes

[1] The *Expository Times*, May to August, 1912.

much in the deepening and widening of its meaning to Christian thought. To-day it is apt to be used as equivalent to individual, and so there has slipped into popular Christian thought a quasi-polytheism. The persons in the Godhead are regarded as members of a family, or partners in a firm. (ii) Athanasius, starting from the conception of redemption, insisted that God alone can redeem, and that, therefore, Christ must be conceived as God. To him the imperative idea was the unity of Father and Son. For him the terms ὑπόστασις and οὐσία and φύσις are interchangeable to express this numerical unity. "He had no word," says Harnack, "by which to describe Father and Son as different subjects, and indeed he never felt it necessary to seek for any such word" (*History of Dogma*, iv. p. 35). In the Cappadocians we may discern a change of emphasis. ὑπόστασις is now distinguished from οὐσιά or φύσις, and regarded as equivalent to πρόσωπον. While the one substance is not merely the generic conception, it is not entirely one subject; for within the one substance there are three distinct subjects, though not individuals. The stress is shifted from the unity to the difference, and so a door is opened for a popular tritheism, which the subsequent change of meaning in the word person has still further encouraged. In Augustine the conception of the unity of the Godhead is, as in Athanasius, in the forefront. As the Trinity as a whole always acts, even the incarnation was the work of the whole Trinity. Although God was incarnated as Son, the incarnation was not the act of the Son alone, but of the whole Godhead. These illustrations will suffice to show the two theological tendencies which seem to be almost inevitable in the ecclesiastical dogma with its categories. Can we get categories which will make the unity and the difference not alternative, but reciprocal?

(8) The value of the doctrine for the Christian faith to-day

is dependent on the adequacy of the formulation for Christian thought. It is the religious interest that must control the speculative effort. As presented in the New Testament the doctrine is rooted in and grows out of Christian experience, the experience of the revelation of God's Fatherhood, and redemption from sin in Jesus Christ, and of the life in God as children of God, enjoying the divine fellowship, and endowed with divine gifts. The ecclesiastical dogma is to us to-day so defective because it does not keep close enough to this experience. We must try to discharge a twofold task, to show how necessary this doctrine is to Christian experience still, and to state the doctrine in such modern categories as will keep it near that experience. Religion cannot rest in pantheism, which removes the distinction between God and man, nor yet in deism, which disturbs the communion of God and man. Religion must have a God both above and near, or in philosophical terms transcendent and immanent. The sense of dependence and submission is as essential as the sense of communion. The moral difference between God and man gives fixity in the religious consciousness to the metaphysical difference. But the God near must be near both within and without, in the self and in the world ; the immanence must be objective as well as subjective. Without the sense of God within the soul intense personal piety would be impossible. The tendency of piety has been, perhaps, too exclusively to turn itself inward, to depend on personal vision, emotion, impulse. But this excessive subjectivity makes the individual too dependent on his changeful moods, exaltation and depression alternate too frequently when God is sought within alone. Man for his complete development depends both on nature and society, and these cannot have their full religious significance for him unless he can find God in both. There is so much in the world and in mankind that challenges the

inward assurance of God, that the religious man needs to find the confirmation of this inner witness to God in the outward certainty that God is and works in nature and in society. Especially in face of sin, sorrow, suffering and death faith in God can be sustained only by convincing evidence of a redemptive divine presence, purpose and power in the world and in man. That redemption must soar as high as God's throne, and stoop as low as man's abyss of need. How can this distance be measured ? How can the absolutely transcendent God, whom the heavens cannot contain, become so completely immanent in the world and man as to share utterly the earthly lot of man to save him unto heavenly life ?

For objective self-expression in nature and society, and for subjective self-communication in the soul of man, there must be self-limitation in God. The transcendent can be the immanent God only by kenosis. We cannot without contradiction conceive the eternal God as changing Himself in time, for while time may be real for God in His relation to the world, the life of God in Himself cannot be subject to time ; accordingly if we are to think of kenosis, as we are compelled to do, we must regard it not as temporal act, but as eternal process (the inadequacy of the word *process* must be recognised fully). If God expresses Himself, and communicates Himself in such self-limitation to man, if His revelation is not to be concealment, and His impartation denial of Himself, we cannot but think of Him as eternally being as He expresses and communicates Himself to us. This is not a speculative construction ; it is surely making explicit the implicit logic of religion ; God above, around, within ; God in time as in eternity ; God in sorrow, suffering, death, as in blessed perfection, is what the soul craves. Does not the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and that alone, adequately meet the demand ? The transcendent God

is ours in the *Father*, whose very name gives promise of the *immanence* objective in the *Son* as incarnate in Jesus Christ to save man, the consummation of a process of divine revelation which is also redemptive, and the *immanence* subjective in the Holy Spirit, the renewer and perfecter of the soul of man. But as personality is necessarily social the subjective immanence issues again in objective, in the Christian community, in which the revealing and redemptive process is continued and extended until the consummation, God all in all, the divine kenosis completed in the divine plerosis.

(9) Can we find a formula for this conception of God more adequate than that of substance and persons ? (i) It seems to me that we must start with the conception of the one God as personal ; the unity is best conceived in terms of personality, not as reality in man merely, but as ideal for man. God is subject thinking truth, feeling blessedness, willing holiness, self-expressive, self-communicative and self-completing in love. But to be conceived thus as personal God cannot be conceived as abstract unit, but as concrete unity, and that involves difference within unity. He must be subject and object, purpose and action, etc. This psychological analogy is familiar enough. Where the difficulty comes in is at this point. If the unity be personal, are the differences within God personal in such sense as the use of the term three persons suggests ? If each " person " be personal in the same sense as the unity, then we must repeat of each the psychological analogy, and so within each difference we must postulate differences, and so *ad infinitum*. (ii) I have felt this difficulty so acutely till quite recently, that I have insisted on the unity of God as personal, and preferred, while recognising their inadequacy, the terms " mode " and " principle " to " person." In using this language, however, I have always insisted that

the mode of perfect personality cannot be described as impersonal, but must be conceived as personal. There is an intermediate conception between a person in the current sense and a power ; and even " a power " is an abstraction unless conceived as in some sense personal, for our conception of even physical force is derived from our exercise of will in action. (iii) But recent reflexion has relieved the difficulty for my mind. The modern conception of society as organic has modified, and must still more modify the conception of personality. We must think of personality in the measure of its perfection as transcending individuality in the sense of exclusiveness. Human personality is rational, moral, and religious only as it is social. Each individual grows in personality through manifold relations to other individuals, and out of the interplay of individuals in society arises a social sentiment, ideal, purpose, character, in which the individuals participate according to the degree of their development. Spencer was utterly mistaken when he denied to society a corporate consciousness because it lacked a common sensorium. The more advanced a society the more distinct is this corporate consciousness ; and the more developed personally the individuals within it are the more sensitive and responsive to it are their consciousnesses. Self-consciousness finds its fulfilment in this common consciousness. A man is more fully man as he is husband, father, citizen. The intension of personality grows with its extension ; the wider the relations, the fuller the individuality. There is even in human society an over-soul which is expressed in all souls, and in which souls find their realisation. If it be urged that this is an abstraction, surely from the standpoint of religion we may affirm that this corporate consciousness is reality in God as immanent in individual and society alike. (iv) But if human persons may transcend their exclusive individuality in such a social unity,

real in, and revealing God as love, may we not conceive God Himself as organic social personality? May not the one life of the personal God be expressed in the manifold personal life of Father, Son and Spirit and the different personal life of Father, or Son, or Spirit be realised in the common life of the personal God? As individuals in society form an organic unity, so may we conceive Father, Son, and Spirit each as personal, yet one in the personal God. (v) This ideal of society as organic would surely command a more august authority over selfish individualism, if we could vindicate the contention that it is the earthly shadow of the heavenly substance of the triune God. Should not the Christian Church realise that ideal more fully than any other human society can? If the Christian fellowship did realise the common life of each in all, and all in each, there would surely be given to it a clearer vision of, a closer communion with, and a greater resemblance to the Triune God. Is it too bold a suggestion that we have had revealed in history the difference of Father, Son, and Spirit, but the revelation of the unity of God in Father, Son, and Spirit waits the consummation when all saints are one, even as Father, Son, and Spirit are one God?

A. E. Garvie.

DR. VOGELS ON THE OLD SYRIAC GOSPELS.

In the first number of the *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* for 1912, there is a review of my edition of the Old Syriac Gospels by Dr. Hugo Gressmann, which, though highly favourable and sympathetic as regards my own work, makes this observation (p. 161), "Aber eben so wichtig wie die Auslassungen sind die Auffüllungen, ja noch wichtiger, denn die Auffüllungen, die allerdings im *sin*

weniger zahlreich sind als im *cur*, erheben den Einfluss des Diatessarons über jeden Zweifel.

"But the amplifications (i.e., in the Sinai text of the Syriac Gospels) are quite as important as the omissions; yes, even more important, for the amplifications, which are certainly less numerous in the Sinai text than in the Cureton one, prove the influence of the Diatessaron without the slightest doubt."

Soon after I had read this, a book on the Old Syriac Gospels by Dr. H. J. Vogels, of Düsseldorf, came into my hands, published in 1911. It contains a list of harmonistic readings, that is, of words or passages in the text of the Old Syriac Gospels, which, in the writer's judgment, are taken from Tatian's *Diatessaron*, and are no less than 1605 in number. If that opinion were founded on sound principles this would indeed settle the question of the supposed priority of Tatian's Harmony to the version represented in the *Sinai Palimpsest*. But a close examination of Dr. Vogels' list has convinced me that most of his conclusions are vitiated by radically false assumptions.

I. He has totally failed to make allowance for a very common grammatical peculiarity of the Syriac language, viz., the introduction of pronouns and pronominal suffixes in every possible and conceivable place. For instance, wherever the word "disciples" occurs in the Gospels, with one solitary exception, the possessive pronoun "his" is attached to it in the form of a suffix, giving us the word תלמידוהי. Without this superabundance of pronouns no translation of the Gospels would have been acceptable to the Syrian peoples, for it would simply not have been Syriac. Yet the author gives us 156 examples of this phenomenon, and tries to show that they have been borrowed from one of the other Gospels, that is to say, are harmonistic.

II. In a few instances such as Matthew viii. 27 the author

points out that S (Sinai) has ὁ ἄνεμος, "the wind," like Mark iv. 41, instead of οἱ ἄνεμοι, "the winds." He has evidently never tried to read a Syriac palimpsest. If he had done so, he would have awoke to the fact that the plural of a Syriac word is often represented by two dots over one of its letters, and that by a curious economy of trouble, or of ink, this is often effected by a duplication of the single dot which distinguishes a *resh* from a *daleth* ܕ becoming ܕ̈. When a second rather heavy writing has been imposed on the top of a text several centuries earlier than itself, it is only natural to expect that we may meet with words which are apparently in the singular, though really in the plural. We cannot read a second dot over the ܕ because it is under a thick stroke of the upper script, and though we may strongly suspect it to be there, we must not report what we cannot see. Instances of this, which may have misled Dr. Vogels, occur in 10 verses, viz., Matthew viii. 26, 27; xi. 16; xiii. 11; xv. 19; Mark ii. 24; iv. 15; v. 23; Luke ix. 16; xxi. 27.

III. There are cases in which the author has misread a Syriac word. For instance, in John i 27, he says that C S (that is, Cureton and Sinai), omit ἐγώ. The Cureton text has there לא שוא אנא, "I am not worthy," while the Sinai text has contracted the ἐγώ into the verb; and gives us דלא שונא, the last word being a short way of saying שוא אנא. It is therefore quite a mistake to say that both MSS. omit ἐγώ.

In Matthew xi. 10 also Dr. Vogels says that S omits ἐγώ, not perceiving that ἐγώ is contained in the word משדרנא "I have sent," which is a contraction for משדר אנא.

There are other cases where the Syriac text has been misread. In Matthew x. 3 we have not Σίμων ὁ Καναναῖος, *Simon the Canaanite*, but Σίμων ὁ Ζηλωτής, Simon the Zealot (קנניא).

We are told that in Matthew xi. 24 S omits *ὑμῖν*. But no mention is made of the word *σοι*, which is used instead of it.

In Matthew xxi. 23 we read + CSP *αὐτῷ* post *λέγοντες*. No word in the Sinai MS. represents *αὐτῷ* after *λέγοντες*.

In Matthew xxiv. 28 the translation is not considered correct because *τὸ πτῶμα* is translated by פגרא which, according to the *Thesaurus*, is its primary meaning, as used in Leviticus vii. 24 and 1 Samuel xxxi. 12 of the Peshiṭta.

In Mark i. 32 *νόσοις ποικίλαις* is considered a translation of בקורהנא קשׁיא. קשׁיא would surely have been better rendered by *σκληροῖς* than by *ποικίλαις*.

In Mark vi. 6 *κύκλῳ* is not omitted. It is surely included in the Syriac word מתכרך.

In Mark vi. 53 the Sinai text has not *ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν γεννησαρ*, but *ἀνέβησαν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν γεννησαρ*.

In Mark viii. 10 the Sinai text has not *καὶ ἦλθεν* but *καὶ ἦλθον*. It cannot therefore have come from Matthew xv. 39.

In Mark x. 21 and Luke ix. 10 we are told that SP (Sinai and Peshiṭta) add *πάντα* before *ὅσα*, the words being כל לדם. But surely כל מדם is a very good translation of *ὅσα*. *Ὅσα* contains the idea of *πάντα* and מדם without would be quite inadequate.

In Mark xi. 9, the Sinai text has the word *ὡσαννά*, אושענא, as in Westcott and Hort's text. Yet the author says that it has *ειρηνη*.

In Mark xii. 12, the word עליהון is translated *περὶ αὐτῶν*, though the *πρὸς αὐτούς* of WH would have been a more faithful rendering. Both עליהון and *πρὸς αὐτούς* imply hostility.

In Mark xv. 21, the author translates גברא as *ἄνθρωπον*. It stands for *ἄνδρα*; and it is quite idiomatic Syriac for the Greek *τινα*. If it had been from Matthew xxvii. 32, it would surely have been ברנשא *ἄνθρωπον*.

In Luke xi. 26 the Sinai text has not *ἑπτὰ πνεύματα*.

IV. In several cases a Syriac word has been quite properly used to represent two different Greek ones, the two being synonyms. When we compare one Greek text with another Greek text it is right that we should notice these cases; but with a translation we must always remember that some languages have a much richer vocabulary than others. Compare, for example, the Arabic lexicon with the Hebrew one, or the Greek with the Latin. The Revisers of our English New Testament fell into precisely the same mistake as Dr. Vogels has done, the pedantic one of thinking that a Greek word must always be rendered by the same English equivalent; and for that reason they sacrificed the supreme virtue of a good literary style, and secured the failure of their own work as a substitute for the less exact Authorised Version in the affections of all English-speaking nations.

I shall give a few examples.

Matthew v. 26, Luke xii. 59. Here the word λεπτόν instead of *κοδράντην* need not come from Luke xii. 59. The words are absolutely synonyms, for λεπτόν means the fourth of a farthing; and *κυδράντης* the fourth of a Roman *as*. As our Lord doubtless meant the smallest coin that His hearers knew, שׁוּכנא = ½ may surely stand for either of them.

Only very fine hair-splitting could show us much difference between

	Supposed Syriac.		Greek.
Matthew xii 25	*διανοήματα*	and	*ἐνθυμήσεις*.
Matthew xv. 35	*κελαύω*	,,	*παραγέλλω*
Matthew xx. 18	*θανάτῳ*	,,	*εἰς θάνατον*
Matthew xxiii. 25	*πίναξ*	,,	*ποροψίς*
Mark vi. 46	*ἀπολύω*	,,	*ἀποτάσσομαι*
Luke viii. 45	*τίς μου ἥψατο* ;	and	*τίς ὁ ἁψάμενός μου* ;
Luke xi. 48	*μαρτυρεῖτε*	,,	*μάρτυρες ἐστε*
Luke xi. 51	*ἀμήν*	,,	*ναί*
Luke xvii. 2	*συμφέρει*	,,	*λυσιτελεῖ*

In Luke iv. 40 the Syriac is said to mean ἔφερον when it ought to be ἤγαγον. But I submit that איתיו is a much better rendering of ἤγαγον than it would be of ἔφερον, of which the equivalent is אובלו from the Afel of יבל

In John xviii. 10 εἵλκυσεν and ἀπέσπασεν both represent the same idea of "drew" [his sword] and in Matthew xxvi. 51, Mark xiv. 47, the same Syriac word שמט is used as in this passage. Probably it is the best rendering of the Greek in all three cases.

V. By far the largest number of verses which Dr. Vogels has judged to be harmonistic are those where the Syriac words follow the order natural to a Semitic language, instead of being placed in the exact sequence of the Greek. The translator wished to give his countrymen a version which should be clear, intelligible and pleasant to them, because natural and idiomatic. It never occurred to him that in Matthew xix. 6 any one would expect him to say σὰρξ μιά instead of μιὰ σάρξ. In the English versions we have "one flesh," although the Greek text says "flesh one." When we translate German into English we do not put our verbs at the end of the sentences, nor do we put the objects of our verbs also near the end of our sentences. Nor do we make the opposite arrangement when we translate English into German. A few instances of this perverse ingenuity must suffice: they are perhaps necessary to make my meaning clear.

(1) Matthew xiv. 19 Syriac καὶ εκλασεν τοὺς ἄρτους καὶ ἔδωκεν τοῖς μαθηταῖς. Greek text καὶ κλάσας ἔδωκειν τοῖς μαθηταῖς τοὺς ἄρτους.

(2) Mark i. 27, Syriac καὶ ἐπιτάσσει τοῖς πνεύμασι τοῖς ἀκαθάρτοις. Greek text καὶ τοῖς πνεύμασι τοῖς ἀκαθάρτοις ἐπιτάσσει.

(3) Luke iii. 3, Syriac καὶ ἦν κηρύσσων ἐν τῇ ἐρήμᾳ καὶ ἐν ὅλη τῇ περιχώρῳ τοῦ Ἰορδάνου.

Greek, *ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ. καὶ ἦλθεν εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν περίχωρον τοῦ Ἰορδάνου κηρύσσων.*

This is surely elaborate trifling, which produces nothing but pedantic lumber. To explain the reason why the Syriac translator has not followed the Greek sequence of words, we need not search in (1) Mark vi. 41, (2) Luke iv. 36 and (3) Mark iii. 1. It will be sufficient if any of my readers will try to translate the Greek into Syriac according to the ideas of Dr. Vogels; and I shall be surprised if he is pleased with the result. Yet of these cases there are no less than 139 examples, which we are asked to consider harmonistic. We have found 23 in Matthew, 49 in Mark, 65 in Luke, and 2 in John.

VI. There are single words and phrases which Dr. Vogels calls harmonistic, i.e., we are to consider them as interpolations in the correct text, although they are also to be found in exactly the same place in the text of Westcott and Hort. I certainly think that every word, which stands in such a text, whether it appears between brackets or not, could never have been accepted by these great scholars, even doubtfully, unless it had a considerable amount of Greek MS. evidence in its favour. Is it not then very unjust to cite the presence of such words and passages in a Syriac version as evidence of harmonising?

I find instances of this in Matthew iv. 17 *Μετανοεῖτε*, ix. 19 *ἠκολούθει*, xii. 11 [*ἐσται*], xv. 27 [*γὰρ*], xix. 20 *Ταῦτα πάντα*, xx. 18 [*θανάτῳ*], xx. 23 [*τοῦτο*] ante *δοῦναι*. Mark ii 22 [*ἀλλὰ οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς καινούς*), Mark v. 2 [*εὐθὺς*], xv. 10 [*ο ἀρχιερεῖς*], Luke vi. 38 *μετρηθήσεται*, viii. 13 *οὗτοι*, viii. 52 *γὰρ* ante *ἀπέθανεν*, xi. 17 *ἐφ' ἑαυτὴν διαμερισθεῖσα*, xx. 27 *λέγοντες*, xxiv. 36 [*καὶ λέγει αὐτοῖς, εἰρήνη ὑμῖν*].

xxiv. 12 [*Ὁ δὲ Πέτρος ἀναστὰς ἔδραμεν ἐπὶ τὸ μνημεῖον, καὶ παρακύψας βλέπει τὰ ὀθόνια μόνα· καὶ ἀπῆλθεν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν θαυμάζων τὸ γεγονός*].

The Syriac translator often supplied a word, and specially a proper name instead of *αὐτός*, to make his meaning clearer, or to avoid ambiguity. He also sometimes left out a proper name, such as *Ἰησοῦς*, at the beginning of a phrase, because he had just written it near the end of the phrase preceding it, for euphonistic reasons. We may be sure that he never dreamt that after the lapse of seventeen centuries he would be called on to account for this. I have found 35 instances of a word being added to make the meaning clearer; and 16 instances of words being omitted simply to avoid an unpleasant tautology.

VIII. The author seems to have no perception of linguistic style. I have found 57 cases in which he makes no allowance for a Syriac idiom which is not pronominal. But I object still more to those cases in which he ignores a Greek idiom, such as the suppression of an important word, which the mind of the reader is expected to supply. This is impossible to reproduce in Syriac. There are really few other languages, if any, which would tolerate it. Therefore the insertion of any such suppressed word ought not to be attributed to harmonistic influences. For example, in Luke xi. 17, the Syriac says: *καὶ οἶκον ἐπὶ οἶκον μερισθεὶς πίπτει*, and in Mark xii. 38 *φιλούντων* before *ἀσπασμούς*. See also *βάλλουσιν* in Mark ii. 22.

Even the well-known grammatical rule of the Greek language, by which a substantive in the neuter plural takes a singular verb, is set up as a standard which the Syriac translation ought to follow. The Syriac maintains its independence by taking a plural verb, and we are told that in such cases its text is harmonistic. For an instance of this, see Mark v. 10, Matthew xi. 16.

IX. Dr. Vogels also gives instances that are too trifling to notice. Early translators of the Gospels probably did not realise the supreme importance of their text; they

looked forward to the speedy return of the Christ, and so failed to see that the Evangelist's autographs would be held very sacred for over 2,000 years. To the Syriac one it was a matter of no moment whether he put καὶ εἰ or εἰ δὲ at the beginning of a verse such as Luke xi. 18.

Many of the above details may seem trifling. They are so, but they have been put forward seriously in order to decry the value of the Old Syriac Gospels, by a scholar who, I cannot help thinking, was prejudiced, inasmuch as he has tried to support a preconceived theory, the theory that the Old Syriac Version is post-Tatian and the Sinai MS. is later than the Curetonian one. In many cases he counts the same example twice; for instance, in Matthew viii. 22, Mark x. 46, xi. 13, Luke xxii. 17.

I do not deny that there are a few passages in the Old Syriac Gospels which might lead us to suppose that they have crept there from a Harmony. Of these I subjoin a list, only premising that they possibly may not have been in the original second-century translation, though they are in the fourth-century copy of it which I found on Mount Sinai. Of this question others will be more impartial judges than I am.

Apparent interpolations of single words.

Mark xiv. 63, τότε, xvi. 1 μύρα καὶ before ἀρώματα.

Luke viii. 22, ἐκείνων after ἡμερῶν, viii. 40 πολὺς after ὄχλος, ix. 17 πλήρεις, xx. 14 δεῦτε before ἀποκτείνωμεν, xxii. 39 λεγόμενον before ὄρος, xxii. 47 πολύς after ὄχλος, xxii. 71 ἴδε after μαρτυρίας; John xii. 3 ἀλάβαστρον before λίτραν, xiii. 38 δίς after ἀλέκτορα.

Of sentences.

Matthew ix. 7 ἦρεν τὴν κλίνην αὐτοῦ after ἐγερθείς.

„ x. 33 καὶ ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀγγέλων αὐτοῦ.

„ xiii. 13 μήποτε ἐπιστρέψωσιν.

Matthew xix. 20 *ἐκ νεότητός μου.*

,, xxvi. 70 *οὐδε ἐπίσταμαι,* xxvii. 28 *καὶ πορφύραν.*

Luke iii. 16 *ὀπίσω μου,* vi. 23 *καὶ ἀγαλλίασθε.*

,, viii. 18 *καὶ περισσευθήσεται,* viii. 22 *μετ' αὐτοῦ.*

,, viii. 45 *καὶ λέγεις τίς μου ἥψατο.*

,, xii. 56 *καὶ τὰ σημεῖα αὐτου,* xvii. 36 *καὶ ἔσονται δύο ἐν τῷ ἀγρῷ. ὁ εἷς παραληφθήσεται καὶ ὁ εἷς ἀφεθήσεται.*

,, xx. 9 *καὶ περιέθηκεν αὐτῷ φραγμόν.*

,, xx. 23 *τί με πειράζετε;*

,, xx. 24 *ἔδειξεν αὐτῷ καὶ* before *εἶπαν.*

,, xxiii. 17. *εἰώθει δὲ ὁ Πιλάτος ἀπολύειν αὐτοῖς ἕνα δέσμιον κατὰ ἑορτήν.*

,, xxiii. 20. *λέγων αὐτοῖς* before *θέλων.*

,, xxiii. 20 *τίνα θέλετε ἀπολύσω ὑμῖν;* after *Ἰησοῦν.*

John vi. 10 *ἐπὶ τῷ χόρτῳ.*

,, vi. 13 *ἦσαν δὲ οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἐσθίοντες ἐκ τοῦ ἄρτου τούτου πεντακισχίλιοι.*

,, vi. 15 *ἀποταξάμενος αὐτοις ἀναχώρησεν.*

,, vi. 19 *καὶ ἤθελεν παρελθεῖν αὐτούς.*

,, xii. 3 *καὶ κατάχεεν ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἀνακειμένου.*

,, xii. 12 *καὶ ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ ὄρος τῶν Ἐλαιῶν.*

,, xii. 44 *ὁ μὴ ὁμιάζων εἰς ἐμὲ οὐχ ὁμιάζει εἰς τὸν πέμψαντά με.*

,, xviii. 3 *καὶ ὄχλον τοῦ λαοῦ* after *ὑπερέτας.*

,, xviii. 28 *καὶ ἀπήγαγον αὖτον* after *Καίαφα.*

,, xviii. 28 *παραδιδόναι αὐτὸν τῷ ἡγεμόνι.*

,, xix. 42 *ὅτι τὸ σάββατον ἐπέφωσκεν.*

,, xx. 1 *τῆς θύρας* after *ἐκ.*

I have thus accounted for 764 cases in Dr. Vogels' list of supposed augmentations, and allowing for 41 apparent interpolations, this leaves 800 cases out of the 1605 to be accounted for. These, though numerous, are not of very great import-

ance, and I think that if they were subjected to close scrutiny by an expert in Semitic idiom more skilled than myself, they would easily be accounted for as the result of Dr. Vogels' having worked on a totally false principle.

Moreover, I cannot help a few regrets that his principle is *not* a sound one. Were it true, those of us who have acquired some ease in reading Latin, Greek, Hebrew and half a dozen modern languages would be able to write these also with fluency and grace, and I should now offer a version of this article to the editors of several European magazines instead of confining myself to the EXPOSITOR.

Yet it is no concern to me personally whether the Old Syriac be, or be not, earlier than the Diatessaron. I am chiefly interested in the question as to whether its peculiar and suggestive readings, wherein it differs from early Greek codices, though often agreeing with the so-called Western text, are primitive and true.

AGNES SMITH LEWIS.

ST. PAUL AND THE MYSTERY-RELIGIONS.

VIII. SACRAMENTAL MEALS.

THE evidence regarding Sacramental Meals in the Mystery-Religions is both meagre and difficult to interpret. Conclusions have been drawn from one or two extant mystic formulae which go beyond the data. Thus, e.g., the Eleusinian fragment preserved by Clement of Alexandria : [1] "I fasted, I drank the *κυκεών*," has been explained of a sacrament in which the initiated drank of the same cup as the goddess in her sorrow. This is indeed an attractive hypothesis, but it can be nothing more. A similar explanation has been given of the formula handed down by Firmicus Maternus [2] and (with variations) by Clement [3] : "I have

[1] Ed. Stählin, I. p. 16, 18. [2] Ed. Ziegler, p. 43, 11. [3] I. p. 13, 10.

eaten out of the τύμπανον, I have drunk out of the κύμβαλον, I have become an initiate of Attis." It is quite possible that these ritual actions may have been the symbols of new life, but there is no hint of how they became sacramental. Attempts have been made to find a sacramental significance in the Dionysiac-Orphic cults, but even Dieterich admits that our knowledge of the facts is altogether inadequate.[1] Accordingly, in the search for parallels to Christian usage, various scholars, notably Dieterich and Heitmüller, have collected evidence from the most primitive phases of religion to illustrate the idea of communion with the god through feeding upon him. To establish, however, the validity of their position it would be necessary to show, first, that this idea survived in the Hellenistic environment of early Christianity, and, second, that it forms an element in Paul's conception of the Lord's Supper. Now it seems to us impossible to demonstrate its presence in the Mystery-ritual itself.[2] But the case may be different when we turn to the sacrificial meals of Paganism, meals which had their counterpart in the practice of mystery-brotherhoods. Perhaps the chief aim of the latter was, as Cumont suggests,[3] the maintenance of communion between the "brethren," but this would rest on the basis of their common fellowship with their deity.

Yet the question still remains: How was that fellowship supposed to be established? And it is not easy to answer with certainty. It is possible, but by no means proved, that, in a primitive stage of society, the partakers of the sacrificial animal believed they were thereby partaking of the very life of their deity, either as embodied in the victim or somehow associated with it. But at least as prob-

[1] *Eine Mithrasliturgie*[2], p. 105.
[2] So also Schweitzer, *Geschichte d. Paulin. Forschung*, p. 154.
[3] *Les Religions Orientales*, p. 54.

able an explanation is the notion that the god himself is present and shares with his worshippers in the sacrificial meal. Striking exemplifications of the latter conception are given by Lietzmann in an *excursus* on 1 Corinthians x. 21 : e.g., *Pap. Oxyr.* I. 110 : "Chairemon invites you to dinner at the table of the Lord Serapis in the Scrapaeum, to-morrow, i.e., the 15th, etc." The "table of the god" (τράπεζα τοῦ θεοῦ) is a phrase which occurs in inscriptions and presupposes the presence of the deity as host at the sacrificial meal. And the Roman religious *epulum* is an example of the same idea. It is impossible, therefore, to bring forward any convincing evidence from Hellenistic religion contemporary with Paul in support of the conception of eating the god. Heitmüller, indeed, declares that in the earliest days of Christianity "this belief and usage had a revival and a new lease of life," [1] but does not produce a shred of relevant proof to establish his statement. Prof. Percy Gardner, who frankly recognises the foregoing facts,[2] finds the closest parallel to the Christian celebration in Pagan "feasts of communion with departed heroes and ancestors." [3] Whether this analogy be valid or not, it at least avoids the absurdity of attributing to Paul the notion of "eating" a Divine Being.

While emphasising the sparseness of the evidence, we have admitted the possibility that, in the Mystery-Religions, certain ritual acts of eating and drinking were believed to impart new life or immortality. And we have taken for granted that in sacrificial meals some kind of communion with the deity was supposed to be established, although

[1] *Die Religion in Geschichte u. Gegenwart* (ed. Schiele), Bd. I., Sp. 45. In *Taufe u. Abendmahl bei Paulus*, pp. 48, 49, he actually postulates for the Christian view of the Lord's Supper a notion so crude as to have been transcended in contemporary heathen and Jewish thought.

[2] *The Religious Experience of St. Paul*, p. 121.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 113.

the method of its establishment eludes investigation. There can be little doubt, moreover, that in the commemoration-feasts referred to above a ritual fellowship with the departed ancestor or hero was a main element in the celebration. We must now attempt to examine the relationship which is alleged to exist between ideas such as these and Paul's conception of the Lord's Supper.

Let us note, first of all, some characteristic statements of the Apostle's position made by investigators obsessed by the phenomena of Comparative Religion, statements so often dogmatically reiterated that writers who receive them at second-hand repeat them as beyond challenge. Dieterich asserts as unquestionable that, according to Paul's view, "Christ is eaten and drunk by the faithful and is thereby in them." The process is actual (*faktisch*).[1] Heitmüller holds that, for Paul, "simple participation in the Lord's Supper produces communion with and in the body and blood of Christ."[2] According to Schweitzer, Paul has "the most prosaic conception imaginable of the *opus operatum*" in the sacrament.[3] Weinel declares it to be obvious from 1 Corinthians x. 1–4 that "in the sacrament the important thing is not the *believing* participation, but the *participation* in the supernatural."[4] In Professor Lake's judgment, the passage just mentioned implies that "in the Eucharist Christians received the 'Spirit' in the form of food and drink."[5] Reitzenstein interprets the Pauline conception of the Lord's Supper from a magical text in which the blood of Osiris is represented as a love-potion, laying a spell on the soul of him who drinks it.[6] How far are such opinions borne out by the data of the Epistles?

[1] *Eine Mithrasliturgie*[2], p. 106.
[2] *Taufe u. Abendmahl bei Paulus*, p. 34.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 166.
[4] *Biblische Theol. d. N. T.*, p. 327.
[5] *Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, p. 213.
[6] *H.M.R.*, p. 51.

Our inquiry is a limited one. It is beyond our scope to enter into the controversy which has arisen regarding the institution and original significance of the Lord's Supper. It may be necessary at one or two points to refer to phases of the discussion. But in the main we must confine ourselves to the question: What did the Lord's Supper mean for Paul? Most scholars admit that Paul found the celebration already existing in the Church.[1] Scientific exegesis rightly rejects the interpretation of *παρέλαβον ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου* (1 Cor. xi. 23) as a special revelation.[2] And great caution must be exercised in attributing this feature or that in the institution to the creative activity of Paul. Many modern investigators claim a totally unwarranted knowledge of the mind of Jesus when they assume that the sacramental in any shape or form contradicts His entire standpoint. We grant that if the sacramental is synonymous with the magical it must have been foreign to His thought. But, as we pointed out in our last article, there is a sacramentalism which is ethical to the core, having its foundations laid in a genuine religious faith. It is no excrescence of primitive superstition, but corresponds to a permanent demand of the human consciousness, the demand that the visible and tangible should be a seal to faith of that which is unseen and eternal.

The Pauline material is contained in three sections of 1 Corinthians: (1) x. 1–5; (2) x. 14–22; (3) xi. 17–34. Section (1) is far less important than the others, as being no more than an illustration used in passing by the Apostle. Sections (2) and (3) supply real evidence of his position. It is wholly illegitimate to assign a superior authority, as Heitmüller does, to section (2), for the determination of Paul's actual conception. As a matter of fact, an unpre-

[1] See, e.g., Holtzmann, *N.T. Theologie*[2], II. p. 208.
[2] See the excellent note of J. Weiss *ad loc.*

judiced interpretation of the two passages reveals, as we shall see, no discrepancy between them. Heitmüller, however, asserts that in chapter xi. we find "a more individual, theological explanation of the Lord's Supper," while in chapter x. there is presented "the unchanging fundamental idea of the celebration and its effect."[1] But this distinction is a mere assertion which there is not a syllable in the Epistles to justify. Indeed, if we were obliged to choose between the two passages for an authoritative statement, Paul's own language would be decisive in favour of chapter xi. For, on his definite testimony, the Apostle simply repeats in xi. 23 ff. the instructions which he had given his Corinthian converts regarding the Lord's Supper when they entered the Christian Church (ὃ καὶ παρέδωκα ὑμῖν). He never suggests that this is a new communication or a discussion of "doubtful points," as Lake represents it.[2] He deliberately recalls to their minds the familiar ordinance, to make them realise how flagrantly they have abused it.

It is unnecessary to spend much time on chapter x. 1–5. It forms part of Paul's admonition to those who claim the possession of γνῶσις, against wounding the consciences of their "weak" brethren in the matter of eating sacrificial meat. For the latter this meat still carries with it "the consciousness of the idol" (ch. viii. 7), and so involves them in a perilous association. But the "strong" have gone further, and even partaken of meals in heathen temples (viii. 10). Paul deals fully with this practice in x. 14–22, which we shall discuss immediately. Meanwhile he prepares them for his later warning by a more general caution based on the experiences of the Israelites as narrated in the Old Testament. Here he reminds them that the chosen people, in spite of the extraordinary tokens of God's favour manifested to them, fell into idolatry, impurity, and rebel-

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 30. So also Lake, *op. cit.*, p. 212. [2] *Loc. cit.*

lion against God. They also must be on their guard. It is thoroughly natural that in connexion with the sacrificial meals of Paganism the Apostle's mind should move forward to the cognate celebration in the Christian Church, more especially as he will immediately demonstrate the incompatibility of partaking in both. And so he hints at the Lord's Supper and Baptism as experiences typical of God's gracious dealings under the new dispensation, in order to warn his readers that the enjoyment of high privileges, as in the case of Israel, does not necessarily ensure acceptance with God. "Our fathers," he says, "were all baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea, and all ate the same spiritual (πνευματικόν) food, and all drank the same spiritual drink: for they drank of the spiritual rock that accompanied them: now that rock was Christ." What light do these sentences shed on Paul's conception of the Lord's Supper?

The nature of the reference to Baptism clearly shows that here we have to do with a somewhat daring analogy, and warns us against reading into the language more than it contains. On the surface Paul follows the exegetical method common to the Rabbis with Philo. And it is possible that he actually derived the idea of the never-failing spring of water from Jewish Haggada.[1] But his description of the Divinely-provided manna and the miraculous supply of water as "spiritual" has no suggestion in it that he regarded either as supernatural in quality, or as the medium of a spiritual "substance." Nor is there a hint that he associated with them any extraordinary effect. Perhaps the best comment on the epithet πνευματικός is to be found in Deuteronomy viii. 3: "He humbled thee and suffered thee to hunger, and fed thee with manna, which thou knewest not, neither did thy fathers know, that

[1] See Lietzmann, *ad loc.*

he might make thee know that man doth not live by bread only but by everything that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord" [i.e., the creative word of God by which He can call into being new means of preserving life]. So that when Paul speaks of "the same spiritual food" and "the same spiritual drink" it is not, as Heinrici (*ad loc.*) well puts it, because the manna and water in the desert are identical realities with the bread and wine in the Lord's Supper, but because both give the pledge of the same Divine grace. They are evidences of the redeeming purpose of God in history. It is from that standpoint also that he can identify the rock with Christ. For he regards the Divine working in the old and the new dispensation as an indissoluble unity.

In the second crucial passage, x. 14–21, the Apostle passes beyond vague hints and deliberately charges with idolatry those "strong" Christians who do not shrink from participating in sacrificial meals. "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not a communion with the blood of Christ? The bread (loaf) which we break, is it not a communion with the body of Christ? For as there is one bread, so we the many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread. Look at Israel according to the flesh: do not those who eat the sacrifices enter into communion with the altar? What then do I say? That sacrificial meat is anything or that an idol is anything? No, but I say that the things which the Gentiles sacrifice 'they sacrifice to demons and not to God.' [1] Now I would not have you in communion with demons. You cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of demons: you cannot share in 'the table of the Lord' [2] and in that of demons."

"Sharing in the table of the Lord" is shown in the opening sentences of the paragraph to mean partaking of

[1] Deut. xxxii. 17 (LXX). [2] Malachi i. 12 (LXX).

the cup and the bread. And this participation is described as a communion with the body and blood of Christ. Now this last conception cannot be explained in the isolation of its present context. But its meaning becomes clear from the interpretation of it which Paul has expressly given in chapter xi. There he deliberately states its significance: "As often as you eat this bread and drink this cup, you represent (καταγγέλλετε) the Lord's death till he come" (xi. 26). That is to say, the bread and wine represent not the flesh and blood of Christ as such, but His human person as slain on the Cross. Therefore communion with the body and blood of Christ means communion with the Lord as crucified and all that that involves. Hence we never find the Apostle speaking of "eating the flesh" or "drinking the blood" of Christ. He is careful to associate the solemn actions only with the bread and the cup. Accordingly it is obvious that the Lord's Supper sets forth visibly for Paul and his fellow-Christians the supreme spiritual experience which he has described in Galatians ii. 20: "I have been crucified with Christ." And as the Apostle can never dissociate the Crucifixion from the Resurrection, the appropriation of the benefits of the death of Christ which is quickened by the sacred celebration will carry with it a like appropriation of the resources of the risen Lord: "No longer do I live, but Christ liveth in me: and that which I now live in the flesh I live by faith, faith in the Son of God who loved me and gave Himself for me." A passage like this from Galatians reminds us that Paul's thought must not be interpreted atomistically, but in the light of his entire Christian experience.

There is nothing in the paragraph under examination to conflict with the explanation which we have seen to be necessitated by the Apostle's instruction on the Lord's Supper in chapter xi. 23 ff. Indeed, the comparisons which are em-

ployed are sufficient in themselves to put us on our guard against supposing that Paul's notion here is, to quote Weinel, that " the communion with the Lord into which one enters at the table of the Lord is sensible—hypersensible of a real kind," that " the conception is not of a mere spiritual reception of Christ, but somehow of His glorified corporeality." [1] It is impossible to associate with the eating of the sacrifices in Israel (ver. 18) the notion of partaking of the Deity. Such an idea is wholly foreign to Jewish thought. Nor is it otherwise in the case of the demons whom Paul regards as the real forces existing behind Pagan idols. His language is not obscure. The communion with the demons against which he warns he describes as " drinking the cup of demons," " partaking of the table of demons." These phrases, when viewed in the light of the examples cited from papyri at the beginning of this article, suggest that Paul regards the demons as hosts at the sacrificial meals, and communion with them is pictured by the relation of the guests to their hosts. [2] It is quite irrelevant to quote as decisive for Paul's meaning [3] the well-known passage from Porphyrius (*De philos. ex orac. haur.*, p. 147, ed. Wolf) in which he relates of demons that " while we are at food they approach and settle on our bodies . . . and delight especially in blood, etc.," as if this made probable for Paul the notion that they were conveyed into the bodies of the worshippers by means of the sacrificial meat. The Apostle takes for granted that the presence of any one at a sacrificial meal is necessarily a more or less distinct recognition of the super-human Person in whose honour the festival is held. And these superhuman powers he calls δαιμόνια, using the term to describe the objects of Pagan worship, after the

[1] *Biblische Theologie d. N.T.*, p. 325.
[2] See also J. Tambornino, *De antiquorum daemonismo*, pp. 36, 95.
[3] So Lietzmann, J. Weiss, and others.

model of Deuteronomy xxxii. 17, which is evidently before his mind. But Porphyrius has the diametrically opposite conception of *δαιμόνια* as beings who interfere with the worship of the gods, and who have to be driven away in order that the god may grant his presence. Very instructive for the view we have suggested of communion with the demons is a passage in the Pseudo-Clementine *Recognitiones* (II. 71) which says that every one who worships "those whom the Pagans call gods, or tastes meat sacrificed to them" becomes "a guest of demons," and "has fellowship with that demon whose aspect he has fashioned in his mind whether from fear or love."[1] We are justified, therefore, on the basis of an examination of the facts, in asserting that 1 Corinthians x. 14 ff. affords no evidence for the notion that Paul believes in the magical communication of the glorified body of Christ to the worshipper through the medium of the bread and wine.

The most ample material for estimating Paul's conception of the Lord's Supper is presented by 1 Corinthians xi. 23 ff. We have already indicated that it is an authoritative pronouncement on the subject. And it has been necessary at an earlier point to call attention to the Apostle's statement of the fundamental significance of the celebration in verse 26. Paul deduces this significance from the words and actions of Jesus, as these have come down to him through the tradition of the Church. Now, apart from the injunction to repeat the celebration as a memorial, there is no essential difference between Paul and the Synoptics. Indeed, so radical a scholar as Eichhorn goes the length of admitting that no one who compares the four reports of the Lord's Supper can doubt that all four writers speak of the selfsame thing in the very same sense.[2] With reference to the cup,

[1] So also J. Réville, *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, 1907, 56, p. 159.
[2] *Das Abendmahl im N.T.*, p. 8.

Mark, Matthew, and Luke (except the so-called "Western" text), report Jesus as saying: "This is my blood of the covenant [Luke: the new covenant in my blood] shed for many [Luke: for you]." It is therefore wholly arbitrary to challenge the allusion to the covenant as an addition made by Paul. And the saying obviously represents the approaching death of Jesus as the sacrifice which inaugurates the new covenant. The words which accompany the giving of the cup make perfectly clear the meaning of those which are spoken at the distribution of the bread, even in the brief form which is found in Matthew and Mark: "this is my body." The extended version in Paul and the non-Western texts of Luke is true to Jesus' thought: "this is my body which is for you [Luke: which is given for you]." [1] The ritual action, therefore, symbolises the death of Jesus as a medium of blessing for His followers. And that part of it which consists in eating the broken bread and drinking the wine emphasises the necessity of appropriating the salvation promised. But there is no evidence of anything realistic or magical about the benefit received. Heitmüller, indeed, finds traces of such a conception in xi. 27: "Whosoever shall eat the bread or drink the cup of the Lord unworthily shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord," taking these words in close connexion with verse 30: "On this account many among you are frail and sick and a number have fallen asleep." He compares a belief of the Syrians that the eating of sardines, which were sacred to Atargatis, produced ulcers and wasting disease.[2] But the parallel is in no sense valid. The unworthy partaking of the bread and wine is regarded by Paul as sacrilege against the crucified Christ. His idea seems exactly equivalent to that of

[1] See an excellent paragraph by Jülicher in *Abhandlungen C. von Weizsäcker gewidmet*, p. 242.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 50, 51.

Hebrews vi. 6 : " crucifying for themselves afresh the Son of God and putting him to open shame." The effect which he discerns in the sickness and death of members of the Christian community he does not trace to the partaking of the bread and wine, but distinctly names it a κρίμα, a judgment sent by God for the ultimate discipline of those who have been guilty.

It is interesting to note that in this important passage Paul is exclusively concerned with the participation of believers in the benefits of the sacrifice of Christ. The same thing applies to chapter x. 14 ff. But as we indicated, in discussing that section, it is impossible for him to think of Christ crucified apart from Christ risen (cf. Rom. iv. 25). And perhaps the significant words, " till he come," are directly intended to remind them that He whose death of love they commemorate, is " with them always until the end of the age." But for the Apostle, communion with Christ does not depend upon any sacred rite. Its essential condition is a whole-hearted faith. This he makes as plain as words can express it in such passages as Galatians ii. 20 and Philippians iii. 9. And so we are brought back to the position which we attempted to establish in our last article, where we endeavoured to show that faith is for Paul the indispensable postulate of all that is of spiritual worth in the experience of Baptism. It is not otherwise with the Lord's Supper. This was no feast of initiation. Those who partook of it had already professed to surrender themselves to Christ as their Saviour and Lord. They had received and welcomed the good news of salvation through His self-sacrificing death. The bread and the wine were to them symbols of all that that death involved. And when they received them with discernment, they were making acknowledgment of the dying love of the Redeemer. But, as in Baptism, there was something more for Paul and his converts in this sacred meal than

an impressive symbolism. The " acted parable " was amazingly fitted to rouse and invigorate their faith. Thus, by faith, they were carried past the symbols into what Holtzmann has fitly called " the sphere of the reconciling grace which rests upon the death of Christ." [1] There they were able to realise with new vividness the actual operation of the Divine love working on their behalf. The symbols became a sacrament, a convincing pledge of the mercy of God in Christ the crucified.

We have dwelt only on those aspects of the Lord's Supper which have been alleged to show a kinship with the sacred meals of Paganism. We have not referred to the curious theory of Schweitzer that in Paul's view the sacraments " produce resurrection." [2] Nor have we discussed the hypothesis that the Christian feast was modelled on those Pagan celebrations which commemorated a dead hero or ancestor, because in these latter there was nothing to correspond to Paul's central idea of communion with Christ as crucified. But we believe enough has been said to justify the statement of Von Dobschütz that " the unique sacramental conception of the Early Church, which lacks analogy in the history of religion because it belongs essentially to the Christian religion, has its origin in nothing else than Christian faith and Christian experience." [3]

H. A. A. Kennedy.

[1] *N.T. Theologie*[2], II. p. 201.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 169. [3] *Studien u. Kritiken*, 1905, I. p. 39.

THE ORACLES OF THE DISCOURSE AT JACOB'S WELL.

The graphic picture of the discourse by Jacob's well is one of the most fascinating scenes in the four Gospels. We are made to see the well-mouth, one of the few undisputed Biblical sites in the Holy Land, the patriarch's own spring, with the cornfields on the east, soon to whiten to harvest, the steep tufted mountains, Ebal to the north-west, Gerizim to the south-west, guarding the pass towards the vine-growing valley that winds down to the Mediterranean Sea. Beyond those cornfields are the hills that drain their waters west, north, and east into the Wâdy Fârah which bears them to the concealed trough of Jordan.

The persons and the dialogues are hardly less graphic. But on closer inspection we come to see that the latter are not without an allegorical sense which intensifies their interest from the historical point of view. While the religious teaching of the chapter has an interest that it can never lose, this historical and critical background also deserves a study of its own.

It has been pointed out by Professor Bacon (*The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate*) that the woman of Samaria speaks allegorically when she says *I have no husband.* She says what Samaria itself would say—in exact contrast to what Isaiah says of Judah, *Thy Maker is thy husband* (Isa. liv. 5 Heb.). The position of this passage in Isaiah is to be noted, because we shall presently see that the context of it will furnish other remarkable references in the Lord's discourse with the woman. These have not been mentioned by Professor Bacon, and they seem to me to furnish abundant justification for his remark and to illustrate it. He has drawn attention to the fact that

the narrative in 2 Kings xvii. 24 ff. has suggested the idea of *thou hast had five husbands*. "And the king of Assyria brought men from (1) Babylon, and from (2) Cuthah, and from (3) Avvah, and from (4) Hamath, and (5) Sepharvaim . . . and they possessed Samaria and dwelt in the cities thereof. . . . They feared not the Lord. . . . Every nation made gods of their own. . . . The men of Babylon made Succoth-benoth, and the men of Cuth made Nergal, and the men of *Hamath* made *Ashima*, and the Avvites made Nibhaz and Tartak, and the Sepharvites burnt their children in the fire to Adrammelech and Anammelech the gods of Sepharvaim. . . . They feared the Lord and served their own gods. . . . Unto this day they do after the former manners: they fear not the Lord. . . . So these nations feared the Lord, and served their graven images." This tangled and self-contradictory account of the origin and course of the Samaritan false worship was at any rate the Scriptural basis of the hatred of the Jews for the Samaritans which was expressed in the scriptural language habitual to the prophets (Jer. iii. 20, Ezek. xvi. 32, Hosea ii. 7, Joel i. 8) by *Thou hast had five husbands*, as also by the words of Jesus *Ye worship ye know not what*. For it is certain that the barbarous idolatry of Succoth-benoth, etc., in the seventh century B.C. had prepared the bitter enmity of Sanballat in the fifth, and had left its deep impression on the character of the people down to A.D. To this day the inhabitants are "fanatical, turbulent, and quarrelsome," though at Nâblus itself the Church Missionary Society, by its admirable hospital and medical mission with an English physician, has made for some years past a noble and partly successful effort to soften the ferocity of Islam.

There is an interesting sequel to the scriptural reference to one of the false gods mentioned above as *Ashima*, in

Greek (A) *Asimath*. For in Tobit iii. 8 we read that in Ecbatane in Media Sara daughter of Raguel "had been given in marriage to seven husbands and (it was said that) *Asmodeus* the evil demon slew them before they lived with her. And they said: [Thou art not meet to be called Sara, but Zara (trouble)]. Dost thou not know that thou hast strangled thy husbands? *Thou hast had* (ἔσχες) already seven *husbands*, neither wast thou named after any of them." Now this *Asmodeus*, by its letters *asmad*, can be identified at once with *Asimath* the false deity. This identity can be checked by the place-names connected with either. For Ecbatana where Sara lived has Hamadān as its modern equivalent, and this name is *Hamath*, the colonists from which made *Asimath* their god or goddess.[1] The question (Mark xii. 21, Luke xx. 31) concerning the woman who had *had seven husbands who left no children* is partly based upon this Sara.

There is one other point of interest before we leave this part of the subject. *He whom thou now hast* is sufficiently precise on one side, that of the allegory: Samaria *did not fear the Lord* with the true worship (2 Kings xvii.), and so had not found her true husband. So says Sara (according to the Latin Vulgate, which was translated from a MS. now lost): "Because perhaps thou hast kept me for another man" (Tobit iii. 15). This has remarkable signficance when the case of Sara is combined with that of Samaria. We may also infer that by some Jews the name Samaria was thought to be spelt Sara for short. But on the other

[1] The article *Hamath* in *E. Biblica* does not assert the contrary, for we certainly need not suppose that Hamath in Syria was the only Hamath. This name, meaning "enclosed or guarded place," would be one of the commonest names, as ubiquitous as *Ramah*; and the author of 2 Kings xvii. would naturally have written it down for any name at all similar to it, if indeed it was not the actual name before him. Dr. Cheyne in the same article identifies Ashima with Ishtar, Venus, which is just appropriate to the reproach in Tobit.

side, that of supposed reality, it is vague, for if the woman had had five husbands (*ἄνδρα, ἄνδρας, ἀνήρ*) the question must arise why she should not have had six. The supposed reality fails upon the hypotheses of death, divorce, or desertion. Thus it seems as if the evangelist had some uncertainty in his mind. And it is noteworthy that if Tobit iii. 8 was his basis, there is a like uncertainty in it. The Cambridge text here (B) reads, *and one of them thou didst not enjoy* (*καὶ ἑνὸς αὐτῶν οὐκ ὠνάσθης*), for which a various reading (א) is, *and of one of them thou art not named* (wife). Plainly the meaning may be (1) *and not one of them didst thou enjoy*, for Asmodeus slew them before they lived with her; or (2) *one* (i.e. *the last*) *of them thou didst not* (or *dost not*) *enjoy;* or (3) *thou wast* (or *art*) *not named as wife of one of them;* or (4) . . . *as wife of one* (i.e. *the last*) *of them.* Of these four interpretations the Fourth Gospel represents on the whole (4) most nearly.

Thus the idea of a woman who had had many husbands —the last husband doubtful—who left no children, is drawn from Tobit iii. (*ἤδη . . . ἔσχες ἄνδρας*): that of the Samaritan who had had five husbands is from 2 Kings xvii.

In John iv. 20 the dialogue rapidly passes from the five husbands to *our fathers worshipped in this mountain.* What connexion is there? Just the six words *Sir* (*κύριε*), *I perceive that thou art a prophet.* No modern reader will deny that the transition is natural and easy. The prophetic power seems to be exhibited in the divination of Jesus that this woman had had five husbands and it is implied that she admitted as much in *Sir, I perceive.* . . . This is the impression produced on the English reader. But let us note in passing that if we had not had these six words the transition in question would have been difficult indeed. Now if we look back, on the other hand, to the original in 2 Kings xvii. 34 ff. we find the transition from

the five "husbands" is forthwith to *the sons of Jacob* (cf. *our father Jacob* John iv. 12), and while the Hebrew takes this of Judah negatively, so that the Samaritans are represented as not conforming to Judah, the LXX takes it of Samaria positively, so that they conform only to their own commandment. The very next verses in 2 Kings provide *worship* twice (προσκυνήσετε), a word which John uses here no less than ten times in as many lines. Therefore here we have the same transition from "husbands" to "worship" that we have in John iv. This is no fortuitous coincidence. It was there long before the fourth evangelist provided the connecting link, *Sir, I perceive . . .*, and provided it with an exquisite and accomplished art.

But is *Sir, I perceive . . .* the right translation for κύριε, θεωρῶ ? Certainly κύριε does mean *Sir* sometimes. But the true translation in the vast majority of cases in the New Testament for κύριε is *Lord* (as R.V. margin here). What has to be remembered is that John has no difference to make between *Sir* and *Lord*, and though we moderns may think that *Sir* is more appropriate here, John simply says *Lord*, as if he meant the reader to take it in the usual sense. As to θεωρῶ there are but two other places where it is translated *perceive* (Acts xvii. 22, xxvii. 10), and in both cases *see* would be far better, as in the one place where it is *consider* (Heb. vii. 4). More than fifty times it is *see, behold*. And it has been shown that the Papyri use the word frequently for *to see*. Therefore the translation *Lord, I see . . .* is far more natural than what we have. Thrice the woman uses the address *Lord*. The upshot is briefly that even the Samaritans, half heathens, rejecting the prophets, called Him *Lord*, called Him a *Prophet*, and came to believe and know that He was the Saviour of the world.

The way by which they came, which next occupies us,

is found to be the way of prophecy. Two prophecies are involved, and yet neither could be employed by Jesus as such, considering that Samaritans, as every one knew, rejected the Prophets and by no means regularly conformed to the Law. Schürer says: "Their observance of the law, e.g., with regard to tithes and the Levitical laws of purification, did not indeed correspond with Pharisaic requirements, on which account they were placed on a level with Gentiles. They were, however, decidedly distinguished from idolaters." Such is the evidence of the Mishna. It would therefore have been vain for Jesus to claim or for John to lead up to the belief of the Samaritans through any avenue of Argument from the Law. The Argument from Prophecy is still the road which is followed in this chapter, but it is a peculiar form of the Argument. For the prophecies here involved are, if we may use the term, submarine, like latent mountain-ranges underneath the surface: and yet they require to be charted as much as if they were Himalayas.

The two submarine prophecies here are the following:

Isaiah xii. 3. With joy *shall ye draw* (ἀντλήσετε) *water* from the *fountains* of salvation (a various reading being *he shall draw*, ἀντλήσεται).

Isaiah lii. 5 ff. Thus saith the Lord, Because of you continually my name is blasphemed among the Gentiles. Therefore my people shall know my name in that day, that *I am he that speaketh.* I am present as *dawn* upon *the mountains*, as feet of him that preacheth the gospel [of the] hearing of peace, as he that preacheth the gospel [of] good things: for I will make thy *salvation* to be heard saying, O Sion, thy king shall be God. . . . And the Lord will reveal his holy arm in the sight of all the Gentiles, and all the ends of the earth shall see *the salvation* that cometh *from God.*

I. The first of these oracles is the basis of John iv. 10–15. It is well known to have been the jubilant greeting and motto of the Jewish people at the annual Feast of Tabernacles, just as "The Lord is risen: He is risen indeed" is the Christmas motto of the Eastern Church to-day. The water-bearing of that chiefest of all the Feasts was a symbolic ceremony that came home to the heart of every pious Jew and carried with it a multitude of lessons, of purity, of tradition in the carrying, of renovation and refreshing in the recurrence, of sacrifice in the outpouring beside the altar. I have tried to show that its lessons and at least its imagery which conveyed them were carried over from Judaism to the Christian faith by the language of baptism, which was itself drawn from the Greek of Isaiah lx.–lxii.[1] The literature of Baptism is so largely developed in the *Odes of Solomon* at so early a date that an explanation is required, and the explanation may well be that the Feast of Epiphany on its bapt smal side, and this is certainly by far its most prominent side, originated in the Feast of Tabernacles.

This oracle, therefore, was of no casual or chance occurrence; though it is little known to many English readers in its application, it was one of the principal texts of the Bible to a Jew of the first century A.D. Its importance was too great to be passed over in any controversy. How then was its importance affected by the Argument from Prophecy? Did Jesus as the Christ fulfil it? In the Hebrew form it was not expressed in the form of a prediction for *Him* to fulfil, but for *them* who believed on Him to see fulfilled, *Ye shall draw. . . .* But in the Greek form the better reading was actually *He shall draw. . . .* And the Greek tended continually to displace the Hebrew,[2] and by 100

[1] *Journ. Theol. Studies*, vol. xiii., Jan., 1912, "The Feast of Tabernacles, etc." [2] See *Oracles in the New Testament*, pp. 53 foll., 158, etc.

A.D. had entirely displaced it outside Palestine. We should therefore expect to find the fulfilment of the prophecy according to the Greek form. In point of fact we find the words of fulfilment (John iv. 13 f.) reflect both forms of prediction: *Every one* that drinketh (πίνων), *whoso* drinketh (πίῃ) . . . these sentences convey the purport of the Hebrew form of the oracle. The water *that I will give him* represents the Greek form, as also, Whence *hast thou* the living water? *To draw* (ἀντλεῖν) is used thrice (John iv. 7, 11, 15). But the *drawing* is part of the prediction only: the fulfilment is such as to supersede the idea of drawing, for the water of life springs up of itself within the heart and needs no *drawing* with pail and rope.

And here it is to be observed that the idea of the fulfilment had been already partially furnished by another oracle from a very different quarter:—

Proverbs xviii. *Deep water* is reason (or [*the*] *word*, λόγος) in the heart of a man, and a river bubbleth up (ἀναπηδύει) and *a fountain of life.*

It is no chance coincidence with these words that the woman says *And the well is deep.* It is no chance coincidence that Jesus replies *The water* that I will give him shall become in him *a fountain of water leaping up* (ἁλλομένου, for ἀναπηδύει is a very rare and difficult word unknown to Liddell and Scott) unto eternal *life.* What more appropriate than for Him who was the Word to speak of this deep water leaping up within the heart? The latter oracle thus provided by itself a dull and impersonal fulfilment of the former. But, once more, this, with the other oracles of the Prophe ts, was unknown to the Samaritan mind. And above all, the significance of it was unknown to all the world until the time came when those beautiful words of Isaiah were made to thrill with a life that is far greater than beauty, by the gracious personal touch of Him who is the Saviour

of the world. Only by His deliberate fulfilment of them, by His taking them as His own and uttering them from His own lips, do they carry the force of an age-long and eternal life. The greeting of the Jewish Tent-feast is extended to Samaria and made forthwith an offer to the whole world.

II. The second oracle, that on which the dialogue of John iv. 20–24 is worked, is equally instructive and capable of illuminating the dialogue itself. The clear statement that *Salvation is from* (ἐκ) *the Jews*, starting from them and proceeding outwards—what springs of history are concealed in that tiny word ἐκ in many passages besides this, especially that of the Virgin-birth !—connects it with the former oracle in its deep significance. That declared the eternal import of the inward and personal touch, this declares the dawn of the new inward method of spiritual life. In the citation of Isaiah lii. 5 ff., as quoted above, the italicised words are chiefly to be noted as actually present in the dialogue. (1) The *mountains* (plural) are actually mentioned, for not only does Gerizim imply Ebal, but *Jerusalem* is itself a mountain 2,500 feet above the sea. Hence *neither in this mountain nor in Jerusalem* . . . But then (2) the very words of the oracle, *I am he that speaketh* (ἐγώ εἰμι αὐτος ὁ λαλῶν) are reproduced in *I am, that speak* to thee (ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ λαλῶν σοι). Nothing can possibly overcome this fact. Nothing can easily surpass the exquisite personal touch of *to thee :* not even that thrilling announcement later to Martha, *The Master* is come and calleth *for thee.* Then (3) the force of the words *the dawn cometh*, which John iv. 21, 23 gives twice as if to emphasise it, is almost wholly lost in our poor translation *the hour cometh.* The Revisers could not indeed have been expected to have their eyes open to all the quotations, submarine or other, from the LXX in the New Testament when Hort himself

declared at the time when the revision was concluded that there were many more to be discovered, and when he marked with a star those which Moulton had supplied to him at the last (App. p. 175). The further discovery of the use of LXX is still proceeding and will proceed. Here is a very certain use of it. *The dawn* is a very rare use of the word ὥρα in LXX: it occurs only in Deuteronomy xxxiii. 13, *beautiful season*. But that it was once commonly used of a [or the] "beautiful season" is proved by the fact of its adjective ὡραῖος meaning "beautiful." Nobody who has seen the dawn in Palestine can hesitate to identify it with beauty. The Lord says not precisely *I am present as dawn* (πάρειμι ὡς ὥρα), but almost the same words, *the dawn cometh and now is* (ἔρχεται ὥρα καὶ νῦν ἐστίν); for He it is *that preacheth the gospel of peace*, reconciling all local salvations in the universal. No other kind of peace was possible.

Now (4) we have seen above that the Samaritans were treated in the Mishna as being on a level with Gentiles. Here in Isaiah lii. we have two references to the Gentiles and one to the ends of the earth. In John iv. they are clearly implied in *the true worshippers*, in *neither in Jerusalem*, and in *from* the *Jews*, i.e. proceeding outside them. But (5) *the salvation* is the only true and complete translation of the definite article before this substantive, though it might seem pedantic in English. "The salvation in question" is what underlies the words. What can this be but the salvation mentioned in the oracle? *Salvation* in the New Testament very rarely has the definite article, and where the definite article is used the immediate reason for it can be seen in nearly every case. The holy city, says the oracle in the preceding context, is to be ransomed without money and without price, even as the Lord's people went into captivity to Egypt and to Assyria (the cradle of this very Samaritan people) for naught, and

yet it is owing to their captivity (δι' ὑμᾶς) that His name is blasphemed among the Gentiles: who know it just enough to blaspheme it, not enough to love it. In future they, too, shall love it as their salvation also, and the dawn of this bright day is now at hand. This is *the* salvation (τὴν σωτηρίαν σου) which John iv. 22 takes up: it proceeds from the Jews but is not limited to them.

Thus there are ten lines of the oracle and ten lines of John iv. which involve no less than five coincidences. These cannot be fortuitous. The latter is built upon the former. But we now come to the most indubitable evidence that it was so built, and that the Lord is reasoning upon the oracle. This consists in the words translated in A.V. *God is a spirit*, most unhappily and irrelevantly, and in R.V. *God is spirit*, which is better, but still imperfect. The subject, however, is far too large for this paper.

It can only be said that in the interpretation of countless oracles the Christian Prophets were perplexed as to the meaning of *the Lord*, whether it meant "the supreme God," as in later days Justin would say, or Christ. In *The Lord said unto my lord*, Sit thou . . . the meaning was clear enough. But *the Lord* was not always Jehovah: in multitudes of passages it pointed to Christ—*the day of the Lord*, *the name of the Lord*, and many more instances which would occupy pages and pages to describe. Elsewhere I hope to be able to show that the true meaning of the words in John iv. 24 is not that of our English versions. Meanwhile I have a strong impression that the Interpreter of the oracle is a greater than John the Evangelist.

III. Whether the setting of the narrative can be considered historical is another question. There are some facts which militate against this character, two of which can here be mentioned. The first is not so much against its genuineness as against its position in John iv., where

it stands before the Judaean ministry. This was pointed out as early as the second century, when Tatian asked the question, Can a Samaritan ministry be supposed to have preceded the Judaean ministry? And to this he gave the negative answer, and therefore placed John iv. after John vi. This displacement of the traditional order of the chapters of John by Tatian, and the other displacements, have been so fully exhibited by Professor Bacon in *The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate* that I need only refer to that striking and important work.

The other fact is one that throws considerable light upon the geographical knowledge of the Fourth Evangelist, and is really far more important. John says *Jacob's fountain was there* (iv. 5), and Jesus sat thus *at the fountain*. Later on we read *a fountain of water leaping up into life eternal*. Now in these three places the word is πηγή, *fount, spring*, which frequently means *origin, source*, but never means what we call *well* (φρέαρ), an artificial thing contrasted with the natural supply. *Well* is used here twice; *the well is deep* and *Jacob who gave us the well*. Though of course every well worthy of the name possesses at the bottom of it a source (πηγή), even if the surface of the water appears from above to be quite still, this fact does not cause the well to be described as a πηγή, which is invariably a source of visibly running water. The well or pit (φρέαρ) is always and essentially a hole, whether containing water or not. Assuming Jacob's well to be that which is traditionally so called, nobody would ever call it a πηγή. But according to the R.V. the Fourth Gospel has done so. Naturally there is a general reluctance to say that the Fourth Evangelist did not know the locality or he could not have said πηγή when he meant φρέαρ. Naturally there is a reluctance to throw doubt upon one of the four or five undoubted identities of site in the Holy Land. Nevertheless the

facts are as they are stated above. And there are other facts. One is that the oracle of Isaiah xii. 3 has *from the fountains* (πηγῶν) *of salvation*, not *the wells*. This fact would suggest one solution of the difficulty, viz., that St. John went out of his way to call *the well* a *fountain* in order to prepare for exhibiting the close fulfilment of the oracle in Isaiah xii., though it was straining a point to use the term. If such explanation is adopted, then the point I make in this paper is admitted.

But this end could have been attained without that means, and therefore does not justify the use of it when the use involves an inaccuracy and more than an inaccuracy. For it was not necessary by any means for the evangelist to say so graphically that *Jesus sat thus by the fountain* if really He *sat by the well*, of which, further, we are told that it was deep, and a bucket and rope were required to draw from it. "Jacob's well" was 75 feet deep and quite dry in May, 1866, when Anderson descended it. Conder says it was 75 feet deep in 1875 and fills by infiltration. The depth was 67 feet in 1881. On October 31, 1910, it contained muddy and undrinkable water. It does not follow that it was always such a worthless well. Westcott observes: "The labour of constructing the well in the neighbourhood of abundant natural springs, shows that it was the work of a "stranger in the land."[1] It is lined throughout with rough masonry, as it is dug in alluvial soil (Warren)." Against another statement of Westcott it must be said that it is not called a *'Ain*, fountain. The Rev. John Mill, in his *Three Months' Residence at Nâblus*, 1864, says that the Christians call it *Beer Samarîyeh*, the "Samaritan Well," while the Samaritans call it *Beer Yakob* or "Jacob's Well," and that it is not a *'Ain* (πηγή), as Westcott says it is

[1] Does this mean that Jacob could not wait till his men found a spring within a mile or less?

called, but a *Beer*, *Ber*, a cistern (φρέαρ). The Greek Church has purchased it, and after many years has now built a Church round and above it.

Travellers have been perplexed by the thought that Jacob was at this trouble to build a well a hundred feet deep in alluvial soil at this particular place, which lies in a depression within easy distance of many springs. So powerful is tradition ! And yet on what does the tradition rest ? Simply and solely on John iv. 12, *Jacob who gave us the well.* John does not say that Jacob made it, and " lined it throughout with rough masonry," without which it would have been useless. The well is not mentioned in the Old Testament. But John iv. 12 further makes the woman say that Jacob's *cattle drank of it.* This must have been a lengthy business indeed. There is a peculiar perversity and inability or fanaticism or tribal prejudice in some people, but yet Jacob had the power to purchase ground in that neighbourhood with *a hundred lambs* (Gen. xxxiii. 19), and also he asserts the power of conquest over *the Amorite* (highlander) *with my sword and with my bow* (Gen. xlviii. 22). Why then did he not acquire one of the neighbouring springs ? " There is a copious fountain in 'Askar : and a stream, capable of turning a mill, flows down the valley only ' a few rods ' from Jacob's well " (G. A. Smith, quoting Robinson). There are therefore some fountains, if one is required to water the cattle. And considering the utter improbability, upon the evidence on the whole, against this particular well being the place where Jacob's cattle drank, it is important to note that what the Fourth Gospel vouches for is not that it was such, but that the Samaritan woman said so. Consequently the whole tradition since A.D. rests upon (1) very insecure testimony that Jacob's well was at Sychar, though a watering place of Jacob there is extremely probable : and upon (2) no testimony at all

that the traditional well is Jacob's well. But let us see.

Since the woman reported the tradition that Jacob's "cattle drank of the well," we look for a fountain, not a well, and one such fountain is the *'Ain Defna* near which the Turkish barracks have been built beside the road. This fine spring is 1,000 yards from Nâblus, and is seen by every wayfarer. This is the particular potential mill-stream which Robinson has described, little as it might appear from Professor Adam Smith's mention of it. Robinson says [1]: "The difficulties of the general question are in no degree lessened. The woman would have had to cross a mill-stream in order to reach the well; and it remains just as inexplicable why the well should ever have been dug. The easiest solution of this latter difficulty is the hypothesis, that the fountain Defneh, from which the mill-stream comes, may be of later date than the well; the effect, perhaps, of earthquakes in this abundantly watered region." Dr. Adam Smith rightly fights shy of the earthquake hypothesis: "In an argument like this we do not dare to count on it." And what sort of earthquake was it that upset the whole disposition of the waters in the vale of Shechem while it did not disturb the masonry of Jacob's well 100 feet deep in alluvial soil?

Now the Bordeaux pilgrim (333 A.D.), the earliest authority for the position of Sychar, places Sychar (Sechar) 1,000 yards from Neapolis (Sechim). The exact concurrence of measurements is remarkable. There is no reason why the *'Ain Defna* should not have been the *fountain* where Jacob watered his cattle, and also the *fountain* at which Jesus sat, and also the fountain of Sychar and in Sychar. But it could not be also the place where the deep well was: Jacob's well is 1,000 yards further to the S.E. And the Greek compels us to distinguish the two, as was observed

[1] *Biblical Researches*, iii., 1856, p. 133.

above. Nothing but unusual prejudice would ever have led the world to suppose that we ought to identify them, or even that the Fourth Gospel intended us to do so. Had it even begun by mention of a *well* and afterwards called it a *fountain*, we might, under conditions very hard to imagine, have said that here was a rough description of one and the same well. But now this mode of conciliation is forbidden to us.

Yet if we look at the passage again we can see that the whole discourse is quite natural upon the supposition that it took place beside the fountain and not beside the well. The woman came *to draw* water. This suits the fountain. Jesus asks her to give Him to drink. This request at the fountain is quite natural, whether we suppose that He and she arrived simultaneously and He wished to make the friendly overture, or that He had already drunk before and *thirsted again* (John iv. 13). Nor is there any difficulty in supposing that in A.D. 30 there was a "*Jacob's fountain*" (*πηγὴ τοῦ Ἰακώβ*, John iv. 5). In fact the same verse seems to say that there was a "*Jacob's place*" (or a *Joseph's place*) which was more famous than Sychar and helped to localise Sychar. It is not conceivable that if Sychar was Shechem the evangelist would have localised the well-known Shechem by the explanation *near to the place which Jacob gave to his son Joseph*. And in any case why should he have written these words unless to show that the name of Jacob lingered about the locality? The difficulty only occurs in John iv. 10, 11, and this is the explanation I now suggest. *Living water!* "He means," the woman thinks, "the healing water from the sacred well called *Jacob's well* a mile further on, but it is ill coming at that: often it is dry, and one must bring his own bucket for it, and this wayfarer has none." Therefore she says *Thou hast nothing to draw with, and the well is deep*. "This well" is not an

expression that she ever uses ; she would have said "*that* well" for it was distant ; but *the well* is intelligible if it was famous, and it was famous only if it was supposed to possess magical qualities, as well it might if it was intermittent even in those days ; and if it was magical she might have supposed that once upon a time the cattle drank of it. There could be none greater than *our father Jacob !*

I can see no other explanation that will not accuse the Fourth Evangelist of utter carelessness in interchanging a fountain with a well in that neighbourhood and so of being ignorant of the geography of one of the best-known localities in the land. That he did not know the difference of meaning between the Greek for *fountain* and the Greek for *well* is a hopelessly untenable supposition. Equally untenable is it that knowing the locality he should not have cared to make the place of discourse plain to his readers. Equally untenable is it that if he were of the Twelve he did not know the locality ; though his knowledge of it does not prove him the son of Zebedee.

E. C. Selwyn.

EXEGETICA.

I.

"Our Daily Bread."

Herr A. Debrunner (in *Glotta*, 1912, 249 f.) offers an ingenious explanation of the enigmatic ἐπιούσιος in Matthew vi. 11=Luke xi. 3. He regards it as equivalent to ἐπὶ τὴν οὖσαν (sc. ἡμέραν). The latter phrase occurs in full in the *Oedipus Tyrannus* (781), e.g., where Sophokles makes Oedipus exclaim : κἀγω βαρυνθεὶς τὴν μὲν οὖσαν ἡμέραν μόλις κατέσχον. Now, at the time when the Gospels were written, Herr Debrunner thinks, ἡ οὖσα ἡμέρα may have been

a current phrase, like ὁ ὢν μήν, and the adjective was naturally formed from it. The old objection that this derivation involves an awkward hiatus is dismissed on the ground that it is not more serious here than in the case of ἐπιετής in Polybius (III. 55. 1) or ἐπιημερινός in the papyri (*Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, vi. 924). The main difficulty, of course, is the lack of any evidence as yet to prove that ἡ οὖσα (ἡμέρα)was current in the Hellenistic Greek of the first century. Herr Debrunner consoles himself by reflecting, however, that perhaps it will be found in a papyrus! In any case, he observes, a linguistic argument which favours the old rendering of "daily bread" will probably be welcome to many people.

II.

The Appendix to Mark's Gospel.

In a short paper contributed to the *Wiener Studien* (1912, pp. 301–317), Herr Adolf Bauer proposes to recover the historical nucleus of Mark xvi. 1–8 by eliminating verses 5–7 as a legendary addition. This involves still further liberties with the text, however. Wellhausen was content to remove ver. 7 as an interpolation, but Bauer's theory cuts ἐξελθοῦσαι out of ver. 8, where it was introduced as a foil to the εἰσελθοῦσαι of ver. 5, and also the words of xiv. 28, which are echoed in xvi. 7 (καθὼς εἶπεν ὑμῖν). By this process he considers that it is possible to recover a historical narrative, emanating from the primitive church, which described the death of Jesus without any hint of a resurrection.

III.

Lysanias.

In the *Revue Biblique* (1912, 533–540) Fr. M. R. Savignac announces the discovery of a new Greek inscription at Soug

ouâdy Baradâ, the site of Abila, the capital of ancient Abilene. He prints a facsimile of the writing, which shows that there was a Lysanias as tetrarch; Nymphaios, the author, describes himself as *Λυσανίου τετράρχου ἀπ[ε]λε[ύ]θερο[ς]*. The inscription seems to be a more perfect copy than the similar one already known in the Corpus of Greek Inscriptions (4521). A reference to the *Σεβαστοί* at the beginning of the inscription helps, according to Fr. Savignac, to fix the date, since Livia who enjoyed the title of Augusta died in 29 A.D. Which tallies with the synchronism of Luke iii. 1.

IV.

"What have I to do with thee?"

Some light upon the meaning of the phrase, *τί ἐμοὶ καὶ σοί*; in the reply of Jesus to his mother (John ii. 4) is furnished by the contemporary usage of similar phrases in Epictetus. One of these occurs in i. 22. 15 (*τί μοι καὶ αὐτῷ, εἰ οὐ δύνατα ἱ μοι βοηθῆσαι; καὶ πάλιν, τί μοι καὶ αὐτῷ, εἰ θέλει μὲ ἐν τοιούτοις εἶναι ἐν οἷς εἰμι*), the petulant complaints of a man about the carelessness of Zeus. 'What is he to me? What have I to do with him?' Again in i. 27. 13 (*λοιδορῶ τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς ἄλλους· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιστρέφονταί μου, τί ἐμοὶ καὶ αὐτοῖς;*). Here the phrase is associated with a resentment of indifference, whereas in John it is occasioned by a resentment of interference, but the employment of it by Epictetus corroborates the Septuagint evidence, and tells against the view, recently advocated by Professor Burkitt (*Journal of Theological Studies*, 1912, pp. 594–595), that in John it only means, "Never mind; don't be worried," as if it were equivalent to *τί ἡμῖν*, "What have you and I to do with that?"

V.

"If it were not so."

The ordinary rendering of John xiv. 2 is, *If it were not so* (i.e. if there were not μοναὶ πολλαί in my Father's house)[1] *I would have told you: for* (ὅτι) *I am going to prepare a place for you.* But the ὅτι here is ὅτι recitativum, and the passage probably should be read as a question. *If it were not so, would I have told you that I was going to prepare a place for you?* This is Weizsäcker's translation, and it has been adopted by Merx (*Das Evangelium des Johannes nach der Syrischen im Sinaikloster gefundenen Palimpsesthandschrift*, 1911, pp. 365 f.), Heitmüller, and W. Bauer recently. The objection usually taken to this rendering is that Jesus has not told the disciples previously that He was going to prepare a place for them, but the thought is at any rate anticipated in xii. 26, and, even apart from such earlier allusions, it is not uncommon in the Fourth Gospel to find similar references (e.g. x. 25, xi. 40), where Jesus reminds His hearers of something which the evangelist has not recorded.[2] It is too strong language to call the ordinary version of the passage "der Gipfel der Plattheit," as Merx does. But the interrogative rendering does yield an adequate sense, and one which harmonises with the context.

VI.

Gamaliel.

In Acts v. 34 f. the Jewish Sanhedrim are persuaded by Gamaliel to refrain from putting Peter and the rest of the

[1] This is much more natural than to regard ver. 2*a* as parenthetical, and connect εἰ δὲ μή with the πιστεύετε of ver. 1, as Dr. Abbott suggests (*Johannine Grammar*, 2080–2086), meaning, "if you will not believe that at least believe me when I say I am going to prepare a place for you." The ὅτι here may be interrogative just as much as in the Septuagint.

[2] Spitta holds that he did record it in a passage which has been omitted.

apostles to death. Gamaliel was a Pharisee who, according to Derenbourg (*Histoire de la Palestine*, 1867, pp. 209 f.), owed his position and influence in the council mainly to Queen Cypros. According to Herr Böhlig (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1913, pp. 112–120), Pharisaic doctrine underlies his advice to the Sadducean majority. *Refrain from these men and let them alone. For if this plan or work be of men, it will be overthrown; and if it is of God, you will not be able to overthrow them. Maybe, it will be found that you are actually fighting against God!* According to Josephus (*Antiq.* xiii. 5. 9, xviii. 1. 3, *Bell. Jud.* ii. 8. 14), the Pharisees taught a form of synergism; a modified freedom of will was left to man, under the overruling providence of God. The Sadducees emphasised the freedom of man, to the depreciation of divine ruling; they laid no stress on predestination. Even when allowance is made for a Greek bias in the evidence of Josephus, his general representation corresponds upon the whole to what is known otherwise of the tendencies prevalent in the two parties, and Herr Böhlig interprets Gamaliel's reason for abstinence from severe measures as a confident belief in God's ability to overthrow this upstart group of heretics. The Pharisee speaks with an undernote of irony against the Sadducees' disposition to forget the overruling will of God, but not with any sympathy for the Nazarenes; their enterprise is a human device, and the God of Israel can be and must be left to deal with it.

James Moffatt.

ALEXANDER THE GOD.

I.

THE important part played by emperor-worship in the history of early Christianity is even now, perhaps, not fully realised except by comparatively few, and indeed even those who are not especially concerned with the religious aspect of those times seldom do it justice. Not less important either for secular or religious history, and certainly an essential part of any study of emperor-worship, is the earlier cult of the hellenistic monarchs; which itself can only be understood if a beginning be made with Alexander.[1] Such a beginning is here attempted, not a very easy or satisfying task, nor one that bears an immediate and direct relation to Old Testament or New, yet one that can be made to throw a flood of light upon the struggle that was to be waged between the God become man and the man become god, the Lord Jesus and the Lord Caesar.

This struggle was but the struggle of Seleucid and Maccabee writ large, and the claim of that storm-tossed dynasty to godhead was itself, again, an inheritance from Alexander the Great. The latter, like Augustus, found himself confronted by a problem in his personal relations with his subjects. How was the servile worship of the Egyptians, the scarcely less servile homage of Asiatics, to be harmonised with the freer monarchy of the Macedonians? Un-

[1] The writer may perhaps mention that he has attempted to give a historical outline of the whole subject in *Ancient King-worship*, a penny pamphlet written for the series on the History of Religions lately brought out by the Catholic Truth Society.

happily both Alexander and Augustus determined to degrade the West.

By his victories over Darius Alexander of course became master of the whole Achaemenid empire; but from the point of view of Alexander's claim to be a god Egypt must be considered separately. Apart from Egypt, says Mr. Bevan, "(the theory) that Alexander claimed divine honours in order to conform to the oriental model . . . will hardly stand examination. Neither among the Assyrio-Babylonian Semites nor among the Iranians do we find the sovereign worshipped as a god." [1] Temples, priesthoods and the like are wanting, and even the star affixed to the names of the departed sovereigns, implying, as it appears to do, some kind of heroising, is found only in the case of the older Babylonian kings.

But the position of the Great King in Egypt was different. For, though Cambyses outraged the Egyptian religion, his successor followed quite another policy. He cultivated the priests, studied the sacred writings, and sought to imitate the great kings of old; "wherefore he was so greatly honoured, as while yet living to be called god by the Egyptians, alone of all the kings, and on his death to receive honours equal to those who of old ruled over Egypt with greatest justice." [2] Mr. Bevan, of course, admits worship in the case of the Pharaohs. "Only in the case of the Egyptians can we point to a formal worship of the sovereign: the king was the son of Ra, the 'good god,' served, like other celestials, with temples and altars and sacrifice." [3] It is unlikely that Darius' successors ever definitely renounced the Pharaonic divinity which he assumed, and an

[1] *The English Historical Review*, October, 1901; *The Deification of Kings in the Greek Cities*, by E. R. Bevan, pp. 629–630.

[2] Diod. Sic., i. 95, 5; cf. i. 90, 3.

[3] The whole subject is treated at length by A. Moret, *Du caractère religieux de la royauté pharaonique*, Paris, 1902.

inscription seems to show the contrary [1]; though there is a world of difference between willing and unwilling service. Divinity on the Nile, however, was not divinity on the Euphrates.

Such, it would seem, was the real state of the case; but it can hardly be doubted that the Greeks of Alexander's time, and even before, thought that the Achaemenids were gods their whole dominions over. The historians of Alexander himself will be touched upon later. The most striking evidence for the times preceding is the chorus' famous greeting to Atossa in Aeschylus' Persae: "The bedfellow of the Persians' god thou, yea, and the mother of their god." She is Darius' wife, Xerxes' mother. Keiper [2] has collected all the lines in the Persae which point in the same direction. His attempt to explain them all away is unconvincing, perhaps even a little wooden. "The Persians call their kings gods," explains the scholiast, and this seems Aeschylus' view. Herodotus, too, attributes to Cyrus a claim to be more than man.[3] This would rest on the wonderful story of his being suckled by a bitch, as Romulus and Remus were by the she-wolf, the dog being sacred to Ahura-Mazda, as the wolf to Mars; Herodotus, however, rationalises the story,[4] as some did the Roman legend.[5] Yet again, Isocrates represents the Great King as addressed by the title "daemon." [6]

Several scholars have practically accepted the evidence of the Greeks as conclusive, while others have maintained that they were misled by the ceremony of prostration. The truth probably lies midway between the two. The Greeks objected to prostration on religious grounds; but

[1] In honour of Darius II., ap. Droysen, *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*, i. 322.

[2] *Die Perser des Aeschylos*, pp. 24 ff., Erlangen, 1877.

[3] Hdt., i. 204, etc. [4] Hdt., i. 122.

[5] Livy, i. 4. [6] Isoc. Paneg., 151.

Herodotus knew that it was due to others than kings,[1] and Isocrates actually speaks of a divine invocation, besides the prostration. Hence some further explanation is needed, and it is probably to be found in the fact that the Persian monarchs looked upon themselves as enjoying to an altogether extraordinary extent the help and protection of Ahura-Mazda.[2] Their subjects would thus consider their persons as sacred and august; and, we may further notice, would adopt with less difficulty the worship of Alexander and his successors.

If Alexander believed that to step into the shoes of the Great King he must become a despot-god, he may well have thought that the time had come when such a claim to divinity would not be too great a shock to his subjects in the West. For the Greeks the hero had already spanned the cleft betwixt man and god. Hero-worship perhaps began in Greece in the eighth or ninth century, among the Aeolians and Dorians, among whom it was always more in vogue. Indeed, the Athenians derided the Boeotians, among many other things, for their self-slaying heroines.[3] The Ionians, on their part, burnt their dead, and, besides, were on too intimate terms with the gods themselves to need any go-betweens; eventually they deified men without difficulty, but never heroised on a large scale. The hero proper, historically speaking, might either be a god fallen out of favour, often for reasons of a racial kind, or an epithet of a god broken loose and personified, or a glorified man, to whom various legends had attached themselves. He was always believed, however, to have once led a mortal life, and was supplied with a grave, and there, naturally enough,

[1] Hdt., i. 134.

[2] The point is well brought out by M. Radet: *Revue des Universités du Midi*, Avril-Juin, 1895; *La Déification d'Alexandre*, pt. ii. He holds, however, that the Achaemenids were everywhere gods.

[3] Plato Com. Kock, C.A.F., i. 622, Frg. 74.

received a cult of a chthonic character, the placatory rites offered to the gods below to ward off evil, and became associated with the chthonic snake. We may remember that legend gave both Alexander [1] and Augustus [2] a snake for a father.

The earliest examples of the deliberate heroising of the recently dead come from North Greece and Sicily,[3] and are probably due to Thracian influence and to the Dorians respectively. In Greece proper it is not common before Alexander, but we may instance the fallen at Plataea,[4] and Athens' tyrant-slayers.[5]

It has been explained that the hero had a divine and human side, that he was supposed to have been a man, yet was often really a sunken god. It is significant, however, for our present purpose, that some remained in what we may term an amphibious condition. Herodotus' pious soul, to be sure, is greatly shocked at the mere thought of a mortal even being descended from gods, the more so that these children of Zeus, whose birth Greek legend relegated to the shadowy past, were shown by Egyptian chronology—his discovery has a modern smack—to be quite a late progeny.[6] That Perseus can be Zeus' son he simply denies.[7] But Heracles proved a terribly hard nut to crack, and cost him a couple of voyages : his final conclusion is, that there are two, one the son of Zeus, and an Olympian god, one the son of Amphitryon, and a mere hero ; and that those Greeks do well, who render to each the becoming ritual.[8] He is perhaps thinking of the Sicyonians, of whom Pausanias [9] relates as follows :

[1] Plut. Alex., 2. [2] Suet. Aug., 94.

[3] E.g., Timesius of Clazomenae at Abdera (Hdt., i. 168), Miltiades in the Chersonese (Hdt., vi. 38) ; Brasidas replaces Hagnon as founder-hero of Amphipolis (Thuc., v. 11) ; Gelon of Syracuse (Diod. Sic., xi. 38), etc.

[4] Thuc., iii. 58, etc. [5] Dem. Fals. Leg., 280.

[6] Cf. Hdt., i. 142–146. [7] Hdt., vi. 53, [8] Hdt., ii. 43–44.

[9] Paus., iii. 10, 1.

"They say that Phaestus, when he came to Sicyon, found the Sicyonians devoting offerings (ἐναγίζοντας, the word for chthonic rites) to Heracles as to a hero. But Phaestus would do nothing of the kind, but insisted on sacrificing to him as a god. And even now the Sicyonians, when they slay a lamb and burn the thighs upon his altar, eat a portion of the flesh as though it were a sacrificial victim, and another part of the flesh they make over (ἐναγίζουσι) as to a hero."

Clearly Phaestus was accustomed to an Olympian rite at home. But neither the Sicyonians nor any other Greeks really upheld two Heracles. Nor is his an isolated case. Herodotus himself seems to have been aware that the cult offered to Menelaus and Helen at Therapnae was divine, not heroic [1]; and Deneken gives other examples.[2]

Even if a hero were nowhere a god in his own right, he might become one to all intents and purposes through association of cults. Among the Greek gods this was quite a frequent practice; they shared their altars and temples without difficulty. Heroes, too, might share their shrines, as apparently Peirithous, Theseus, Oedipus and Adrastus did at Colonus.[3] But from our present standpoint the important association is that of god and hero. Erectheus shared Poseidon's altar in his own Erechtheum, a fact probably to be explained by his being originally a mere epithet of Poseidon: within the same building were also altars to the hero Boutas, and to Hephaestus.[4] At Oropus there was a fivefold altar, one part of which was dedicated to Heracles, Zeus and Apollo Paeon, one to the heroes and their wives in general, one to Hestia, Hermes, Amphiaraus,

[1] Isocr., x. 63; cf. Hdt., vi. 61.

[2] Art. Heros in Roscher's *Lexikon der Mythologie.*

[3] Pausanias, i. 30. Is the "hollow" of Sophocles O.C. 1593 that of the ἐσχάρα or heroic hearth-altar?

[4] Paus., i. 26.

and Amphilochus' children ; and so on.[1] So, too, Artemis shared her altar with Alpheus,[2] and one to Zeus Herkeios, Hermes and Akamas has been found at Athens.[3] We have to remember that this relation was a very close one : feasts, and often offerings, would be in common : we even know from Plutarch that he who sacrificed to a god was understood to invoke also the sharers of his altar or temple, even though he did not expressly name them.[4] Such usages would tend to blur the distinction between the god and his protégé : we are not surprised to find a generic use of θεός covering heroes, even in Sophocles.[5]

In the present article we are not primarily concerned with the passing of dead monarchs from being heroes to godhead, in the time of the early Ptolemies and Seleucids : it is the living Alexander that is in question. There are, it is true, one or two cases of a living man becoming a hero ; for example, Dion at Syracuse,[6] but this could never become a general practice, for, one may say, it was essential to a hero to be dead and gone, and to apply the title to a living man might imply a wish to see him to his grave. The hero prepares men's minds for the deification alike of the living and the dead ; but in the former case heroship could not be an intermediate stage.

On the other hand, we have two examples of men who become gods, even before Alexander. Something of the kind seems to be implied in Homer, and it is noteworthy that most often there is question of Hector, the champion of the East ;[7] but on this we cannot linger. To come to more certain history, Lysander's Persian connexion, and

[1] Paus., i. 34. [2] Paus., iv. 14 ; schol. Pindar, Nem. i. 3.
[3] Köhler, *Mitt. d. ath. Inst.*, iv. (1879), 288.
[4] Plut. Symp., vii. 6.
[5] Soph. O.C. 65 ; for other examples, Jebb *ad loc.*
[6] Diod. Sic., xvi. 20.
[7] Il., 22, 394 ; 7, 298, etc.

the nearness of Samos to the Asiatic coast, put him in a position more or less approaching that of the hellenistic kings or Alexander. It seems certain that at Samos, at all events, he received divine honours in his lifetime, and took over Hera's feast.[1] In contrast to him stands that other Lacedaemonian, Agesilaus, who told the Thasians to make themselves gods first, after which he would believe that they could make him one.[2] Still more instructive than Lysander's case is that of Alexander's own father, Philip. His marriage with Cleopatra was the occasion of high festival, and together with the statues of the twelve Olympian gods was borne a θεοπρεπὲς εἴδωλοι of Philip himself, a statue, I take it, which represented him as a god. Thus he sought to make himself an associate in their cult.[3] Besides Lysander and Philip, Hephaestion deserves some attention. Alexander gave his friend a magnificent funeral, but it is unfortunately in doubt whether it was as a hero or a god that he afterwards honoured him. Arrian says that according to most accounts Alexander ordered heroic honours; that according to some Alexander asked Ammon's leave to render divine honours, and was refused.[4] A refusal strikes one as highly unlikely. Plutarch only knows of heroic honours.[5] On the other hand, Diodorus and Lucian[6] seem to have no doubt that Hephaestion was made a god. Lucian's vivid picture is true to life: all the cities vie with each other in putting up altars, appointing feasts and so forth; and it is quite dangerous to be anything but most fervent in his worship. Diodorus on his part speaks of a spontaneous order from Ammon to sacrifice as to a god.

[1] Plut. Lys., 18.
[2] Plut. Apophtheg. Laced. Agesilaus, 25.
[3] Diod. Sic., xvi. 92, 95.
[4] Arr. Anab., vii. 14. 7; cf. 23. 6. [5] Plut. Alexander, 72.
[6] Diod. Sic., xvii. 115. Lucian, de cal. non cred., 17. So Justin, xii. 12. 12.

Both mention Hephaestion's title : doubtless it was Ammon who received him as "associate god." On the whole, it seems slightly more probable that Hephaestion was made a god, the more so that his death was so late (324 B.C.), when Alexander, as we suppose, had been one for some time already. But the cult of Hephaestion is in any case significant because of its universal character, which, even if it were only heroic, brought it nearer apotheosis.

II

It is now time to turn to Alexander himself. In the foregoing pages some attempt has been made to show the historical background and the *a priori* possibility, even probability, of his claim to godhead, for it is largely due to prepossessions on this score that the existence of such a claim has ever been called in question. The most able and forcible denial came years ago from Mr. Hogarth,[1] who is followed by Professor Kornemann.[2] He "protests" against "this charge against the great Macedonian, that he would have been a god. . . . (The legend) is so utterly groundless, and withal so injurious, that it may be worth while to examine in some detail this imputation of insolence and folly laid to the account of one with whose name romance has been so busy as to leave small space for history." This at the outset of his essay, and it lends colour to the whole.

[1] *The English Historical Review*, April, 1887 : "The Deification of Alexander the Great," by D. G. Hogarth. This appears to be still the best and most important presentment of the case against divine claims, and as such is cited approvingly, e.g., by Wheeler ("Alexander," Heroes of Nations Series, p. 353, cf. p. 487). Mr. Hogarth himself refers back to it in his brilliant work, *Philip and Alexander of Macedon* (p. 197), where he has not, I think, really altered his views, though he does speak in one place (ibid.) of Alexander "demanding the same adoration from men of the West." I can only try to bring out the force of the evidence by following up his argument.

[2] *Beiträge zur alten Geschichte*, Bd. I. Heft I. ; *Zur Geschichte der antiken Herrscherkulte*, von E. Kornemann, Leipzig, 1901.

Such language is really out of place. We may regard Alexander's action as, in the long run, a mistake, but it was a mistake which even a great statesman might make—a Darius or an Augustus. And since, after all, character goes for much in history, and it is absurd to look upon a man like Alexander as in all things the mere product of his time, we must bear in mind, not merely the vastness and audacity of his schemes in general, but especially the immense personal ambition which all agree in attributing to him.

"Students of the historians of this period will, I think, allow that this inquiry may be confined with much convenience and no less certainty to four incidents in the record of Alexander—four occasions, that is to say, on which the assumption of divinity has been accounted most clearly proved. These are the visit to the oasis of Ammon, the banquet at Baktra, remarkable for the first prostration, the mutiny at Opis, and the famous decree demanding divine honour from the Greek cities. If this fourfold wave can be surmounted successfully, we may safely relegate the whole charge of the category of libel." In following Mr. Hogarth point by point we shall merely be taking in their natural order the incidents that most demand our attention.

First, then, as regards the visit to Ammon, that Zeus Ammon who of old enjoyed such prestige among the Greeks. Justin's statement that Alexander's purpose was to consult Ammon as to his own origin is fully borne out by Arrian himself, who assigns his claim to be Ammon's son as one of the reasons for the visit.[1] Nor is this the only place where he shows his belief in such a claim. Later on the mutinous soldiers—for the mutiny at Opis is hardly worth treating apart—angry at Alexander's growing partiality for Asiatics, tell him to let all the Macedonians, not merely the old and unfit, go home, and himself go on fighting alone with his

[1] Justin, xi. 11; Arr. Anab., iii. 3. 2.

father Ammon. This gibe is found both in Arrian and Justin,[1] and is the more significant in the latter, that it hardly fits in with his general account of the incident. Alexander in his speech refers to Philip with some emphasis.[2] From this it is fair to argue that Arrian looked upon his claim to be Ammon's son as no less real than his aping of the Achaemenids. In his final apology for Alexander the historian again treats the claim as an unmitigated fact; and other passages might be quoted to the same effect.[3] The fact is, that the cautious views which Arrian expresses in his preface, and, in general, the high value which he rightly puts upon his two best authorities, Alexander's general Ptolemy, afterwards first king of Egypt, and Aristobulus, himself also in Alexander's service, ought to make us the more ready to accept whatever he accepts himself, even though it be not in either of these two authorities. He himself recognises that there are other trustworthy sources.[4] Moreover, it is hazardous to suppose that anything which he adopts has no ground in these two, unless of course we have the usual hint to that effect from himself.

The question still remains, what happened at the oasis of Ammon. Arrian's narrative is not positively at variance with what we should gather from the other authorities: indeed, Diodorus implies that Alexander's interview with the oracle was private,[5] and Plutarch, that he was reticent about it.[6] Both details, I take it, are true; but if Alexander's reticence was due, as one would suppose, to his not having meditated divinity seriously hitherto, he would certainly divulge what had taken place when he made up his mind.

[1] Arr. Anab., vii. 8. 3; Justin, xii. 11. 5.
[2] Arr. Anab., vii. 9. 1–5; cf. Curtius, x. 2. 23.
[3] Arr. Anab., vii. 29. 3; cf. iv. 9–10, etc.
[4] Arr. Anab., vi. 28. 2; vii. 13. 3. [5] Diod. Sic., xvii. 51.
[6] Plut. Alex., xxvii. 4.

But is antecedent probability against the tale? Very far from it. The position of the Pharaohs, and afterwards of the Achaemenids, in Egypt, has already been touched upon. Alexander had succeeded them as monarch of Egypt, and therefore Ammon, or Ammon-Ra, for the two were early identified, was sure to look upon him, too, as his own immediate issue, and would think it the most natural thing in the world to salute him as his son. "Even a god," says Mr. Hogarth, "can hardly claim a dual pedigree," but this is practically what the Pharaohs did, the theory being that the god had impersonated the earthly father. Much of this has been shown to demonstration by that eminent Egyptologist, M. Masfero. It must be enough to cite his forcible conclusion: [1]

"Alexander became a god in Egypt naturally and without effort, by the sole force of the institutions and beliefs peculiar to the country. From the moment that he penetrated into the Nile Valley and was recognised as Pharaoh, he could not avoid the necessity of having a divine father, and of being proclaimed son of Ammon, son of Ra, son of whichever of the greater or lesser gods he might invoke. Even the fact that he was a Greek could not save him from this law of fate: Egypt had had so many foreign masters, that it had been forced to adapt its theory of solar royalty to the realities of its history, and the rites which had before served the native Pharaohs had long served those of foreign race."

It may be well to add, that the Pharaohs' sonship to Ammon-Ra was on a different footing from his sonship to the other gods, as is clear from M. Masfero's whole paper, as also from his speaking here of "solar" royalty.

M. Masfero has done more than this. Taking the accounts

[1] "Comment Alexandre devint dieu en Égypte" (*Annuaire de l'École pratique des Hautes Études*, Paris, 1897), p. 30.

of Alexander's visit to Zeus-Ammon-Ra as a whole, without any attempt to pit Arrian's testimony against the rest, he shows, with a detail which cannot here be reproduced, how all fits in with what is known of similar Egyptian sanctuaries, of the Pharaohs' position in respect of them, and so forth. His paper has, in fact, greatly increased the plausibility of the whole incident. Whatever we think about the Achaemenids, it is tolerably certain that Alexander inherited godhead from the Pharaohs, and that the easy and spontaneous declaration of his divinity in Egypt had much to do with the evolution of his own views and desires. The "first wave," far from being "easy," is perhaps the most formidable of all.

The second is the banquet at Baktra. One must, of course, be careful in dealing with speeches in ancient authors; but if in the speeches at the banquet a religious significance is ascribed to the proposed prostration, this certainly means that the writers thought the prostration had that religious significance. Arrian is not following Ptolemy or Aristobulus,[1] but we see from Plutarch[2] that he takes the last part of the banquet incident—Alexander's refusal of his kiss to Callisthenes, because he has not prostrated—from Chares of Mitylene, a companion of Alexander and a good authority[3]; although he prefaces it with a diffident phrase.[4] Nay, he undoubtedly supposes his own story to be sober history, seeing that he uses it to account for Alexander's dislike and distrust of Callisthenes.[5] In fact, Mr. Hogarth himself takes it for history, in spite of the silence of the two authorities; he accepts all Arrian's facts, the proposal, probably preconcerted, to prostrate, the Asiatics' acquiescence,

[1] His phrase is, λόγος κατέχει. Arr. Anab., iv. 9. 9; 10. 5.
[2] Plut. Alex., 54. 2.
[3] Cf. Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie*, sub voce.
[4] ἀναγέγραπται δὲ δὴ καὶ τοῖσδε λόγος, Arr. Anab., iv. 12. 2.
[5] Arr. Anab., iv. 12. 6–7.

the Europeans' opposition, voiced by Callisthenes; but the actual speeches he is inclined to attribute to Callisthenes' supposed desire to make "the hated name of Alexander, which he himself had little cause to love, stink yet more in the nostrils of the Greeks for whom his chronicle was written." But Callisthenes cannot have written much between his refusal to prostrate and the death which that refusal brought him; and his actual narrative apparently stops some years earlier.[1] His strained relations with Alexander can hardly have had time to influence his narrative. On the contrary, Arrian records, though with misgivings,[2] some proud sayings of his, that he had come to Alexander not to receive but to give glory, that it was to his writings that Alexander was to look for godhead, not to lying stories about his mother Olympias. Polybius, too, who, while severely criticising his utter ignorance of military tactics, still holds him in high esteem as a writer, speaks simply of his wish to deify Alexander.[3] His account was probably full of wonders, as may be seen from the fragments; but it is not likely that Arrian took much from him. It is rather against such writers that his preface is directed.

In the debate, as recorded in Arrian, though not as in Curtius, occurs one of those slight touches, which to the critical eye mean so much, as being true to the time and place, and not likely to be reproduced or thought out later. Anaxarchus maintains that it would be more just to look upon Alexander as a god than Dionysus or Heracles, both because of his deeds, and because he is a Macedonian. Further, Alexander will be honoured as a god when dead: why not when alive, and when it can be of profit to him?

[1] Cf. Scriptores Rerum Alexandri M. (Didot, Paris, 1846), *Callisthenes*, p. 7, and the fragments.

[2] Arr. Anab., iv. 10. 1–2: εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ξυγγέγραπται—a far stronger expression of doubt than the preceding.

[3] Polyb. Hist., xii. 17–22; vi. 45. 1; xii. 23. 4.

Now Heracles has already been shown to be a peculiarly happy example of a man-god. Dionysus is too complicated a character to be dealt with here. Probably Euripides' Bacchae would represent, and indeed have largely helped to shape, current ideas about him. A man, but likewise a god, he had marched everywhere asserting his godhead; let Alexander do the same! But Callisthenes in his reply adopts the more reverent view of Herodotus, ignoring such awkward personages; he not merely carefully distinguishes between gods and men, but goes on to draw the line between gods and heroes, thus tacitly disapproving of the idea that even after death Alexander could become a god.

It may also be noticed that Arrian, Curtius and Justin all suppose that the Achaemenids required prostration, and that in their case it implied worship.[1] Arrian supposes that prostration began with Cyrus, but this he perhaps repeats from Xenophon,[2] whose ape he is; and the Cyropaedia can hardly be trusted on such a point.

There is left Alexander's supposed order to the Greek cities to render him divine honours. "The silence of Diodorus, Justin and Plutarch is a powerful argument. . . All three join with Arrian in accepting without question Alexander's lust of divinity, and record many gratuitous fables in support thereof, but this most signal confirmation they each and all omit."[3] Now, against this one might argue that it is precisely because they "accept without question" that they feel no need of "signal confirmation"; or, again, with M. Beurlier,[4] that they are engrossed with Alexander's own doings, and have no eye to events in Greece; or, finally,

[1] Arr. Anab., iv. 11. 9; Curtius, viii. 5. 11–12; Justin, xii. 7. 1. Cf. Plut. Them., 27; Artax., 23.

[2] Arr. Anab., iv. 11. 9; Xen. Cyrop., viii. 3. 14; cf. iv. 4. 13; v. 3. 18.

[3] Hogarth, op. cit., p. 323; the admission about Arrian is noteworthy.

[4] *De divinis honoribus Alexandri*, etc., p. 24. Paris, 1890.

one might protest against the use of arguments from silence to rebut positive evidence, a proverbially dangerous proceeding. But it may seriously be questioned whether the historians allow of an argument from silence at all. True, there is a lacuna in Arrian's narrative for the year 324 B.C., and so his silence, at all events, would go for nothing; but later he expressly mentions the arrival of embassies from Greece to render divine honours to Alexander.[1] It is surely perilous history-writing to argue that Arrian ought to mention that they came in answer to his letter, and still more perilous to insist that there was bound to be a reference back to the lost chapters, if the letter had been mentioned there. On the whole, Arrian may be held to confirm the view that Alexander did ask for divine honours; and if Arrian, then Diodorus too, who mentions his being crowned, a ceremony which Arrian implies was the chief token of the divine honours, and even Justin,[2] who, like Diodorus, speaks of embassies from almost the whole world, though he does not explicitly mention Greece, nor, in this place, divine honours.

The evidence which directly supposes some sort of a demand from Alexander is fairly strong. The chief item is a fragment of Hypereides,[3] which Mr. Hogarth fails to mention. Not improbably it gives us some of the actual words which the Athenians used in their decree. The orator declares that Demosthenes "assented to Alexander that he should be the son both of Zeus and Poseidon, if he wished." The word for assented (*συγχωρεῖν*) would naturally mean to accede to a request made, and therefore we must suppose

[1] Arr. Anab., vii. 23. 2.

[2] Diod. Sic., xvii. 113. 1; Justin, xii. 13. 1–2.

[3] Hypereides, Blass, ed. 3, 1894, Frg. vii. p. 19, ll. 15 ff. It is likely that in what immediately follows Demosthenes is accused of having consented that a statue inscribed to Alexander "the god" should be put up; but the text is very mutilated.

a request from Alexander, even though it be only Demosthenes who assents, much more if it be the Athenians who use the word of themselves in their decree.

Demarchus, another contemporary Attic orator, also accuses Demosthenes of vacillation in his attitude towards Alexander : " now he is for passing a decree that none but the traditional gods are to be recognised, now he says that the people ought not to deny Alexander his honours in heaven." The word here used (*αμφισβητεῖν*) implies a claim put forward by the one party and disputed by the other.[1]

We may take next Valerius Maximus' account of Demades' " wise saying," which we give below.[2] The Athenians " were for refusing " or " were unwilling to decree " divine honours to Alexander ; whichever translation we prefer, it does not follow that they did not think it well in the end to overcome their reluctance. Moreover, the half-threatening tone of this prominent partisan of Alexander rather makes for an actual letter from him.

Aelian certainly presents a difficulty. He says that Demades came forward to pass a decree recognising Alexander as the thirteenth god of the Olympian circle, but that the Athenians could not bear such outrageous impiety, and fined him a hundred talents.[3] One would certainly infer from this, if taken alone, that Demades' motion was lost. Athenaeus' short reference to the incident, however, while giving the more likely sum of ten talents as the fine, leaves the question open.[4] It may, of course, have been lost, in which case the Athenians would be quite capable of passing

[1] Demarchus in Demosthenem, 94. So Bevan, op. cit., p. 635.

[2] Val. Max. Sapienter dicta aut facta, vii. 2. 13 : Nolentibus Atheniensibus divinos honores Alexandro decernere, " Videte," inquit, " ne dum coelum custoditis, terram amittatis."

[3] Ael. Var. Hist., v. 12.

[4] Athen. Deipnosophistae, vi. 58.

another to the same effect, if they saw fit ; but on the whole it is perhaps as easy to suppose that Demades was prosecuted later, when Demosthenes and the anti-Macedonians were again in the ascendant. " The mover of a new law or psephism," says Mr. Grote,[1] " even after it had been regularly discussed and passed, was liable to be indicted, and had to defend himself not only against alleged informalities in his procedure, but also against alleged mischiefs in the substance of his measure." We have an example of this in Aeschines' famous attack on Demosthenes, made at a time when Macedonian interests might have been expected to prevail ; for Demosthenes had already been crowned.[2] Indeed, Mr. Hogarth himself supposes that Demades did carry a motion conferring divine honours on Alexander, and merely denies any initiative on Alexander's part, an initiative which the last-quoted passages neither prove nor disprove.

For Athens the chief witnesses are Hypereides and Deinarchus ; but there is likewise some evidence of a Lacedaemonian decree, also in answer to a letter from Alexander. Aelian professes to give the actual words : " Seeing that Alexander wishes to be a god, a god let him be." [3] Plutarch would lead us to suppose that he is doing the same, though he only records it as the answer of a single Spartan : " We assent to Alexander that, if he wish, he be called a god." [4] In this latter version we have the same word (*συγχωρεῖν*) as in the Athenian decree. Thus both in Aelian and Plutarch Alexander's initiative is implied, even though in the latter the " if he wish " no longer refers, as apparently in the Athenian decree, to the ulterior question of Olympian relationships. And apart from the wording of the decree, both writers speak of an order, which we may suppose conveyed

[1] Grote, *History of Greece*, iv., p. 459 (pt. ii., c. 46).
[2] Dem. de Corona, § 118, p. 266.
[3] Ael. Var. Hist., ii. 19. [4] Plut. Apophthg. Lac. Damis.

either by letter or embassy or both, "to vote him a god." Aelian expressly speaks of it as issued to all the Greeks in general, including, therefore, the Athenians.

That Alexander never struck his own portrait on coins may be easily allowed; but neither this, nor such variety in his cult as can be traced back to his own lifetime, can be held to disprove his own initiative. After-events may sway our judgment overmuch, making us forget the time which a new idea or institution requires to develop itself to the full. Alexander, we know, was only at the beginning of his schemes when he was struck down. It is only after his death that system is introduced into hellenistic king-worship.

CUTHBERT LATTEY.

ST. PAUL AND THE MYSTERY-RELIGIONS.

IX. CONCLUSIONS.

IN our former articles we attempted to test at various points the assumption that Christianity was for St. Paul a Mystery-Religion, and that many of his religious conceptions were closely allied to the Mystery-cults of Paganism. It may be well in this closing section of our inquiry to gather up and emphasise the more important conclusions at which we have arrived, supplementing them in one or two directions.

The relation of the Mystery-Religions to Paul's environment requires no discussion. Ample evidence has been adduced to show that throughout the sphere of his missionary operations he would be in touch with many who had been initiated into Pagan Mysteries, and had finally entered the Christian Church. We cannot picture him engrossed

in the cure of souls without recognising that he must have gained a deep insight into the earlier spiritual aspirations of his converts and the manner in which they had sought to satisfy them. Even apart from eager inquirers, a missionary so zealous and daring would often find himself confronted by men and women who still clung to their mystic ritual and all the hopes it had kindled. It was inevitable, therefore, that he should become familiar, at least from the outside, with religious ideas current in these influential cults. Sometimes, as, e.g., in the case of γνῶσις and δόξα, these ideas found remarkably close parallels in the thought of the Old Testament. So he would be impressed by their capacity for holding a genuinely spiritual content, and would use them in circumstances in which their earlier history would tend to make them all the more effective. Certain important terms like τέλειος, πνευματικός, σωτηρία, etc., were in the air. They meant one thing, no doubt, for a Christian, and quite another for a Pagan. Yet their fundamental significance for both had elements of affinity, sufficient to link together the respective usages. The essentially religious meaning, for example, of πνεῦμα and νοῦς in documents of Hellenistic Mystery-Religion provided a common standing-ground for Paul and many of his readers. What holds of separate terms may occasionally be affirmed regarding groups of ideas. Thus the combination of συμμορφιζόμενος with γνῶναι in Philippians iii. 10 seems to suggest a background for the Apostle's conception akin to the Mystery-doctrine of transformation by the vision of God. But it has also become clear that we dare not make far-reaching inferences from terminology as to the assimilation by Paul of mystery-ideas. For we were able to show that the central conceptions of the Mystery-Religions belong to a different atmosphere from that in which the Apostle habitually moves. There is no principle determining their relations,

which in any sense corresponds to the Cross of Christ in the realm of Paul's thought and experience.

It is vain, moreover, to endeavour to find points of contact between Paul and the Mystery-cults on the side of ritual. Unquestionably he was too sensitive to the practical demands of the human soul to disparage the simple rites which he found existing in the nascent Church. Indeed, he was aware that the celebration of the Lord's Supper had its origin in the Master's farewell meal with His disciples. He was ready to recognise the high spiritual impulses which were quickened in the solemn surroundings of the Christian sacraments. He knew that these actions, with lowly, believing hearts behind them, became real channels for the Divine grace. But the essential characteristic of his religious attitude was detachment from ceremonial. It is no wonder that interpreters like Heitmüller and Weinel, who attribute a magical view of the sacraments to Paul, are concerned to point out that his sacramentalism is a sort of erratic boulder in his system viewed in its entirety. It would be foolish to postulate for Paul a rigid logic in the concatenation of his thought. But his thinking is in no sense atomistic. And the vital centre of the organism lies in his conception of faith. Independent as are the gracious movements of a God almighty and all-loving, they demand for their effectiveness the receptivity of the human soul. That is one aspect of faith for Paul. And the other is the personal appeal to God of the surrendered life. A heart to welcome, and a will to claim the supreme Divine gifts, and behind both, as their explanation, the emotion of a love created by the unspeakable love of Christ. Every living idea in Paul is irradiated by his faith, whether its form be juristic or theosophical or sacramental. To assign a position of any importance in the complex of his ideas to an element for which faith does not count, is to ignore the indissoluble con-

nexion between his thought and his religious experience. The centrality of faith, therefore, comes to be a criterion for every attempt at reconstructing Paul's spiritual platform. And here also we discover that there is no corresponding feature in the frame-work of the Mystery-Religions.

Nevertheless, it is wholly justifiable to speak of the Mysticism of Paul. How is the term, in his case, to be interpreted? To many natures everything that savours of mystical experience is not only alien but offensive. They regard it as a purely pathological condition, the result of auto-suggestion. Or they view it as an unethical dissociation of personality from the salutary claims of normal life, with the aim of absorption in an impersonal Absolute. It is unquestionable that mystics have often laid stress on more or less morbid self-mortification as the pathway to their goal, and that the *via negativa*, so dear to many of them, has resulted in a conception of God which really obliterates all that we mean by character. But it is equally certain that in numerous instances those who have yearned for and professed to attain real contact with the Divine have exercised a moral power achieving astonishing results in the sphere of practical life. Mysticism, in effect, is a term which covers a manifold area of experience. It is extremely difficult, for example, in the history of Christianity, to distinguish it from those conditions of overpowering faith, involving profound emotion, which belong to the soul that has "counted all things as loss" for Christ. Indeed, Pfleiderer can scarcely be said to exaggerate when he asserts that "the mystical element in Paulinism depends immediately and exclusively on Paul's notion of faith." [1] Let us examine this mystical element.

The phenomena associated with Mysticism, and appearing in every age and in all manner of environments, seem

[1] *Paulinism* (E. Trans.), vol. i., p. 199.

usually to presuppose a special type of temperament. In our second article we referred to the case of the prophet Ezekiel as a nature peculiarly sensitive to ecstatic or trance conditions, in which he received the Divine message. Yet it is plain that his "peculiar psycho-physical constitution" in no way detracted from the vigour of his ethical teaching. We have hints that the temperament of Paul was of a similar kind in the allusions he makes again and again to revelations (ἀποκαλύψεις) and visions (ὀπτασίαι) which came to him, and especially in the remarkable description of an ecstatic experience which appears in 2 Corinthians xii. 1 ff. But no reader of the Epistles could ever form the impression that these occurrences, associated with special psycho-physical conditions, constitute for the Apostle a predominant feature of his religious life. We have ample evidence as to the attitude he assumes towards abnormal workings of the Divine Spirit. In his famous discussion of spiritual χαρίσματα in 1 Corinthians xii.–xiv., he makes no secret of his desire to curb all manifestations of intense spiritual emotion which are not calculated to edify the Christian community. And while he admits that such phenomena may spring from a real contact with Divine influence, he gives them no place in his impressive enumeration of the fruits of the Spirit. The distinguishing characteristic of these is their ethical quality. That is in full accord with one of Paul's most splendid achievements in the life of the Early Church, the transformation of the conception of the Spirit as a fitful energy, accompanied by extraordinary manifestations, into that of an abiding, inspiring power which controls conduct in the interest of love. His own ecstatic experiences must have been regulated by the same cautions. For this would be certainly possible. The testimony of the great Christian mystics warns us against confounding ecstasy with hysteria. They recognise, indeed, that there is often

a justification for such comparison, and declare that ecstasies must be tested. The test consists " not in its outward sign, but in its inward grace, its after-value." [1] This after-value is due to the high conviction that the soul has been carried into the world of Eternal Reality. All the evidence suggests that for Paul these experiences were not depressing but life-enhancing.

But in touching these more or less abnormal conditions, we are dealing only with the circumference of Paul's religious history. Its centre lies elsewhere. Weinel aptly remarks that the simultaneous origin of what he calls Paul's " Spirit- and Christ-mysticism " can only be explained from his experience on the Damascus road.[2] This was for the Apostle a real contact with the risen Lord, the Lord as life-giving Spirit. There and then he came to be " in Christ " (2 Cor. v. 17). There and then Christ came to be " in him " (Gal. i. 16). We pointed out in a former article that this language transcends all spatial categories. But while the ultimate fact which it endeavours to express eludes analysis, Paul himself supplies the material for estimating, up to a certain point, the process by which the ineffable relationship is realised. It is not established by any magical method. It is the Divine answer to faith. And the nature of the faith is not left obscure. In the most classical passage on union with Christ to be found in his Epistles, Paul illuminates the matter by a single flash. For he describes the faith which is the nexus in this fellowship as " faith in the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me " (Gal. ii. 20). Here, obviously, the intellectual element in faith is not emphasised ; not even that which is involved in Paul's attitude towards the resurrection. This is a faith which has behind it the force of an all-subduing love. The emotion is the

[1] E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 431.
[2] *Biblische Theologie d. N. T.*, p. 287.

response to the redeeming love of the Cross, which is the most tremendous moral power with which Paul has ever come in contact.

Thus we can discern that the Mysticism of the Apostle has an inherently ethical quality. This might have been deduced from his conception of the Spirit, as we have briefly exhibited it. And that conception, of course, can never be dissociated from his experience of intimate communion with Christ, as appears from such crucial passages as Romans viii. 9, 10. But we have preferred to keep on the main track of his thought, a track which leads through the hard realities of an earthly life. For Paul relates his supreme experience of fellowship, that which is far more precious to him than abnormal raptures (although he valued these), to the common existence which is his daily lot: "that which I now live in the flesh" (Gal. ii. 20). It is possible to go further in our analysis on the basis of the material presented in the Epistles. We have already emphasised the nature of the content of that supreme experience which lies at the heart of Paul's mysticism.[1] He himself calls it, "being crucified with Christ." It occupies the central place in his exposition of the meaning of the Lord's Supper. There he describes it as "communion with the body and blood of the Lord" (1 Cor. x. 16). And we saw in our last article that, in the light of the explicit statement in 1 Corinthians xi. 26, the phrase could only mean communion with the Lord as crucified. The central implication of the conception is identification with the relation towards sin of the crucified Redeemer and all that that involves, with its correlative of sharing in the victorious life of Christ as risen. Here is a type of mysticism which stands by itself. It has little in common with the notion of absorption in the Deity which links together mystical aspirations in every age and every clime. If there

[1] See Article 6.

is any possession which Paul holds dear, it is that of his individuality. His eager speculations on the "spiritual organism" are sufficient proof. And as regards the Divine factor in the fellowship, he has too keen a sense of the historical personality of the Lord to lose himself in the sea of absolute Being. These are never the categories with which he works. Indeed, we can vividly realise the limits which he sets for his mystical thought and feeling, when we reflect on his attitude towards deification.

We have pointed out the prevalence of this doctrine as the goal of mystical aspiration in Hellenistic religion. Dean Inge clearly shows [1] that, in the Eastern part of Christendom in the early centuries, owing to the fluid nature of the concept θεός, the notion of deification (θεοποίησις) was widely current in a somewhat vague sense, often scarcely distinguishable from immortality.[2] But rash inferences were sure to be drawn, such as that of Methodius that "every believer must, through participation in Christ, be born as a Christ." [3] On the lines of such a development the conception of personality was bound to became nebulous, as, e.g., in Eckhart's utterance: "If I am to know God directly, I must become completely He, and He I: so that this He and this I become and are one I." [4] Paul is careful to avoid language or thought of this type. When he approaches it, as, e.g., in Galatians ii. 20, he expressly guards against possible misunderstanding. Perhaps the reverence born of his unwavering monotheism was a determining factor for his position. In any case, he never permits his aspirations to carry him further than the Divine εἰκών into which believers are being transformed (e.g., 2 Cor. iii. 18). And it is easy to exagger-

[1] *Christian Mysticism*, p. 356 ff.

[2] Cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, II. p. 2: "He who among the Greeks says 'immortal,' says 'God.'"

[3] Qu. by Inge, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

[4] See E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 502.

ate the significance of the language he employs in that connexion. We observed in our fifth article how difficult it was to grasp the precise nature of Paul's conception of the "transformation" (μεταμορφοῦσθαι). The only assertion which could be made with confidence was that we must guard against identifying it with the magical transmutation of essence central for the Mystery-Religions, as Paul's idea of the πνεῦμα, the chief factor in the transformation, is essentially moral.

A wholly arbitrary emphasis has been laid by Schweitzer on the eschatological implicates of Paul's conception of union with Christ. He rightly contrasts that conception with the notion of the Mystery-Religions, that the living man, by means of gnosis and the vision of God, receives the Divine essence into his being. But he rushes to the other extreme in holding that Paul attributes the experience of transformation to what he calls "a world-process." "As soon as the individual by means of faith and baptism enters into this new cosmic event (*Geschehen*), he is immediately renewed and receives Spirit, ecstasy, gnosis, and all that accompanies them." [1] We get some light upon the meaning of this extraordinary condition in connexion with Paul's statement as to "dying with Christ." Schweitzer criticises Reitzenstein for holding, as every unbiassed exegete of Paulinism must hold, that the Apostle thinks here of a deliberate identification of himself with the death of Christ, which involves the breaking off of relations with sin and the crucifying of the natural man. Instead, we are told that Paul has by no means in view an act which is carried out by the believer. His conception rather is that "at the moment when the individual receives baptism, the process of the dying and rising again of Christ, without the believer's co-operation, without any exercise of will on his part, with-

[1] *Geschichte d. Paulin. Forschung*, p. 175.

out any reflection of his, starts working in him like machinery which is set in motion by pressing a spring." [1] This grotesque misconception of Paul's religious standpoint is an arresting instance of the results of "consistent eschatology," and warns us against approaching the Epistles with a ready-made framework into which their thought has to be forced. Let us admit without hesitation that Paul keeps his eyes fixed on the glorious consummation of the future. But let us no less carefully recognise that for that realm he has no clear-cut scheme of things. Such utterances as Philippians i. 23 : "having the desire to depart and to be with Christ," remind us that his eschatological forecasts were as flexible as our own. And it is only by ignoring many of the cardinal elements in his outlook that we can find the clue to his mysticism in those magical and mechanical processes which Schweitzer associates with the transference from the present to the coming Aeon. How far the Apostle is removed from the notion of a salvation which works automatically, appears from such statements as Philippians iii. 11 : "if by any means I may attain unto the resurrection from the dead. Not that I have already obtained, or am already perfect : but I press on if so be that I may lay hold on that for which also I was laid hold on by Christ Jesus " ; and 1 Corinthians ix. 27 : "I beat my body black and blue, and bring it into bondage, lest by any means, after having preached to others, I myself should be rejected." It would take a bold interpreter to assert in the light of these and many similar passages that in Paul's view there was no co-operation of the believer, no exercise of will on his part in the matter of participating in the benefits of Christ's death and resurrection, but only an external, supernatural machinery set a-going by the rite of baptism.

The central ideas of Pauline eschatology are essentially

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 176.

religious. Take, for our purpose, those which are most intimately linked to his experience of mystical union with Christ, namely, life and salvation. In Romans vi. 4–6 Paul deliberately interprets the "newness of life," which has been reached by communion with Christ, realised with peculiar impressiveness in the solemnity of baptism, as the norm for daily living (ἵνα . . . ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπατήσωμεν), and explains it as "no longer serving sin." Again, in Romans viii. 6, he describes "the mind of the flesh" (i.e. the earthly nature as insensible to God) as death, while "the mind of the Spirit is life and peace." Without question the terms "death" and "life" have direct eschatological bearings. But their content is in no sense exclusively eschatological. Paul invariably regards "life" as a present possession of the believer. He would not, however, affirm that originally he possessed a natural life, but that when he surrendered himself to Christ he received a spiritual. The new life is a renewal of the old from its very foundations. It embraces the physical (to use our distinctions) as well as the ethical and religious. Its only contrast lies in death. Death for the Apostle means the ruin of the whole personality. Life in Christ is something larger than existence and means the triumphant continuance of personality beyond the barriers of earth and time, in conformity with the nature of the glorified Lord, who is the image of the invisible God. The same considerations apply to Paul's conception of salvation, which is really "life" regarded from a special point of view. It is needless to cite passages which disclose the eschatological colour of σωτηρία. The fact that it occurs most frequently in the phrase εἰς σωτηρίαν, where it is a goal to be reached, is sufficient evidence. But Paul has too keen an interest in the demands of daily life to defer the reality of salvation to a future crisis. Like eager Christians of every period he delights to think of that consummation

in which the hampering conditions of material existence shall be surmounted. It is absurd to estimate as a pessimistic aberration his passionate cry : " Who shall deliver me from the body of this death ? " Has any yearning been more constantly echoed throughout the ages ? But no one was ever more conscious of the reality of salvation as an existing fact of experience. " God was pleased," he declares, " through the foolishness of the thing preached to save them that believe " (1 Cor. 1. 21) : " There is therefore now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus " (Rom. viii. 1).

Our investigation has reached its limit. If it has accomplished anything, it has simply demonstrated afresh that in St. Paul we are confronted, not with one of those natures which is content to be the medium of the spiritual forces of its environment, but with a personality which has been shaped once for all in the throes of a tremendous crisis, and henceforward transforms every influence to which it is sensitive with the freedom born of a triumphant faith.

H. A. A. Kennedy.

SUGGESTIONS ON THE HISTORY AND LETTERS OF ST. PAUL.

I. The Date of the Galatian Letter.

Much depends on the answer to the question—which has recently been much discussed—regarding the date when, and the place where, the letter of St. Paul to the Galatians was written. Several able writers have contended that the letter must be assigned to a very early date. One of the first to do so was Professor Valentin Weber of Würzburg in a series of books and papers. Quite a number of English and Scottish writers have taken the same view: they are too many to enumerate, as I should be certain to omit some, and I should regret to leave out the names of any to whose courtesy and historical acumen I am so much indebted. Bibliography is my weakest point. When I attempt to draw up a bibliographical list, I usually find that I have omitted books of which I have been making frequent use. I must, however, mention several private letters from the Rev. J. Ironside Still as suggestive and stimulating.

For my own part I have long been in a state of uncertainty and dissatisfaction, and hoping for the opportunity of reaching a decided opinion. After one has argued in favour of a date and place, it is not easy to contemplate the whole question from a quite unbiassed point of view; and I waited for leisure and a quiet mind, which are conditions not easily attained.

The theory of early origin was maintained, if I recollect rightly, by Calvin. It frequently came up in my mind, but was always set aside. Now it has established itself in the form that the letter was written at the time meant in Acts xv. 1 f., and was an early step in the controversy there

described. Emissaries from Palestine, acting with a general commission from James, though not with instructions on this special matter (which, as we shall see, had never yet been brought up as one pressing for definite decision) had come to Antioch, and some also into the Galatian churches. In the latter, which were quite newly formed (Gal. i. 5),[1] and in which there was at the moment no authoritative and experienced teacher, these emissaries, being of old standing in the Church, exercised (as was natural) very great influence. They were able to quote words or acts of Paul as implying that he agreed with them: Paul himself, as they declared, was a "preacher of circumcision."

The acts or words are admitted by Paul.[2] He disputes only the interpretation placed upon them: for the sake of peace and harmony he was willing to make great concessions, but these were only concessions to Jewish weakness and must not be regarded as doctrinal and obligatory.

The Galatians, of course, knew that Paul had never ordered them to accept circumcision; but the emissaries evidently maintained that this rite was the completion of their Christian profession: they had begun well, and now the perfect stage of full communion with the original Church awaited them. If (as seems to me probable) the emissaries quoted on their side a case of fullest concession by Paul, this would be an extraordinarily effective argument. However that may be, it lies in the nature of the case that the familiar idea of a progressive instruction, i.e. of stages in knowledge, was employed. Paul himself had used words of this kind,[3] which quite naturally and reasonably sug-

[1] The words here used, coming in the forefront of the letters, as the first after the address, must be meant quite emphatically.

[2] Gal. v. 11, i. 8–10.

[3] First Corinthians ii. 6, iii. 1 f., ii. 15, if read in this order, imply the idea of steps in knowledge, and of teaching withheld from beginners as not intelligible to them, but communicated to advanced Christians.

gested the idea of stages in action. Beginners heard less, and learned less, and were called upon to do less, than Christians of experience, who were more fully endowed with the Spirit of God.

Without this conception of stages in knowledge the action of the Galatians, and the Epistle to the Galatians, cannot be understood, as is maintained in my *Historical Commentary*, § xxvii. p. 324. The Galatians thought that they were progressing to a more perfect stage of spiritual knowledge. Paul points out to them that really they are changing to a different form of Gospel, fleshly and not spiritual; but he acknowledges that they think they are progressing: "After beginning through the Spirit, are you now perfecting yourselves through the flesh?" [1]

Even the Apostolic Decree, while it is in word so remarkably complimentary to Paul and Barnabas, yet lends itself without difficulty to a similar interpretation. The concessions regarding meat, etc., are laid down as obligatory, but are called "burdens": it is an easy thing to go on, and to say that burdens are proportioned to the strength of the bearer, and that more perfect Christians can (and should) bear more than the minimum imposed as necessary on weaklings and beginners. This conception of degrees lies at the basis of the whole Galatian trouble. Paul had to remove it by convincing the Galatians that they were moving diametrically contrary to the spirit of his teaching.

It has been argued that the question might have become acute in Antioch long before the Council. That, however, did not take place. So Luke and Paul both say. In Antioch Jewish and Gentile Christians had for years been dwelling side by side, and the conditions of amity must have been settled by agreement, either tacit or formal: the general body of Jewish Christians in Antioch were in full fellow-

[1] Galatians iii. 3.

ship publicly and privately with the Gentiles of the Church. They all ate together and lived together harmoniously. Luke and Paul are in full agreement on this point (Gal. ii. 11 f., Acts xv. 1 f.). Discord arose only when the Christian Jews from Palestine, who were far more strict and narrow than those of Antioch and of the Diaspora in general, found themselves confronted with the question, whether they were to sit and eat with the uncircumcised.

Peter answered the question in the affirmative, Gal. ii. 11, just as previously he ate with Cornelius and other Gentiles, Acts xi. 3. But apparently he did so impulsively and naturally: he looked only to the fact that these also were Christians, that all nations were admitted to the Church (Acts x. 34), that Cornelius and his friends and the Antiochian Church in general had received the Spirit; and he acted on impulse accordingly.

Afterwards, when the protest of the Jewish Christians from Jerusalem made him realise all that was involved in his action, he withdrew from full communion with the uncircumcised Gentiles in Antioch. In Acts xi. 5–17 it is noteworthy that he does not reply to this part of the charge against him. He speaks in general terms: he had Cornelius and his friends baptized,[1] and vaguely he adds, "Who was I that I could withstand God?" That he ate with them, he does not expressly acknowledge, and he does not deny.

The charge in this respect, however, was allowed to drop: it was not urgent, and it was not pressed.

Until the emissaries from Judaea came to Antioch, therefore, there had been no trouble regarding intercourse among the converts Jews and Greek. Such a case as that of Titus in Galatians ii. 3 f. could not have arisen at an earlier date.

[1] It is noteworthy that he did not baptize them himself, x. 48: he had with him one or more ministers for such work. Compare the rareness of Paul's personal action in baptizing at Corinth.

Nor can the case be placed during the controversy after the emissaries arrived in Antioch, for the controversy was a universal one and not about the treatment of an individual. Moreover the circumstances in which the case of Titus came up are of quite different character from what existed in Antioch. The emissaries found there a general rule of common life and intercourse, public and manifest; but the case of Titus was brought forward by some persons, called in strong terms "sham-brethren," who spied secretly and found that Titus was eating along with certain Jews. In Antioch this could be seen every day by all men. Hence I cannot entertain the suggestion (which has been made by some) that the case of Titus occurred at Antioch.

There seems therefore to be no doubt that the case of Titus must be placed at Jerusalem. Nothing in it suits Antioch. Everything in it points to Jerusalem. In Jerusalem there were doubtless many Jews that, without being fully Christian, were in a certain degree sympathetic with the new Faith. These might be called "pseudo-Christians"; and some of these, looking askance at Titus as a Greek, and watching carefully though in a covert way the private life of the Antiochian delegates, observed that he ate with the Jewish colleagues. This is just what would naturally occur in Jerusalem; and doubtless this took place within the first day or two of their arrival. At once there was an explosion similar to that in Acts xi. 2 f., but ending as quickly as in that case, through the prudence and sympathetic action of Titus (as we shall see).

Some of the writers who argue in favour of an early date for *Galatians* seem to lay most stress on the difficulties which accompany the theory (as yet the dominant and generally accepted theory—but after all only a theory) of a late date for the Epistle. Personally I attach great weight in all such problems to positive arguments of one

particular class: which date makes the Epistle most illuminative of Christian history and of Paul's mind and character? As to difficulties, it is often the case that the solution of a seeming difficulty opens the gateway of advance in knowledge; and I do not feel any serious dread of difficulties as such, even although my ignorance may at the moment prove unable to dispose of them. The only real difficulty is the impossibility; and it is not always easy to distinguish between what is only difficult and what is impossible.

Approaching the question on a different line, I am glad to feel that I have reached the same conclusion as Professor V. Weber and the rest, even though it has involved abandoning my former view. I find, however, that the change of view is not so great as might appear. The place of origin remains the same, and this involves the important question who it was that joined with Paul in issuing the letter. Who were the persons that added to Paul their authority in making the weighty decision pronounced in this letter? As it has been already maintained in my *Historical Commentary*, § ii. p. 238 ff., Syrian Antioch, and no other Church but Antioch, could be in the position to join with Paul in authorising this letter.

With the earlier date, there can be no possible place of origin except Antioch (or the road thence to Jerusalem).[1]

As has been stated in that book, there was the most complete difference between the class of persons who might be mentioned in the end of a letter as joining in sending salutation to Paul's correspondents, and the class of persons who could be admitted as joint-authorities in issuing the letter. Paul took no humble view of his own relation to

[1] The latter view, which is that of Professor Lake, arises apparently through the idea that "all those who are with me" implies travelling companions. It puts *Gal.* some weeks later.

his correspondents. He composed his letter as one having authority, like an Emperor using a rescript; and few could be associated in composing the rescript.

Generally his authority was Divine inspiration and knowledge of the mind of Jesus; but even where he "has no commandment of the Lord," and gives his own personal opinion (as in First Corinthians vii. 25), he still regards his judgment as carrying weight to his own spiritual children. He did not admit as joint authors of his letters any except persons who occupied a position of authority in respect of the correspondents addressed in the special letter.[1] Timothy, for example, could co-operate in the first letter to Corinth or in that to Colossae; but not in the circular letter to the Asian Churches which was written at the same time. He had authority in Corinth and in Colossae,[2] but not in the Asian cities generally. The person who is associated as an authority was present with him, and approved the doctrine and judgment delivered in the letter.

Antioch was the one church which could and did possess special authority in respect of the Galatian congregations.[3] Antioch had sent forth Paul to them, and had received him back to give an account of all that had occurred to him in that mission, and of the new step that he had taken in the course of it, Acts xiv. 27.

If, however, that was so, why did not Paul mention the name of the Church which lent its authority to his letter? Why did he veil it under the vague phrase "all the brethren who are with me"? This question did not occur to me formerly. Now I would suggest that the

[1] The proof of this has been given in detail already, see *Histor. Comm. Gal.* § II.

[2] On Colossae, *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 274.

[3] Even Jerusalem could not well be considered. It would indeed have the authority suitable in general for any young Church, but not in this peculiar case where its authority is treated rather slightingly.

Church in Antioch was not itself unanimous; and that Paul could only claim the authority of "all those who are with me."

Though there can be no doubt that the overwhelming majority of opinion in the Antiochian Church was with Paul, yet there can also be no doubt that the emissaries who came from Jerusalem had their supporters. Paul, in Gal. ii. 12, tells the story: the Christian Jews in the Church of Antioch, including even Barnabas, pretended in deference to the emissaries to maintain no social intercourse with the uncircumcised Christians. Hence Paul claims to speak with the authority only of "all those who are with me," and not of the Church as a whole. He will not claim support from any man that is not in full agreement.

What light does the early date throw on the difficult sentence in Galatians ii. 3 f. ? "Not even Titus who was with me, who was a Greek, was compelled to be circumcised: but by reason of the pretended brethren——." The sentence was never completed. Paul breaks off, being carried away by the tide of his thought; and he never resumes the interrupted thought—perhaps avoiding, in the hurry and rush of his ideas, the repetition of a matter, which was doubtless known in a general way to the Galatians. Paul completes their knowledge by adding some less known details; but does not repeat the public and familiar facts.

Perhaps the right clue is furnished by Acts xvi. 3: "because of the Jews that were in those parts." In *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 158 f., the close parallelism between Acts xv. 1 f. and Gal. ii. 12 f. is pointed out, and the parallelism is used to date the incident described in those two passages. That date now stands fast on the earlier dating of the letter; but the parallelism with the language of the Acts extends further. There is a certain analogy between the case of Titus in Galatians ii. 3 f. and of Timothy in Acts xv. 3.

Each was an uncircumcised Hellene ; and each had to be treated in some way " because of the Jews in those parts." διὰ τοὺς Ἰουδαίους is exactly parallel to διὰ τοὺς ψευδαδέλφους. Two possibilities seem to be open as regards the case of Titus.

(1) Not even Titus was *compelled* to be circumcised, but because of the sham brothers who came about to spy upon our actions—he voluntarily accepted the rite, though we (viz. Barnabas and I) did not for a moment yield by deferring to their demands and requiring him to comply : his conduct was purely voluntary, and arose through his desire to avoid anything that might wound their feelings and produce enmity or strife. In that case Titus, by his unselfish devotion, served as a model for the case of Timothy ; and Paul, by accepting his devotion, might be said by enemies to have become a preacher of circumcision. That this was actually said in Galatia by his enemies is fully admitted by himself (Gal. v. 11 ; compare i. 8–10) ; and it is of course clear that their account was founded on some acts or words of Paul's, even though the acts or words were, according to him, misrepresented.

This theory has some advantages. It well explains the words of v. 11, and i. 8–10, (which otherwise constitute rather a difficulty as we shall see below, when the early date of Galatians is accepted).[1] It puts Paul's conduct on a uniform plane throughout ; he acted towards Timothy as he had consented to Titus's voluntary action some years before : he was always willing to go a very long way practically in concession to Jewish prejudices and customs. It has one very great advantage in respect of v. 2 f. : " I,

[1] When the later date of *Gal.* is accepted, these passages are naturally understood as a reference to the case of Timothy ; and to my mind that has always constituted the strongest argument in support of the later dating.

Paul, say unto you that, if ye receive circumcision, Christ will profit you nothing. Yea, I testify again to every man that receiveth circumcision, that he is a debtor to do the whole Law. Ye are severed from Christ, ye who would be justified by the Law; ye are fallen away from grace." This passage would be an ugly one, if it were taken *au pied de la lettre;* but, as it was written to correspondents into whose ears the case of Titus, as now interpreted by the theory we are considering, had been dinned by the insistence of Paul's emissaries, there was no danger of their taking it in the extremest sense, and no question of Paul's intending it in that sense. They would know at once that Paul was not condemning Titus, whose conduct he has just been explaining and justifying. They would catch Paul's real meaning, that if you get yourselves circumcised as a rite necessary for salvation and incumbent on every Christian, who desires to be in the fullest sense a Christian, then you are asking that the Law, not Christ, should be your means of justification; but if you accept the rite as a concession to the feeling of others, this is an act of love and sympathy.

The objection to this way of supplying the suppressed thought is that it requires such strong emphasis to be laid on the verb "was compelled." It has, however, been maintained by a number of exegetes, and must be admitted, that this strong emphasis is quite possible grammatically, and not inconsistent with the force of the Greek language.

Considerable difficulty was experienced from early time with this passage and with the facts of the case. *Οὐδέ* in Galatians ii. 5 is omitted in the Western text and by many Fathers, though the difference on this matter does not determine or depend upon their opinion whether Titus was actually circumcised (as a good many careful authorities have maintained).

(2) Not even Titus was forced to be circumcised; but

because of the sham-brethren—he retired from Jerusalem, in order to avoid outraging their scruples, and to facilitate the success of our mission—though we personally did not for a moment yield to their demand that Titus should be circumcised. The advantage of this interpretation is that it explains the statement of Acts xi. 30, xii. 25, in which Titus is not mentioned as a delegate ; and thus it produces perfect harmony between the two accounts of this second visit. It has perhaps no other advantages ; and it makes the verb " was compelled " rather feeble : one asks why, on that interpretation, Paul did not say περιετμήθη in place of ἠναγκάσθη περιτμηθῆναι.

On this interpretation we cannot determine, except by pure conjecture, what parts of Paul's teaching and conduct it was that had been construed by his opponents as implying the concession and admission that Gentiles should be circumcised ; no word or act previous to the case of Timothy is recorded on the part of Paul, from which the teaching of circumcision by Paul could by any twisting be elicited. But, of course, conciliatory teaching in general on Paul's part, may be assumed as having always been his way.

Further, the strong words of Galatians v. 2–4 would be more liable to be interpreted by Galatian readers in the extreme and most literal way. There would not remain any case (known to us) in which Paul had in practice demonstrated his opinion that a converted pagan might voluntarily and justifiably, in courteous and sympathetic consideration for Jewish custom and feelings, accept the rite as a concession to them.

We should have to explain both v. 2–4 and v. 11, i. 8–10 by the same supposition, that in his early Galatian teaching Paul had laid great stress on the duty of making concession to Jewish feeling—which is of course quite probable in itself, though not actually recorded—and had said that for

this purpose any might accept the Jewish rite. In the latter part of the supposition, however, there is the difficulty that it carries back the beginning of the question and the controversy to an earlier time. Luke certainly conveys the impression that the question first emerged when the emissaries from Jerusalem came to Antioch, Acts xv. 1.

(3) It cannot be admitted that there is any third alternative. Either Titus retired from Jerusalem and relieved the delegation of the difficulty caused by his presence, and thus the question was shelved for the time; or Titus submitted voluntarily in deference to Jewish prejudices. It cannot for a moment be regarded as possible either that the strait-laced Jews of Jerusalem submitted quietly to the continued presence of the unclean Gentile among them, or that Paul and Barnabas consented to dissimulate their relations with Titus and their feelings towards him. If Titus stayed on in Jerusalem uncircumcised, the whole question must have been raised. "They of the circumcision" could not possibly have tolerated the daily presence among them of an uncircumcised Hellene in intimate intercourse with Jews.

If Titus retired from the city, the question might have been quietly postponed, since neither side cared to force it to the front, and both probably thought that time might bring about a solution. The question had threatened to emerge, in the case of Cornelius; but as Cornelius was far away, it did not become active, and was left undecided (Acts xi. 1 ff.). Not until some of the strictest class of Jewish Christians, "they of the circumcision," found themselves daily confronted by this question in Acts xv. 1, Gal. ii. 11, did a final and authoritative decision become necessary. So Luke clearly intimates, and nothing that Paul says is discrepant.

It is not easy to choose between the two open alternatives. The arguments which occur to me are now stated; and

they tend to favour the former alternative, that Titus accepted the rite. This seems to make history more harmonious; and it explains well the text of Galatians ii. 5 and the remarkable variation there.

The reading of *οὐδέ* in Galatians ii. 5 is preferable in history as well as in authority and in sense. The omission of the negative is an early error, which disappeared again comparatively early. It arose in the time when the memory still survived that Titus had submitted to be circumcised; and the apparent contradiction—not really a contradiction—was solved by eliminating the negative word.

Considering what immense importance in this controversy attached to the willingness of Gentiles to make concessions to Jewish feelings, one is surprised to find that in the Apostolic Decree, which decided the question, there is, according to the generally accepted Text, no recognition of what after all was the most powerful force and motive to action in this problem. The Decree is almost harshly anti-Hebrew in this Text. It has not a word except condemnation of the old-fashioned Hebrews. It makes little, if any, allowance for their point of view. The concessions which it commands as necessary are very slight; and they are called burdens, not concessions. Since that is so, one fails to understand why the Decree does not say anything about the point which to Paul always seemed the most important in this question—the duty of sympathy and wider concession.

In the Western Text, on the other hand, the supreme duty not to do to another what you would not wish to be done to yourself is emphasised. This, beyond all doubt, is a strong point in that Text: it relieves us of a most serious difficulty in the Decree. Those who reject the Western Text as wholly wrong must take refuge in the accompanying verbal message, which is expressly referred to in the Decree,

and which (as may fairly be urged) must be regarded as needed to complete the Decree. Judas and Silas were to convey the Decree, and to complete and explain its terms. They were to show the power and the need of love and brotherly feeling and mutual concession in the give-and-take of ordinary life. Hence Paul, when treating this subject in 1 Corinthians x., and in Romans xii., lays almost the whole stress on love and concession. He was completing the Decree, as the Council had expected that the messengers should complete it. He does not quote the Decree, because it was so completely in his favour: he assumes it as familiar: it is in the minds of all his correspondents like the Ten Commandments: its meaning is what his readers are seeking for, and this he expounds.

Therefore, Paul never quotes the Decree to Corinthians and Romans: he only adds to it the savour and the grace of love. In the letter to the Galatians, on the contrary, he does not add love to it: he rather intensifies the sternness and the bareness of its rebuke to the extremists on the Jewish side.

This is why, on mature consideration, I find myself forced to put the letter before the Decree. The letter was written in the stress of conflict. It states the Pauline side in the strongest form. Though it mentions[1] the duty of love, and condemns quarrels and strife, yet it does not apply love to this question of conduct, and it is open to the criticism of suggesting that the cause of quarrel and strife lay always on the side opposed to his view. It was not written after the victory was gained, and the Decree issued, which requires as a duty that those who carry and comment on it should add what Judas and Silas were commissioned to add orally to the letter.

When the Galatian letter is placed early, the result is

[1] See Galatians v.

that the stages in early Christian development are more clearly marked in history, and the conduct of Paul is always seen clearly to be actuated by the same spirit; he is from first to last full of sympathy and ready to make concession in his attitude to the Jews, so far as practical conduct is concerned, but from first to last he is resolute and uncompromising in his teaching of principles. In this he never hesitated: it is always wrong to make any external act or any bodily mutilation a condition of entry into the fullest rights of the Christian Church. Salvation is a spiritual fact, in the spirit and through the spirit. To abandon that essential principle is to be severed from Christ, and to be fallen away from grace. In practical conduct, however, one should be ready to go very far in self-denial, and even to submit to privation and suffering, in the way of accommodating one's deserved liberty to the scruples and prejudices of a weaker brother.

From this point of view the accepted form of the text of the Apostolic Decree is found to be justified. The Western reading would be an early error, arising so early that it reaches back to the time when the real facts were still in the memory of the Church and the text was accommodated to them. As in Galatians ii. 5, so it is in Acts xv. 29.

I can quite imagine that many, when the case is clearly before them, will refuse to believe that the Apostles' Decree could wholly omit a reference to the duty of being conciliatory, and could leave this to be added orally by messengers. I am not quite sure that I can finally accept this idea myself. All such must be driven to prefer the Western Text of the Decree, not necessarily as exact, but as proving that there has occurred dislocation and mutilation of the original form.

However this may ultimately be determined, the Decree is not a good specimen of legislation for the Universal

Church. The Council had not attained to easy mastery of its own powers. The mere fact that the Decree is not subsequently quoted in the early history shows that it was not found in practice to be sufficient. The congregations could not neglect the duty of being conciliatory to Jewish feelings, yet this duty is either omitted or put in a very vague way, according to the text which is selected as nearest the true form. I imagine that the Corinthians, when they consulted Paul and were answered in his First Epistle, referred to the Decree, and that Paul was expounding what he conceived to be the spirit which actuated the Apostles in framing it.

It seems, then, clear that, during the visit to Jerusalem described in ii. 1–10, the question of the circumcision of Gentile converts did not reach an acute form, and was not discussed publicly.

Nor was the question discussed in the private meeting of Paul and Barnabas with the three leading Apostles, ii. 2. The latter heard the two future missionaries describe their action and attitude in Syrian Antioch. Perhaps this private conversation took place on the eve of Paul's departure, after he had received the command described in Acts xxii. 17–21, and the future mission plans were also indicated. The three fully approved of the division of work : Paul and Barnabas were commissioned to the Gentiles, and they themselves to the circumcision. But in this there is nothing to suggest that the conditions of future intercourse between Christian Jews and converted Gentiles were considered.

Every difficulty was met when it emerged in the early history of the Church. It was met always [1] in the same way by reliance on the guidance of the Spirit. The Apostles did not go out to meet future difficulties and to discuss ways

[1] *Pictures of the Apostolic Church*, § xiii.

of solving questions that had not yet presented themselves in practice.

Personally, I find myself strongly influenced by the argument which Mr. Still puts in a private letter, and which I restate in my own fashion, as well as I can. The Galatian letter in i. 16 f., ii. 6–9, seems a little ungracious in tone towards the older Apostles, and hardly justifiable as a complete statement of fact, if Paul was carrying with him the Decree in which they speak so cordially and generously of him, and in which they decide a difficult case on his appeal to them.

Could he so emphatically assert his complete independence of them ? Could he say, as if this were complete and final, without adding later some qualification and restriction, "I conferred not with flesh and blood, neither went I up to Jerusalem to them that were Apostles before me," if he had actually gone up to Jerusalem, and had referred to their decision a controversy that had arisen in Antioch ? Those words would be correct for the moment referred to, but they had at that later date ceased to be a sufficient statement of the case, and it was urgently necessary that the modification needed after the meeting of the Council should be mentioned. Contrast the tone of Gal. ii. 6 with the words of the Apostles about Paul, Acts. xv. 25 f.

Paul's later statement of his relation to the older Apostles is very strong, but yet it is qualified : 2 Corinthians xi. 5, xii. 11, "I reckon that I am not a whit behind the very chiefest Apostles, though I am nothing" ; 1 Corinthians xv. 9, "I am the least of the Apostles."

If the Galatian letter is early, this would confirm the confidence expressed in the Expositor, 1911, II. p. 493, that Paul had thought out his Gospel completely before he went to the Gentiles, and that there is no development in his religious thought from letter to letter. There is

indeed development in his missionary methods. He learned much in that respect through experience. There is also some development in his way of presenting his Gospel to his audience. But, on the whole, the difference between his letters is mainly due to the varying character and needs of his correspondents. In writing to the Thessalonians he was addressing an audience of pagan hearers, from whom he had been torn after a very few weeks of preaching, and who were in their infancy as converts. Their needs and their difficulties were quite different from those of a community where Paul had taught for months or years, and where he had instituted a body of officials charged with oversight of the congregation.

The Galatian letter is the earliest, yet it is perfectly mature in its teaching, and it naturally goes with the Roman and Corinthian letters. Paul had been a long time in Antioch, Iconium and Lystra [1] (we know little about Derbe, which was less important in Pauline time and throughout Christian history): he returned to those cities and spent some time there, organising them, appointing presbyters and (as we may say with confidence) giving some training to these officials in their congregational duties.

On these two visits he had formed bodies of not merely enthusiastic, but also in some degree matured, converts; and it was to such people that his letter was addressed. Their very error was a sign of thought and of anxious painstaking search for truth, though they had not understood Paul's religious position. It is, however, quite clear that some word or act of Paul's had been misconstrued, and Paul's explanations and recurrence to the topic show that the misunderstanding was easy and not unnatural.

[1] I adhere to the views expressed about times and seasons in my first books on the subject: the first journey lasted from spring 47 A.D. to autumn 49. Mr. Turner would cut the time much shorter.

Those Galatian converts still needed much further training; but the training was that which was suited for a more mature class than the Thessalonians; and this training was conveyed to them both in the letter and in two subsequent visits (Acts xvi. 1–6, xviii. 23).

The desire to avoid pressing the South Galatian theory too far long influenced me, and made me shrink from disturbing the general consensus that *Galatians* should go with *Romans* and *Corinthians*. I could not trust myself completely in this matter. I feel, however, that the early date brings out better the conduct of Paul as eagerly seeking after unity from first to last. Only in the very beginning of the controversy, when he was contending as it appeared for the very existence of a Gentile Church, he seems in some small touches to claim too complete independence. But quickly he recognised that such complete independence was inconsistent with the unity of the Church, and he accepted (probably, as I think, he suggested) the reference of the controversy to the senior Apostles and the whole governing body in Jerusalem for an authoritative decision. This was a sacrifice of complete independence, and is therefore subsequent to the Galatian letter, which claims absolute independence.

W. M. Ramsay.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT AS GIVEN IN THE FIRST GOSPEL

Modern criticism of the synoptic Gospels enables us to state that the version of our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, as we have it in the First Gospel is a compilation, and it further enables us to point out how the writer of that Gospel, whoever he may have been, gathered up much of this beautiful collection of the sayings of our Lord and added a great many sections to the original discourse. Before entering upon any attempt at analysing Matthew's account of the Sermon, I must make a few preliminary remarks.

1. The common matter in Matthew and Luke was probably derived from a source (Q) which consisted mainly of discourses of our Lord, with the record of a few incidents or occasions which gave rise to or led up to the discourses.

2. The second source of Matthew and Luke was St. Mark's Gospel, a brief and vigorous account of the events of our Lord's life, written apparently for Roman Christians, and giving comparatively few of the discourses of Jesus probably because Q was already in the hands of Mark's readers.

3. After this, Matthew had another source—probably Palestinian tradition, and Luke also had other sources. It is not necessary for our inquiry to assume anything concerning these sources, of which little apparently can be found out.

Matthew and Luke are real Gospels, real biographies or interpretations of Christ's work and teaching, of his Person and character. We see in them the intentions of the biographers and the colour of their minds and ideas. Matthew obviously writing for Jewish Christians and Luke for all men. St. Luke tells us he intended to embody and supersede what went before, or at all events to give a well-authen-

ticated, connected and chronological account "of those matters which have been fulfilled among us." Neither Matthew, nor Luke, however, can be regarded as an exhaustive account of Christ's life and teaching such as any modern writer would give. They rather aimed at edification and were probably confined to a certain length by custom as to the size of books or scrolls.[1]

Between the two Gospels they embodied all of Mark save a few verses (611 out of 661), and inasmuch as Q has not survived we may conjecture that between them they embodied the greater part of it also.

Now a question important to our analysis arises, namely, how probably did Matthew and Luke treat this matter common to them both? How did each use his Q? Did he copy it exactly or not?

To answer this question, I ask another. How did they treat Mark, their other chief source?

Roughly the answer is, Matthew takes little account of the order of Mark at first; he departs from it freely, he selects what he wants, combines it with other matter, omits what does not suit his design, and transposes the narrative freely. After Mark vi. however he for the most part preserves its order.

St. Luke, on the other hand, is more like a modern historian in that he preserves St. Mark's order, with a few exceptions apparently arising from the fact that he had another parallel source for those particular cases. He takes Mark's narrative and prefixes to it two or three chapters containing the account of the births of Christ and John Baptist and the temptation of our Lord; he adds an account of the resurrection differing from Mark's broken off account, and in the account of the Passion and Death of Christ he departs freely from St. Mark's account, clearly

[1] See *Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, edited by Dr. Sanday, p. 26.

showing he has another source for that part of Christ's life. He leaves out 1½ chapters of Mark, probably for the reason that they contain events very like others he elsewhere gives. Into this framework of narrative St. Luke fixes one great block of nine or ten chapters (called "the great insertion"—ix. 51 to xviii. 14) containing the report of long discourses of our Lord, and which the argument of this paper and other similar arguments go to show was mostly part of Q.[1] A great part of this is unique, found only here. Finally, he inserts one lesser block in St. Mark's framework of story, viz., Luke vi. 20–viii. 3. Now, besides those portions of "the great insertion" which are unique, there are in it many sayings parallel to Matthew's account of the Sermon on the Mount. Concerning these the question is, Are they in their right historical connexion in Luke or in Matthew? I believe the answer to be, Luke.

Because 1. no editor finding sayings in one block more or less connected would scatter them up and down, but, on the other hand, scattered sayings might by an editor be grouped under headings or subjects.[2]

2. If Matthew treated the subject matter of his other source (St. Mark) freely, he is likely to have done the same with Q. Moreover, he has put a saying from St. Mark (ix. 50) and also a saying of John the Baptist into the Sermon (Matthew vii. 19).

3. Matthew's Gospel, as a matter of fact, consists very largely of groups of sayings of Jesus—e.g., in chapter x. he has a group gathered from our Lord's discourse to the Twelve when He sent them forth, from His discourse to the Seventy

[1] So Mr. Streeter. Sir John Hawkins also shows that 52 close parallels exist between the two insertions of Luke, and collected sayings in Matthew v.–vii., ix., x., xi., xii., xiii., xviii., xxiii.–v., besides many less strictly parallel. *Oxford Studies*, p. 113 ff.

[2] So Mr. Streeter, *Oxford Studies*, pp. 145–8.

as found in St. Luke, and from His eschatological discourse as found in Mark and Luke, and from several other sources.

Assuming these preliminary positions as highly probable results of recent criticism, we now proceed with our analysis.

We have in St. Luke (vi. 20–42) an account of the Sermon on the "level place." We have most of the substance of this, together with amplifications, in St. Matthew's Sermon on the Mount; over and above this, we have numerous and large sections, all in Matthew gathered together into this one discourse, but in Luke scattered about and occurring in what we might call the bedrock of history.

In St. Luke's account every saying almost without exception rises naturally from some question put to Jesus or following some incident which gave rise to it (see Luke xi. 1–4, and Luke xii. 13), or enforcing some lesson given in a parable (Luke xvi. 17 or Luke xi. 5–13). In other words, St. Luke records the true historical occasion which gave rise to the saying; in his Gospel we have Christ's various sayings lying in the original bedrock of history as they naturally occurred. In Matthew's collection of the sayings and teachings of Jesus we have the same sayings quarried from their original position and each hewn into a unit of teaching, or an aphorism, and built into a systematic discourse.

The best instance and the largest I can give of this is the section forbidding anxiety for the things of this world, and commanding men to seek first the Kingdom—Matt. vi. 25–33, Luke xii. 22–32. In Matthew it has no close connexion with what went before it. In Luke, where it is almost verbatim the same passage with no greater verbal alteration than Luke makes when incorporating a section of Mark, we find recorded the original occasion of this discourse. A man comes to our Lord and asks Him to compel his brother to divide the inheritance with him. This leads our Lord, after refusing to be a judge, to give a solemn warning

against covetousness, part of which was the parable of the rich fool, from which this splendid discourse goes on uninterruptedly. "Therefore I say unto you, Be not anxious for your life, what ye shall eat, etc." All the anxiety of the rich fool about his fruits and goods had failed to add even one day to the length of his life, and in the following discourse we have the question, "Which of you by being anxious can add to his age one span?" This is in logical connexion. There is also verbal connexion when, after it has been said in the parable that the rich man's ground brought forth abundantly and that he pulled down his *barns* and built larger ones, we have the mention of sowing and reaping and gathering into *barns* in connexion with the ravens.

I maintain that this whole discourse is given by St. Luke, and derived by him from Q, as it arose naturally in the history of our Lord's dealings with men, and that Matthew, in accordance with his custom, has plucked this flower of teaching, and placed it together with many more in the framework of the Sermon on the Mount.

I must now try and briefly indicate the lines on which an analysis of the Sermon as given in Matthew should proceed.

I. We find a good deal of the Sermon *common to both* Matthew and Luke. (1) Four beatitudes Matthew v. 3, 4, 6, 11, 12; Luke vi. 20–23. (2) Matthew v. 39b, 40b, 42, and 44–48; Luke vi. 27–36 (two sections of exposition of the Law in Matthew, combined into one in Luke, and joined with "the golden rule" in its true context). (3) Omitting the whole of Matthew vi., we come to Matthew vii. 1–5, "Judge not," and the parable of the mote and beam. Compare Luke vi. 37–42. (4) The tree and its fruit, Matthew vii. 17–20; Luke vi. 43, 44. (5) "Lord, Lord," and the wise and the foolish man building his house (Matt. vii. 21, 24–27, Luke vi. 46–49), this forming the natural conclusion of the Sermon.

All this common matter we must look upon as part of the original Sermon.

II. The second part of the original Sermon is *that which there is evidence belonged to it but which is not recorded by Luke.* He plainly omits one long passage (Matt. v. 21–37), containing four sections of our Lord's exposition of the contrast between the laws of His kingdom and the laws of Moses (with one or two added passages) each beginning with the words, "It was said to them of old time, but I say unto you"; for how does St. Luke's sermon read? Luke vi. 26–27, "Woe unto you when all men shall speak well with you! for in the same manner did their fathers to the false prophets. But I say unto you which hear, Love your enemies, etc." Where is the connexion? Dr. Plummer ("St. Luke," *Intern. Crit. Com.*) says: "Ἀλλα. What is the contrast which this ἀλλα marks? The emphatic position of the ὑμιν seems to show that the contrast is between those on whom the woes have been pronounced and the faithful hearers now addressed." Is not this somewhat forced? Surely the connexion is lost or omitted by St. Luke; in fact, he omits "Ye have heard that it was said, An eye for an eye," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy." The words "*But I say unto you which hear*" are a plain indication that St. Luke has omitted these sections and the contrast drawn in them between the Christian and the Jewish law. He was not writing like Matthew for Jewish Christians, and therefore he omits the reference to the Law and also the whole of four of the sections in which Jesus corrects, enlarges or hedges it.

III. The third part of the original Sermon is *that which is given in Luke and not in Matthew.*

1. There are the four Woes (vi. 24–26). 2. The passage concerning the blind leading the blind," and "the disciple is not above his master" (vi. 39–40). 3. "The good man

and the good treasure of his heart, etc." (vi. 45), and a few phrases of amplification in some passages recorded in both the reports of the Sermon. Matthew must have omitted these if they belonged to the original discourse, as I believe they did, and it is noteworthy that he records some of them in otherg roups of sayings (see Matt. x. 24, xiii. 52, xv. 14).

IV. We come now to the matter *which is found in Matthew's account but is not recorded anywhere in Luke.*

1. We have four or five more beatitudes (v. 5, 7–10). some critics maintain that these were added by Matthew from the Psalms and elsewhere, but this seems a violent supposition. The existence of them here and the variations in the other beatitudes have been explained in different ways.[1]

2. Matthew v. 16, "Even so let your light shine, etc." This is an amplification of the passage which precedes it and which will be considered later.

3. Matthew v. 17. This may well have been the introduction to the five sections on the Law.

4. v. 19, "Whosoever therefore shall break one of these least commandments, etc." This does not agree with our Lord's own treatment of the law in qualifying it and repudiating parts of it in verses 21–44. It is probably a Jewish-Christian gloss.

5. v. 20, "For I say unto you, except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, etc." This passage is surely in very close connexion with chap. vi. 1–8, 16–18, "Take heed that you do not your *righteousness* before men to be seen of them, etc.," where our Lord, in contrasting the righteousness His disciples are to have with that of the hypocrites, gives three examples (vers. 2, 6 and 16), alms, prayers and fasting. The rendering *alms* in verse 1 for *righteousness* in A.V. obscures this. Verse

[1] For a simple explanation see *Oxford Studies*, p. xxii.

1 is a heading comprehending the three classes of good works.

We shall see that this section on good works is out of its true place in Matthew vi. If it be part of the original Sermon, as seems probable, should it not follow at the end of Matthew v. 20 and precede the five sections on the Law, and v. 17, which introduces them ?

6. vii. 6, "Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, etc." This has been called "an erratic bolder" (*Encyclopaedia Biblica*, art. "Sermon").

7. vii. 13, 14. The two ways.

8. vii. 15, "Beware of false prophets, etc." We have not much means of knowing whether these two sections (7 and 8) were part of the original discourse or not.

V. The fifth division of the Sermon in Matthew is the large quantity of matter found in it *to which there occur parallels in totally different contexts in St. Luke.* These do not belong to the original Sermon. They lie far more naturally where Luke has them.

1. Matt. v. 18, "Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the Law, till all things be accomplished." This saying is given in Luke in an historical setting in the form "But it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than for one tittle of the law to fall."[1] It is a rebuke to the Pharisees and has reference to the Law forbidding divorce. Plummer (*Internat, Crit. Com.*, Luke) states that this is a condensed discourse, and the connexion is rather lost. "The law and the prophets (the O. T. dispensation) were until John. The law is now superseded. The Kingdom of God is open to all; all can force their way into it and to salvation. But the moral elements in the law are indestructible. You cannot abolish them as you Pharisees try to do by frequent divorce," and

[1] Luke xvi. 17.

we may add, by their upholding Herod's divorce and remarriage, unlike John.

2. Matt. v. 25, "Agree with thine adversary quickly, etc." This saying is given in Luke in another connexion. Jesus has just said to the multitudes, "When ye see a cloud arising in the west, straightway ye say, There cometh a shower, etc., for as thou art going with thine adversary before the magistrate, etc."; that is, "When you see the signs, act at once, and see that you are on the right side. Make your peace with God now; the time for payment is before judgment is given."

3. Matt. v. 31, 32. The second verse in this enlargement or correction of the law, "every one that putteth away his wife, etc.," is parallel to a passage in Luke xvi. 18, where Jesus utters the same prohibition (though without the exception which is added by Matthew) speaking to the Pharisees, who derided Him and upheld Herod. It applies there exactly in both its clauses to *a particular act of putting away*, viz., Herod's divorce of the daughter of Aretas and his marriage of Herodias, and therefore we have a true historical setting for it in Luke and not in Matthew—though it may, on the other hand, be a true doublet in Christ's teaching, and have been spoken twice or oftener. It occurs again in Matthew xix. 9 (from Mark x. 11, 12).

We come now to Matthew vi. There is evidence in St. Luke which connects Matthew v. 44 closely with vii. 1. If this is so, then the whole of chapter vi. is either an interpolation into the Sermon gathered from elsewhere, or part of it is out of its true order in the Sermon. Luke vi. 35–37 reads thus: "Love your enemies and do good . . . and ye shall be the sons of the Most High, for He is kind to the unthankful and evil. Be ye merciful, even as your Father is merciful, and judge not, and ye shall not be judged, etc."

Of the connexion between Luke vi. 36 and 37, Plummer

writes (*Luke*, p. 189): "Judge not" is a further development of the principle of Christian love. Having told His disciples to cherish no personal animus against those who injure them, He now warns them against judging others . . . censoriousness is a transgression of the royal law of love, and an invasion of the Divine prerogatives; not only vengeance but judgment belongs to God." Now Luke vi. 36, "Be ye merciful" (or "be ye perfect, etc."), is the last verse of Matthew v., and "Judge not" is the first verse of chap. vii.; if, therefore, "Judge not" is part of the subject "love your enemies" and the perfection urged, the whole of chap. vi. in Matthew is out of place.

4. Passing over Matthew vi. 1–8, 16–18, which have been already treated of, we come to Matthew vi. 9–15, the Lord's Prayer. St. Luke gives the historical setting of this —Luke xi. 1–4. It was after seeing Christ pray that the disciples asked for and were given a model prayer. (We note that Matthew's account adds to Luke's "Thy will be done as in Heaven so on earth," and "Deliver us from the evil one.")

5. Matt. vi. 19, "Treasure in heaven," cf. Luke xii. 33, "Sell that ye have and give alms; *make for yourselves* purses which wax not old, *a treasure in heaven* which faileth not, where no *thief* draweth near neither *moth* destroyeth . . . for where your treasure is there will your heart be also." In St. Luke this saying is put directly at the end of the long passage forbidding anxious thought for earthly things, and it is a *positive* conclusion from the forbidding of anxiety, a method of seeking the Kingdom. Matthew puts it at the beginning of the same passage, but not so directly in connexion with it, but with "the light of the body, etc.," intervening. This is surely a very inferior setting to give it.

6. This last passage (vi. 22, 23, "the light of the body") is found in St. Luke (xi. 34–36) in the discourse regarding

"an evil generation seeking after a sign"—we shall speak of its bearing on that subject when treating of another similar passage which occurs there with it, "no man when he hath lighted a lamp putteth it in a cellar." It is a good example of how St. Matthew sometimes even breaks a saying into two pieces and combines each of them with other matter elsewhere.

7. Matt. vi. 24, "No man can serve two masters, etc." . . . In St. Luke vi. 13 this saying (word for word the same) is part of the lesson drawn from the parable of the Unjust Steward—Let your use of the mammon of unrighteousness be made entirely subservient to your Master's service, for no man can be a slave to two masters. "This verse" (says Plummer, *Luke*, p. 387) "forms a natural conclusion to the comments on the parable; and if it was uttered only once we may believe that this is its original position, rather than in the Sermon on the Mount, where it is placed by Matthew (so Schanz, Weiss)."

8. vi. 25–33. This long passage forbidding anxiety, I have already shown to be in its right setting as a corollary from the parable of the rich fool as given in Luke xii. 22.

Thus all of Matthew vi., except the three sections on good works, is found in an historical setting in Luke and must have been collected by Matthew from the same or a similar source from which Luke derived it. Matthew then grouped them in the collection of sayings which we call the Sermon on the Mount in his Gospel. Its verbal similarity suggests that the same Greek original source was used by both Matthew and Luke for this section.

9. In Matthew vii. there are only two passages which are found in St. Luke in different contexts. Vers. 7–11, "Ask and it shall be given you, etc." This section, in very similar words, together with the additional illustration of the egg and the scorpion, is found in Luke xi. 9–13 as the lesson

enforced by the parable of the Friend at midnight. There (Plummer says) it is "an exhortation to perseverance in prayer based on the preceding parable and confirmed (vers. 11–13) by personal experience." . . . "And *I also* say unto *you*, Ask, etc."; the parable teaches them, and *Jesus* also teaches them the same. The parable shows how the urgent suppliant fared; the disciples may know how *they* will fare. The three commands (*Ask*, *seek*, *knock*) are obviously taken from the parable and they form a climax of increasing earnestness." (*Luke*, p. 299.)

10. Chap. vii. 13, "Enter ye in by the narrow gate," found in St. Luke xiii. 24 as an answer to the question: "Lord, are there few that be saved?" in the form "Strive to enter in by the narrow door." The two ways—broad and narrow (vers. 13, 14), and the warning against false prophets (ver. 15), are peculiar to Matthew; but in the same section of St. Luke following the words quoted, comes the passage Luke xiii. 25–27, "Lord, Lord, open to us . . . we did eat and drink in Thy presence, and Thou hast taught in our streets, and He shall say, I tell you, I know not whence ye are; depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity" (ἀδικίας). St. Matthew has further on, under the heading as it were of the tree and its fruit, a very parallel passage, "Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in Thy name . . . works? And then will I profess unto them, I never knew you; depart from me, ye that work iniquity" (or lawlessness, ἀνομίας). The last clause is, of course, a quotation from Psalm vi. In Luke's version of the Sermon we have also the words "Why call ye me Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say?" cf. Matt. vii. 21. This case is not so conclusive as the others, and it may be a real doublet. The *gate* to the way may not be the same as the *door* into the house.

I have passed over three other parallels, one of them

with Mark, because they may be examples of sayings uttered by our Lord more than once, and in different connexions, and if so, we cannot build much upon them in our argument. These are Matt. v. 13; cf. Luke xiv. 34, 35, Mark ix. 50; and Matt. v. 15 and v. 29.

11. In the middle of the section Matthew vii. 13–23 we have a saying already recorded by Matthew as part of the preaching of John the Baptist (v. 19). "Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire" (Matt. iii. 10b, and Luke iii. 9b = part of Q). It is here brought in by Matthew to enlarge the teaching of Jesus on the tree and its fruits. This whole section is very composite and is a good example of Matthew's method of producing a grand effect—comparable to the original effect of our Lord's teaching when the people were astonished at it—by conflating our Lord's sayings and dove-tailing one into another.

12. Lastly, the golden rule is part of the original Sermon; but when we compare its position in Matthew and Luke we see at once that the latter is its correct connexion, and that St. Matthew has transposed it. It is puzzling to see any connexion with what preceded it as it stands in Matthew, although he introduces it with the word "Therefore." It runs thus: "How much more shall your Father who is in Heaven give good things to them that ask Him? All things, therefore, whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, even so do ye also unto them: for this is the law and the prophets" (vii. 12). There is absolutely no connexion. St. Luke vi. 31 has it much earlier in the discourse, thus: "Love your enemies. . . . Give to every one that asketh thee, and of him that would take away thy goods ask them not again. And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise. And if ye love them that love you, what thank have ye? etc."

Here, again, Plummer, whom I always quote as a standard commentator, and one who has not expressed any opinion on the subject of whether Matthew's or Luke's account of the Sermon is the more historical, says (*Luke*, p. 186): "The καὶ introduces the general case which covers all these cases; 'and in short, in a word,' How would one wish to be treated oneself if one was an aggressor? How ought one to wish to be treated? But obviously the principle covers a great deal more than the treatment of aggressors and enemies."

To sum up, I have taken twelve separate passages from Matthew v.–vii., and have found that ten of them are to be found in the "great insertion" of nine chapters which St. Luke has placed in one block in the framework of narrative which he derived from St. Mark.

One of these, v. 13, No. 3, Matt. v. 32, may be a real doublet in Christ's teaching, i.e., an habitual saying of His which occurs in different connexions.

The first ten passages all occur in St. Luke in logical (and often verbal) connexion with some parable or discourse, or in a natural connexion with some incident, or as an answer to some question put to Jesus, or an illustration of some warning or doctrine; and with regard to two other sayings, parts of the original Sermon and reported in both accounts, viz., "Judge not, etc.," and the "golden rule," the context in which they occur in Luke's version of the Sermon is clearer and more logical and connected than that in which Matthew has placed them in his report of it.

On the other hand two separate sections of the contrast between the new law and the old have been combined into one in Luke, and three or four other such sections entirely omitted. Here Matthew adheres more closely to the original Sermon in his report than Luke.

There is also in the Sermon in Matthew one other saying

(Matt. v. 29) derived from Mark (ix. 43–8), and there occurring in another connexion. This is given again by Matthew in xviii. 8–10, and so may come from or be a real doublet—besides one saying (11) derived from the account of the preaching of John the Baptist.

If my contention is the true one, it is plain that the Sermon on the Mount as given in Matthew is a conflation of Christ's teaching grafted upon the original discourse. St. Luke's report of the Sermon is nearer to the discourse as given by Jesus, though he has certainly omitted some considerable sections on the Law, and perhaps some of the beatitudes, and probably also the section on Christian righteousness contrasted with the outward righteousness of the Pharisees vi. 1–8, etc., as well as one or two other brief sayings. In both cases we must of course remember that what we have is rather a brief summary than a detailed account of our Lord's words. Some have supposed that the Sermon in Matthew is really a kind of summary of elementary Christian teaching, a brief compendium of Christian ethics and practical teaching, a sort of manual of the early Church, which Matthew introduced into his Gospel. This would be to push the collector further back and make him a source of our Matthew; but this is an unnecessary hypothesis when we see that the writer of Matthew, who is "a born teacher" has collected many other groups of the sayings of Jesus. If my analysis is at all correct, the systematic nature of the Sermon in Matthew is derived from the Editor's skill in grouping sayings under single headings and fitting our Lord's scattered teachings into a continuous whole, while St. Luke gives us the sayings and their occasions together, thus connecting them with individual incidents and facts.

Maurice H. F. Collis.

THE HISTORIC SETTING OF THE PASTORAL EPISTLES.

(i) *The Linguistic Argument.*

TURNING now to the style and diction of the Pastoral Epistles as possible letters of instruction from the Greatest of Missionaries, written to direct and strengthen trusted disciples in facing certain practical difficulties (arising in mission churches, rooted in soil in which other growths of far longer standing acted as competing influences), we cannot but feel that the old problem appears in a somewhat changed light. Our eye does not to-day rest on Paul so much in his individual capacity—what we may call "the unconditioned theologian" of critical fiction in its more academic moods,—but rather on the missionary, bound with a myriad threads of living memory and association to those who are before his mind as he writes—their special needs and failings, *their* way of looking at things and even of putting them to themselves in words. Surely all this would tend, consciously or unconsciously, to condition his way of writing, as we know it did condition the line of thought and even some of the phrasing of 1 Corinthians, in which there are obvious echoes of what his readers were wont to say among themselves.[1] If in 1 Timothy iii. 16 a citation from some current Christian hymn shows how the writer's mind was working on the line and level of what was familiar to those whom he held in his mind's eye, surely this would not be unlike Paul himself. Nor is it natural to limit the application of this principle to what we can demonstrate to be formal quotation.

Signs of the way in which his mind keeps in touch with forms of thought and even phraseology to which the common

[1] "We know that 'honourable (καλός) is the Law'" (1 Tim. i. 8), recalls 1 Cor. viii. 1, "We know that 'we all have knowledge.'"

consciousness of the local church would most readily respond, appear also in certain terse, sententious maxims [1] introduced by the formula "Faithful is the saying." In most cases these seem couched in the very words in which each sentiment was current among the local Christians, while one at least (Tit. iii. 8) seems a little adapted in form to suit the context. But all appear to reflect modes of expression proper to the average Christian consciousness to be impressed through these letters, which are virtually "open letters," fit for quotation so far as might seem needful in order to silence challenge of Timothy's authority and win over local public opinion. This is implied by the closing salutations in 1 Timothy and Titus, "Grace be with you (all)," especially as compared with the ending of the more intimate and personal second Epistle to Timothy, "The Lord be with thy spirit." [2] But it is implied also, when the matter is considered more closely, with these hints to guide us, in many other phenomena of the Epistles, especially such as have often been alleged to prove their fictitious nature, as though the forger could not help dropping the mask occasionally and using language suitable enough in addressing those relatively out of touch with Paul's own ideals, but to that degree unsuitable in writing to intimate disciples like Timothy and Titus. This point, however, will come up again in another connexion touching the substance rather than the form of these writings.

Passing then to style and diction in the stricter or philological and grammatical sense, it is hard not to agree with Sir W. M. Ramsay in his recent contention in these pages,[3] to

[1] 1 Timothy i. 15, iii. 1, iv. 9; 2 Timothy ii. 11–13; Titus iii. 8, all cited below.

[2] The ἡ χάρις μεθ' ὑμῶν which follows in a group of our MSS., with significant variants in others, while it is lacking in another group (see, e.g. A. Souter, *Nov. Test. Græce* (Oxonii), *ad loc.*), is probably a gloss, added on the analogy of 1 Timothy and when the Epistle was used in public reading.

[3] Series VII. vol. viii.

the effect that a man of such large reserves of every kind as Paul proves himself, both in Acts and in his acknowledged Epistles, must not be judged by a hard and fast standard even in this respect. Further, those other Epistles actually reveal great flexibility and variety in his style at different stages of his career and in different conditions, by the range of variation within his now admitted Epistles. The force of this analogy seems still insufficiently recognised, even where it is in principle admitted. A leading feature of the case is that those variations within Paul's Epistles which have finally been accepted as due simply to changed conditions, concern not only style and diction proper, but also thought and emphasis or dominant interest. Thus it is never a purely linguistic problem that meets us. Disputed epistles have won their way to recognition not along one line by itself, but rather as the result of an impression of continuity along several converging lines. In some cases the linguistic ties have come to be regarded as the strongest, in others not so. But in no case could they be held conclusive in themselves. The variations in style and in subject-matter are causally connected. So is it in the case of Colossians and Philippians, the latter of which, though it is, at least in the judgment of most of the very critics who reject the Pastorals on the score of style, the further removed in date, is in style nearer to the earlier groups of Paul's letters. Now in the Pastorals the change in subject-matter is most marked: hence we might expect large changes also in style. Bearing all this in mind, it seems that the linguistic facts of these Epistles are sufficiently covered by analogies gained from the gradual linking up of the rest of the Pauline Epistles, especially when we note that the process has gone on at both ends. It has, on the one hand, taken up the earliest and most rudimentary type, letters of encouragement and exhortation like the two Thessalonian Epistles, which were once held "sub-

Pauline" because not full enough of Paul's distinctive Gospel; and on the other, it has embraced the so-called "Captivity Group," once treated as "Deutero-Pauline," as going beyond the doctrinal development possible to his own Gospel. This means that in both directions, the so-called "sub-Pauline" and the "Deutero-Pauline," far larger latitude is now recognised than formerly; and the case against the Pastorals, whether in substance or form, is proportionately weakened.

As regards the details of the linguistic argument[1] *pro* and *con.*, one can here touch only a few of the chief matters. I fully recognise that change in the use of particles requires more explanation than the appearance of a number of fresh words: but even it is connected with the change of aim and subject-matter, which carries with it a change from a more to a less argumentative[2] and closely compacted style, or from a narrative to a hortatory. In fact, what strikes one forcibly in scanning the lists of constructions and *hapax legomena* adduced on the negative side, is the absence of proper analysis. They are accumulations, upon which the historical and psychological imagination has not been brought to bear: which means that the human factor, as compared with the mechanical, has not been given due play. What has to be shown, before fresh words can prove anything against a Pauline origin, is that they constantly occur where otherwise known Pauline terms would serve equally well, or that they were not likely to be used in Paul's circle of experience. But this has not been shown; nor is the argument from the total or relative absence of certain common Pauline terms a strong one: such can seldom be shown to be required by the subject-matter itself. A good many words and expressions which do not happen to occur in Paul's admitted writ-

[1] Which may be studied in Wohlenberg's Commentary, especially its Introduction.

[2] This would account for the disappearance of ἄρα, διό (δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, which replaces it, is found also in Hebrews ii. 11), διότι, ἔπειτα, ἔτι.

ings are paralleled in the Lucan and other New Testament writings [1] (e.g., 1 Peter), probably dating a good deal earlier than the period to which the Pastorals are often assigned. Further, the proportion of fresh words in the Pastorals as compared with the "Imprisonment Group," does not largely exceed that in the latter group when compared with the letters preceding it—especially when one allows, as is only fair, for the long strings of epithets belonging to the new subject-matter which naturally swell the list of fresh words.

Beyond these general considerations, one or two instances may be given to show how dubious is the stylistic case against authenticity. Two words in particular have been cited, viz., καλός and σωτήρ. "Καλός, which Paul never uses as an attribute, is mainly employed in this way" in the Pastorals. But the adjective is one which appealed strongly to the Greek mind in the sense of "honourable" or "fair" (= "noble"): it enters into their equivalent for our "gentleman" (καλοκἀγαθός). Why, then, should Paul, who used it in Romans vii. 16, in "I consent unto the Law that it is good" (ὅτι καλός), not have used it also in the other way as occasion offered? The easy transition between the uses is seen in 1 Timothy ii. 3, "This is (a) fair and acceptable (thing)." But further, the relative frequency of the adjectival use in the Pastorals seems partly due to suggestion from the usage current among his converts. Thus both in 1 Timothy iii. 1, "If any desires oversight, he desires a fair function," and in Titus iii. 8, "that those who have placed their trust in God should take care to patronise fair deeds," the sentiment is prefaced by "Faithful is the saying." Again, 1 Timothy i. 8, "We know that the Law is honourable," probably echoes what was being said by others—perhaps quoting Paul himself (Rom. vii. 16); and "the fair confession" in 1 Timothy vi. 12 was a natural, if not a regular, expression for the convert's baptismal

[1] See, e.g., tables in W. H. Simcox's *Writers of the New Testament.*

pledge of allegiance. Such a view receives support from the reference to "the fair name" ("Christ") invoked upon the Christian according to James ii. 7. Indeed I suspect that the language of the Pastorals is allusive and coloured by common usage in far more passages than we can now trace with certainty. But if so, this would help to explain the relative lack of the *distinctively* Pauline element even in letters which contain some characteristically Pauline passages.

Σωτήρ, "Saviour," as applied to God, is another clear case in point, occurring as it does after "Faithful is the saying" in 1 Timothy iv. 9: "We have set our hope on a living God, who is the Saviour of all men, especially of them that believe." This saying may also underlie 1 Timothy ii. 3 f., "This is fair and acceptable before our Saviour God, who willeth all men to be saved." There is not the slightest reason why this widely used religious term for a God as "Deliverer" should not have been applied from the very first to God and Christ, as we find it used in the Pastorals (cf. Phil. iii. 20; Eph. v. 23). And as regards another religious term, that for the "manifestation" of deity, while *Parousia* (the more Jewish term perhaps) occurs oftener in the other Pauline Epistles, *epiphaneia* does occur in 2 Thessalonians ii. 8, in the interesting expression "the *epiphany* of His *Parousia*," as though the words expressed rather different aspects of the same thing. Other terms bearing more on the substance of the thought, like "faith" and "insight" (ἐπίγνωσις), will be referred to in another connexion. But it is here pertinent to call attention to so formal a phrase as "night and day"—with its Oriental order of thought—found in 1 Timothy v. 5, 2 Timothy i. 4, and implying that the author of these Epistles was at any rate a Jew and not a Greek—as one imagines the supposed forger would be.

On the whole, then, it seems that the true verdict as to the style and diction of the Pastorals in relation to Pauline authorship should be simply *Nil obstat*: the issue must be settled on other grounds. This is very much Dr. Peake's attitude in his *Introduction to the New Testament*. He feels the linguistic difficulties to be about equal against "Ephesians" and against the Pastorals (especially if "Ephesians" be Pauline); and if on the whole he sums up *pro* in the former case and *con.* in the latter, the difference turns for him on those other grounds. To this attitude I have no objection in principle; but I hope to be able to change the balance on the remaining grounds, as he conceives it, by what now follows. VERNON BARTLET.

AN ORACLE OF THE LORD IN ISAIAH XXXII.

THE words and deeds of the Lord Jesus will be more clearly understood when the origin of the four Gospels is more clearly understood. For this purpose it is much to be desired that students of the question should fairly consider whether Papias did not put us all on the right track while we ever since have declined to understand his meaning. It is here to be suggested that Papias, in speaking of the *Oracles of the Lord* of which he wrote an *Exposition*, meant select and precious words and passages of the Greek Bible which foreshadowed the earthly life of Christ the Lord: that, in fact, he made a collection such as that which "Matthew" had made before him, of prophecies concerning Jesus as Messiah, and that *Dominical* (κυριακά) Oracles are those concerning Christ and only in a distant and secondary way were, or contained, Sayings of Christ, while any lengthy discourses found no place whatever in his collection. And a single instance of these Oracles is presently to be treated.

This idea was propounded by the anonymous writer of *The Oracles ascribed to Matthew by Papias of Hierapolis, a Contribution to the Criticism of the New Testament*, with Appendices on the authorship of the *De vita contemplativa*, the date of the Crucifixion, and the date of the *Martyrdom of Polycarp*, London, 1894, pp. 274. The author is the late John Burslem Gregory, LL.D. The volume is the result of a sound and thorough investigation that well repays study. The present writer had written *The Oracles in the New Testament*, so far as the question of Papias was concerned, before the anonymous work was brought to his notice by the present Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity. No doubt the idea is "revolutionary," as it has been called by Dr. Moffatt. But other revolutionary ideas have from time to time emerged in the Christian Church, and in the realm of discovery. The Christian faith was itself revolutionary. St. Paul was revolutionary when he said : *This one thing—forgetting the things that are behind*, by which he meant especially the Covenant of Circumcision and the Sacrificial System, to which he had just before made reference (Phil. iii. 3, 10, 14), two things that a Jew would never forget. It is just possible, I believe it is certain, that those who regard the title of Papias's work as throwing light upon the discourses of Jesus are quite on the wrong track. In any case, it is a matter well worth considering. Neither Lightfoot nor his antagonist, the author of *Supernatural Religion*, had any idea of it thirty-five years ago. They both assumed that the *Dominical Oracles* of Papias's title were sayings of Jesus. Yet the assumption was on the whole barren of result. At least, it did not result in bringing the world to a clearer understanding of the origin of the Gospels or of portions of them.

Since that time the Septuagint has been made far more available by the labours of Dr. Swete and his collaborators at Cambridge, and has naturally been far more widely and

profitably studied than before. The time is not far distant when it will be seen that the Greek Bible was the cradle of the Christian faith. When this is seen, it will be easy to admit that the Hebrew Bible never could have nursed it. It will further be seen that the Massoretic text was intended not to nurse it. The Hebrew authorities held with Aeschylus,

> οὐ χρὴ λέοντος σκύμνον ἐν πόλει τρέφειν,
> ἢν δ' ἐκτραφῇ τις, τοῖς τρόποις ὑπηρετεῖν—(Ar. Ran. 1431),[1]

especially when the whelp was of "the Lion of the tribe of Judah." It will be seen, in fact, that some slight alterations were made in the Hebrew authorised text at the Synod of Jamnia about 90 A.D. for the purpose of upsetting the Argument from Prophecy, which was then a weapon handled so powerfully and easily by the Christian controversialist against the Jewish defender.

The discovery of traces of the Argument from Prophecy at work is a fascinating pursuit. Some of these traces are provided for us in the apostolic statements : *that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet saying*, and very numerous they are in most of the New Testament books. Every one of them is an invitation to look further, and when we have understood these to find more. Between the Greek Bible (assisted occasionally by the Hebrew) and the Greek Testament with Papias' statements to guide the track, it is probable that students will be able to go far in this quest which is only just beginning.

Two salient points of interest can here be mentioned : the former directly affects our belief in the mental attitude of the Master-prophet Himself. Was He conscious of being the Messiah ? or did He resolve to be the Messiah ? Which is the right conception of His mind ? In recent times if we take

[1] "Nurse not the lion's whelp within the city : Nurs'd up, thou must comply with all his ways."

up a religious or a theological work we shall probably see the term "Messianic consciousness" employed. What does this *mean*? is the first question to be asked. What *does* it mean? is the last. For the mind is utterly baffled. Was He born with this consciousness? was it implanted in Him in childhood, or at the Baptism, or when? Was it superior to Him, or interior to Him, or exterior to Him? Did it descend upon Him, as the Gnostics thought, at Baptism and depart from Him in a moment on the Cross? Was it a descending rain, or was it a haze that crept upon His coloured view, or was it a haunting spell that hung round Him, or was it a phase of thought that now and then bathed Him in light, or was it an endowment that passed to Him before or after birth? Is this the sort of consciousness that a Messianic purpose assumes or in which it is invested? Or, on the other hand, is consciousness a hopelessly false, futile, and improper term altogether? Is not every one of the above notions untrue to the written word of the Epistles and the Gospels? Is not the sphere of His Messiahship that of the will, not that of the intellect or that of the emotion? Should we not speak of His "Messianic will," "Messianic resolution," "Messianic purpose," and abolish "Messianic consciousness" for ever? If so, we should then be in line with the hallowed words of the Psalmist, *Lo! I come to do Thy will, O God,* and with *Thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness.* The moral effort was not a work of less unflinching determination than is here expressed, nor was it an easier exertion of the will that must continue until *it is finished.*

Now suppose that we find by searching that the Lord Jesus set Himself, so long as He was a free agent, and not either an infant or a prisoner, deliberately to fulfil that which He read in the Psalms, and in Zechariah, and in 2 Samuel, concerning David and Jesus and the Lord—for this is actu-

ally what we find—then we have a most important and convincing confirmation of His purpose. It begins to shine with a clearer outline than before, while the shadows cast by it are darker and blacker. Even the fulfilments by Judas of the prophecies concerning him under the name of Judas or Judah become clearer, or shall we not say, more flagrant: for Judas begins to appear as a disciple whose intelligence is only equalled by that of Peter among the Twelve, and as one who was in the secret place of prophecy.

The other point is related to this and is fascinating by reason of its difficulty in contrast with the clearness of the former. When the Master is not a free agent, but an infant or a prisoner, we find that His doings and sufferings are also reported as fulfilments, and the question now is how far we are to say that the actions which His followers attributed to Him as fulfilments were real actions at all. This is a very large question which does not at present admit of a clear general answer. Probably for some time to come the only answer possible will be that the apostolic writers embroidered real history with details from prophecy which they treated as evidence of fact, but how far these details extend is just what cannot easily be determined. We can see that there were wide tracts of which they have told little, vaguely, variously; for instance, as regards Joseph, the names of the Twelve, the locality of incidents, the numbers of individuals involved; while, on the other hand, we cannot be blind to the possibilities that even coincidences with the word of prophecy may both consist with and consist of facts of history, and that some of these coincidences may be unintentional on the part of the evangelists. Still the first thing to be done is to ascertain and set forth the precise amount of coincidence between the phraseology of the Gospels and that of the Greek Bible. There are abundant encouragements to the quest of this Holy Grail. When, after trying to pursue

the movements of Jesus from place to place in obedience to the prophecies of the Psalmist, we find such an astonishing coincidence as *ἀντάλλαγμα, recompense, exchange*, in Mark viii. 37 with *the recompense of thy Christ* in Psalm lxxxix. 51, it will take much convincing to make us doubt that the coincidence was intentional on the part of the evangelist or to doubt that the Psalm was then in Greek before the Master's eye and mind.

These questions, however, are far too wide for the present paper, which aims at nothing more than to treat of a point which the Gospels repeatedly make concerning the secrecy and retirement of Jesus, and to show that this was due to His deliberate fulfilment of prophecy. The oracle was Isaiah xxxii. 1 ff.: "For behold a king, a righteous [king], shall be king, and rulers with judgment shall rule. And THE MAN shall be hiding his words, and he shall be hidden as from rushing water; and he shall appear in Sion as a river rushing gloriously (ἔνδοξος) in a thirsty land. And no longer shall they be confident (πεποιθότες) upon men, but they shall give their ears to hear, and the heart of them that are feeble (τῶν ἀσθενούντων) shall come near to hear, and the tongues that stammer shall quickly learn to speak peace."

After the Greek Bible has been tested in scores of passages as the guide of the Master's action, it is too late to pretend that it was nothing of the sort; the assumption made in this paper is that it was His guide here as elsewhere. At the Baptism He became the Elect of God, the Son of God, THE MAN. He resolved to do the will of God, as it was written of Him, of THE MAN. It therefore became His duty to do what none would have expected of Him, to *hide His words*, and to *be hidden*. This He did; He hid His words in parables, and He hid Himself from time to time in seclusion. He also endeavoured to seal the lips of those whom He healed because they *were feeble*, but so much the more they published it.

I. Let us take one of the points in the last line first. The Alexandrine MS. of the Greek Bible is that which I have found in almost every instance of a very great number to represent the form of text that was in the hands of the Lord and the apostles. This MS. (A) has two slight variations of its own, *ἀσθενῶν*, which is unimportant, for *ἀσθενούντων*, and *προσέξει*, which is more important, for *προσήξει* (*shall come* to him). Now *προσέξει τοῦ ἀκούειν* means *shall attend* (sc. *τὸν νοῦν*) *in order to hear*. This is remarkable, for it represents the sick as being more anxious to hear than to be healed, or at least as anxious to hear. Now we observe the way in which Luke introduces his Sermon on the level place: "a great multitude of the people from all Judea and Jerusalem and from the sea coast of Tyre and Sidon who came *to hear* him and to be healed of their diseases; and they that were troubled of unclean spirits were being healed (*ἐθεραπεύοντο*) and all the crowd sought to touch him, for power came forth from him and healed them all." This looks as if Luke was working on the oracle, but perhaps rather with the reading *προσήξει*. Luke then proceeds with the Sermon, but before he has gone eight verses in the report of it (Luke vi. 27) we have, "But I say unto you *that hear*" (*τοῖς ἀκ.*). Now it was not necessary to add the words *that hear*. Matthew does not add them. And they might be easily passed over as meaningless. But in the light of the oracle they shine with meaning: here were the people that *had come to hear* or *gave heed to hear*. And there is nothing but the oracle to give them meaning.

A somewhat different turn has been given to the same idea of the oracle in Mark vi. 55. "They ran round . . . and began to carry round in beds those that were sick (*τοὺς κακῶς ἔχοντας*), where they *heard* he was (*ὅπου ἤκουον ὅτι ἔστιν*). And whithersoever he entered into villages . . . they laid *the sick* (*τοὺς ἀσθενοῦντας*) in the marketplaces and besought

him. . . ." This seems to rest upon the previous words of the oracle, "*They shall no longer be confident on men*, but on THE MAN, and *shall give* (*turn*) *their ears to hear*"—where He is, in order to obtain His healing. The next words in Mark, *touch him*, etc., look very much like a reference to προσήξει, *come near*.

It may well be asked why, if this is so remarkable a fulfilment, does Mark not say so. The answer is, first, that he was so beset in his Gospel with fulfilments that he was unable to specify them all, and had to be content with a few as typical of the rest. But secondly, he has, in fact, cited another verse of Isaiah upon this subject immediately after (Mark vii. 6 = Isa. xxix. 13). "This people honoureth me with their lips, but *their heart* is far from me. . . ." What a contrast to *the heart of them that are sick!* These *gave their ears to hear*: they included many Gentiles: *the people* of Israel gave the service of *their lips*.

But we have only to look a few verses further in the same chapter and we see that the order of events in Mark is the order of events in Isaiah xxxii., *and the tongues that stammer shall quickly learn to speak* peace. For unto the *stammerer* (μογιλάλον) whom they bring to Him Jesus says, *Ephphatha*, and the bond of *his tongue* was loosed and *he spake* plain. Now, as Alford shows, this particular Hebrew word is found in Isaiah xxxv. 6 (close neighbour of xxxii.), where the Greek is *and clear shall be the tongue of the stammerers* (τραυὴ . . . γλῶσσα μογιλάλων). Considering that μογιλάλος occurs nowhere else in the New Testament and nowhere else in the Old Testament, it is quite certain that Mark took the word from Isaiah xxxv. Nor is there much doubt that he took the order from Isaiah xxxii. For no sooner is the miracle performed than the Lord enjoins silence; *He hides His words*: but again in vain.

In my opinion there is every reason to suppose that this

miracle of healing took place : I see no reason to doubt it. But the question may be raised whether the time and the place and the details were as described in Mark, and this we cannot solve.

II. But we must pass on to the earlier part of Isaiah xxxii., though there is much more to be said concerning the hiding of the words and of Himself. There is a verse, John ii. 25, which has escaped notice generally and has never, I think, been rightly understood. "*Many trusted* (ἐπίστευσαν) *in his name* when they saw the miracles which he did. But Jesus did not trust (ἐπίστευεν) himself to them, for that he knew all [men], and because he needed not that any should testify concerning THE MAN (τοῦ ἀνθ.) ; for he knew (ἐγίνωσκεν) what was in THE MAN (τί ἦν ἐν τῷ ἀνθ.)." The R.V. came halfway to expressing the pointed antithesis *trusted* . . . *trusted*, but only halfway. This then should be restored. Now the underlying idea is manifest when we refer to Isaiah xxxii. But, although we all know that ὁ ἄνθ., *the man*, can stand for the individual and does so elsewhere, we may very easily see that in this verse it conveys more. Let any one refer to Westcott's note and ask if it satisfies him. What is the point of Jesus not needing that any should bear witness concerning man generically ? And what is the point of the evangelist in saying that Jesus (as does elsewhere Jehovah, Jer. xvii. 10) *was coming to discover* what was in the individual with whom He dealt ? The insuperable objection is that there is no individual in question. Therefore, 25*b* is useless ; but John does not waste words : he would not have said of the supposed individual what he had just said of mankind in the most comprehensive terms. There is therefore not enough to satisfy us here in Westcott's note.

Now if we open the door to Isaiah xxxii. we see daylight. Many trusted in His name, which has been already described as *Messiah*, Christ, the Son of God, *King* of Israel. Here,

then, is a trace of Isaiah xxxii. underlying the narrative. They trusted in His name but without the deeper trust in Him, because they saw His miracles. The Argument from His Miracles is sometimes an inadequate ground of trust or faith, implies the evangelist, and this is noteworthy. He would not say this of the Argument from the Moral Character, nor of the Argument from Prophecy. But Jesus did not meet this inadequate trust of theirs by a similar trust on His part, for that He was by way of discerning all men, in the course of His experience, and particularly because He had no need that any one should for the present resolve to bear witness in public that Jesus was THE MAN of Isaiah's prophecy, for He Himself was by way of discerning the full meaning of that prophecy of THE MAN.

John here recognises what he does not often recognise, the gradual growth of the Lord's resolution, or rather, the gradual confirmation of it, since it can only "grow" by contact with events and experience. "He learned his obedience by the things that he suffered." This being so, he proceeds to say in other words—what Jesus had just said twenty verses before—that His hour was not yet come. The hour for any one to stand forth among the Jews generally and say, "This is the Christ, *the King*, THE MAN," was not yet. Even Nicodemus was about to visit Him only by night. He should hide even His conversations (λόγους). Not yet should He appear in Sion as a river rushing gloriously. The aorist μαρτυρήσῃ implies, as usual, an act of resolution by the witness whoever he should be. Jesus had no need of such a witness whether to declare Him or to confirm His resolution. It may even be that He was Himself surprised at His own miracles. Even later, in the thanksgiving over Lazarus (John xi. 41 f.) there is a trace of this feeling. But what is manifest is that this was too soon, not for any one to tell Him—the idea of *bearing witness* on such a subject is really

absurd—but for any one to tell the world of Him, to bear witness of Him in the usual and natural sense (John i. 7, 8, 15, iii. 26, v. 31 ff., viii. 13 ff., x. 25, xv. 26, etc.) Thence it follows that He is THE MAN, as Isaiah said. For He was coming to see, to realise (if we may use the word) the full meaning of THE MAN.

Thus the meaning is exceedingly simple and exceedingly clear, when once the point of view is seized. The whole of St. John is the same. It has only been made difficult by being overlaid with ponderous commentaries. That the evangelist had his own point of view is no peculiarity of his. We moderns are to blame for not endeavouring to discover it. Instead of going to him for sympathy after we have made him a Sphinx that cannot sympathise we should take blame for our own poverty of sympathy, for our inability to see what he saw. The whole perplexity concerning the Messianic Secret, about which so much has been written in recent years, finds its solution in the understanding of this oracle, of which the evangelists saw the fulfilment to be part of the deliberate purpose of the Lord.

E. C. SELWYN.

THE GRACE OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST.

THE personality of Jesus is so passing rich and various that no single author seems to succeed in bringing the whole into "the eye and prospect" of his thought. Like the painters who catch an aspect of His Face rather than His Face itself—an unimaginable wealth of feature and of form—the writers represent a side or section of the personality, every one essential but none complete. This is no matter of surprise, it is rather what one might expect. But it is matter of surprise that amid the burning discussion of the day one side, and that the side of most significance, should ever fail to obtain its rightful place. It is the side which is conspicuous in the New Testament, and as represented there indeed is so vastly more than a side as to be the centre and secret of the whole. Paul with his commanding insight saw and set it in its place, of which there is no more striking proof than his favourite and familiar benediction "The grace of the (or our) Lord Jesus Christ be with you." In every one of his epistles, supposing them all to be ascribed to him, either at the end or beginning, or at both, this phrase is found or one but slightly different. And his benediction might well be said to be the burden of his thought. He is the apostle of grace. No word, no theme, no thing is so often on his lips as χάρις. It is his message and its motive in one. Paul was a miracle to himself. Something extraordinary had occurred in his experience comparable to Creation itself (2 Cor. iv. 6), and nothing could at all explain it save the grace of God, as he beautifully describes it, "which He freely bestowed on us in the Beloved."[1] Henceforth

[1] ἧς ἐχαρίτωσεν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ ἠγαπημένῳ, (Eph. i. 6). Cf. J. Armitage Robinson, *Ephesians*. He says that the sense appears to be, "His grace whereby He hath endued us with grace." This is a more em-

he views his whole career and interprets all its stages in the light of it. God of His good pleasure has "separated" him and called him through His grace to reveal His Son in him, that he may preach Him among the Gentiles (Gal. i. 15, 16). And all through the Epistle to the Romans runs the same one master-thought of the grace of God and the gift by the grace of the one man Jesus Christ abounding to the many (Rom. v. 15) till in chap. viii. 31, 32 it mounts on wings of eloquence to the climax, "What then shall we say to these things? If God is for us who is against us? If God did not spare His own Son but gave Him up for us all, He shall certainly give us all things by His grace (τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν χαρίσεται) when He has given Him."[1]

Χάρις likewise is the master-thought of his preaching, that which sends him forth and the others alike as ambassadors on behalf of Christ, "as though God were intreating by us, we intreat that ye receive not the grace of God in vain" (2 Cor. v. 20; vi. 1). How moving their appeal could be, we hear or overhear in the pathos of a strain like this, "For ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though He was rich yet for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might become rich" (2 Cor. viii. 9; cf. Phil. ii. 7). And in many another passage born of the same inspiration Paul shows how it is grace that does make rich, how, in other words, grace is as wide and deep as life; it covers its entire course from its "making its bed in hell" to its partaking of the inheritance of the saints in light. Grace is involved in the sanctification of life as in its seeking and salvation. "Through Jesus Christ we have had our access by faith into this grace wherein we stand, and we rejoice in hope of the glory of

phatic way of saying, "His grace which He hath bestowed on us" (p. 228; cf. pp. 229–233).

[1] W. G. Rutherford's translation.

God" (Rom. v. 2).[1] Grace is the abounding spirit of God in Christ which issues not only in rescue but regeneration, not only in repentance but perfection. "By grace have ye been saved through faith; and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God. For we are His workmanship (ποίημα, poem) created in Christ Jesus for good works." "This is the will of God, even your sanctification" (Eph. ii. 10; 1 Thess. iv. 3; cf. Rom. xii. 1, 2; 2 Cor. ix. 8).

It would not be in place here to discuss the vexed problem of the relation between Paul and Jesus, but at least in what we have culled from Paul's evangel it is easy to find an essential continuity with the evangel of Jesus. No one indeed, before or since possessed himself or was possessed so fully of the mind of Christ. Truly it had pleased God to reveal His Son *in* him. Deep down in the soul of him grace itself had come in a perfect form and made its dwelling there, so that Paul was "no longer I, but Christ that liveth in me." Grace and Christ were not only interchangeable terms but interchangeable realities, realities interwoven like the strands of a cord with his life and faith; and therefore among the contrasts to be found between Paul and Jesus, and even their divergences, it is essential to keep in view their fundamental unity of spirit. Such a unity is congruous with difference, for Paul was no mere echo or imitation of his Lord, but one who through his own experience and the characteristic needs and yearnings of his mighty soul fought and found his way to a faith which was his own—"the faith which is in the Son of God who loved me and gave Himself up for me" (Gal. i. 20). Revelation never means the contraction of the soul, but always its expansion, by which it grasps anew and for itself the living

[1] Rutherford translates, "Through whom we have also obtained our access to this state of grace in which we are and triumph in the hope of attaining God's glory."

word of God. And nothing is more sure in all the work and witness of Paul than his insight, creative, impassioned, personal into the mind of Christ.

In passing to the Fourth Gospel we pass to a system of thought which is likewise deeply interfused with personal experience and which has its centre in the same enthralling Person whose πλήρωμα is equally real to the author as to Paul. It consists essentially in grace. "Of His fulness we all received, and grace for grace" (i. 16), which means grace succeeding grace perpetually, i.e. the richest abundance of grace. The verse is connected with verse 14 where it is said, "And the word became flesh and dwelt among us, . . . full (πλήρης) of grace and truth," and here as there the accent falls on grace. "The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (i. 17). It is the same contrast as Paul draws in Rom. vi. 14, where he says, "Ye are not under law, but under grace." Grace is the essence of the new dispensation. While the essence of the old is the law which demands and imposes, the essence of the Gospel lies in grace which offers and communicates. And that is the truth of things, the fulness of the revelation of God as compared with the law which was but a preparation, "a shadow of good things to come." It is enough now to remark the subtle concord of experience and phrase between Paul and the Fourth Evangelist.

In the Gospel of Luke we meet with a sentence of which the Johannine πλήρης χάριτος κ.τ.λ. might be said to be a recollection or perhaps a deeper recollection of the same fact, "And the child grew and waxed strong, becoming full (πληρούμενον) of wisdom, and the grace of God was upon Him" (Luke ii. 40). It is significant that in the same Gospel in the first record of His preaching what is singled out as its especial note and character is its grace, that being the Spirit of the Person "poured into

His lips" and on His hearers; "And all bear Him witness and wondered at the *words of grace* which proceeded out of His mouth." It is not too much to claim for the Gospel of Luke that every page bears witness more or less to the same thing.

Although the Gospels of Mark and Matthew do not describe His preaching at Nazareth or anywhere else as λόγοι τῆς χάριτος, they are at one with Luke, and even go beyond him in recording the glad amazement of the hearers (ἐξεπλήσσοντο in the parallels Mark. vi. 2 and Matt. xiii. 54), just as on the occasion of His preaching in the synagogue (Mark i. 22) and at the conclusion of the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. vii. 28) and elsewhere, and they both make a point of the impression of His σοφία and δυνάμεις. If also they do not include the passage from Isaiah (chap. lxi. 1 2; Luke iv. 18, 19), still one may find it embedded in Matthew xi. 5, where, in the roll of δυνάμεις which Jesus sends to the prisoner John by way of answer to his doubt, He gives the crowning place to the preaching of glad tidings to the poor. It is worth observing in view of the matter before us that in neither passage is there any reference "to the day of vengeance of our God," Jesus evidently refusing to identify Himself, His message or His mission with the ancient threat. It was not of the kernel of His "words of grace" or of His "powers," or congenial to the Spirit of the Lord which was upon Him. One may imagine that for a mind brooding on the axe, and fan, and fire, such an answer charged with grace would scarce avail. Nevertheless it was the answer appropriate to the Messiah; it proclaimed the Messianic age, the advent of the acceptable year, or the year of the grace of the Lord. And conscious of all it meant to others as well as to Himself, He added the impressive words, "And blessed is he whosoever shall not be offended in Me."

Now, of this sentence it has been said in a recent volume,[1] that "there is not a word in the Gospel which reveals more clearly the solitary place of Jesus. It stands on the same plane with those wonderful utterances already considered in which He speaks of confessing and denying Him before men, of hating father and mother, son and daughter for His sake. . . . It makes the blessedness of men depend upon a right relation to Himself; happy with the rare and high happiness on which God congratulates man is he who is not at fault about Jesus but takes Him for all that in His own consciousness He is. That Jesus in this informal utterance claims to be the Christ is unquestionable; or if 'claims' is an aggressive word, we can only correct it by saying that He speaks as the Christ. . . . By taking this simple sentence in its simplicity we do not hesitate to say of it, as of Matthew x. 32, that there is nothing in the Fourth Gospel which transcends it. The attitude which it so calmly and so sovereignly assumes to men, the attitude which it as calmly and sovereignly demands from men—even from men so great as John the Baptist—is precisely the attitude of Christians to their Lord in the most 'Christian' parts of the New Testament. It is not they who gratuitously, and under mistaken ideas of what He is, put Him into a place which no human being ought to give to another; but He Himself from the very beginning spontaneously assumes this place as His."

That is a typical passage—one of a hundred from an able book, the feature of which, and much of its force lie in its insistence on the solitary place of Jesus. It is the place, as the author is never done repeating, which is not merely assigned Him by the faith of the Church, but from the first assumed and asserted by Jesus Himself. It is the place, the cathedra, as it were, from which He

[1] *Jesus and the Gospel.* James Denney, pp. 259, 260.

speaks, from which He proclaims Himself and His demands upon the obedience of men. And like His place His consciousness of self is "solitary, incomparable, incommunicable." [1] Place and person, person and place are all of a piece, and in the faith of the Church "He is set"—and set "unquestionably" as the author thinks—"on the side of reality which we call Divine and which confronts man." "There is no Christianity except through a particular attitude of the soul to Jesus, and that attitude is demanded at every point, in every relation and in every mode, tacit and explicit, by Jesus Himself."

In quoting parts of any argument one always runs the risk of misquoting the whole, and one shrinks from any such thing in regard to a writer of such manifest sincerity and power as the author of this work. But amid all his insistence on the solitary Person and His solitary place one wonders if there is any room at all for that quality or spirit of grace which the New Testament singles out in Jesus and in His word and way. One would not deny that there is an important truth in the line which the author takes. One would not attempt in the unwarranted fashion of the critics whom he criticises to explain away the uniqueness of Jesus and His attitude to men which, rightly understood, is vital to the Gospel. One is thankful for much in the book bearing on this point which required to be said or said again. But the question recurs, is the uniqueness of Jesus, or what amounts to the same thing, the uniqueness of His attitude as fully and as fairly represented as it ought to be? One cannot truly say that it is. One feels as if the representation were almost entirely evacuated of the grace which is the glory of Jesus and the gospel. No author, one would imagine, could be less oblivious of grace than the author of this book,

[1] *Jesus and the Gospel*, p. 206.

and yet as one turns its forceful pages one is more and more impressed by the absence of the one thing which makes all the difference. Where one parts from him is not so much in what he says as in what he leaves unsaid. What he leaves unsaid is what we may call the atmosphere of the whole, that something which is deeply interfused through all the gospel and the personality of Christ, and which is more unique than all the features of uniqueness he describes. It is really the secret of the uniqueness of both, that which lies behind the solitary person and the solitary place, but which is essentially communicable, self-diffusive, imparting itself as life in creation, "the gift of God." The interfusion of grace does not take from the solitary person or his solitary place, but it adds, or provides, that basis between Himself and others upon which something can be given or communicated and something received. And that surely is the essence of Jesus and His Gospel and the one thing to insist upon. It transfers the emphasis from the solitary to the social, from the self-exclusive to the self-inclusive, from the one as confronting man to the one as in the midst of men, from the claim to the communication, from the demand to the gift and the glad tidings. It is a question of right emphasis which again is a question of right analysis of the elements contained within the comprehensive unity of "Jesus and the Gospel" and their determination in the light of the last and highest of all. Now in that analysis we come with the author to a stage where Jesus stands by Himself, where He asserts Himself, proclaims Himself, and the conditions whose acceptance on the part of men alone sets them in that right relation to Himself which constitutes their blessedness; where "it is not enough to say that He claims," but "rather assumes that He will obtain that martyr devotion to which only righteousness and

God are entitled"; and "Until we see this," he adds, "we do not see Jesus." It may freely be admitted that to see "this" is to see a part or side of Jesus—necessary and not to be ignored—but surely it is not to see *Jesus*. For the last and highest side of all, and the secret of the whole, drops out of the analysis, and what we see, therefore, is really more a law than a gospel, and more a dictator than a deliverer, and a monitor than a mediator. To omit grace from the analysis and interpretation of Jesus and the Gospel is to omit the one thing needful and unique, the atmosphere, the tone, the spirit which pervade both utterance and act, both character and creed, both life and death, and which far more than anything He ever said or did is Jesus' contribution to the life of the world. Grace is the one word which adequately describes the spirit of Jesus, that unique endowment or development of life within Him which moulded everything it touched, so that His severity and sympathy, His compassion and power, His truth and holiness are all its various aspects and activities, and all devoted to its twofold task of revelation and redemption. The task of grace is simply grace itself, the bringing together of God and man in a union of holy love and holy life. Grace is love, grace is holiness, not apart but fused together in that wonderful influence or effluence by which the ends of God are satisfied and the ends of man are realised. In grace there is no confronting man save only to "create" him anew, nor any solitary severance from man save only the more effectually to save and hallow him. In grace there is no dictating or demand save only to define the path of blessedness and plant man upon it, nor any self-assertion save only in the way of conscious self-oblation to the will of God. Hence we do not see *Jesus* so long as our eyes are fixed upon the solitary person seated in the solitary place, but only as we see Him stooping from the

solitary place and becoming in and through His very solitude the perfect Son and Saviour of the world. His solitude is all subservient to service, His difference to unity. As the apostle strives to express it in the Ephesians, and the full force of his language is only found in the original: "But God . . . quickened us together (or made us to live together, *συνεζωοποίησεν*) with Christ (by grace have ye been saved), and raised us up (*συνήγειρεν*) with him and made us to sit with him (*συνεκάθισεν*) in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus: that in the ages to come he might shew the exceeding riches of his grace in kindness toward us in Christ Jesus: for by grace have ye been saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God" (Eph. ii. 4–10).

To see Jesus, therefore, in the sense in which the New Testament sees Him is impossible until we see Him arrayed in the exceeding riches of His grace, going about His Father's business of communicating life, giving of his fulness to the need of men, the gift of God incarnate. But this is not to be blind to the measure of truth in what is said about the solitary person and his solitary place. For what makes Him solitary and His place, is just the fulness of grace that was in Him, but, just that same fulness of grace is what makes Him the one whose touch is all-essential and whose place is in the midst of men. From this point of view it is possible to speak of His "demand," but only as a mode of defining the "gift"; possible to speak of His "claim," but only as a way of voicing His authority the soul or sense of which is appeal (Mark vi. 45), constraint (Mark i. 17, 18; Matt. xi. 28), and great desire (*Ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐπεθύμησα*, Luke xxii. 15; *ποσάκις ἠθέλησα*, Matt. xxiii. 37, Luke xiii. 34); possible to speak of His self-proclamation, but only in the sense of self-communication. And all this, so far from subtracting from the solitary person or

His place, only adds to both and justifies them. We are dealing with a person whom in a real sense it is true to describe as solitary; as indeed the most inaccessible, inapproachable, lonely figure in history. He enters in by the narrow gate of a most uncommon independence. He is as fearless of the frown, as careless of the favour of men. Far from seeking their advice or shrinking from their blame He goes in the face of their traditions and of popular opinion and desire, working out His task with the clearness and swiftness of necessity, and with a dignity no cunning can check, a devotion no pain can chill. Not that He is callous or superior to their motions of friendship and hate. Thus He does not heedlessly or needlessly expose Himself to danger, but chooses on occasion to avoid it, learning by His own experience what He teaches others, "to be wise as serpents and harmless as doves." At the same time He is utterly aloof from the ordinary pleas and covetings of men: "the prince of the world cometh and he hath nothing in me." Again, "Ye shall leave me alone." Truly the world has never seen so extraordinary a figure of independence, independence of thought, independence of judgment, independence of purpose, carried to the last limit of holy pride and the power of God. "His soul" indeed "was like a star and dwelt apart." Both at the beginning when He is tempted to cast Himself down from the pinnacle of the temple, and at the end when He is enticed to come down from the Cross, He grapples to His lonely calling and His lonely Cross inflexible, invincible, alone, and as such conceding nothing and at no time to the tempter or the throng He summons men to follow Him and "agonise to enter by the narrow door."

"Get thee behind me, Satan." "Abba, Father, thy will be done." There is surrender of nothing to the one because there is surrender of everything to the other. It is inde-

pendence rooted in dependence, pride rooted in prayer, aloneness in alliance, fortitude in faith, self-assertion in self-devotion, loneliness in loyalty and love which passeth knowledge. In that unsearchable word, with its mingling of tears and rapture, the word with which He leaves the garden and finally accepts the Cross, it is all profoundly stated: "Abba, Father, thy will be done." That is the secret of the solitary person and His solitary place, and of this also which is greater and is the point before us; the secret of the paradox by which the solitary person is the Saviour and His solitary place the centre of the life and destiny of men. We do not see the highest we can see in Jesus while we see Him in His solitude. We must see Him in that larger vision in which His solitude is but an aspect of His being and is all that it is, like every other aspect, as the servant of His grace. His solitude is only in and through His grace, the plenitude thereof, and therefore it is not His solitude but His plenitude that is supreme and makes Him and His gospel what they are. We do not see Jesus till we see Him clothed with the universal grace which brings Him to the world and the world to Him, through which God shines in the hearts of men, to give "the illumination of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." In other words, the most inaccessible is the most accessible of beings, the most lonely and apart of persons is the most divinely winsome person known to men, the first to earn and the last to keep the name of the friend of publicans and sinners. It is grace making isolation the instrument of love, independence the organ of compassion, difference the bond of unity, or doing this besides which adds another touch of wonder. To think of the power residing in Jesus and "proceeding from Him" (Mark v. 30; Luke viii. 46) is to think of power of "saying with a word" (Matt. viii. 8; cf. Mark i. 41), power of leader-

ship, power of law, power of life; so that at one time the people are crowding round Him with their sick (Mark vi. 53–56); at another are fain to take Him by force and make Him king (John vi. 15; cf. Mark vi. 45 ἠνάγκασεν), and at another are leaving Him alone, self-driven from His presence (John viii. 9; cf. Luke iv. 30)—such power as has always been to men the acme of temptation. Never is it used by Him to grasp at selfish privilege or for the sake of show or the glory of this world, but always and without exception to bestow unselfish service and in renouncement of the world. "This temperance in the use of supernatural power is the masterpiece of Christ." It is more than His masterpiece, it is Himself. Once again it is grace transforming a quality of solitude into one of sympathy so deep and exquisite that they of old time saw the prophecy fulfilled, "Himself took our infirmities and bare our diseases," and we of our time see in flesh and blood the picture of the Good Samaritan (Luke x. 33, 34). It is grace transforming the utmost difference into the medium of perfect unity.

If then "the face of Jesus Christ" is a vision of benignity appearing from a background of solitude, a vision of winsome Saviourhood emerging from a covert of seclusion, a vision of grace in its divine sufficiency in virtue of which the New Testament is glowing with a light that never was on sea or land, then it is wrong analysis and wrong emphasis alike to exhibit Christ as first and chiefly a solitary person in a solitary place, wrapped in an "incommunicable" consciousness of self, addressing His demands to men and claiming their allegiance. That may be a side, but it is not the centre of His personality, and we do not see the side until we see the centre. We do not see it in its true proportion. It is but a fragment by itself, and such a fragment as, had it been the whole, neither gospels nor epistles would have been the books they are, with their glow of atmosphere,

irradiance, life. They partake of the personality they present, and therefore belong to the sacred Canon. They are touched and informed by His Spirit, which, far from being solitary and "incommunicable," they being witness, is self-communicative up to the measure of the fulness of His grace. Self-communication is of the essence of personality as it is of grace, so that when personality and grace are both alike at their pitch in Jesus, as they are, we must allow that what differentiates Him is not what separates Him from, but what connects Him with, humanity. In other words, He is what He is not in His solitude or as confronting men, but in His self-communication—essentially a fulness to be imparted and received.

It is from this point of view it seems best to interpret the Messianic consciousness of Jesus and all those sayings which, being interpreted from any other point of view, are too aggressive and severe to be described as "words of grace." More than any other sayings they are fraught with personality. "The words that I have spoken unto you are spirit and are life." Their teaching lies as much in their tone as in their truth. We might almost say that they are not so much statements of principle as expressions of personality, the principle in their case being so wholly carried up into and merged in personality. They are personality manifesting itself in speech as in action, so that the speech is without meaning or at least its maximum of meaning in separation from it. It is immanent in them, and they are therefore what they are as words that are not only truth, but grace and truth. It must make a difference in the matter of their interpretation when the supreme thing about them is remembered, viz., the immanence of personality, the interfusion of grace without which they do not form a Gospel at all. A gospel, or as we know but one gospel, the Gospel, is not simply "a new teaching" and

nothing more, but essentially a new teaching that is also an old teaching, with all the gathered force of personal life behind and in it moulding it and making it what it is. It is the sum of life-sayings in which He who gives them gives Himself to men. Himself is in them, hence their meaning and momentum, their virtue and vitality, their permanence and incomparable soul-renewing touch from age to age. Such terms accordingly as "claim," "demand," "authority," as used to describe the Gospel, are far from true unless they be understood in the light of the personality who communicates *before* He claims and gives *before* He demands, and whose authority is illumination more than proclamation, and influence more than ordinance. Herein lies the distinction of what we know as the Gospel.

James Robertson Cameron.

(To be continued.)

THE CHRISTIAN SPIRIT AND THE MODERN WORLD.

It is now generally accepted as a truism that Christianity is not a creed but a life. But the statement, with all its appearance of simplicity, is profoundly misleading. It becomes mischievously false when it is used, as it often is, in order to evaporate the intellectual content of Christianity, and reduce it to a mere sentiment, or at best, to a system of ethics. No presentation of Christian truth can be acceptable that ignores the appeal to the reason, and substitutes for it any lower or easier appeal. But on the other hand, it is equally untrue to the facts to resolve Christianity into a purely intellectual or theological system, and to make subscription to a creed its final test. We are involved at the present moment in a strong reaction from this tendency, and it is compelling a new and healthy interest in the practical and experimental side of the Christian faith. Men are asking what Christianity involves in the way of life and conduct as well as in the way of belief. And it is well that they should do so, so long as they do not make the two things mutually exclusive. Modern intellectual conditions are forcing us to revise our theology. Christian candour demands no less. But the process is resulting in a new sense of proportion. The Christian facts require intellectual interpretation, but they have also certain moral and spiritual implications. It is these that give the proof of the thinking and are the test of the truly Christian creed. The life of Jesus Christ, for example, has its dogmatic presuppositions

and consequences. But it must be studied, in the first instance, apart from these, and the result of this study is to bring into strong relief its bearing upon conduct and character. To be a Christian is to believe in Jesus Christ; but belief in Him means something more than a mental assent to the theories of His work and Person which pass current among those who call themselves by His name. It means also a personal relation to Him which results in a certain likeness of character and a certain identity of aim. It is, therefore, highly pertinent to the modern situation to inquire with some exactness what Christianity means on the side which affects human life and conduct, to ask what are its practical bearings and how far should it affect the complex conditions of life in the present age. We may willingly accept the apostolic test, "If any man have not the spirit of Christ he is none of His," but we have also to inquire what the spirit of Christ is, and how far it is possible to enshrine it in a human life in this twentieth century.

The inquiry raises at the outset a difficult historical problem. Nothing that can be called a biography of Jesus Christ is in existence, and critical research has considerably reduced the materials out of which it may be possible to form a judgment as regards His character, teaching and claims. Nevertheless, the real crux of the situation is not here. Even when the materials for the life of Jesus have been sifted to the utmost, enough remains for all practical purposes. Harnack's judgment respecting the Gospels may be fairly accepted, as when he says,[1] "In the first place they offer us a plain picture of Jesus' teaching, in regard both to its main features and to its individual application: in the second place they tell us how His life issued in the service of His vocation: and in the third place they

[1] *What is Christianity?* p. 31.

describe to us the impression which He made upon His disciples, and which they transmitted." It would be hypercriticism to require more than this in order to form a general idea as to the type of character for which Jesus stood, and as to the spirit which He inculcated. But the real difficulty meets us when we seek to translate His example into terms of our modern life. He lived under and dealt with conditions which are utterly different from those with which we are familiar at the present day. And men are not slow to express their belief that certain of the principles of conduct which He laid down are quite incompatible with the order of modern society. They do not conceal their opinion that the ethics of Jesus are Utopian, and they are too ready to abandon in despair the attempt to apply them to their own circumstances. This attempt, however, must be made if Christianity is to retain its hold on thinking men, and to fulfil its function of leavening human society with the principles of the Kingdom of Heaven. It can only be successful, however, as we view the teaching of Jesus from the standpoint of the spirit which He inculcated and cease to expect to find in His words definite formulas applicable to modern needs. He spoke in the language of His own day; and the moral and economic conditions pertinent to the time were ever present to His mind. But underlying His practical teaching in respect of these were principles which hold good for all time, and it is with these mainly that we have to do.

Jesus Christ came into the world conscious of a mission, and conscious that His mission was from God. He recognised from the first that He "must be about His Father's business," and His interpretation of this "business" led Him to take the attitude He did towards all human actions and relations. He looked at the life of His day from a standpoint and a vantage ground above it. He saw it all

in the light of the ends which He believed it was destined to serve—ends which He described to Himself and to His contemporaries in terms of the Kingdom of God or of Heaven. His aims and His point of view were thus other-worldly—or, if we prefer to use the term, supernatural. Human life was to Him a far larger thing than could be indicated by the operations and interests of this world. A man's life could not consist in the abundance of a man's possessions. To confine it to these things was to make shipwreck of it. The story of the Temptation in the Wilderness indicates much more than the thought and determination of Jesus regarding His own work and mission. It sets before us, in unmistakable terms, His belief in those higher ends and motives which should regulate all human conduct. That man doth not live by bread alone, but by the word of God, that the kingdoms of this world and all the glory of them are but as the small dust of the balance in comparison with doing God's will, became the commonplaces of His teaching and illustrate the gulf which separates Him from a self-seeking and materialistic age. To believe in Jesus Christ is, so far forth, to accept the spirit of this teaching, and to seek to enshrine it in action and outlook.

To do this, however, is not to lay Christianity open to the reproach of other-worldliness. It does not mean that a Christian must separate himself from the life of his time and take no interest in those mundane activities which are so absorbing to the average man. On the other hand, the Christian of all men may say with the pagan poet that his interests include :—

> "Quidquid agunt homines, votum, timor, ira, voluptas,
> Gaudia, discursus."

But the difference between him and other men consists in the fact that these things do not fill the whole of his horizon. He uses them not as ends in themselves, but as

means to higher ends. These higher ends he interprets not in terms of material reward and achievement, but in terms of the unseen, of character, of the soul and of the will of God. To use the old distinction, the Christian is in the world but not of it. He will not suffer himself to be caught up in the stream of life and hurried along with it against his will. He keeps his head above it all the time, learns by the aid of his own inner force and determination to breast it at times, and to force it into channels of his own making. There is a necessary element of mysticism in every interpretation of Christianity. It is this which saves it from becoming a mere code of ethics. And the essence of this is the sense of the unseen as a motive for action and as determinative of the ends we have in view. No interpretation of the teaching of Jesus Christ which leaves this out of account can be true to the facts or speak with any effect to the men of to-day.

It must, therefore, be recognised from the outset that any true interpretation of the mind of Jesus Christ begins with His doctrine of God. From this point of view theology has to be reckoned among the practical sciences. It bears on human life and happiness in a fashion as intimate and far more important, than, say, chemistry or electricity. When Jesus spoke of God as Father, and interpreted the term as in the parable of the Prodigal Son, He lifted heavy clouds of doubt and apprehension from men's minds, and made it possible for them to face life with a serenity and a hopefulness to which they had long been strangers. We are not concerned here with the exact terms and definition of His doctrine of the Fatherhood, but rather with those moral results of it through which it can perhaps be best understood and appreciated. For Him the new name of God meant a new relation with God. He exemplified this first in His own person and thereby made it the norm

for Christian thought and conduct for all time. His sonship to God was a relation not merely of natural dependence, but of moral and spiritual affinity. In assuming the reality of it for men He profoundly modified their attitude, not only to God, but to one another and to the world around. His doctrine of God involved a corresponding doctrine of man. He believed in human nature as such, in its infinite possibilities and in its power of adaptation and regeneration. The secret of His attraction for the men and women of His day was the fact that He saw in them the best that was yet to be, and filled their souls with a hope that was in itself a genuinely renewing power. They realised that they were worth something in God's eyes, and the new estimate of themselves which this involved was the beginning of salvation to many of those whom Jesus addressed as lost.

These ideas, when transferred to the followers of Jesus, took new shape and became exceedingly fruitful. They are still active and potent, and it is the chosen task of Christianity to represent and interpret them to the world. The Christian spirit is the incarnation of the mind and spirit of Jesus Christ. It follows as the result of the work of Christ on the individual soul. We have not to do now with the processes by which the result is brought about, so much as with the result itself. But it should be clearly recognised that this result is not an isolated and supernatural phenomenon but a growth which has deep roots.

The Christian spirit means, then, in the first instance a new relation to and apprehension of God. One main effect of the teaching of Jesus was to deliver men from those fears and uncertainties which the name of God had too often suggested. Implicitly in His mind grace took the place of law, and men were led to think of God not as requiring of them but as giving to them. This led to a new spirit of trust and hope, and it is one that becomes fundamental

in the Christian character. To Jesus Himself a quiet trust in God was of the very essence of religion. He spoke so emphatically on the subject that His words have been often misunderstood, and even in these days men can hardly persuade themselves that He was serious. To take no thought for the morrow, to keep oneself free from anxiety and worry, and to be content with the knowledge that God knows our needs, is something very far removed from the busy and careful temper of these days. Yet Jesus spoke in this way advisedly to a people much immersed in trade, and apt to be as anxious about the things of this world as any moderns. He saw the sin and folly of it all, and taught the need of a spirit which would lift men above toil and circumstance, and help them to breathe a higher air. And this spirit of trust, this poise of soul, is a thing characteristically Christian. It leads men not to be careless about the things of this world, but to hold them at their right value and keep them in their proper place. It gives them a perspective of the soul, and shows them life in its true proportions. It helps them to take into account always the things eternal and unseen, and to move through life as masters, who keep a soul above earthly things, who know how to make the best use of them, and are not distracted by their claims. This is the spirit that is needed in order successfully to deal with many of the pressing social problems of to-day. These will never be solved so long as they are regarded from the merely materialistic point of view. While they fill the whole horizon, and life is approached as though it did consist in the abundance of the things a man possesses sane judgments and effective remedies are impossible. That life is more than meat and raiment, that man doth not live by bread alone, are precepts which belong not only to the Church and the pulpit, but to the market-place and the political platform. To neglect them is

to warp one's view and to blind one's eyes. It is only from this Christian, or if the phrase is preferable, from this other-worldly standpoint, that it is possible to obtain a clear understanding of the situation, and to discover remedies which will meet our pressing needs. Belief in the Fatherhood of God is not a mere article of a creed, it is a temper of mind, an attitude of the soul. It becomes a standing rebuke to that fretfulness and anxiety which are so characteristic of the Christian Church in these days. If the Church is successfully to leaven the world, she must believe in her own message, and she must approach her task in a spirit of sane and confident optimism. It is no losing battle that she has to fight. God is not always on the side of the big battalions, and those silent ethical and spiritual forces by which she works are more potent in the long run than men or money or arms. A sound and experiential belief in Providence, with its consequent freedom from worry and nerves, is the best indication of a truly Christian spirit, and is the condition precedent of successful Christian work.

Turning now from God to man, we may accept the general conclusion that the idea of the Fatherhood of God involves the further idea of human brotherhood. But this again, to be effective, must pass from the region of mere creed to that of actual experience and practice. The brotherhood of man may be no more than a meaningless formula, or it may contain within it the inspiration to the highest human life. It is not the accuracy of the idea or the interpretation of it with which we are concerned, so much as with our own attitude towards the obligations it involves. As we have already seen, the teaching of Jesus sets humanity before our eyes in a new and larger light. It breaks down those entrenched barriers of race and colour and creed which have been the most potent sources of human strife. It puts all humanity not on a level, but in a position where equality

becomes at least possible. In showing that God is no respecter of persons, it reminds us that in His sight all persons may be equally entitled to respect. Thus the teaching opens out new and wide avenues of human duty. It calls not merely to a vague philanthropy, but to that active service of mankind in which Jesus Himself was so splendid a pioneer. The spirit required here is again characteristically Christian. It is the spirit of meekness, humility, self-effacement. It is the very opposite of that spirit which was most popular in the pagan world in the days of Jesus, and is strangely popular in "the world" to-day. Self-assertion, self-realisation and the like are necessary duties no doubt; but, as they are popularly carried out they are the very antithesis of the Christian spirit. To Jesus realisation of Himself meant not a pushful self-advertisement, but self-sacrifice, the losing of life in order to save it, and the same remains true for His followers. His attitude to God was one of deep and settled obedience, an obedience which followed naturally from His perfect trust. For Christians faith must have the same issue. Above all things they delight to do His will, and, according to the teaching of Jesus, they find the will of God for them expressed in that extra righteousness which is the sign of the children of the Kingdom. The ethical consequence of their faith is that inner and spiritual righteousness which was in so sharp a contrast to the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees. The spirit of faith towards God which works out in love towards men is a better thing than any legal correctness of life, and opens to us the central secret of the Christian character.

On the human side, therefore, the Christian spirit is best described as one of love and service. Something more is required of the Christian than a conventional doing of his duty towards his neighbour. The new relationship to God which Jesus came to make known to men involves

for them a new appreciation of their fellows. Neighbour becomes a word of far deeper and wider significance, and love takes the place of duty. Jesus Himself exemplified in His own Person that spirit of service towards men which is the highest expression of Christian love. He embodied this in a kind of third sacrament which the Christian Church would do well to celebrate with the same scrupulous care bestowed on the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. When Jesus took a towel and girded Himself and washed the disciples feet, He was not only leaving them a formal example, He was enshrining in a beautiful deed the spirit which was to characterise His followers for all time. "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto but to minister," is the charter of Christian service and the watchword of the Christian life. To be among men as one that serves, to live not for self-interest alone but for the interests of others, to subordinate private and personal aims to the collective good of mankind, this is the ideal of Christian conduct, and in this sense every Christian has to become as Christ unto men. The obligation is one that seized on the imagination of the Christian Church from the first. It found vent in that abortive experiment in collectivism of which we read in the Acts of the Apostles, and it has continued to inspire men and women to ministry and self-sacrifice ever since. In the present age it is likely to receive a new impulse from the growing sense of the solidarity of mankind which is characteristic of much modern thinking. Christianity is a natural solvent of human barriers, but in this direction as in many others it works very slowly. Now, however, its operations are being continually furthered by all those forces which tend to draw the distant parts of the earth nearer to the centres of civilisation, and to break down those influences which have served in the past to keep different races apart in ignorance and

suspicion. These modern conditions present the Christian Church with an unexampled opportunity of putting into practice her precepts of human brotherhood and of being among men as the servant of all.

With this wider outlook has come a broader conception of the mission of Christianity to the world. The task of the Church is not now limited to evangelisation alone; or rather, the Church is rising to a new conception of Evangelisation, and one more suited to complex modern needs. The old-fashioned picture of the Christian missionary preaching under a palm tree to half-naked savages, and the old-fashioned idea that missionary work meant grafting on to the heathen a Europeanised evangelicalism, have passed away for ever. Missions, both at home and abroad, include every possible agency for the social, moral and educational uplifting of mankind. With a new understanding of the meaning of ancient and Pagan faiths has come a new appreciation of the peoples who hold them, and a new point of contact with them. The Christian idea of human brotherhood is felt to be something more than merely utopian, and the evident capacity of man for religion gives to the Christian propaganda a new note of hope. So at home the social and institutional work of the Churches makes for the same ends, and springs from the same sources. It involves a wider conception both of the Christian gospel and of the capacity of those to whom it comes. It is a clear and striking application of that spirit of charity and service which is most characteristically Christian. What this may mean for modern life and society it is our task, if possible, to discover.

Christianity admittedly deals in ideals. It bids men aim at the higher life and lays down rules which amount to a counsel of perfection. It is, therefore, often condemned as unpractical if not altogether impracticable. The Church

as a whole has acquiesced in an average and conventional standard of Christian conduct, which is far indeed from giving a fair representation of the reality. On the other hand there are many to whom the Christian ideal seems the highest possible, and in whose eyes it gives the only promise of that new moral and social state which they desire. To these the reproach of Christianity lies in the fact that it is seldom or never exhibited in its fulness to the world. They admit the difficulty of applying it to the complex needs and circumstances of the present day, but they feel that the attempt should be made more seriously and strenuously than has ever yet been the case. It is no doubt true that in His ethical teaching Jesus Christ used the language of His own time and dealt with circumstances as He found them. But at the same time He inculcated certain principles which are eternal and capable of application to an immense variety of conditions. There is some reason to believe that the modern Church has failed to grasp this fact and to rise to the responsibility which it involves. A modern Anglican [1] teacher has stated the case none too strongly as follows:—"We are told that whole classes of our fellow-countrymen have drifted away from any kind of systematic religion, and that the chief cause of this departure is the impression that outward religious observances and the acceptance of creeds make no difference in action and character; that people who go to Church are no better than those who do not. The workman observes that the Christian employer who in his private life is prominent in religious and even philanthropic activities, is to him just as hard and exacting a taskmaster as the man who professes no belief: and he is being taught also to observe that the Church has for many years opposed

[1] Rev. J. F. Peile, in *The Reproach of the Gospel*, Bampton Lectures, 1907, p. 7.

every reform which has benefited the mass of the population, and looked coldly on efforts outside legislation to improve the condition of the labouring class, such as the Temperance movement; neglecting and thwarting them in their earlier stages, and only patronising and exploiting them when they have established themselves without its aid. We know that this charge against the Church and Churchmen is not wholly true, but it is true enough to be widely accepted and to be very difficult to disprove: and the belief in its truth has incalculable influence in driving men, not only from the Church, but from Christianity."

It is, therefore, above all things necessary to distinguish in this matter between Christianity and that representation of it which we find in the organised Churches. We are not shut up to the belief that all that is possible has been done to apply the teachings of Jesus Christ to the needs of men. The Christian ethical system must lose something in the process of realisation. But the loss should be less and less as time goes on. If the Churches as they are constituted to-day fail fairly to represent the Christian spirit, then they must give way before some other power or organisation that will do their work more satisfactorily. We shall do well here to learn the lesson which is written broad on the face of history. Again and again in the past the Church has become decadent, and has failed to rise to the measure of her opportunity. But as often as this has happened there has come the breath of a new life, and from the ashes of one dead Church there has arisen another with a truer spirit and clearer vision. Every revival has meant an approximation to the Christian ideal of life and conduct, and a raising of the moral standard as well as a quickening of the spiritual sense. The process in Churches and peoples is very much the same as that in the individual heart. Regeneration begins in the vision

of God, of sin, and in repentance. There are encouraging signs at the present time that the Churches are in the throes of such an experience. A new conscience is arising among them. There are the stirrings of a divine discontent, the beginnings of a genuine sense of sin. It is acknowledged on every hand that the Church is losing her hold of the masses of the people, and the fact is causing real searching of heart. It is acknowledged, too, that the Church fails to leaven the life of the world to any appreciable extent. She is learning a much needed lesson from the enthusiasm of the socialist movement, and she is beginning to understand that she must make her appeal with a like zeal and insistence. The tendency at the present time is to judge religion, like everything else, not by its theories but by its practice. Christianity must stand or fall in the estimation of many by the extent to which it realises its ideal, and confers upon men the blessings which it is understood to promise.

Without entering further into theological questions, it will be generally agreed that the application of the ethical teaching of Jesus Christ to modern conditions is a task that will try the faith and energy of the Christian Church to the utmost. So far as human relations are concerned the Christian ideal of brotherhood, of which we have already spoken, is practically a dead letter. Yet nothing is more obvious in the Churches of England and America at the present time than the desire to give practical expression to the teaching of Jesus in this respect. Even conservative and aristocratic Churches feel the stress of the democratic movement, and are stirred to put themselves into line with it, at least so far as lip-service is concerned. But it is just when we come to concert practical measures that the real difficulties begin. It is one thing to recognise the needs of the situation, but it is quite another thing

to persuade people to make the sacrifices necessary in order to meet them. There must be an entire change both in the attitude and methods of the organised Churches before they can be true to their professions. The experiments in communism made by the primitive Church were, no doubt, a dismal failure ; but they were at least an honest attempt to carry out the Christian ideal, and they built upon a true foundation. The modern Church starts too high, and has never quite rid herself of feudal and aristocratic notions. Even in the Churches whose organisation is confessedly democratic, money and social status count for far too much, and the poor have necessarily to take an inferior place. When disputes arise in which class interests are involved, it is not always obvious that the Churches are prepared to view them without prejudice. Too often they seem instinctively to range themselves on the side of the more favoured and influential sections of the community.

The remedy for this condition of things does not lie in merely stating the evil, still less in bringing railing accusations against those who are mainly responsible for it. The effort must be made to apply the doctrines taught to present conditions and to present-day needs. Modern civilisation is the product of a number of combined forces, economic, social, political, intellectual and the like. With the normal operation of these Christian morality has very little to do. Its influence is restricted to small circles, and even then it is not suffered to be very widely felt. The need of the movement is some more definite study of Christian principles in the light of modern conditions, and some organised attempt to apply them all round.

W. B. Selbie.

THE GRACE OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST.

Say, what is this rare element of personality, this fine effluence of spirit stealing like some strain of music or stream of fragrance on the soul, so that straightway it begins to know itself and cherish thoughts, ideals, longings unconceived before ? Something fine and rare indeed, compounded of the gifts of God and fraught with such a strange invasiveness that at its call the soul awakes and hastens to the newness that awaits it. "The Master is here and calleth thee; and she, when she heard it, arose quickly and went unto Him." It is inspiration. It finds the soul beset with fear, it leaves the soul beset with faith ; it finds the soul wrapped in despair, it leaves the soul arrayed in hope ; it finds the soul bereft of love, it leaves the soul possessed of love and life. One is unable to describe in fitting phrase the beauty, wonder, power of this spirit or genius of inspiration, this extraordinary note of the creative in Christ by which He enters into souls and becomes their life. The great word of the New Testament is the one word that avails to utter it. It is grace. Grace is not merely the tenets of His teaching, or even the tone of His teaching, but essentially the creative thrill, the "Lazarus come forth" of His word and Spirit. Grace is power, but power exclusively as the minister of redemption; grace is authority, but authority bent and spent on life. Even when it must destroy it is only that it may construct, its decree of death is but a counsel of life. "If thy hand cause thee to stumble, cut it off ; it is good for thee to *enter into life* maimed rather than having two hands to go into Gehenna" (Mark ix. 43). Grace is the reality of the New Testament, its beginning, and its end, that which makes it new once and for all and for ever, that which inspires its writers to write, which rivets their gaze

upon Him and which they all see in Him as central and suffusing every word and way. This that they see in Him is not mere intellectual genius as in a Plato, else they would not adore Him as they do ; nor mere moral passion as in a Moses, else they would not die for Him as they do ; nor merely the enthusiasm of humanity as in a Buddha, else they would not obey Him as they do ; nor only capacity of leadership as in a Caesar, else they would not count, as they do, everything but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Him. It is something more than any or all of these supreme endowments of humanity. We are told that on His coming up out of the Jordan " He saw the heavens rent asunder and the Spirit as a dove descending upon Him." It is in virtue of that supreme endowment of *the dovelike spirit* that He is the Being He is in the New Testament and in the experience of God and man. A novel sort of supremacy, authority, mastership, power ! Since the world began was it ever heard of power being likened to a dove, a mother-dove ? It seems like contradiction, but it is not so. He once spoke Himself of being " harmless as doves," and not only is the air of harmlessness characteristic of His spirit but that also which the poet describes as " the brooding of the gentle dove." The Spirit descended like a dove and abode upon Him. The image is that of a mother-dove brooding or hovering over her young, and in this connexion it is suggestive to find two other passages in each of which a kindred image is used, and the divine life compared to the activity of a mother-bird.

> " As an eagle that stirreth up her nest,
> That fluttereth over her young,
> He spread abroad his pinions, he took them,
> He bare them on his pinions,
> Jehovah alone did lead him " (Deut. xxxii. 11–12).

Here is a creature with power to soar and yet with patience

to serve, a creature of the great spaces and also of the lowly nest, beside her brood, imparting life and guidance for the "trackless way." "So Jehovah alone did lead him." In the New Testament occurs the other image of the mother-bird which comes nearer to us and thrills us by its pathos: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem . . . how often would I have gathered thy children together as a hen gathereth her own brood under her wings"—to protect them from peril and quicken the life-powers slumbering within. Those three images of the mother-bird, all of them used in striking connexions, help us to appreciate that unique unfolding of the Spirit of God which arrests us in Jesus and which is best described in the phrase "full of grace"—thoroughly permeated, that is to say, with the dove-like, the mother-like, the divine, that essential spirit of life which communicates, imparts, empowers. If there is one thing in the gospels that makes us feel we are walking in a new world, it is the presence of this spirit of life in Christ, this self-diffusing air of personality, this virtue, δύναμις, going out of Him and going into men, redeeming them, and which is what is meant by grace essentially in all its forms. Not thaumaturgy[1] but grace. It is the most original sight in history, the simple, unpretentious, undogmatic and yet wholly dynamic way in which He goes about among men, "not crying aloud or making His voice to be heard in the streets," holding back about His own Messiahship, withdrawing often to the solitudes alone or with a few companions, and coming back betimes and using all His more than regal power, His power of life, His power of sympathy, His power of sanctity, His power of "removing mountains," among the most unknown, unlearned and reprobate of men, content and confident to let His gospel win the world by the quiet dove-like brooding, the benign mother-like appeal and passion of His great

[1] Cf. B. W. Bacon, *The Beginnings of Gospel Story*, p. xxxv.

heart. When He opens the roll in the synagogue and reads His commission, "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me," He describes just the opposite of what His people sought; they sought a Christ with plenteous show and panoply of power proclaiming His predominance, and "the day of vengeance of our God," not a Christ with the child in His arms and a kingdom moulded to the child-spirit or speaking in a voice and with a cry from heaven which would have won them if they only would; "How often would I have gathered thy children together . . . and ye would not." In His tidings to the poor, the captives, the blind, the bruised, in His acts of mercy by the way, ineffable in reverence and tenderness, in His high priestly spirit of ministering, His bending down and binding up the wounds of fallen humanity—in all this and more uplifted on the quiet, almost silent Cross, silent save for words of grace drawn from the veins of anguish and of hope, we find the secret of the power of Christ for all time in and over the lives of men. He reigns because He loves to the uttermost of the brooding, yearning, self-devotion of the parent's heart, the Saviour's heart; not because He proclaims Himself or His own incomparable dignity, or claims a solitary place confronting men, which is not the essence of *His* title to reign, but because He comes to men in His Father's name and gives Himself, Himself the grace incarnate, the "omnipotence" of sorrow, love and holiness. If we are ever to get at Jesus and the gospel we must get at this "unsearchable" grace which permeates His person, character and mission. All that is unique in Him is of a piece with it. It is the sum and centre of His consciousness of self. Messiahship is nothing except in terms of it. From the days at the Jordan to the days of the Cross it is the one uniting bond of word and deed, the breath of God breathing through the life and from the lip, His own over-shadowing, self-imparting Spirit in the form

of man. It is the one humanity in history that impresses as being harmonious and one. It marches to the one Eternal voice. Manysided as it is, it is all the more profoundly one, one and many, many and one in virtue of the grace that is the spirit and emanation of the whole. From this point of view it is not possible to say that there is a "higher gift than grace" or to describe grace itself more aptly than as "God's presence and His very self and essence all-Divine." "Full of grace" means that if it means anything at all.

If we have regard to the Baptism, e.g., that creative moment which determined the career of Jesus, to which some reference has already been made, the vision of the Spirit which broke upon Him as He prayed was significant of nothing less than His endowment with the power of God. "The Spirit whatever else is involved in it always includes the idea of power, and power in which God is active." It was such that it could be said to bear the likeness of a dove, and therefore was not ordinary power, as has been shown, but power replete with purpose. The voice that crowned the vision gave it utterance: "Thou art my Beloved Son, in Thee I am well pleased." It has often been explained that the words are the words of Old Testament idealism, two ideals found but never found together there being fused together here, both Messianic King and lowly servant of the Lord rising as one upon the consciousness of Jesus and revealing in their unity the truth of His endowment and His destiny. The point is that they not only applied to Him as ideals but were fulfilled in Him as realities. Manifestly a consciousness of self, with these as its own, living and moving and having its being in them, is a consciousness that must be described as "solitary," "incomparable" "alone." But it is surely missing the point to stop there. That is not the last to be said about it nor

was that the object of the vision and the voice. Their object in bringing home to Jesus the fact that the hopes and aspirations of the past were realised in Him was that He might be the set Revealer and Mediator of the truth that dwelt in Him. Their object was not only to invest Him with the truth as it applied to self and plant Him in a place apart, but also to invest Him with the grace by which He could and could not but impart the truth to others. It is one thing to think of Christ as full of truth and as, therefore, having lordship over men, demanding their obedience, claiming their surrender to Himself. It is another thing to think of Him as full of *grace* and truth, the truth in Him in virtue of the grace behind it rising from the note of claim to that of call, from the note of law to that of gospel, from demand to impulse, with self-surrender always as its source and motive of appeal. Truth is one thing, grace and truth another; it is truth charged with the potency of life. "He shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire."

The Baptist perceived that there was something profoundly awanting in his message which the message of the "mightier" would be sure to provide. And nothing in early tradition is more certain than that what was absent from the one was present in the other. John and Jesus both came preaching repentance, but what in the lips of the one was the mandate of a law in the lips of the other was the music of a gospel. It was hurled forth by the one in the stern tones of the judge, whilst the other gave it in the gracious accents of the Saviour. The one voice awed and terrified, the other charmed and inspired. The one said, "Flee from the wrath to come," the other said, "Come unto me, and I will refresh you." The one remained aloof from men, lifting up his lonely witness in the wilderness, the other went in and out of the homes of men, their Physician and

Friend, the Giver of Life. It is the difference between law and gospel, or between truth and "grace and truth." The gospel as distinguished from the law is not just the law revised and rounded off, but still essentially the law, it is the law changed into life and holy love in a unique person, and therefore something radically new. The insufficiency of the one is changed into the sufficiency of the other. "He shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire." That is the Baptist's reading of the voice and vision of Jesus. In the majestic "He," as he discerns, the Gospel is concentred and consists. It is not to be dissevered from the "He," nor is the "He" a mere contingency to it. Rather it is the necessity that makes the Gospel what it is, that in the Gospel which makes it the Gospel. It is one thing to be conscious of the truth of moral ideas, it is another thing to be possessed of their power. The Gospel is not merely a table of ideas which men may be sensible of, but it is essentially the power which transmits itself in the ideas and through them and regenerates. It is "the power of God unto salvation." It is the Baptism of the Holy Spirit and fire, which it is solely in virtue of the personality, the "He" Who is in it and Who so communicates Himself to men. Hence it follows that what are called the demands of the Gospel or His demands, His claims, His verities, imperatives, severities and the like are all to be understood in the light of the personality whence they come, and whose spirit they are meant to convey. Not one of them but in its own way contains the whole Jesus. It is the whole Jesus in them, both the truth and the grace of Him, His dove-like Spirit bodying itself forth through them, that gives them their character and that distinctive note of appeal more than assertion, of persuasion more than precept, of holy love more than holy law. The note of the decalogue has absolutely passed into the note of the Beatitude. The air of prohibition has

changed into the air of promise. "Ye are not under law, but under grace."

Now if that is the teaching of the "Baptism," it seems to be equally the teaching of the "Temptation." The later episode is fraught with the same incomparable significance as the earlier. The one cannot be understood apart from the other. If Jesus was revealed to Himself at the Baptism the next and necessary step was that He should be led up of the Spirit into the wilderness and face the issues of the revelation there. For if, as we may think, it had but dawned upon Him then, the tremendous consciousness that upon Him had come the ends of the ages and that the dreams of men and the purposes of heaven met in Him and were fulfilled, there would be the further need that such a consciousness should enter into full possession of itself and choose and see its own appointed path. Though it is only a graphic touch there is a hint of spiritual suggestion in the phrase that He was *led up* of the Spirit into the wilderness. What had possessed Him at the Jordan He had now to possess in calling and career. The secret of His Person had now to be construed in terms of His vocation. Vision must pass into venture, rapture into wrestling. The message of the heavens must become the ministry of the earth. What had been given without measure He must now absorb and apply to appropriate ends. What had been given was the Spirit or power of God in its uttermost forms, "My Son," "My Servant"; it had now to be striven for and sifted out, what these involved and how they were to be accomplished in the world. Theophanies, in order to avail, must find or forge themselves a path amid the forces of experience. The task of Jesus was to find the best and only way by which the heavenly ideals embodied in His person could be made real to men and the kingdom of heaven established among them; how to use the sacred fire which burned within Him

so as to achieve the highest good. Such was His "Father's business" in the wilderness.

"If thou art the Son of God, command that these stones become bread." But why was this no answer to His problem? It certainly had reference to His gift of power and pointed out a way by which it could be put to use—of self as well as others. Facts so personal to Himself as that He hungered and had compassion on the multitude who hungered lent it all the double force of a temptation, which once He felt as such He foiled and sought another way to use His power.[1] The use of it along the path of self-regard and mere material ascendancy was not in keeping with the vision of His soul nor did it answer to His calling as the Son and Servant of the Lord.

"If thou art the Son of God, cast thyself down." Why was this again no answer to His quest, but only another specious voice, another method of misuse? As before, it bore upon His consciousness of power making the field of self-display as dazzling and deceptive as it could, the summit of the national shrine, no less, from which with confidence unlimited in God and in His might of miracle He could fling Himself upon a world of danger with impunity and so proclaim Himself in sight of all. It came on wings of psalm and prophecy alike, "He shall give His angels charge concerning thee." "The Lord whom ye seek shall suddenly come to his temple." It was a form of temptation to which, as we may suppose, one gifted with the rarest gifts would naturally be exposed. Was there anything which the darling of heaven

[1] Cf. Carlyle, *The French Revolution*, Bk. v., ch. vi.

"The Ritter Gluck confessed that the ground-tone of the noblest passage in one of his noblest Operas was the voice of the Populace he had heard at Vienna, crying to their Kaiser: Bread! Bread! Great is the combined voice of men; the utterance of their *instincts*, which are truer than their *thoughts*; it is the greatest a man encounters among the sounds and shadows which make up this World of Time. He who can resist that has his footing somewhere *beyond* Time."

need fear or fail to do ? Was not the arm of omnipotence His to call His own ? Just here lay the peril of supernal power, that He might overstep its limits, profane its laws, presume upon its presence in and with Him, so tempting God. It was the temptation to overtrust, to a life of self-assertion swathed in miracle which, as He discerned, was alien to His person and His work. Overtrust would come to overlordship ; tempting God would come to tyrannising man, and Jesus would have none of it at all. " Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God."

" All these things will I give thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me." Another prize presented to His consciousness of power, another imposing prospect of possession, another glittering realm put within His grasp ; and another snare, another make-believe, as He perceived. If He will not make irreverent demands of heaven, may He not attempt the enticing mastership of earth ? If He will not try to force the hand of God, may He not accept the proffer of another ? If He will not win by presumption, may He not win by compromise ? Instead of the power of Deity, let it be the power of the prince of this world, let it be a league with evil instead of good. The repulse in this case was one of peculiar intensity, " Get thee hence, Satan." It would seem as if the last temptation were the first fully to reveal the principle of evil in them all, the essentially Satanic nature of the things that strove to fasten on the soul of Christ. They were all of them ideals proper to a life of self-assertion, and all of them possible to one aware of great capacities and coveting ascendency. They were all of them forms of ascendency centred in self, and were all rejected because they did not march with the voice and vision of His soul ; they were false alike to the truth of His mission and the grace of His person. It was a wholly different sort of ascendency that dawned on Jesus and waxed into

clearness in the conflict of the time. It could never be found on any of the paths of self-display or self-desire. On the other hand, it lay along that path where the mystery of His person merged in the labours of His calling and where the exalted names He bore fulfilled themselves in a ministry whose centre was the will of God. It was the ascendency of the Beloved Son and Servant and that alone.

There the Baptism and the Temptation met and were one. The second finished what the first began. The Baptism was " accomplished " (cf. Luke xii. 50) in the Temptation, and after the Temptation " Jesus came into Galilee preaching," or, as Luke has it, " Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit into Galilee " (iv. 14), which means that the transcendent revelation of the Jordan had passed into the practical resolve of Galilee. Before Galilee, the Jordan and the wilderness ; before the preaching, the personality attaining full possession of itself and its vocation. Otherwise Galilee had not been the Galilee of the Gospel. Otherwise His personality had not been present in the preaching and the power of it, the grace had not been present in the truth and the life of it. We are dealing with a personality whose every step was a step in a process of expansion and expression. Each step to the centre was a step to the circumference. Arriving at its Messianic title it must needs arrive at its Messianic task. Scaling its heights it must explore its depths. The whole personality moved as one amid its difference ; its consciousness of self, its consciousness of God, its consciousness of man were but itself in its activities. If the revelation of the Baptism was the revelation of a personality such as had never dawned on any soul save one, placing that one upon a pinnacle which only seers had seen from afar, it brought responsibilities tremendous as itself and all demanding struggle and a life of sacrifice. The newness of the revelation lay not only in its loftiness, but

also and profoundly in the fact that its loftiness could only be achieved by lowliness. It was the revelation of a personality summoned to supremacy and at the same time to a post and path of servitude. The difference between its ascendency and every other was that it centred in the will of God and not in self. Instead of coming into Galilee as Jesus might have done, exhibiting His power in miracle, in the proclamation of Himself and in "the pride of life," He came into Galilee *preaching*. The passion of parade always couches at the door of power, but it did not rule over Him. Power grasps at greatness almost as its right, but in Him it appeared as duty, it came in fashion as a servant, it was the power of the Spirit, it was grace. And lo! this is the new creation of Jesus, and the glory of history. Power wholly parted from self and sanctified to God and man; power emptied of presumption and filled with prayer; power freed from evil and fraught with good; power absolutely won to love and holiness. If self-assertion is the way and wont of power, in Jesus it was self-renouncement. If it falls to tempting God and tyrannising man, it rose in Him to worship and redeeming work. If its passion is proclaiming self, in Jesus it was that of communicating self. "The Son of man came . . . to *give* His life a ransom for many." Power wholly taken up and merged in grace. So that when He came in the power of the Spirit into Galilee, and when He came preaching, He came as the grace of God incarnate.

If it were possible to go with Him through Galilee or journey to Jerusalem and mark His preaching by the way, one would bear Him witness as they did in Nazareth and wonder at "His words of grace." "Words of grace" is a wonderfully apt appreciation of His preaching, of its content, character, effect, of its words from first to last with the thrill, the inspiration, the enraptured

personality pervading them. His words, as has been shown, are never the words simply of a new law or a new teaching, but essentially the words of the Evangel, words with a background, an atmosphere, a spirit all their own, and only to be understood in the light of the life they embody and express. Shakespeare speaks of one whose

> "plausive words
> He scatter'd not in ears but grafted them
> To grow there and to bear."

Of His words likewise it might be said that He grafted them to grow there and to bear. They were things of life imparted. They were just Himself in touch articulate with men. They throbbed and heaved with the power of the Spirit. Deep in them, organic to themselves, were acts and motives, tears and triumphs, eternity and time, the whole accepted will of God. A life, a death, a destiny were in them, whence the secret of their being once and always words of grace. Hence one must object that it is not the root of the matter to speak, e.g., of the sovereign legislative authority which breathes throughout the Sermon on the Mount, or to speak of Jesus represented there as the "final Judge of man."[1] There is authority in the words of Christ, no words indeed carry the authority they do, but one cannot describe it barely as legislative unless one obliterates the difference between law and grace. At the same time their authority is none the less the authority of law that it is the infinitely larger authority of grace. Law is in the Gospel but the Gospel is more and other than law, and it is therefore away from the point to refer to its authority as legislative. In the same way one cannot name Him the final Judge unless one remembers that He is Saviour first and last, and Judge only as exercising a function of the Saviour and fulfilling the Saviour's work. The Judge is always the Saviour for the reason that the Saviour must always be

[1] *Jesus and the Gospel*, pp. 240–253.

the Judge. Life must often kill to make alive. Hence the judgment of the judge is co-operant to the saving of the Saviour, and it has no other meaning in this connexion. There is no word of judgment or any other word in the mouth of Christ of which the principle does not hold, " I came not to destroy but to fulfil " ; no word of judgment that is not in its heart a word of grace. The " I say " of the " legislation " of the Sermon on the Mount and the " I say " of its final judgment are all in tone and tune with every other " I say " of Jesus and with the " I will " and the " I am " of the great invitation itself (Matt. xi. 20–24, 25–30).

Though much might still be adduced one may now conclude by repeating that it is wrong analysis and wrong perspective alike to picture Christ as a solitary person in a solitary place wrapped in an incommunicable consciousness of self with sovereign legislative authority proclaiming His demands, and daring men to disobey. As such He is simply another Lawgiver, but by no means the Christ of history or of faith; He is the Christ of a theological creed but not of the New Testament life; He is the Christ who confronts but not the Christ who communicates. The point of view is wrong. It suffers from a lack of breadth and catches, therefore, but a portion of its object. On p. 221 of the volume which contains this image of a part of Christ we find the notable admission, " What is to be observed here is that we see already Him who had been baptized with the Holy Spirit and power baptizing His followers with the same." That is the point which in these pages one has tried to emphasise as the central point and principle of Jesus and the gospel. " Baptizing His followers with the same." That is far more like the attitude of Christ than the other, in which He stands over against and apart from men in the solitude of the sense of His absolute significance, His incommunicable self-consciousness, the atti-

tude which, it is said, " He calmly and sovereignly assumes to men and as calmly and sovereignly demands from men," and which " is precisely the attitude of Christians to their Lord in the most Christian parts of the New Testament." One has no wish to deny the measure of truth in this interpretation. It is one way of making it appear that Jesus is unique, central, sovereign. But all that Jesus is is surely more apparent in the other attitude than in this.

> " O lovely attitude ! He stands
> With melting heart and laden hands. '

These lines may not say everything, but they approach the fact before us. For it is surely in virtue of His grace that Jesus is what He is and stands where He does among men and is known and adored as Lord. It is as interfused with grace that His word, His character, His Cross prevail. It is His Spirit breathing through the whole. A recent Jewish writer[1] has been claiming that nearly all that is true in the teaching of Jesus is anticipated in the best teaching of the Rabbis, and that even His " I say unto you " may be, where it is historic, no more than the felt equivalent of " Thus saith the Lord " ; but he admits that the originality of His teaching is chiefly in its general character, its spirit, its atmosphere. " In any case the teaching of Jesus is more than its *disjecta membra* ; it is a whole ; it is a spirit. To this spirit it is easy to do less than justice through cold analysis and dissection." One cannot help thinking that both the Jewish and the Christian writer do less than justice to this Spirit which, elusive as it is, is the Spirit of Jesus and His supreme creation and contribution to the world. An earlier writer[2] seems to show a finer sympathy and a clearer judgment when he speaks of " His sweet reasonableness." " The conjunction of the three in Jesus—the method of inwardness

[1] C. G. Montefiore, *Jowett Lectures*, pp. 119, 86–87.
[2] M. Arnold, *Lit. and Dogma*, p. 215.

and the secret of self-renouncement, working in and through this element of mildness—produced the total impression of his epieikeia or sweet reasonableness; a total impression ineffable and indescribable for the disciples, as also it was irresistible for them, but at which their descriptive words, words like this '*sweet reasonableness*' and like '*full of grace and truth*,' are thrown out and aimed. And this total stamp of grace and truth, this exquisite conjunction and balance in an element of mildness, of a method of inwardness perfectly handled and a self-renouncement perfectly kept was found in Jesus alone." Much as men to-day may impugn the uncritical work of Arnold they cannot deny that he has laid his hand here on something that is central and inseparable from the personality of Christ. His "epieikeia" is a striking approximation to that spirit which, even though it may defy description, one feels to be the original thing and the endless thing in Jesus. It is the spirit that pervades the gospels and makes them what they are and likewise the epistles. It is the discovery or the disclosure, or both, of the New Testament. It is the peroration of Scripture. It is the finishing touch of reality. It is the Gospel. It is the source of that extraordinary attraction which Christ exerts over men of every age, and which makes Him at once the most intelligible and the most mysterious Being in history. It is the secret both of His unity with God and His unity with man. It explains why men are bound to Him as the One who answers to their own ideals and is irresistible to their better selves. Hence also it explains why it is no mere "demand" which He makes of men standing above them, but rather an inspiration which He gives to men standing among them, so that they "awake and remember and understand." For He does not merely call but recall. He revives ancestral memories, unlocks ancestral hopes. "The Spirit beareth witness with our spirit that we are children of God;

and if children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ." It explains why men in being joined to Him are joined to God Himself. It explains His extraordinary sense of community with God on the one hand, His speech and action in His name and His identification with His kingdom which "comes" as He comes, and is a gift as He is of the Father's good will; and His community with man on the other, His speech and action as the Son of man, His identification with his various life and His intercession and death on his behalf. Above all things it explains, or rather is that extraordinary interfusion of Himself with all His words, that entwining of His personality with all His truth which issues in this, that His commands are invitations, His imperatives entreaties, His severities the sanctities of sacrifice, which no one knowing Him would wish away. In a word, it explains, or rather is the Christ.

No one ever spoke with the authority of Christ, no one ever cast and kindled fire on the earth like Him, no one ever threw aside the veil of heaven and let men see the heroism God expects of them, no one ever quenched the light of low ideals as He, and brought into view the good and perfect will of God, no one ever planted such a standard on the path of life and uttered himself in words inexorable as these: "Deny thyself," "lose thy life," "take up thy cross." But immediately after the "deny thyself" comes His "follow me," after His "lose thy life" His "for my sake." Into the inexorable words there steals the heart-subduing tenderness of the "Me," into the authority the appeal, into the sovereignty the Saviourhood, into the truth the grace with its deep sweet well of tears. And this is the glory of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. This is He of whom the voice upon the Mount as at the Jordan, spake and said, "This is my Beloved Son, hear ye Him."

James Robertson Cameron.

DID JESUS SPEAK OF HIMSELF AS JUDGE?

"He ascended into heaven . . . From thence He shall come to judge the quick and the dead," runs the Apostolic symbol, hallowed through the centuries by the repetition of millions of Christian people.

To some the very inquiry may seem to be unnecessary, almost irreverent, in face of allusions direct and indirect to the return of the Saviour as Judge in the Te Deum and the Creeds, as well as within the limits of the New Testament literature. To the question, when asked, the faith and the fear of countless disciples would appear to answer in the affirmative. But that return to the sources (as far as they are attainable) which has characterised the religious investigations of our age is not compatible with any restriction which would exclude the reverent student from certain quarters of the area to be explored.

In this inquiry, as in others, verification of the ancient and still prevailing view must assuredly be sought from the self-witness of the Master and the implications of self-consciousness that may emerge in the course of His teaching.

Whichever part of the material be examined first, the letters of St. Paul or the compilations of the Synoptic evangelists, we are struck by the exceeding fragmentariness of the data directly bearing on the subject in hand, and by the almost entire absence of such in other writings included in the New Testament.

The smallness of the sphere of relevant allusions, almost definable by the writings of St. Paul and the first Gospel, is sufficiently arresting; and the lack of any outspoken claim treasured in the memory of disciples is remarkable, although the argument from a silence for which there may have been reasons of which we are unaware is admittedly precarious.

Let us state the evidence with the utmost brevity.

We may assume without preliminary discussion and with some confidence a general recognition at the present time that Jesus claimed in some sense Messiahship, however much He may have transfigured popular conceptions, and poured new content of experience and of interpretation into current expressions.

He found the traditional figure of the Messiah to be the only one which could be used with any adequacy to express the consciousness of His vocation and work, and He claimed the office and functions of the Chosen One, the Anointed, at least in private with his intimate followers after the confession of St. Peter, and publicly—according to the reports—at His trial before the high priest.

If we are asked, was the dominant expectation of our Lord's day that the Messiah would be the final Judge of men? we should, I think, be compelled to say that the balance of available evidence is on the negative side.

And if His teaching as to judicial functions was out of harmony with views generally current, we should be prepared for considerable emphasis—to the disciples, at any rate —because of its newness, its "mystery."

This we do not find.

As to the prevalent opinion: speaking broadly, from that portion of Jewish apocalyptic literature that is considered to have arisen previous to the ministry of Jesus we seem to have only the Psalms of the Pharisees, or "of Solomon," and that part of the Book of Enoch usually termed the Similitudes, which distinctly ascribe functions of judgment to the Messiah.

In the former, such judgment is preliminary to the Kingdom; in the latter, it appears to be final. For example: Psalms of Solomon xvii. 28 f., "And he (the King, Son of David), will gather together a holy people, which he will rule

in righteousness, and he will judge the tribes of the people sanctified by the Lord his God. And he will permit iniquity no more to dwell amongst them . . . (39) with the words of his mouth he will smite the earth," and the "day of separation" is the day when the Anointed comes to dominion (xviii. 6).

This reflects the conception of a preliminary judgment, limited to Israel, and delegated by God. A general judgment of mankind is beyond the horizon of the Psalmist's thought, at least in regard of the Messiah.

To turn to the other source named. We find here judgment committed to the Chosen One, the Son of Man. This is chiefly the case in Enoch lxi. f., lxix. For instance: Enoch lxi. 8, "The Lord of Spirits set the Chosen on the throne of his glory, and he will judge all the works of the holy ones above in the heavens, and weigh their deeds with the scales." Here obviously angels are included in the range of Messiah's judicial functions, and judgment is according to character manifested by deeds. Again, we note a connexion of thought with the Psalms of Solomon, Enoch lxii. 2, "The Lord of spirits set him on the throne of his glory . . . the word of his mouth slew all the sinners, and all the unrighteous were destroyed before his face."

Further, the range of jurisdiction in the day of his manifestation, "for the Son of Man was previously hidden" (lxii. 7), extends presumably to the Gentile powers—at least such as have come into contact with the Jews, "for all Kings, etc., rise up before him," they "praise him who rules over all," they also "beg for mercy from" the Son of Man (lxii. 3, 6, 9). Moreover, the angels whose function is to punish arrest them, apparently at the Son of Man's bidding, for their evil treatment of the elect people. The righteous, on the other hand, are pictured as viewing this spectacle of doom, and then in their state of salvation

they enjoy continuous feasting with the Son of Man to all eternity (lxii. 11, 13).

That this authority to judge mankind is delegated by the Lord of spirits seems implied: "This is the judgment established before the Lord of spirits" (lxiii. 12), "He sat upon the throne of his glory and the sum of judgment was committed unto him, the Son of Man" (lxix. 27), while the finality thereof appears to be sufficiently indicated, "he caused the sinners . . . to pass from the surface of the earth . . . and all evil will vanish from before his face" (lxix. 27, 29).[1]

The foregoing references would lead us to expect teaching concerning authority to judge to be connected in the Gospel story with teaching relative to the Son of Man. Such we shall discover it in great part to be. We turn then to the evidence of the Synoptic Gospels.

Mark.

The Gospel "according to Mark" contains no plain and direct claim to judicial functions in the eschatological sense.

An indirect claim might be argued from the clearest utterance (although some have doubted its authenticity), that before the high priest (xiv. 62), in answer to the question, "Art thou the Christ?"—"I am, and ye shall see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of the Power, and coming with the clouds of heaven." It is open to infer that this co-session includes functions of judgment, although it may be doubted whether such would be regarded as more than punitive and national in aim, executed by Messiah in the rôle of divine vicegerent.

Another reference in the Second Gospel (viii. 38) would seem to imply that the office of Jesus is that of chief witness

[1] Passages dealing with the retributive judgment (not final) of Messiah in the Apocalypse of Baruch (xl., lxxii.) and Ezra (xii. 32 ff., xiii. 37 ff.) appear to be coloured by events subsequent to the ministry of Jesus.

rather than of Judge in relation to His own "generation" with its especial opportunity of hearing His message: "Whosoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words in this adulterous and sinful generation, the Son of Man also shall be ashamed of him, when he cometh in the glory of his Father with the holy angels."

For the idea, apart from the question of the exact words of the original source, we must compare the related passages concerning the Son of Man's "confession" or "denial" of men (Matt. x. 32 f.; Luke xii. 8 f.) before God (Matt.), and the angels (Luke).

LUKE.

We might expect to find a claim to the functions of eschatological judgment more clearly and emphatically presented in the Gospel according to Luke, with its universal outlook.

The following are relevant allusions:—

(*a*) Luke xvii. 22 ff. refer to "the days" (22, 26) or "day" (24, 30) of the Son of Man. The opening verses of the section are unique (20–22), but a considerable amount of the subsequent figurative language concerning the Son's manifestation is found in the parallel (also based on Q), Matthew xxiv. 27–42, only "parousia"—the specially Pauline term—is there used, not "day." The latter expression recalls the implications of judgment in the Old Testament "day of Yahweh." Yet there is no ascribing of the functions of separation (Matthew 41 f., Luke 34 f.) to the Son of Man; only the times are comparable, for neither Noah nor Lot judged in their "days," but God alone.

(*b*) Luke xxi. 36*c*., "And to stand before the Son of Man," affords indeed an instance involving judicial authority, reminding us of Enoch lii. 3; but it is isolated in the Gospel, and seems to be an addition (cf. 2 Cor. v. 10) out of harmony with the warning to "watch," which forms the purport of the preceding clauses.

(*c*) Luke xxii. 30 (=Matt. xix. 28) remains, in a difficult context, apparently belonging originally to Q, concerning the Son's Kingdom. Here the additional promise is recorded, "Ye (sc. the disciples, in answer to Peter's question as to reward) shall sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." *A fortiori* the Son is Judge; but it is not stated, and the reference is only to Israel.

On the other hand, the parallel in Matthew makes it perfectly clear, "When the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of his glory" (in Enochic phrase), "ye *also* shall," etc. If our Lord had claimed authority to execute final judgment, and the second or third evangelist knew recorded utterances to that effect, why should we have to depend on these precarious instances?

MATTHEW.

We have left the evidence from the Gospel "according to Matthew" till last, because here the whole aspect is changed. Jesus is represented in this Jewish-Christian compilation as claiming openly in utterances declaratory and interpretative the prerogatives of final Judge, as Son of Man.

(*a*) In the interpretation of the parable of the Tares (that is ascribed to Him) it is the Son of Man who sends forth the separating and punishing angels, and they are "*his* angels" (xiii. 41, cf. xxiv. 31). But the passage can hardly be held to be authentic, for story and allegorical explanation are not in accord.

(*b*) Again, we have a unique addition in xvi. 27. The coming of the Son of Man is referred to in the parallels (Mark viii. 38, Luke ix. 26), and Luke indeed attributes "glory" to the Son separately; but Matthew continues quite definitely, "then shall he render to every man according to his deeds."

Would such a declaration, with its obvious personal claim, coming just after the critical confession of St. Peter, have

passed unnoticed or have been omitted by the other evangelists?

(*c*) The reference in apocalyptic terms in xix. 28 to the Apostles as sharers with their Master in the prerogatives of a national dominion has already received a brief notice as a parallel to Luke xxii. 30: it is peculiar to the first Gospel, and is a marked development of the saying which lay behind the forms transmitted.

(*d*) Once more, the ideas of the heavenly Son of Man and of the angels of retribution are combined in xxiv. 30 f. The vision of the coming is common to all, but the sending forth of the Son's angels is again peculiar to Matthew (cf. xiii. 41).

(*e*) There remains the description of the Judgment-scene, in the first Gospel only (xxv. 31 ff.), where the basis of judgment is loving ministry. The present form can hardly be original. A parable regarding the blessedness of acts of lovingkindness seems to underlie the latter part, and perhaps the figure of a King belongs to it, but this has become—with incomplete adjustment of detail—a picture of separation for bliss or woe under the sentence of the Son of Man in His glory, according to the treatment which either the heathen have bestowed upon His followers, the primitive missionaries in His name, or Christians—assuming a converted world—have imparted to one another.

Jesus nowhere else is recorded as having thus called Himself King, and as such pronouncing final judgment on the comparatively narrow basis of the non-receiving of His emissaries, or the omission of acts of kindness.

The setting is that of Enoch lxii., but the form of the material transmitted suggests very strongly the moulding influence of early Christian preaching.

Another hint of the regarding of Jesus as Judge in the eschatological sense is to be found probably in the unique

addition "before the time" (viii. 29) in the story of the Gadarene demoniac(s); apparently implying that the first evangelist or his circle assumed the final punishment of demons and evil angels (xxv. 41) to be part of Messiah's judicial functions.

The first evangelist then stands virtually alone among the Synoptists in representing Jesus as claiming to be Judge in clear words, and in doing so in terms mainly Enochic.

Parabolic Implications.

In addition to the eschatological utterances of Jesus which involve the claim direct or indirect to execute judgment, it may be asked, Do any of the parables imply that the speaker will judge? Let us seek for any further evidence that they may provide.

Now although there is a considerable amount of eschatological matter in Mark, the few parables afford us no data for this question. In Luke, however, several parabolic references suggest such a claim in the form in which they have come down, the most obvious being contained in the simile concerning (*a*) "the master of the house" (xiii. 25 ff.). We cannot be at all sure that this section was originally spoken immediately after the allusion to the "narrow door" (24, cf. Matt. vii. 13 f.), and suggested thereby, and followed by the picture of the incoming of the dispersed (whether proselytes or, as later interpreted, Gentiles) to recline in the Kingdom of God (29). Luke may have so linked the fragment taken from his source (be it Q or another) because of its connexion with the idea in the context of "shutting out" and "casting forth" through the exclusion of those who felt certain of inclusion (28, cf. Matt. viii. 12).

As the action proceeds in Luke, the application of this veiled parable of the Kingdom appears to pass from God to Jesus, "master of the house"—"Lord"—"thou didst *teach*

in our streets." [Cf. the Matt. form (vii. 22 f.), which, however, breaks the connexion. Here those excluded claim to have "prophesied," etc., in the name of Jesus. The insertion is made in this case shortly after the reference to the "narrow gate" (13 f.).] The verdict too is eschatologically conceived, "Depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity" (cf. Matt. vii. 23, xiii. 41).

The "confession" of the Lord to their detriment, which precedes this adverse pronouncement, reminds us of Matthew x. 32 f., the "confessing" and "denying" of men by Jesus, while the agent in the Lukan parallel (xii. 8 f.) is the Son of Man, and is not clearly identified with Jesus.

This definite reference to our Lord does not seem, therefore, likely to belong to the common original, for this reason: unless we are to assume these verses to be a fragment of private teaching for the disciples, one of whom is the questioner (23), surely so open a claim to the right of pronouncing the final verdict would have been seized on at once (as Messianic and more) if uttered in public address "journeying on unto Jerusalem" (22). Besides, the figure is changed from that of the city-gate to that of the house-door by Luke (24), perhaps for his Roman readers, perhaps to suit the following section that was to be incorporated. Further, the order in the succeeding paragraph (28 f.) has been altered from that of the Matthaean form, so as to connect the verses with the place of exclusion already implied in the command to depart.

The opening and closing portions of this teaching concerning non-entrants appear somewhat widely separated in Matthew's compilation (vii. 13 f., viii. 11 f.).

Thus the addition which describes the excuse offered to the "teaching" Lord, i.e., Jesus in His ministry, seems most probably to belong to the later touching of an original simile, as application was made (quite naturally) in early Christian

homiletics to the glorified Lord as the judicial excluder from the Kingdom. Most likely there was nothing in the original utterance involving His thus giving sentence, but rather God was implied; for the point of comparison throughout is the struggle for entrance, the striving for fitness to share in the coming Kingdom, expressed under the imagery of a banquet (Matt. viii. 11 f.).

(*b*) Again, in the parables to teach Watchfulness, there is that of the Pounds (Luke xix. 12 ff.), which appears in a different dress—quite possibly a divergent stream of tradition from a common source—in the Matthaean story of the Talents. It is introduced as being in answer to a question about the immediacy of the Kingdom of God, so that the whole point of the parable is, "Be ready whenever it shall come, it may be delayed more than you expect; readiness lies in consistency of loyal service." If any emphasis is to be placed on the agent in adjudicating reward or punishment in the parable, the hearers would interpret the act as God's, because His is the dominion concerning which the inquiry was made (if the occasion were such as Luke states) and answered in story form. But it was easy for the Church to interpret the departure and return of the "nobleman" of Christ's ascension and expected coming again.

Nor does Matthew's story of the Talents (xxv. 14 ff.) itself imply in any way that it is the speaker who goes and returns "after a long time" (19) and apportions praise or blame, although Christians afterwards naturally took it so, but, as in the Vineyard parable, it is God who is primarily represented.

(*c*) Now in the comparisons about faithful waiting, it is Matthew alone who adds words that point definitely to the ascribing of prerogatives of judgment to Jesus having been made already at the time of the compilation of his Gospel. This we may see by comparing the similes of the Thief and

the Unfaithful Slave in Matthew (xxiv. 43 ff.) and Luke (xii. 40, 42 ff.). Only Matthew applies to Jesus the preceding section regarding sudden separation in plain terms, "Watch therefore, for ye know not on what day *your* Lord cometh" (42); but the moral of the Thief simile is drawn in both Gospels in the same words, "Be ye also ready: for in an hour that ye think not the Son of Man cometh" (Matt. xxiv. 44, Luke xii. 40). And so with the warning from the Unfaithful Slave (but for Luke's change of "hypocrites" to "unfaithful" (46), except that here Matthew gives the whole a new turn by the addition of his favourite eschatological clause, "there shall be the weeping and the gnashing of teeth" (51), thus considerably increasing the feeling that he regards final punishment as being in the hands of the Christians' Lord, although the original language (probably in Q) did not demand such interpretation.

(*d*) This peculiarity of the Matthaean representation seems to be further confirmed by his inclusion of the "Ten Virgins" in his closing group of parables, without any interpretative additions as to the "shutting out" of the unprepared. It might have been utilised to teach more openly the Son's judgment; it does so by its very position indeed, but the moral of the story itself was simply "watch" (13). This, however, is just the lesson drawn from the comparison with the slaves ready with lamps lit for the return of their master from his wedding that *they* may open to *him* (Luke xii. 35 ff.). The longer and shorter traditions were evidently closely related. At the time of the incorporation of the parable-form in Matthew Jesus was already identified with "the bridegroom," for so He was reported to have spoken of Himself elsewhere (Mark ii. 19 f., Luke v. 34 f., Matt. ix. 15).

It would be quite unreasonable to suppose that in the numerous instances set forth above Matthew has been merely correcting the omissions and misconceptions of Mark, and,

unconsciously, of Luke. Additions and transforming touches such as those that have been enumerated in the transmitted records of our Lord's parables appear to indicate the way in which primitive interpretation in Jewish-Christian circles was tending towards the attribution to Jesus of an authority to give sentence which He had at least not claimed in any direct manner for Himself.

John.

In the interpretation of the historic life given us in the Fourth Gospel, judgment is present and progressive in man's experience according to his relation to the manifestation of the Son (Logos) in the world. Indeed, judgment (κρίσις) is expressly disclaimed by Jesus (iii. 17, viii. 15, xii. 47), and yet the very coming of the Son into the world has proved to be a judgment (κρίμα, ix. 39).

Of judgment in the eschatological meaning as a function of Jesus there is no trace in discourse or soliloquy, but for a verse (v. 27) which, if so taken, is out of harmony with the preceding context, as it states in apocalyptic phrase (cf. En. lxix.), "the Father . . . gave him authority to execute judgment (κρίσιν ποιεῖν), because he is (the) Son of Man" (contrast 22). The small section which follows concerning resurrection of the literally dead at the voice of the "Son of Man" to life or judgment (28 f.) appears to be in many respects alien not only to 24 ff., but to the main teaching of this Gospel upon (spiritual) death and life.

Other New Testament Evidence.

If the expectation of the coming of Jesus in His character of Son of Man or Messiah to judge were based on explicit utterances cherished in the memory of intimate associates and reported to and recorded by Gospel-writers in their turn, we should be prepared to discover considerable testimony in other writings within the New Testament to that

effect, especially where the speakers (or authors) had been closely connected with our Lord "in the days of His flesh." This we do not find.

(*a*) It is remarkable that in the Petrine addresses in Acts there is no word of judgment in relation to the functions of Him who was made "both Lord and Christ," but rather of the blessing that accrued from His incarnate life (iii. 26); except in the speech before Cornelius (x. 42) with strong Lukan traits, "This is he which is ordained of God (to be) the judge of quick and dead,"—singularly close to the words reported of St. Paul at Athens (xvii. 31).

(*b*) Even if we may assume that the first epistle bearing St. Peter's name is genuine, the reference therein to "him that is ready to judge the world," before whom men "shall give account" (iv. 5), does not necessarily allude to the glorified Jesus, because God is the nearer subject (2). The other relevant instances ascribe judgment to God the Father (i. 17, ii. 23).

(*c*) Let us turn next to letters attributed to "the brethren of the Lord." If they be of later origin, their evidence, though scanty, is of the sort that we should be led to expect in the case of a development. St. James alludes to the "coming of the Lord," which "is at hand" (v. 7 f.), and uses the word *παρουσία* just like Matthew and St. Paul. The judge that "standeth before the doors" is presumably Jesus.

(*d*) The brief letter of St. Jude is so pervaded with Apocalyptic phraseology that we are not surprised to find Enoch lxii. 9 adapted in the clause "looking for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto eternal life" (21). The one who extends mercy in this sense is probably regarded also as the Judge.

(*e*) The epistle (so-called) "to the Hebrews" provides no evidence, except in so far as judgment and the "appear-

ing" of Christ would seem to be coincident in time (ix. 27 f.).

(*j*) In the intensely Jewish-Christian Apocalypse one verse (xxii. 12) recalls immediately Matthew xvi. 27: the speaker is Jesus or the angel in His name, "I come quickly, and my reward is with me, to render to each man according as his work is." Again, judgment, under the figure of reaping, is ascribed to "one sitting on the cloud like unto the Son of Man, having . . . in his hand a sharp sickle" (xiv. 14): in the passage following, an angel reaps (17 ff., cf. Matt. xiii. 39). Otherwise God is the Judge, although "the Lamb" shares the throne.

We should not be far wrong in concluding from our survey up to this point that a tendency to relate judicial functions to Jesus at His coming is growing up in Jewish-Christian circles, but is not of such strength as we should have surmised if there had existed genuine utterances concerning such from the lips of the Master. We have seen that in the rest of the New Testament (outside the extant letters of St. Paul) there is but one clear reference in the Apocalypse, one inference in Jude (unless the quotation [14 ff.] from Enoch be applied to Jesus), and one possible allusion each in James and 1 Peter, to be brought forward in support of the reported claims to final judgment which are peculiar to the Gospel "according to Matthew"; and in at least three of those cases that the authors were "apostles" or even men of the first generation is open to serious question. The doctrine was apparently becoming established in the circle of the first evangelist that the Judgment, as suggested by the Book of Enoch, would be "committed" to the Lord at His return.

Paul.

It remains to call the last witness; to inquire what part St. Paul had in the upholding and teaching of this ex-

pectation among the Jewish-Christians, and in causing it also to become firmly rooted in the faith of the Gentile churches.

That the eschatological judgment was part of the office of the heavenly Christ, the Son of God, is taught consistently by St. Paul in his letters, although quite incidentally. Whether the firm conviction which underlay this teaching was due to converse with older disciples as to the functions of the risen Lord in the future (seeing that personal hearing of Jesus is scarcely to be assumed), or was due—as would seem more likely—to his thinking out of his mental attitude towards the old and the new factors in his religion as the result of his experience upon the Damascus road, or to some other cause or causes, we have not the material for a certain decision.

Along with the traditional belief of his nation in the coming judgment of "the day of the Lord," there is the strong confidence on Paul's part that such is committed (after the manner of a portion at least of the Jewish apocalyptic teaching) to "the Lord Jesus" as "the Christ." Moreover, this doctrine, although occasional and unsystematised, developes in the course of the extant epistles from the national eschatological outlook to one which is universal and more definitely spiritual in expression. For example: (*a*) in the letters to the Thessalonians the Judgment that is expected speedily (1 Thess. iv. 15) coincides with "the parousia of our Lord Jesus Christ" (v. 23), or, in language reminiscent of Enoch, with his "revelation from heaven" (2 Thess. i. 7), when "he shall slay the lawless one with the breath of his mouth" (ii. 8) and execute the divine vengeance (1 Thess. iv. 6). Now it is worth noting that about the same time St. Paul is reported by Luke to have enunciated this doctrine clearly in his address at Athens, in the words, (God) "hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world of men

in righteousness by the man whom he hath ordained" (Acts xvii. 31); so that (if the words in question were spoken) the transition to the including of the Gentiles apart from their treatment of the Jewish people is apparent already.

(*b*) As time proceeds, the doctrine of the Judgeship of Christ is more definitely announced. In the "revelation of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Cor. i. 8) it is He who judges, and that according to works which afford the test of character (iv. 4 f., etc.); and nothing could be clearer than the statement (2 Cor. v. 10), "we must all be made manifest before the judgment seat of Christ." Here again is the Enochic idea, and the conception implied in that additional clause peculiar to Luke xxi. 36 ("and to stand before the Son of Man"); yet this was also in the apocalyptic manner "the judgment-seat of God" (Rom. xiv. 12).

(*c*) In the later letters, wherein the cosmic significance of the Christ emerges clearly, the positive aspect of absorption into His dominion (where "Christ is all and in all," Col. iii. 11) is emphasised: "reconciliation" of heavenly powers (i. 19 f.), as well as "reward" of men (iii. 24 f.), become more prominent features than vengeance. The Son's day of judgment is taken up into a universal mediation which transcends time, and so the way lies open to the Johannine teaching of the ever-present judgment of the manifested Word.

In conclusion, the least that we appear compelled to admit is that the curious distribution of the evidence ought to make us pause. We should not greatly err in hesitating to attribute to Jesus Himself a claim to the prerogatives of final judgment, because of the virtual silence of His more immediate reporters in this respect.

We know that the pseudepigraphical literature of the Jews was divided on the question whether God or the Messiah executed judgment, and also as to its range and exact place in the scheme of the future. If it were a matter

of controversy between opposing schools we should hardly be surprised at our Lord's silence, for the teaching of Jesus went deeper than partisanship. Indeed, would it not seem to be rather a mark of the greatness of the Master if He gave no verbal assent to any one of the views that were current as to the judicial functions of the Messiah in the time to come?

In the main, it is two writers intensely Jewish that stand sponsors for the claim reported or ascribed—the author of the First Gospel and St. Paul. The latter towards the close of his career as a missionary statesman breaks through the narrow Jewish judicial conception of his earlier days, and attains to a larger and more comprehensive, more universal and more spiritual view of the judgment of the Son, of God in Christ. This view is to us the higher, freed from the limitations of a national and temporal outlook. It is virtually that of the author of the Fourth Gospel, and we may well grant that it is considerably more in accord with the world-view of our days. The silence of Jesus, if such it be, may be regarded as more eloquent than the efforts of the apostolic and later ages to fill in from the narrow time-coloured outlook of earth what appeared to be a gap in the Lord's teaching concerning Himself, to quicken ancient hopes in times of gloom, or to satisfy the religious cravings of their own generation.

After all, the question of the Person of the Judge is relatively of little importance for the essentials of religion, because the confirming and completing of ever-present individual judgment is in any case ultimately the act of God.

EDWARD WILLIAM WINSTANLEY.

THE APOSTOLIC DECREES IN ACTS XV.: A COMPROMISE OR A TRIUMPH?

The question of the historical value of the Acts of the Apostles reaches its climax in the discussion of the story of the Apostolic Council in Acts xv. and more especially in that portion of the chapter (vers. 28–30) in which the formal and official decision of the Council is quoted. It is, to a very considerable extent, upon the strength of this particular portion of his work that the Lucan authorship of the Acts is rejected by the extreme left wing of modern New Testament criticism, and it may be also said to account for the tendency, even among those who accept St. Luke as the author, to refuse him the position of a historian of first rank. The historicity of the Apostolic decrees is denied mainly on two grounds.

1. That they are directly at variance with St. Paul's Epistles, and more especially with Galatians ii. 6, where the Apostle declares that "they who were of repute imparted nothing to me," and with 1 Corinthians viii., where his silence concerning the decrees is inexplicable on the supposition that such a document had been promulgated.

2. That the acceptance of the decrees by St. Paul is absolutely irreconcilable with what is known elsewhere of the Apostle's character and principles.

Few, however, of those who dispute the historical accuracy of this section of chapter xv. are prepared to regard it altogether as the invention of the author. Among those who take this extreme view is Renan,[1] who describes the decrees as "assuredly a fiction." The tendency of other critics is to look upon them, not as an instance of the exercise of imagination, but as a case of historical misplacement

[1] Renan, *The Apostles*, p. xviii.

on the part of the writer. This is the view of Baur,[1] Weizsäcker,[2] Julicher,[3] and McGiffert.[4]

These scholars differ considerably as to the period to which the decrees should be correctly assigned. Baur relegates them to the second century, where, according to him, they have strong affinities with the Clementine literature, while Weizsäcker and McGiffert adopt a much more moderate tone, and date them only a few years after the Council. In their generally accepted form they are definitely described by Harnack [5] as unhistorical, on the grounds already mentioned in the previous page, but of Harnack's views more will have to be said in the sequel. With the great mass of English-speaking scholars there is little or no difficulty in accepting the decrees as the genuine outcome of the Apostolic Council, although there is a wide range of opinion as to the interpretation of their clauses. But in spite of considerable differences as to details there is a fairly general consensus of opinion that the decrees consisted of rules of abstinence, of a ceremonial character, enacted with the view of regulating social relations between Jewish and Gentile Christians, and as such were a concession to Jewish feeling and prejudice, and, therefore, *partook of the nature of a compromise.* Beginning with Lightfoot,[6] who maintains that the decree was "a compromise" and its provisions "articles of peace," we trace the same view in Ramsay,[7] Bartlet,[8] Chase,[9] and Rackham,[10] and to these we may add the name of a well-known French writer,

[1] Baur, *Paulus*, pp. 149 f.
[2] Weizsäcker, *Apost. Age*, pp. 205 f.
[3] Julicher, *Intro. to N. T.*, p. 442.
[4] McGiffert, *Apost. Age*, pp. 211 f.
[5] Harnack, *Acts of the Ap.*, pp. 249 f.
[6] Lightfoot, *Galatians*, pp. 127, 303.
[7] Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller*, pp. 168 f.
[8] Bartlet, *Apost. Age*, p. 7.
[9] Chase, *Cred. of Acts*, pp. 95 f.
[10] Rackham, *Acts*, p. 269.

Sabatier.[1] As against this chorus of opinion must be quoted, however, the weighty authority of Hort,[2] who maintains that all the previous views take for granted that the four precepts were simply concessions to the Judaic side, and that it is more natural to suppose that they were meant as concrete indications of pure and true religion, and not of Judaism in the exclusive sense.

Two other exceptions to the general view are to be found in Douglas Round[3] who is of opinion that the decrees do not refer to exceptions from the ceremonial law, but that they are the rudiments of a moral law, and in Dr. A. T. Robertson,[4] who sees in the document not so much a compromise as a victory. In spite of these exceptions we shall not be far wrong in describing English-speaking opinion as, on the whole, accepting the historicity of the decrees, and as regarding them as consisting, in three out of the four clauses, of precepts of a ceremonial character, promulgated for the purpose of conciliating the extreme Judaistic party in the Christian Church. To put the matter succinctly and briefly, *the Apostolic decrees were a compromise.*

Of recent years, however, a new solution of the problem has attained considerable prominence, and with this I now propose to deal.

It has already been noted that Harnack definitely rejects the decrees, but only in their generally accepted form, from which it might have been inferred that he is prepared to accept another version of them, and this proves to be the case. The new theory owes its origin to a continental scholar, G. Resch, who put it forth in a work entitled *Das Aposteldecret nach seiner ausserkanonischen Textgestalt* (*Texte und Untersuchungen*, N. F. xiii. 3, 1905). It has received

[1] Sabatier, *The Apostle Paul*, pp. 129 f.
[2] Hort, *Jud. Christ.* pp. 70 f.
[3] Douglas Round, *Date of Galatians*, pp. 18 f.
[4] Robertson, *Epochs in the Life of St. Paul*, p. 83.

the support of no less an authority than Wellhausen,[1] has been accepted by Harnack (although this meant the complete abandonment of opinions previously published), who devotes a considerable space to its discussion in his *Acts of the Apostles*, pp. 249 f., and, finally, is most ably and lucidly advocated by Professor Kirsopp Lake in an article on "The Judaistic Controversy" in the *Church Quarterly Review* for January, 1911, and in his recently published work on *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul.*

It is well known that the decrees have come down to us in two forms, viz.—

1. The generally accepted form which appears in our Revised Version, is found in all the Uncial MSS. except D, and is quoted by the Greek Fathers, Clement of Alexandria and Origen.

2. The text as given in D (Codex Bezae), which is also that found in most of the Latin versions, and in Irenaeus (in the Latin translation as well as in the original Greek), Tertullian, Cyprian, and in several other less known Latin writers. The former may be said to represent the Eastern or Greek tradition, and is associated specially with Alexandria, while the latter is the version generally accepted in the Latin countries of the West. The Eastern version reads "*ἀπέχεσθαι εἰδωλοθύτων καὶ αἵματος καὶ πνικτῶν καὶ πορνείας· ἐξ ὧν διατηροῦντες ἑαυτούς εὖ πράξετε*," and is translated by the Revisers, "That ye abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication: from which if ye keep yourselves it shall be well with you."

The Western text omits *πνικτῶν* (things strangled) and inserts after *πορνείας* (fornication) a negative form of "the golden rule" *ὅσα μὴ θέλετε ἑαυτοῖς γίνεσθαι ἑτέρῳ μὴ ποιεῖτε* (what you would not have done to you do not

[1] Wellhausen, *Noten zur Apostelgeschichte*, iii. 19 f.

to another), and closes with a reference to the Holy Spirit, *φερόμενοι ἐν τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι* (being carried along by the Holy Spirit).

Now the difference in scope and character between the two versions is perfectly clear. The first gives us a four-clause document, three of which formulate conditions for regulating social intercourse between Jewish and Gentile Christians, or, in other words, constitute a "food-law," with an additional clause of a different character; while the second, which also contains four clauses, can be quite plausibly interpreted as a mere catalogue of moral precepts. It is not, however, the Western text in its fullness that is proposed for our acceptance in Resch's theory, but a shortened form of it, obtained by a combination of the reading in D with another rendering found in Tertullian,[1] who omits "the golden rule" as well as "things strangled." This gives us (omitting the reference to the Holy Spirit as an obvious interpolation) the decrees no longer in a four-clause, but in a three-clause, form, in which reference to both "the golden rule" and to "things strangled" drops out, and it is now maintained that this must have been the original reading. In support of this contention it is argued that this shortened form presents just that amount of ambiguity which would necessitate and justify the insertion of the doubtful clauses, both of which were interpolated for explanatory purposes, but in support of opposing ideas. Thus the reference to "things strangled" was inserted in the East at Alexandria to give the decrees the appearance of a "food-law," while the "golden rule" was the product of the West in order to emphasize the purely ethical character of the document. This argument is also strengthened by the history of exegesis, for in Alexandria the decrees were invariably interpreted as a "food-law,"

[1] Tertullian, *De Pudicitiae*, 12.

but in the West they were regarded as referring to the three deadly sins of idolatry, murder, and fornication. Very gradually, however, the Alexandrine version of the decrees spread and gained all but universal recognition, chiefly owing to the influence of St. Augustine, by whom it was eventually adopted. It was in this way, according to Harnack,[1] that the false interpretation replaced the true.

Now the importance of this new theory, in the minds of those who advocate it, lies in the fact that it is supposed to do away entirely with the difficulties associated with the decrees in their traditional form. If the decrees are nothing more than a series of moral precepts they are no longer irreconcilable with Galatians ii. 6, and their acceptance by the Apostle in no way conflicts with what is known of his character and principles. Harnack in his forcible way declares that the three-clause form removes all difficulties with regard to Acts xv. and that we can close whole libraries of commentaries and investigations as documents of the history of a gigantic error, and that the scribe who wrote the little word πνικτῶν opposite αἵματος in the margin of his copy, from which it crept into the text, has for almost 2,000 years swamped the correct interpretation of the whole passage.

Now, it is here that we come to the question which stands at the head of this article. If this version of the decrees is to be accepted as correct we are irresistibly driven to the conclusion that they represented not *a compromise*, not an attempt to meet the reasonable demands of the Judaic Christians, but *an absolute triumph* on the part of St. Paul and the Antiochene party in the Church. There is no question here of regulations to simplify social intercourse between Jew and Gentile within the Christian Church, no trace of a *quid pro quo*, of an accommodation to Jewish

[1] Harnack, *op cit.*, p. 261.

prejudices in return for the abandonment of the demand for the circumcision of Gentile converts. The decrees, in their new form, simply register the demand of the Christian Church that the Gentile section should observe the ordinary rules of morality, and should abstain from idolatry, murder, and fornication, a demand, we are told, which was perfectly justifiable in view of the moral, or rather immoral, condition of Syria at the time. The Antiochene party had won a victory all along the line, and, in Professor Kirsopp Lake's [1] words, "They conceded nothing, and gained a triumph of the most far-reaching consequences."

If this verdict be correct, it undoubtedly calls for a complete revision of opinion among the great majority of scholars as to the character of the Apostolic Council, its results, and the whole course of the Judaistic controversy.

From the point of view of textual criticism there would seem to be no insuperable objection to the adoption of the shortened version of the Western text as the original form in which the decrees appeared, although it is a somewhat large order to give the preference to D in the matter of the omission of "things strangled" as against the evidence of all the other Uncials. There is much force, however, in the contention that as the different readings are found, the one in Clement of Alexandria, and the other in Irenaeus, they must have originated as early as the second century, and as none of our extant MSS. are of earlier date than the fourth or fifth century, there is more than a sufficient interval of time available for the readings to become stereotyped in either direction.

But when we enter the domain of historical criticism the question assumes quite a different aspect, and, in this connexion, the theory under discussion creates more difficulties than it solves, as I now propose to demonstrate.

[1] *C. Q. R.*, January, 1911, p. 365.

1. If the Apostolic Council ended in the complete triumph of the Antiochene party, *the circumcision of Timothy by St. Paul, after the Council*, becomes absolutely unthinkable. Even on the traditional theory that the Apostolic decrees were of the nature of a compromise the acceptance of this incident as recorded in the Acts is beset with considerable difficulties, but if the alternative theory be adopted there can be no hesitation whatsoever in rejecting the event as being entirely devoid of historical foundation. As a continuation of the policy of conciliation inaugurated in the Council, registered in the Apostolic decrees, and acquiesced in by St. Paul it becomes intelligible, but I utterly fail to see how St. Paul's action can be explained or justified if the deliberations of the Council resulted in a complete triumph for the Gentile Christians and the Judaistic controversy was settled once and for all. Under these latter conditions the event is nothing less than an anti-climax, and it is impossible to imagine the Apostle being capable of such weakness or St. Luke recording it.

2. *It does not remove the difficulty connected with Galatians* ii. 6, in spite of Harnack's statement to the contrary. The suggested change in the character of the decrees does not render St. Paul's assertion "that they of repute imparted nothing to him" any more justifiable than it was under the old rendering.

The fact remains that the Apostles in Jerusalem did "impart" something, and that something was, on this theory, of infinitely greater importance than it was hitherto understood to have been, viz. an attempt at an accommodation with the view of conciliating Judaising opponents, a compromise, and therefore, from the very nature of the case, indefinite and unsatisfactory. I can understand the Apostle's silence on the latter supposition, because a declaration of this indefinite character was of no great

support to his argument, but to demand that he used the expression in Galatians ii. 6 of a decision which had given him all he asked for, and which had settled, in his favour, once and for all, the very question which evoked this Epistle seems to me to increase immeasurably any difficulty which may have been felt as to the historicity of this particular section of the Acts. If the visit to Jerusalem described in Galatians is not the occasion of the Apostolic Council, but an earlier visit referred to in Acts xi. 29, 30, and xii. 25, as is maintained by Ramsay, Kirsopp Lake, and others, and, as I myself have suggested elsewhere,[1] this difficulty of course disappears, but this identification has very serious objections to face, and is not agreeable to Harnack, nor to the great majority of New Testament scholars.

3. *The theory leaves the Epistle to the Galatians entirely "in the air,"* utterly unrelated to any known course of historical events.

If we accept the ethical character of the decrees, we are compelled to believe that, in spite of the fact that the Judaistic controversy had been brought to an absolutely definite issue and that a formal pronouncement of the Council had been issued and officially distributed which effectually precluded any possibility of a misunderstanding, and left no loophole for the Judaising party to use it in favour of their propaganda, yet, a few years later, St. Paul writes the most impassioned of all his letters, in which this very controversy is the one burning question, and which contains the clearest indications that advantage had been taken by the Judaisers to exaggerate their own interpretation of an *ambiguous decision*. As a sequel to the promulgation of decrees which were indefinite and admitted of a twofold interpretation, and which might be explained in such a way as to place the Gentile Christian on a lower plane

[1] Maurice Jones, *St. Paul the Orator*, pp. 113 f.

than his Jewish brother in the faith, the course of events which evoked the Epistle to the Galatians, and the contents of the letter itself are natural and intelligible enough, but I can see no place for the one or the other as the aftermath of a complete triumph for Gentile Christianity. The whole atmosphere surrounding the Epistle is one of uncertainty and doubt, the matters at issue are still in a state of solution, and there is nothing in the description given by St. Paul of what happened at Jerusalem which in any way justifies our assuming anything like a complete surrender on the part of the pillar Apostles. He himself does not strike that jubilant note which we should have looked for had the Conference resulted in the absolute triumph which this theory demands. The attitude of the Apostles is decidedly non-committal, and the tone of this passage (Galatians ii. 1–10), and indeed of the whole Epistle, essentially favours the theory of a compromise, and not of a complete victory on one side or the other.

Then again what are we to say of *the incident at Antioch, recorded in Galatians* ii. 11 f. in view of this theory. There are few incidents in the New Testament more difficult of explanation than St. Peter's conduct on this occasion, and none which reflect less credit upon him, even under the most favourable interpretation. Something may be said in his defence if we assume that the Council at Jerusalem had closed with an indefinite and ambiguous decision, and if the question of social intercourse between Jew and Gentile Christian still remained in a fluid condition. But what justification can there be for his conduct if we believe that the Apostolic decrees had freed the Antiochene Christians from all restrictions whatsoever, and had deprived the Judaic party of every claim and demand upon them.

If we are to be bound to this interpretation of the decrees, it appears to me that we have no option left but to follow

Douglas Round and Vernon Bartlet in dating the Epistle to the Galatians before the Apostolic Council, a solution which, I am afraid, will not commend itself to the advocates of the Western Text, with the exception of Kirsopp Lake,[1] who is inclined to accept this date.

4. *Wherein lies the relevancy of St. James' reference to the decrees in Acts* xxi. 25, if they referred solely to the rudimentary principles of morality? The matter under discussion is the observance of the ritual demands of the Mosaic Law, and, unless the decrees had something in common with this subject matter, it is difficult to understand the point of St. James' reference. To remind St. Paul, in the midst of a discussion concerning his observance or non-observance of the provisions of the ceremonial law, that the Apostolic Council had enacted certain moral requirements appears to be devoid of all meaning and purpose, whereas, if the decrees are taken in their usual acceptation, as containing a series of ritual directions, the reference is perfectly natural and presents no difficulty. Nor must we forget the fact that though it might have been necessary, while the Gentile Mission was still in its infancy, to insist upon the observance of an elementary code of morality by Gentile Christians, this could no longer be the case after the lapse of more than seven years, and when St. Paul's missionary labours, with all that they meant, had been completed. Yet St. James' reference implies that he regarded the decrees as being still in force and as being of great importance.

5. The theory *fails to account for the continued existence of the Judaistic controversy.* A decree which meant the complete triumph of the Gentile section of the Church and the equally complete defeat of the opposition could only have resulted, in view of the state of feeling among

[1] Kirsopp Lake, *Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, p. 301.

the Judaisers at the time, in an absolute breach between the two branches of the Christian Church. That there was no breach, but simply an extension of the controversy, forms the strongest evidence that the Council did not result in the actual triumph of the one party or the other. St. Peter's conduct at Antioch, the tone of the Epistle to the Galatians, important references in almost all the other Pauline Epistles, the incidents connected with St. Paul's last visit to Jerusalem, and the contents of the Clementine Homilies and Recognitions all point to the same conclusion, that the Judaistic controversy led a strong and healthy existence all through the first and well down into the second century. This could hardly have been the case if the decision of the Council had been of that definite character which the acceptance of the modified Western text demands. I am, therefore, driven to the conclusion that the adoption of the latest theory as to the character and contents of the Apostolic decrees does not satisfy the conditions of the problem as they are stated by Professor Kirsopp Lake.[1] The three-clause version of the document is not likely to have been the decision of the Council, it is not consistent with subsequent events, and is not implied in St. Paul's Epistles.

This article would not be complete without some reference to what is regarded as the one fatal objection to the "compromise" theory, viz., that the policy which this theory implies is absolutely irreconcilable with what we know of St. Paul's character and principles. It has become a commonplace with many modern critics to describe the great Apostle as hard, obstinate, and inflexible, and as incapable of anything like compromise or accommodation under any conceivable set of conditions, and then to take it for granted that this gives a complete representation

[1] *C.Q.R.*, January, 1911, p. 358.

of his personality. It is only in the light of this reading of his character that the objection to the historicity of the Apostolic decrees in their traditional form has any force. I must confess that I do not so read St. Paul. That he could be as firm and as inflexible as a rock where a question of principle was at stake is amply proved by his own statement in Galatians (Gal. ii. 5) in the matter of the attempt to compel Titus to be circumcised. To describe the Apostle as hard and inflexible, and to rest content with this, is to leave out of sight some of the most precious elements of his character, his wonderful tenderness, his unfailing tactfulness, and his readiness to sacrifice so many of his own cherished ideas for the sake of peace and to promote the general welfare of the Church. I may be permitted to quote the words of two scholars whose names will command universal respect in support of this reading of the Apostle's nature. Sanday,[1] speaking of this very incident of the acceptance of the decrees by him, says, "St. Paul, it is impossible to doubt—in fact we have his own word for it in 1 Cor. ix. 20—met the Apostles halfway, and did all he could to keep the Christian Church together," and Hort,[2] referring to the one-sided representation of his character mentioned above, remarks, "Both St. Paul's character and his work are grievously misjudged when they are interpreted exclusively by his zealous championship of Gentile liberties. This fidelity to his special trust which he had received was balanced by an anxiety to avert a breach between the Christians of Palestine, for whom the Law remained binding while the Temple was still standing, and the Gentile Christians of other lands; to promote kindly recognition on the one side and brotherly help on the other."

It is sometimes forgotten that there was no deep question

[1] Sanday, *Inspiration*, p. 324.
[2] Hort, Sermon, 'The sense of service and membership," p. 5.

of principle concerned in the decrees. On the main question the victory had been gained, the triumph was decisive. The one crucial point was whether the Gentile, to become a Christian, must first become a Jew, and to this demand the Apostolic Council replied with an emphatic negative, although it is only implied and is not explicitly declared in the decrees themselves. When the main question had been thus decided in his favour St. Paul's conduct under similar conditions justify us in assuming that he would be prepared to go far in order to conciliate the opposition and to ensure the peace of the Church. When, therefore, it was suggested to him that, in order to render social intercourse between Jew and Gentile in the Church smooth and easy, the latter should avoid certain practices which were particularly abhorrent to the former, I fail to see why the Apostle should be thought incapable of falling in with such a reasonable policy. That he was not above making an effort to conciliate opponents when the interests of peace and of the Church demanded it is demonstrated by his circumcision of Timothy, and by his conduct in the matter of the vow during his last sojourn in Jerusalem. The exclusively hard and inflexible view of the Apostle's character is not true to facts, and quite as prominent as his inflexibility where real principle is involved are his tactful patience, his anxiety to disarm opposition, and his efforts to gain his ends by compromise where the issues are not vital. His conduct in the matter of the Apostolic decrees forms an admirable illustration of his policy as described by himself in 1 Corinthians ix. 20, 21, 22.

In virtue of all these considerations I must be forgiven if I remain of opinion that no sufficient reason has been shown for the abandonment of the generally accepted text of the Apostolic decrees, and that on historical grounds the new theory must be pronounced unsatisfactory.

MAURICE JONES.

THE HISTORIC SETTING OF THE PASTORAL EPISTLES.

(ii) *The Argument from Religious Contents.*

A good deal of what falls under this heading has already been said by anticipation, and still more must come after (iii.), when a final effort will be made to show that the impression that the Pastorals are un-Pauline in spirit is ill-grounded. Apart from the specific topics dealt with, as to which enough has been said to show that they do not necessarily imply a date later than Colossians and Philippians, it is argued that the way in which they are handled, viz., less argumentatively and more "dogmatically" than can be believed of Paul, is a serious objection. But in writing to Timothy and Titus to enjoin on them resolute *application* of principles which had long been well understood between him and them, it would be needless for Paul to do more than indicate the practical applications, with occasional allusion to principles. Yet the principles are supported by reminders (meant for those whom they are charged to "put in mind," quite as much as for their own reassurance) of the Divinely-given apostolate which lay behind all "his Gospel" and gave it incomparable authority over against the views of possible gainsayers (see below for analysis of 1 Tim. i.). This explains the "dogmatic tone," which is quite natural under the conditions presupposed. Such undeveloped or allusive reference to his familiar principles is specially natural, since "in the cases of the resurrection being allegorised (2 Tim. ii. 18) and marriage repudiated, it is feasible to detect distortions or exaggerations of Paul's own teaching." But it is mere question-begging to speak of terse, compressed polemic in characterising errors, for the guidance of familiar friends, as "indiscriminate denunciations." The more we are able

to read between the lines, the more of discrimination we discover and the more appropriateness.

But it will be said,[1] "Christianity is here set forth as already becoming more and more 'a form of sound words,' a crystallised creed, whose teaching is the vital point . . ., while unusual prominence is assigned to the more tangible and practical tests of Christianity." Waiving the fitness of the epithet "crystallised," the simple answer is, Why not? Is not this an inevitable necessity according to the experience and practice of every foreign missionary? And what evidence is there that it would be untrue to Paul's own methods, especially as his experience of his converts' actual needs increased? No one suggests that Paul ever gave his converts "a form of sound words" by itself, i.e., apart from inspiring teaching as to principles and motives in the power of which all precepts were to be understood and obeyed as "in Christ." But neither is there any suggestion in the Pastorals that the precepts in question were to be regarded *in abstracto*, apart from the living faith in the living God in and through Christ which alone entitled a primitive Christian, especially in a Pauline Church, to rank as such. This can go without saying for Timothy or Titus; but it is again and again implied in the way in which conduct is referred to, as "fair deeds" which are the final proof that men "holding a form of godliness" have not "denied the power thereof" (2 Tim. iii. 5). They are but the outward side of the "seal" of God's possession; "Let every one that nameth the name of the Lord depart from unrighteousness" (ib. ii. 19). It is the body of such ethical teaching, setting forth the ideal of Christ-like living, that the Pastorals describe as "the wholesome instruction" (ἡ ὑγιαινοῦσα διδασκαλία, 1 Tim. i. 10; Tit. i. 9, ii. 1; 2 Tim. iv. 3; cf. 1 Tim. vi. 3), reposing on the "principles of the faith" (οἱ λόγοι τῆς πίστεως, 1 Tim.

[1] As by Dr. Moffatt in the *Encyc. Brit.*, xxvi. 992.

iv. 6; cf. vi. 3, and 4 *νοσῶν*). Now there is no sign that these latter, the contents of distinctive Christian faith, hope, and love, had assumed the formulated shape of a creed—beyond the baptismal confession—though they were perfectly well understood (see 1 Cor. xv. 2 ff.; comp. Eph. iv. 4, 6, "one Lord, one faith, one baptism"). But as regards the ethical standard for the guidance of "faith unfeigned" and "a good conscience" (1 Tim. i. 5), the wholesome "teaching" (*διδαχή*) or "instruction" (*διδασκαλία*), it was no doubt more definitely formulated in the oral instruction or "tradition" (*παράδοσις*), "the fair deposit" (*παραθήκη*) which Paul, like other Christian apostles and teachers, must have given to his converts from the earliest days.[1] This element in his teaching is apt to be overlooked, because elsewhere the references to it are rather incidental; but they are really quite distinct, both in the Thessalonian Epistles (1 Thess. iv. 1 f., "charges" to regulate their "walk," 2 Thess. ii. 15 "the traditions which ye were taught," cf. iii. 6), and in Romans vi. 16 f., where we meet the "type of teaching" (*τύπον διδαχῆς*), bearing on "sin" and "obedience," unto which the Roman Christians had been "handed over" (cf. xvi. 17, "contrary to the teaching which ye learned"). We may infer, too, something of its contents—which may well have been arranged somewhat on the principle of the "Two Ways" (of Life and Death) embodied in our "Teaching of the Apostles"—not only from the rather uniform lists of vices in Galatians v. 19, 1 Corinthians v. 10, Colossians iii. 5, 8 (cf. Romans i. 24 ff.), but also from the moral instruction in Romans xii.–

[1] When we read in 2 Timothy i. 13, "Have as outline pattern (*ὑποτύπωσιν ἔχε*) of wholesome words the things which thou hast heard from me, in faith and love which are in Christ Jesus," nothing more formal need be implied than in 1 Corinthians xv. 2 ff., where Paul refers to "the word" of his Gospel as he "handed it on" to the Corinthians, the testimony to Christ as risen being "among first things." The true sense of 2 Timothy i. 13, as of much else in the Pastorals, has often been obscured by imperfect rendering.

xiii., and the element common to Colossians iii. 5 ff., Ephesians iv. 17–vi. 9. In Ephesians v. 5 reference is made to certain ethical principles as familiar to the readers ; while it is added, " Let no man deceive you with empty words," as though breach of such principles involved no penalty—very much the sort of danger implied in parts of the Pastorals (cf. also Eph. iv. 14). Such stress as the Pastorals lay on ethical conduct as the natural fruit and test of " godliness " (εὐσέβεια), is often treated as sub-Pauline " moralism." But as we have seen, there is here really nothing alien to what we find in Paul's admitted writings[1] ; nor is there any real trace of that divorce of ethical precepts from the distinctive Christian dynamic of " faith working by love " which is the essence of religious " moralism."

Space forbids any complete application of the above principles to the Pastorals as a whole. But a brief synopsis of 1 Timothy—which is said to be the least " Pauline " of all—followed by more detailed analysis of its opening chapter, may here be given by way of example.

The general theme of 1 Timothy is the way men and women (ii. 8 ff.) should act, corporately (ii. 1 ff.) and individually, in the Church (iii. 15), and especially as official members with special functions to perform (iii. 1–13). Further, in connexion with the revealed truth of the Incarnation, of which each Church is a support, mention is made of some prophetic warning (possibly in a Jewish apocryphal writing) as to the danger of falling away from (the) true faith, a danger calling for such ministry as Timothy's, to remind the brethren of the truth (iv. 1–6). To this end he must watch himself in thought and practice, as being an example and aid to others (iv. 7–16). His attitude to various special classes in the Church is then outlined, along with hints as to their respec-

[1] This subject is developed rather more fully in the article *Paul* in the *Encyc. Brit.* xx. 946 f., 950 f.

tive duties (v. 1–vi. 2). A brief aside follows, directed against any who suggest other ideals, and passing into a warning against worldly gain as a deflecting motive (3–10). Timothy is solemnly charged to shun such tendencies and live the life already set forth, with Christ's example and appearing ever in mind (11–16) ; the subject of riches, their danger and duties, is again alluded to (17–9) ; and after a final charge to him to guard against false *gnosis* (cf. Col. ii. 3 f., 8 f., Eph. v. 14 f.), the Epistle ends with a collective blessing to Timothy and those under his care.

Mingling with this general line of thought are several personal touches (e.g., iv. 7*b*, 8*a*, with v. 23 ; iv. 12–14, cf. iii. 14 f. ; vi. 13 f.) which add not a little to the actuality of the whole. The references to theoretic errors play a relatively small part and are made as indirectly as possible, as though to cause the minimum of offence to individuals with whom Timothy might actually be confronted. This perhaps explains, too, the grammatically unfinished form of the opening sentence (i. 3 ff.), so avoiding a definite application to the situation at the moment—a phenomenon in any case unlike a forger's methods.

Then in chapter i. note the following features :—

Ver. 1. " An apostle . . . according to the commandment of God " (so Rom. xvi. 16), comp. Galatians i. 1. " Christ Jesus our hope," comp. Colossians i. 28 : " Christ in us, the hope of glory " ; also Colossians iii. 4, " Christ our life." " Genuine (γνησίῳ, cf. Phil. iv. 3 γνήσιε σύνζυγε, ii. 20 γνησίως) child in faith "—a thoroughly Pauline phrase.

Ver. 2. " Mercy," added to the usual " Grace," does not make the blessing less Pauline (cf. Gal. vi. 16), but suits the tried state of Paul and his circle, is thoroughly Jewish in style, and is not like one slavishly copying Paul.

Ver. 3. " Not to teach a different doctrine " (ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν), comp. Galatians i. 6–9.

Ver. 4. "A dispensation of God that is in faith," surely a distinctively Pauline idea, but without verbal parallel. So for the description in verse 5 of "the end of the charge," comp. Romans xiii. 10, and see Galatians v. 6, "faith working by love"; 1 Corinthians iv. 4, of a good conscience (*οὐδὲν ἐμαυτῷ σύνοιδα*); 2 Timothy i. 5, "faith unfeigned" (in a passage generally thought Pauline); and for the whole verse cf. Philemon 5 f.

Ver. 6. The genesis of error in thought from a defective conscience, here and in verse 19, is Pauline in idea, cf. Col. ii. 18.

Vers. 7–10. The limited and negative function of the Law, as relative to sin (Gal. iii. 19), is very Pauline; comp. Romans vii. 14 ff. The list of sins here given recalls Romans i. 29–31, but differs widely in form. That the "wholesome instruction" is not a new Legalism is made clear by what immediately follows.

Ver. 11. "According to the Gospel of the glory of the Blessed God, with which I was entrusted"; comp. 2 Corinthians iv. 6; and for the implicit contrast of the Law and Gospel in point of Divine "glory," ib. iii. 7–11, Romans iii. 23. *ὃ ἐπιστεύθην ἐγώ* is Pauline both in thought and expression, Romans iii. 2, 1 Corinthians ix. 17, Galatians ii. 7, 1 Thessalonians ii. 4; and the last of these passages, "Even as we have been approved of God to be entrusted with the Gospel, so we speak," is parallel also to what follows.

Vers. 12–14. Most characteristic throughout, even in language, e.g., "enableth me" (Phil. iv. 13, "I can do all things in Him that enableth me"), "ministry" (*διακονία*, see esp. 2 Cor. iii. 6, iv. 1, v. 18, cf. Rom. xi. 13). "Grace . . . abounded exceedingly" (*ὑπερεπλεόνασεν ἡ χάρις*; cf. Rom. v. 20, *οὗ δὲ ἐπλεόνασεν ἡ ἁμαρτία, ὑπερεπερίσσευσεν ἡ χάρις*).

Vers. 13, 15 f. Such self-reproach recalls 1 Corinthians xv.

9, Ephesians iii. 8, but in quite independent form. The reasons too assigned for the election of so unworthy a person are most characteristic, especially that in verse 16. All this is as like Paul as it is unlike a later Paulinist; and this is true also of the adoring Doxology in verse 17 (cf. Rom. xvi. 27), which opens with a highly Jewish phrase, "the King of the ages" (cf. Rev. xv. 3).

Ver. 18. To dwell on Timothy's vocation as also manifestly God-given, is like Paul.

Ver. 19. "Faith" has both the shades of meaning, subjective and objective, which occur in Paul's letters (see below); neglect of "faith" in the heart leads to loss of "the (Christian) faith" as "the truth of the Gospel" (Col. i. 5).

Ver. 20. The names given are otherwise unknown; while the idea of temporary discipline, rather than final penalty, as befitting such cases, is the same as in 1 Corinthians v. 5, and is unlike a forger.

Two things seem to stand out from such an analysis: first, the combination of Pauline ideas with fresh and independent modes of expressing them; secondly, the chapter is all of a piece, and not to be resolved into a Pauline basis (such as some see in the autobiographic verses 12–16) with later additions. Nor are these phenomena peculiar to this chapter: they run throughout the whole Epistle and its fellows. If it be replied that the way in which the Pauline ideas are stated is more "tame," less daring and paradoxical, than our average impression of Paul's admitted letters would lead us to expect, one may ask whether this is not quite natural. Our general impression is apt to be coloured most strongly by the more striking and individual parts of his writings, which are at once the more polemical in form and the earlier. Here, however, Paul is professedly giving a summary and allusive exposition of his teaching by way of reminder; and he is doing it in his later years, when his

thought, like that of other men, would tend to assume that more measured and balanced form which is the mark of mature experience. What we look for in such circumstances is comprehensiveness rather than intensity of expression, justly balanced statement (showing full consciousness of all the factors, especially the moral) rather than incisiveness, and a tendency to safeguard one's meaning from misapprehension. There are qualities which mark all Paul's writings subsequent to Romans, or even inclusive of the practical part of that Epistle. He is now much concerned with the problem of getting his converts to grasp things on their practical side, and adapts his exposition to this end. It " is not irksome " to him to do this, if for them it is the " safe " course (Phil. iii. 1). There is a simple directness and clearness of statement, which comes to ripe wisdom in the school of life, that is apt to be undervalued because it is less boldly suggestive than certain of the utterances of the prophet's earlier ministry of the same message. But the prophet may be none the less alive to the old truths in their own ideal grandeur and sweep ; only his love for actual men and women, even the slow and commonplace types, is more developed, and he will take pains to make the essentials of practical religion as plain to them as possible. The theologian stoops to think and speak as the pastor of the Lord's silly sheep : therein he is made perfect in love—" love out of a pure heart and . . . faith unfeigned," but also " out of a good conscience " towards the Chief Shepherd who gave Himself utterly for their sakes. Professed " Pastorals," even by a Paul, *should be judged as pastorals* ; and if these letters can be read afresh in this light, I question whether they will be found really un-Pauline either in style or contents.

But where can room be found for them in the known life of Paul ? To this aspect of the problem we must next turn.

VERNON BARTLET.

SUGGESTIONS ON THE HISTORY AND LETTERS OF ST. PAUL.

II. The Imprisonment and Supposed Trial of St. Paul in Rome: Acts xxviii.

It has sometimes been made a charge against the method of investigation which is employed in my study of St. Luke, that I have pressed too closely the words of the *Acts*, that I have sought to read too much in (or into) the terms employed, and have laid too much stress on the more delicate features and on the principles of method which can be observed in the book as a whole and which must be applied in reading the individual parts and scenes of the narrative.

After many years of study, however, I have on the contrary learned that I did not carry my method far enough, and that the words and terms of the *Acts* are far more vivid and full of meaning than I had ventured to suppose. It is not easy to press Luke's words too closely; and at least I have not done so. With better understanding of the authorities and vastly increased knowledge of the country I now find the history recorded in the *Acts* much more informative than I previously did; and it seems as if I had only just barely begun in my older writings to appreciate the true value of Luke's narrative.

The whole work of the past has to be done over again. The previous results, on the whole, stand [1]; but they require much addition and receive confirmation from further study and wider knowledge.

The attempt to carry out this deeper method for Acts

[1] The chief change is in respect of the date of the letter to the Galatians, which should be placed earlier than I formerly allowed.

xiii.–xiv. has been made in the *Expository Times*, Oct.–Dec., 1912, and is continuing there. Here it will be tried in respect of Acts xxviii. What are the facts which Luke had in mind, and which lie behind and beneath the narrative describing the fortunes, the imprisonment, and the supposed trial of St. Paul in Rome ? The historian does not say anything overt regarding many facts, which he must have known (or believed that he knew). Yet those facts are to us of the most absorbing interest.

There are two questions to be answered : first, what were the main facts ? Secondly, why does not Luke mention them or say anything clear and explicit about them, i.e. why does he content himself with stating how the Gospel of Paul came to Rome, and for what length of time it was preached there by him, while he says nothing regarding Paul's personal fortunes in the trial ?

Now, first, as to the facts. Was Paul tried in Rome during his residence ? If so, before whom was he tried, and what was the result ? Was he condemned on the capital charge, and his career brought to an end ? Or was he acquitted, and allowed (as is implied in acquittal) to continue his missionary and confirmatory work ?

In the latter case, the " first trial," in which the circumstances described in the *Acts* culminated, must be distinguished from a " second trial " with fatal issue. That a trial of Paul ending in condemnation must have occurred at Rome is proved by tradition and by Clement of Rome, and is clearly implied in Second Timothy. If, however, the supposed " first trial " ended in condemnation after its two or more stages (2 Tim. iv. 16), then there was no " second trial " and the Apostle's life ended in 61 or 62 A.D. The proof that Gallio was governing Achaia during A.D. 52, which is now furnished by epigraphic evidence, makes it certain that St. Paul's arrival in Rome cannot

be placed later than spring A.D. 61 at the very latest,[1] and was in all probability earlier.

If he was aquitted at first, did he carry out his intention of going on into Spain (Romans xv. 28)? Or did he return to the East, as is implied in the Pastoral Epistles? Or did he do both?

It is characteristic of all Lukan research that, as soon as one enters on any investigation, one is involved in some difficult questions of law and procedure; and these often require the most minute study. This, incidentally, affords a complete proof that the subject is thoroughly historical. Invented, or distorted, or misunderstood incidents wander far from the paths of real life. It is because Luke states each point in such intimate relation to reality, and with such vivid surroundings of actual life, that he compels the reader to grasp the facts of law and custom which are involved in the narrative before he can gauge its full significance.

To understand the position of St. Paul during the two years of his Roman captivity, therefore, we have to enter on obscure questions of Roman law and procedure during the first century. Obviously, one cannot adequately understand Luke's allusive and suggestive account of the circumstances in which a defendant awaiting trial under custody was situated, unless the principles and practice of the law are known. Now, as it happens, legal points are involved which have never been properly investigated, and which seem never to have occurred to the commentators whom I have consulted.

It is, accordingly, necessary to go into some difficult and

[1] I hope to treat this date in Section V below. Dr. Deissmann's treatment of it in his *St. Paul, a Study*, 1912, pp. 240–260, seems to me far from satisfactory. The statement that he quotes from Dessau is fundamental, but all that he builds on that foundation involves misconceptions, and his dating is only possible, not certain.

minute points of legal and historical detail, which may prove tedious to the reader. It may therefore be well to state first of all in succinct terms the conclusion which results from this investigation, and afterwards to show the steps of the reasoning.

Paul was detained at Rome until his prosecutors should appear. The trial could not begin until there was an accuser to state the ground of complaint against him. The Jewish leaders, however, did not appear. They knew that their case was too weak to bear statement in a Roman court, as they had learned from the conduct and words of two successive Roman governors of Palestine and from the plain language of King Agrippa (Acts xxiv. 24 f., xxvi. 30–32)[1]; and they would have to depend on personal influence. They wished rather to delay the case and keep Paul shut up as long as possible; and the most effective way was to refrain from appearing in court. After a certain lapse of time, perhaps eighteen months,[2] the accused party was presumed to be innocent, in accordance with a rule laid down some years before by the deceased Emperor Claudius. Thus Paul was set at liberty after two years. This space of "two years" (Acts xxviii. 30)[2] is equivalent to the legal term eighteen months, together with some small addition required for the formalities of release. There was therefore no proper "first trial," but only an acquittal in default. Paul was henceforth free to preach and to travel, until some years later he was arrested during the Neronian persecution, probably in 65 A.D.

The situation in which St. Paul found himself on his arrival in Rome (Acts xxviii. 16) requires careful consideration. He had come up on his own appeal for trial before

[1] Acts xxvi. 31, "This man doeth nothing worthy of death or of bonds."

[2] The term cannot be proved, but seems probable. According to the usual ancient custom, eighteen months is loosely called two years: see the present writer's article in Hastings' *Dict. Bib.*, vol. v. p. 464 ff.

the supreme tribunal of the Empire. In order that the trial should proceed, there must be some accuser : the Crown did not prosecute, but left such cases to private initiative. When he reached Rome, fully seven to eight months must have elapsed since the appeal had been granted [1] by Festus, the Procurator of Palestine, and the case remitted to Rome. Abundance of time had therefore passed for the accusers to travel to Rome and to be there before him making the preparations to push the case actively. What is it that actually occurred ?

When he arrived, no accuser was present in Rome. No official representative of the nation, and no letter or message from the national leaders in Jerusalem, had come to " those that were the chief of the Jews " in Rome. The latter had no authoritative information about the case. Their statement in verse 21 must be understood in this way : as officials they had received no documents bearing on the case, nor had any of their Palestinian brethren arrived who was authorised to make accusation or charge against Paul.

It is not uncommon for commentators and moralists to enlarge on the duplicity of the Jewish leaders in Rome, who certainly knew a good deal in an unofficial way. In fact, they by implication in their concluding words acknowledge to Paul that they have heard bad reports concerning him and his hostility to his own nation : those must have been talked about in all Jewish circles throughout the empire. But they were not bound in any way to take official notice of private tales and gossip. They are speaking as officers of their people ; and their reply is a complete proof that no properly authorised person, and no letter intimating

[1] That the appeal had to be allowed by the Governor of the Province is now well known : see Mommsen's article reprinted in Vol. III. p. 386 of his collected legal papers from the *Savigny Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte*, 1890. Galba refused an appeal when he was governor of Spain : Suetonius, *Galb.* 9.

the coming of any person to act as accuser of Paul, had reached Rome. It would be the natural and obligatory course that any national representative should report on arrival to the heads of the nation there. As to the tales, they are ready to hear Paul's side and plea.

It is difficult to see why these rulers should be blamed for duplicity or cunning. Their silence about charges against Paul, except in this slight reference to current talk, amounts simply to a refusal to regard gossip and vague reports as any ground for action or ill-feeling against him. They treat him as a Jew, entitled to the rights and privileges which all Jews could expect from their own nation in a strange city. Their reply is dignified, courteous, and apparently fair. It commits them to nothing ; but that is not a ground for blaming them.

Evidently the leaders of the Jews in Palestine were not pressing the case very actively. If they had had any confidence in the success of their case they would probably have ere this been in Rome employing all the arts of skilful solicitors to push their case and secure conviction. Everything for them depended on the favourable reception of their first plea ; and it was believed that they were able to use strong indirect influence through the partiality of the powerful Poppaea.

They had, however, no good ground for feeling such confidence. All appearances pointed to a verdict in Paul's favour. Festus and his assessors evidently thought there was not even a *prima facie* case against him (Acts xxvi. 30 ff.),[1] though the Governor had gladly used the loophole of Paul's appeal to the supreme court as an excuse, in order to avoid the responsibility of deciding: he shrank from putting a slight on the national leaders at the beginning of his relations with them, and getting involved in a quarrel,

[1] See note 1 p. 267.

which would certainly be the result, if he dismissed their charges as unjustifiable.

The expenses involved in carrying this prosecution before the Roman tribunal were considerable; and the Jewish leaders probably thought that it was not worth while to incur them in a case where success was so unlikely. They had got rid of Paul, and made it difficult for him to return to Jerusalem; and they felt that it was wise to content themselves with this. After acquittal Paul would be more dangerous to them and more secure against them than if the case were left unfinished. In the Jewish mind, there would always attach some stigma to Paul, so long as the scandal remained that he was a practically unacquitted defendant, released owing to the accusers having failed to appear so far away from Jerusalem.

The Jews had probably been using their influence to protract the case in Palestine (see Acts xxiv. 26 f.). They were not showing themselves as yet (xxviii. 21) eager to push it to a conclusion. This implies that they felt their plea to be legally weak.

Accordingly the leaders in Palestine had allowed the case to lie for several months after Paul's departure, without taking any steps to appear in Rome.

Now is there any apparent probability that they would revive the case after that interval? In the first place Luke's narrative gives no ground to think that envoys arrived to conduct the case in Rome during the two years of Paul's residence and detention there. And, in the second place, it is not *a priori* natural or probable that the national leaders in Jerusalem should resume Paul's case and send envoys later, after they had allowed it to lie for a good many months. They had many more important and pressing matters to keep them occupied. In the immediate irritation caused by the presence of Paul in Jerusalem and the troubles

that arose out of it, they had been impelled to act. Their one strong plea rested on the Roman desire to maintain order. They could calculate that Felix was far more anxious to keep the peace and to avoid disturbance than to aim at justice. They knew, and he knew, that the ability of an official was gauged in Rome mainly by his success in preserving peace and quiet in his province, and that some injustice done to the rights of one individual in the interest of public order would probably escape notice, or if noticed would be pardoned as conducing to the general peace of the province.

The speech of the Jewish advocate Tertullus (Acts xxiv. 2 f.) was pitched on this key. He praised the success of Felix in maintaining peace and order. He rested his whole case on the plea that the national leaders would not come before the Governor except for the réason that they had found the prisoner to be a cause of disorder over all the world, since wherever Paul appeared disturbance ensued. Tertullus produced no witnesses, and made no specific charge against Paul, expect that of *trying* to profane the Temple. The Jewish plea was simply that, if Felix got rid of Paul, peace would reign ; but so long as Paul lived, disorder would abound.

This line of argument shows a cynical disregard for justice, except in the fashion that it is expedient for one man to be sacrificed to secure the peace of the nation. The only positive charge made against Paul was that he had essayed to profane the Temple. This attempt had been frustrated by the riot. The riot was the weak point in the Jewish position, and it was disguised and palliated by the charge of intended profanation ; the riot had been provoked (as they said, and as was really true) by Paul's supposed intention to profane the Temple. Roman law treated leniently a disturbance arising from profanation of the temple, and would take

little cognisance of it, if peace was restored as soon as the immediate occasion was past.

This form of accusation was, probably, the most effective attack that was possible in the circumstances. The Jews had no good ground to stand upon, because they themselves were the real breakers of the Roman law, as being in a sense responsible for the riot; but, as they knew, the weak point in most Roman governors was their eagerness to avoid disturbance and to gain credit for having kept their province free from serious disorder. In no other way could the Jewish authorities make up a case.

If the Jews' case was weak, it must be admitted that their hand had been forced. The riot had not apparently been planned, but was sudden and unpremeditated (Acts xxi. 27 f.). Doubtless, the leaders had found on inquiry that they could not base a charge on any act of Paul's. Certainly, they failed to make any such charge. They only maintained that he had *intended* to profane the Temple. The very form of the accusation shows that the attempt had been unsuccessful. There was no accomplished act of profanation for them to found upon. Hence they could not bring witnesses to prove any misconduct. The crowd had thought that Paul was bringing Gentiles unto the Temple, and had effectually prevented this supposed intention from being executed.

If the Jewish leaders had been free to choose their own time they would doubtless have waited for a better opportunity, but the lawless action of the crowd compelled them to act. They had now to explain away the riot, and they did so by attacking the sufferer, and declaring that he was in fault, not only then, but frequently on previous occasions: he wilfully and intentionally outraged the Jewish feelings and violated the religious Law.

The weak point of Paul's case was that disturbance among

the Jews dogged his steps, and broke out wherever he was. The Jewish leaders seized on this. "Eliminate Paul," was their plea to Felix, "and then you will find the Jews quiet and peaceable: believe us that this will be so: you can take this on the faith of us who are responsible for preserving order."

Paul's action in claiming the privileges of a Roman citizen resulted in the case being carried before the Governor at Cæsarea. The case against him was poor and thin, when it had to be put in legal form and specific acts proved in open court. Intention to profane could not be proved by witnesses, hence none were offered. The accusation rests on the credibility of the accusers. They, as responsible for order and peaceful conduct in their own nation, declared that Paul's intentions were suspicious, and that they could not preserve order among their people where Paul came. That seemed legally weak to a governor of the province at the time. It was a case that could hardly be brought forward years afterwards in the Imperial court except as a mere cloak for a concealed attack.

Felix, evidently, felt no doubt about the weakness of the Jewish arguments in the case. He was, however, anxious to keep the leaders of that troublesome nation in good humour, and he had an eye to possible bribes from Paul (who must have appeared to be a man of substance and not a beggar). Accordingly, he remanded the prisoner, kept him in custody for two years, and did not even release him on departing.

The successor of Felix had equally little doubt regarding the case. He saw that there was no real accusation in the Roman sense against Paul, and he said so quite frankly: it was a matter of Jewish religion and procedure (Acts xxv 18 f.), and he would gladly have rid himself of it by sending it to Jerusalem for trial before the Sanhedrin according to

the national law (Acts xxv. 9, 20).[1] Paul, however, refused to go before this prejudiced court, where his accusers would practically be his judges, and appealed from the provincial to the Imperial tribunal.

Festus evidently shrank as much as Felix had done from offending the Jewish authorities. His first proposal to send the case back to the Sanhedrin had manifestly been unjust; it was merely a device to please the Jews, and showed stronger leaning to their side than ever Felix had shown. Almost every Roman governor of Palestine was affected by similar weakness, and was willing to go great lengths in order to keep the Jews on friendly terms.

Festus now seized on this suggested way of treating the case. If he sent Paul to the Supreme Court he avoided all responsibility and escaped giving offence to the Jews. He therefore, after considering the matter with his *consilium* (board of assessors), according to the proper form, allowed the appeal and sent it up to the higher tribunal in Rome.

At the same time Festus indicated in an extra-judicial way his own opinion on the case. The private conversation between him and Agrippa became generally talked about, in which they agreed that Paul was innocent.

It is necessary here to refer to an opinion which has been suggested as possible by my friend Professor Vernon Bartlet in his edition of the Acts regarding these words of Agrippa, "This man might have been set free, if he had not appealed to Cæsar": [2] perhaps there lies in them a reference to the approaching doom of Paul: Paul might have escaped, if he had not appealed to Cæsar.

This opinion, which Professor Bartlet gives only as an

[1] It is true that, according to Josephus, *Bell. Jud.*, vi. 2, as Professor J. S. Reid points out, even a Roman could be brought before the Sanhedrin for trial on the charge of profaning the Temple. But Paul had been prevented from committing the sacrilege which he was charged with attempting; and accusation based on frustrated intention was weak.

[2] In the Century Bible, the volume containing the *Acts*.

alternative, seems to me more ingenious than sound. Festus, when he could do so without annoying the Jews, stated his opinion to the king, who sat with him on the tribunal, and the king emphasised it. Although the opinion was private, rather than formal, yet it was on hearsay recorded by Luke as showing the mind of a Roman governor in respect of Paul's innocence: the prisoner was guiltless so far as Roman law and official opinion were concerned. This, however, does not and could not carry any implication that the Supreme Court would decide differently, for the governor and the king were thinking only of the present situation and the verdict. Moreover, Luke takes every opportunity of bringing out that the Roman administration decided in favour of the Christian right to preach and teach freely. It could only weaken his intention, if the words conveyed the innuendo that Paul had wrecked his cause by appealing to the higher Roman tribunal.

The truth is that Festus was not a strong enough man to pronounce a judicial judgment in favour of Paul, and so to alienate Jewish feeling and provoke the enmity of the national leaders. If he had had the moral courage to do so, it was still quite within his power. He was not bound to wash his hands of the case as soon as the appeal was made; but he eagerly seized the chance of shuffling off responsibility.

Luke too was eager to bring out the analogy between the case of Paul and the trial of Jesus. In both instances the Roman judge thought that the accused party was innocent. In each case the judge's opinion, though expressed in court, was stated in an extra-judicial way and did not influence the result. The judge was weak, and yielded to the influence of the Jews. Pilate thrice declared that Jesus was innocent.[1] Felix practically, and Festus explicitly, regarded Paul as innocent.

[1] *St. Paul the Traveller and the Roman Citizen*, p. 307.

If we are justified in speculating as to a deeper intention underlying Agrippa's statement to Festus, the opinion suggests itself that there was during these proceedings a third decision, whether implied or expressed, by the Roman tribunals in Paul's favour.

All the circumstances which are stated by Luke were equally well known to the Jewish national leaders. Therefore, either Luke's account is prejudiced and partial, exaggerating the Roman judgment of Paul's innocence and concealing circumstances which gave reason to look for an adverse decision, or the Jews must have gathered that they had no real case against Paul and little prospect of success. The best that they could do for their cause was to lengthen out the proceedings, to postpone the final stage of the trial, and to keep Paul as long as possible in custody. His seclusion was a gain to the Jews, whereas to bring on the trial would probably mean the speedy release of the prisoner.

Now in Rome there was one very effective way to keep Paul secluded. If no prosecutor appeared there, the law presumed for a long time that the absence was only temporary, and detained the defendant in expectation of the complainant's arrival.

By Luke's custom, as pointed out in *St. Paul*, two years must be taken as the whole time of the Roman residence, not as a part followed by a period during which the trial was proceeding.

The Jews therefore played a waiting game. This procedure was clever: it meant success to a certain degree: it was economical for the Jews, and expensive for Paul. That was the line of conduct that imposed itself, and all that Luke records points to that way of action. For the space of two years Paul had to maintain himself and his guards and personal attendants, to hire a house, and to defray the other expenses of living. The custody, however, was of

the mildest type. He had not been tried. His trial was not even imminent, for no prosecutors were in Rome. He could see all that chose to visit him, and speak with perfect freedom. Thus there was great opportunity for him to teach and preach. This is the third decision by implication in Paul's favour.

It is evident and certain that during this period of two years no trial occurred. Such freedom of action as Paul enjoyed is inconsistent with the procedure of a trial on a capital charge. Especially is it totally and absolutely inconsistent with a trial such as is implied in Second Timothy, a trial which evidently was accompanied by seclusion in a prison, by almost complete solitude, by depression and even fear in Paul's heart (2 Tim. iv. 6–8, 9, 11, 16–18). On the contrary, Acts xxviii. implies success, joy, and hope: this is also the spirit of Colossians, Philemon, Philippians and Ephesians.

The second letter to Timothy, therefore, cannot be placed during this period of two years. The circumstances are irreconcilable.

It must, of course, be understood that the detention was always of the nature of imprisonment. Paul was a prisoner in Rome, just as he had been on the ship. Soldiers were in charge of him, and were answerable with their life for his safe custody. He was bound with a chain, so that his movements were not free. He was confined to the house, and his friends had to come in to see and hear him. He was not out of danger (Phil. ii. 17), so long as there was a possibility that the accusers might appear and the trial proceed. Jewish accusers, by their private influence and by their weight as representing the nation, could perhaps carry even a weak case to success.

Hence the letters composed during this detention vary in tone. Paul writes as a prisoner in bonds; he is

in affliction and suffering; and yet he is fairly confident that he will be set free and be able shortly to visit Philippi and Colossae (Phil. ii. 24; Philem. 22). On the whole their spirit is one of quiet confidence, and even of marked joyfulness, especially Philippians iii., iv.

The only word in these Epistles that perhaps conflicts with the foregoing interpretation is *praetorium* in Philippians i. 13. The meaning of this term is obscure and disputed. In my *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 357, I have followed Mommsen's explanation that the word denotes "the whole body of persons connected with the sitting in judgment." This, however, seems unjustifiable. The trial was only a possibility of the future when the letter was written. Lightfoot's explanation seems preferable, that, as Paul's guards were always changing, the prisoner after a time became known among all the praetorian soldiers; and it is entirely consistent with our view of the situation.

We cannot think that after two years the trial came on, passed through its stages amid strict detention, anxiety and solitude, to its issue in condemnation and death: nor that the Jews risked a trial ending in Paul's escape.

Now what was the rule and procedure of the Roman law, when a case came up on appeal from a province and the prosecution did not put in an appearance? The Crown did not prosecute. The Crown waited the action of the private prosecutors. Until the Jewish representatives appeared nothing could take place, except that the defendant was detained in view of future trial; and the case of Paul may serve as proof that ordinarily the detention of such defendants was of the mildest type.

How long would this continue? Was the defendant kept in custody, even of a mild kind, far from home and friends, for as long time as the prosecutors chose to delay? Evidently there must have been some term, for indefinite deten-

tion of a Roman citizen at the instance of despised foreigners is inconceivable and inadmissible. Was the term fixed by formal law, or was it left to the defendant to claim release after a certain delay ?

We are imperfectly informed on this subject, but yet the evidence is sufficient to justify a confident statement. In this matter I am indebted to Professor J. S. Reid, of Cambridge, for kindly placing his minute learning and long study of the subject at my disposal.

In the third century the procedure had been already settled by custom or enactment ; and definite rules existed about the time within which a prosecutor in a case transferred to Rome must carry out the prosecution : for non-capital charges six months were allowed if the appeal was from Italy, nine months if from the provinces : for capital charges the times were twelve and eighteen months respectively. The longest term would apply in a case like Paul's.

How long had these rules been in existence ? and is there any reason to think that these or some such principles had been formulated, and the same or other limits fixed, in the time of St. Paul ?

There can be no doubt that some limitation of the period allowed for prosecutors to appear in order to push the case became necessary as soon as cases began to occur in which no prosecutor appeared. A presumption arose that in such circumstances there was no good case, and after a certain time probably this presumption would have almost the force of an acquittal. As Professor Reid says, "one would suppose that some rules of the kind must have been laid down very soon after the right of appeal to Rome began to be allowed."

Some term, therefore, was necessary to prevent flagrant injustice. The Romans were skilful in using the forms of law in order to harass an opponent. Philo supplies a case in point, where he tells that a certain Lampon of Alexandria

had been accused of disrespect to the Emperor Tiberius, and the proceedings were protracted for two years by Flaccus, the Prefect of Egypt, in order to keep Lampon in terror of death.[1] A defendant could not be allowed to remain for ever at the mercy of a wily prosecutor, who delayed to appear in Rome.

That cases of such failure to appear had become numerous before St. Paul's imprisonment is attested by Suetonius and Dion Cassius.[2] The Emperor Claudius took steps to bring these cases to an end by condemning the absent party, i.e. by presuming the innocence of the defendant. According to the usual fashion of dynastic history in the first century, Claudius's action is described by Suetonius in such a way as to make it unreasonable and erratic[3]; but Dion Cassius placed it in a fair and proper light. Claudius checked and ended what had become a scandal in Roman law, by acquitting all defendants in these long-standing cases.

The action of Claudius constituted a precedent, which would be acted upon in later cases. He must have presumed some term of limitation. The principle, on which he acted, when it had been once recognised, became a feature in Roman law for the future; and the term which he in practice fixed would become a rule for the constructive spirit of Roman law, until a different term was settled by a subsequent enactment. It is not at all improbable that the limits which were observed in the third century were those fixed by Claudius. We hear of no change;[4] and it would

[1] This case has a certain superficial resemblance to that of Paul; but there is no true parallel. There was no want of a prosecutor in Lampon's case; and the delay in the proceedings is attributed to the intentional malignity of the Prefect who acted as judge.

[2] Suetonius, *Claud.* 15; Dion. lx. 28, 6.

[3] Suetonius says that Claudius condemned the absent party whether his absence was avoidable or unavoidable. But there could be no real excuse for absence extending over two years.

[4] It is, however, true that our information is very incomplete. The apparent

be characteristic of Roman law that the term, when once established, would continue unchanged.

It would appear from the two accounts of Claudius's proceedings that his action was an innovation. Suetonius speaks of it as if it were strange and unprecedented, and makes this a charge against the Emperor. We see, however, that an action and a principle were urgently required.

Be that as it may, the principle and the term were fixed by Imperial action before Paul entered Rome. At the expiry of a certain period the case against him fell, and he was set free. For the third time in this case the Roman law determined in his favour.

From this conclusion I can see no escape. It is inexorably determined by the historical facts and by the established principles of the Roman law.

Why, then, does not Luke say this in so many words? To this I would answer that the issue is implicit in the narrative: the final chapter, and the whole story of the trial, point to this solution. Just as the narrative is overcast with gloom and bad omen during the final journey to Jerusalem, and the reader is filled with the thought of evil, so from the time that Paul leaves Palestine the narrative becomes brighter and happier. Even in Jerusalem the prospect of escape lay in the thought of Rome: see xxiii. 11, "As thou hast testified at Jerusalem, so must thou bear witness also at Rome." Riot and plots of assassination, imprisonment and guards, surrounded him at Jerusalem. But on the voyage, as soon as it began, the officer who commanded the convoy showed marked kindness to his prisoner, allowing him to go on shore to recruit after a rough passage[1]; and

incompleteness may be due partly to the fact that there was nothing to record.

[1] xxvii 3. The west wind keeps that Syrian sea always tossing uneasily, so that a coasting voyage in a small ship is trying to landsmen.

asking or permitting him to offer advice in council regarding the future voyage. In the crisis of the voyage, when all others were in despair, Paul comforted the crew and passengers, took command, issued orders, and saved the lives of all. The voyage was dangerous, but the narrative is never gloomy or despairing: there is always the assurance that the danger will be surmounted. In Malta Paul was honoured and complimented and regarded as almost divine. And so he came to Rome, encouraged by meeting friends and brethren along the way; and in Rome he was courteously received by the leaders of the nation, and invited to explain his views. During two years he enjoyed great freedom to receive all visitors, and to teach in the most outspoken way.

Only in one detail has an omen of trial been found. As Paul says on shipboard, xxviii. 24, a messenger of God also not only promised him the lives of all his shipmates, but also said, "Thou must stand before Cæsar." This has been regarded as foreboding misfortune and condemnation; but there is no warrant for this interpretation of the words. It is here mentioned by Paul as an encouragement to his hearers. He knew already that he must bear witness in Rome to the Gospel. The "appearing before Cæsar" is not a terror, but an omen of good. To stand before kings is not the expression of misfortune, but of honour.

But does this not forebode a trial as the issue of the journey? Certainly it does. The procedure of Claudius ruled the case as a precedent. As no accuser appeared, the trial ended in a verdict of acquittal, not in a mere dismissal of the accused. In ordinary appeals it cannot be supposed that the Emperor had time to preside in person at the trial; but it is not improbable that, where the issue was assured and the verdict certain without a trial and without loss of time, the Emperor may have himself pronounced judgment. The historians' account of Claudius's procedure in such cases

suggests that he intervened personally.[1] Thus the words of the divine messenger, xxvii. 25, were literally fulfilled : Paul stood before Cæsar. If a tedious trial, with speeches of the prosecution and the defence, had been required, it is probable that the case would have been heard by the usual delegates : the Emperor, burdened with the care of all the provinces and of Italy and of Rome, could not spend time in hearing the case of a Tarsian citizen and his Jewish accusers.

Why, then, does not Luke clinch his case by recording the acquittal more definitely ? We must understand that the real climax, as it seemed to Luke, is recorded. The free and bold preaching in Rome is the consummation of the narrative of Book II., though not the consummation of the work as a whole. The personal fortunes of even Paul are a secondary matter in comparison with the bringing of the Pauline Gospel into the capital of the Empire. But, further, as I have always maintained from the time when I began to understand Luke's method, the history is not ended. The story of the working of the Spirit in the Church and in the world was not confined to one book, the second of the whole work, but was continuing according to the plan of this great history. No third book was ever written. The second had not received the final touches from the author's hand. If the second book had been intended to be the last it would have concluded with some expression indicative of the future that lay before the Church outside the limits of this history. As it is, it ends with a forward reference : it stops abruptly in the middle of an action : it shows that the narrative is to go on. It points on to Book III. as clearly as Book I. points on to Book II. by its abrupt ending, and as Book II. points back to Book I. by repeating and completing the account of the last action in that Book, viz. the Ascension.

[1] Claudius loved to sit in judgment, see Hirschfeld, *Röm. Verwaltungsbeamten*, p. 329.

The last action described in Book II. is to be resumed and completed in Book III. When the legal term was reached the trial was formally ended, and a new period ensued in the career of the Apostle and of the Church: missionary work had gone through a series of legal proceedings extending over four years, and had emerged triumphant from the ordeal, while its enemies had failed.

At the beginning of Book II., in the very first words, τὸν μὲν πρῶτον, Luke points forward to a succeeding book. As has been pointed out,[1] the expression "first book" implies at least three books: in this emphatic position the fullest stress must be laid on the word "first." The Authorised and Revised Versions[2] both recognise the emphasis which falls on the word in this prominent place, and their recognition leads to the mistranslation, "former," instead of "first." The most striking analogy is "the first enrolment which took place when Quirinius was governing Syria" (Luke ii. 2): the importance which attaches to the word "first" there has been explained elsewhere.[3]

The ending of Book II. can be rightly understood only with reference to a coming Book III. That Book III. was never written, and that Book II. was not finally completed by the author's latest revision, appears in some small details, one of which will form the subject of our next Section. It is possible that varieties due to the incompleteness of the author's work in Book II. may be the ultimate cause of some of the divergences of the Western Text from the Standard Text; but this I should be disposed to apply only with great hesitation. As a rule those divergences arise from early modifications in difficult passages, and are non-Lukan, though often significant and indicative of the true text.

W. M. Ramsay.

[1] *St. Paul the Traveller and the Roman Citizen*, pp. 27 f.

[2] "Former" in both; but the Revised Version gives "first" in the margin.

[3] Expositor, Nov., 1912, p. 393 f.: St. Paul, p. 28.

EXEGETICA.

VII.

"Without Repentance."

Ἀμεταμέλητα γὰρ τὰ χαρίσματα καὶ κλῆσις τοῦ θεοῦ (Rom. xi. 29). A fresh example of the synonymous *ἀμετανόητος* in the sense of "irrevocable," as applied to a gift, is furnished by the contract of 291 A.D. published in "Oxyrhynchus Papyri," vol. ix. pp. 245 f., where the seller acknowledges that, in return for a fixed sum of money, "the land is bestowed upon you as a present (*ὡς προσφερή* [i.e. *προσφοράν*] and gift (*χάριν*) unchangeable and irrevocable (*ἀναφέρετον καὶ ἀμ*[*ετανό*]*ητον*)."

VIII.

If all prophesy, and any one enters who is an unbeliever or uneducated, he is convicted by them all, condemned by them all; the secrets of his heart (*τὰ κρυπτὰ τῆς καρδίας αὐτοῦ*) *are made manifest* (1 Cor. xiv. 24, 25).

Epictetus, in describing the teaching of Musonius Rufus, the philosopher, says that "he used to talk in such a way that we who sat there imagined that somebody had given information to Rufus about every one of us; *οὕτως ἥπτετο τῶν γινομένων, ὅυτω πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐτίθει τὰ ἑκάστου κακά* (*Diss.* iii. 23. 29).

IX.

"Not ashamed."

The author of Hebrews uses this phrase (*οὐκ ἐπαισχύνεται*) twice. (*a*) In ii. 11 he writes: *For the sanctifier and the sanctified have all the same origin* (*ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντες*); *wherefore he is not ashamed to call them brothers.* (*b*) In xi. 16, speaking of the patriarchs and the faith they evinced, he

remarks: *therefore God is not ashamed to be called their God, for he has actually prepared a city for them.* What is in the writer's mind, as he develops the argument of the second chapter, is the notion, which was perhaps connected with a veneration for angels among his readers, that it was degrading for the Son of God to assume human nature. It is argued that Christ had far more in common with men than with angels. Men were "sons of God," to be conducted to glory, and Christ, as God's Son, therefore became man. The thought here is the motive for the incarnate and redeeming life of Jesus Christ. In (*b*) the thought resembles that of Mark xii. 26 f. God is *not ashamed* to be called the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, though they are dead. The reason is that their faith on earth is rewarded by the fellowship of the living God in heaven; *He actually has prepared a city for them*, and therefore has a right to be called *their God*. His present relation to them, with a reward in store for their faith, corresponds to that title. We might expect, from the counsels against being ashamed of God on earth, that the writer would develop the thought of God being proud of human faith and loyalty; but this does not seem to be prominent in the epistle.

X.

THE EPISTLES TO THE SEVEN CHURCHES (Rev. ii.–iii.).

The structure and phraseology of these epistles may be compared with such a document as the letter or rescript of King Darius I. to a provincial governor, Gadatas, in Asia Minor.

Βασιλεὺς βασιλέων Δαρεῖος ὁ Ὑστάσπεω Γαδάται δούλωι τάδε λέγει· πυνθανομαί σε τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιταγμάτων οὐ κατὰ πάντα πειθαρχεῖν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἐμὴν ἐκπονεῖς γῆν, τοὺς πέραν Εὐφράτου καρποὺς ἐπὶ τὰ κάτω τῆς Ἀσίας μέρη καταφυτεύων, ἐπαινῶ σὴν πρόθεσιν, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα σοι κείσεται

μεγαλη χάρις ἐμ βασιλέως οἴκωι· ὅτι δὲ τὴν ὑπὲρ θεῶν μου διάθεσιν ἀφανίζεις, δώσω σοι μὴ μεταβαλομένωι πεῖραν ἠδικωμένου θυμοῦ· φυτουργοὺς γὰρ ἱεροὺς Ἀπόλλωνος φόρον ἔπρασσες καὶ χώραν σκαπανεύειν βέβηλον ἐπέτασσες, ἀγνοῶν ἐμῶν προγόνων εἰς τὸν θεὸν νοῦν· ὃς Πέρσαις εἶπε πᾶσαν ἀτρέκειαν καὶ . . .

The inscription, which was found in 1886 in Magnesia on the Maeander, breaks off here. It is only a copy of the original, and if, as Kern [1] conjectures, it belongs to the second century, it can hardly have been before the writer of the Apocalypse. But it is possible that Persian inscriptions of this kind were familiar to him in Asia Minor; the general cast and tone of such addresses was not a new thing.

Herr Gunnar Rudberg, in a recent article in *Eranos* (1911, pp. 170–179), therefore suggests that John's letters to the seven churches were modelled consciously or unconsciously upon such edicts and epistles of the Persian monarchy. He calls attention to some parallels, none of which, however, is particularly decisive. Thus, the Darius letter begins with commendation, and then proceeds to censure; so do the majority of the apocalyptist's letters. Again, he compares the *μὴ μεταβαλομένῳ* of the Darius-letter with the *μετανόησον οὖν· εἰ δὲ μή* of Revelation ii. 16, and notes the interesting parallel of the *τάδε λέγει* in the address, a formal and solemn phrase, which often occurs at the opening of Oriental royal epistles (LXX and Josephus, passim).

XI.

"Like Frogs."

In Revelation xvi. 13 f. the seer recounts how he saw the kings of the East summoned to the Armageddon of a supernatural conflict from across the Euphrates by *three*

[1] Kern, *Die Inschriften von Magnesia von Maeander*, 1900, pp. 102 f.

impure spirits like frogs, issuing from the mouth of the Dragon and from the mouth of the Beast and from the mouth of the false prophet; they are demon-spirits working miraculous signs, which go out to the kings of the universe, to muster them for the battle of the great Day of Almighty God . . . and they mustered them at the spot called in Hebrew Harmagedon. Nine years ago I called attention, in the *Hibbert Journal*, to a Zoroastrian basis for the detail of the frog-like spirits; frogs were detested by the pious Zoroastrian as the agents and creatures of Ahriman, the antagonist of the true God. Almost simultaneously F. Hrozný (in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde d. Morgenlandes*, 1903, 328) suggested a Babylonian origin for them in the legend of Istar's descent to the lower world, where Ea's messenger, sent to bid Ereschkigal release the goddess, is changed into a frog. The seer's reference to the Euphrates, he pointed out, corroborated the hypothesis of a Babylonian source for the vision, and in the Greek magical papyri the consort of Ereschkigal is named Ἀρμαγεδών, which echoes the Ἀρμαγεδών of Revelation xvi. 16. The analogies between the Babylonian legend and the vision are not clear, however, As Professor Steinmetzer has shown (*Biblische Zeitschrift*, 1912, pp. 252–260), the single frog in the former is an envoy of help whereas the three frogs in the latter are agents of evil; besides, these three are not changed into frogs from their original shape. Finally, the suggested origin for the obscure Harmagedon is too far-fetched to be convincing. Professor Steinmetzer does not seem to be aware of the Zoroastrian parallel. But when it is correlated with the ancient idea, preserved by Artemidorus, that frogs symbolised ἄνδρας γοήτας καὶ βωμολόχους, it absolves us from the need of falling back upon Babylonia for an explanation of this curious detail in the apocalyptic vision.

James Moffatt.

THE DIVINE NAMES IN GENESIS.

THE question which I propose to discuss in this and subsequent articles is one of great interest, but at the same time of almost unmanageable complexity. It is matter of general knowledge that for many years back Old Testament scholars have adopted what is known as the documentary theory of the Pentateuch, and that that theory originated in observation of the names for God used in different places of the Pentateuch, and especially in the Book of Genesis. Most readers are also aware that of recent years this aspect of the theory has been subjected to persistent, and sometimes embittered, attack on the lines of textual criticism. We have been told in every accent of assurance, from the cool emphasis of Eerdmans to the superheated invective of Wiener, that the " higher " critics have built their house on a rotten foundation. They have worked with a blind faith in the inerrancy of the Hebrew text, and have been too slothful to examine the evidence for and against the soundness of that text. The assailants on their part have certainly not been slothful. They have striven with might and main to discredit the Hebrew text, and have not been backward in proclaiming their own success. They believe their hour of complete triumph is at hand. Insinuations have not been wanting that nothing but the arrogant and disingenuous perversity of a few individuals, whose scholarly reputation is at stake, keeps an exploded theory in being before a deluded public. But the imposture cannot endure much

longer! The linch-pin has been removed from the axle, and the collapse of the cart is momentarily expected.

It must be allowed that under a heavy bombardment the fire of the besieged has been slack. The critics have seemed to say in effect that since the enemy's shells were falling wide there was no need to waste powder merely to add to the noise. Their silence has evidently been misunderstood. It has not been due to a dishonest and cowardly shirking of a discussion in which they knew that they would be worsted, and from which they would emerge as "broken men"! As one of the incriminated persons I protest that Wiener's war-whoop has not struck one instant's terror into my soul, and that I have even read the temperate arguments of Redpath and Eerdmans with unruffled composure. And I rather think that critics generally have had a better knowledge of the text than their assailants give them credit for. The great quarry in which those who impugn the Hebrew text have been digging of late is the Septuagint. Now every Old Testament scholar is aware that the MSS. of the LXX simply teem with various readings of the divine names, as of many other things besides; and that an immense number of these variants are of no value. Critics had a well-founded suspicion that those on the divine names in Genesis were no better than the rest. If they have not ceased their work and come down to inspect the supposed foundation of their theory, they have only acted as reasonable men might be expected to act. For one thing the textual evidence as to the divine names (as I shall show later on) has much less importance than certain writers imagine. In the next place the Hebrew text possesses credentials to which no version, and perhaps the LXX least of all, can pretend. Moreover, the criticism of the LXX is even now not sufficiently advanced to enable us to determine in any scientific manner what the original Greek text was; and until that stage has

been approached the mass of variants is merely so much evidence of confusion in its text. It is true that while on the whole the LXX is inferior to the Hebrew it can often be used to correct the Hebrew in virtue of the intrinsic superiority of isolated readings. But in dealing with the divine names this resource fails us, because it is very rarely the case that one name is more suitable to the context than the other. Therefore it is unscientific trifling to cite a number of MSS. which differ from the Hebrew, as if any one of these threw doubt on the accuracy of the Hebrew. So that unless the whole business of criticism was to be suspended until LXX scholars had completed their task, the only practical course to follow was to rely on the general soundness of the Hebrew text, and see whether it led to important results. That that confidence has occasionally been pushed too far I am not concerned to deny, but that in the main it has been justified by its fruits remains for me an indisputable fact. When it is added that in the attack textual work has often been associated with improbable explanations and arbitrary theories, as in the case of Redpath and Eerdmans, or with hastily improvised scholarship, as in the case of Wiener, there is little to wonder at in the attitude of reserve which upholders of the documentary hypothesis have hitherto mostly observed in regard to this matter.

But there are obvious reasons why an attitude of defensive silence cannot be indefinitely prolonged. We must frankly acknowledge that the trustworthiness of the Hebrew text in its transmission of the divine names calls for more thorough investigation than it has yet received at the hands of critical scholars. Whether the impulse to that investigation comes from one side of the controversy or the other is, or ought to be, a matter of indifference : provided the question is raised in a judicial and scholarly manner, it is right and proper that it should be examined. It may be a regret-

table circumstance that the initiative has been left to opponents of the critical position ; but they at least need not complain if the advantage of the attack has fallen to them. It is none the less the duty of the critics to put before the public the grounds on which they withhold assent from the conclusions so confidently urged upon them.

The immediate occasion of these remarks is the appearance of a new book by Johannes Dahse,[1] a German pastor who has already done excellent work in the department of LXX criticism. In many ways the book marks a great advance in the treatment of the question before us. The author is a competent scholar who has devoted many years to the investigation of the subject. He has contributed a number of acute and interesting observations on the minutiae of the text ; and has collected and tabulated the textual data of the LXX in a form which, though unfortunately not free from errors and defects, nevertheless represents an approach to completeness which has never been realized before. He has sought to establish the existence of recensions of the LXX which rest on earlier recensions of the Hebrew. A still more important advantage is that he does not confine himself to negative criticism, but brings forward a positive solution of the problem which has at least the charm of novelty. Over against the documentary hypothesis he will set a " pericope-hypothesis," worked out with great ingenuity. Last, but not least, he maintains a tone of uniform respect and courtesy towards his opponents. I do not mean that Dahse is the first on his side to exhibit these qualities, but we have had enough of their opposites to make us feel that we could do with a little more of them.

I wish, then, to take this opportunity to explain and defend the sceptical attitude which I hold as regards this whole

[1] " Textkritische Materialen zur Hexateuchfrage " : I. *Die Gottesnamen der Genesis* ; Jakob und Israel ; P in Genesis 12–50 (1912).

movement to undermine the foundation of the documentary theory by destructive criticism of the Hebrew text. Dahse's work has raised many new points, and though I shall not be able to deal with them all, I shall try to meet the issues new and old impartially and candidly. But I will say at once that I have seen no reason to modify the opinion I expressed in writing on Genesis a few years ago. I may find occasion as I proceed to reply to some of the strictures which Dahse passes on positions I then took up ; but that is quite a subordinate interest. The main issue as between Dahse and me is wrapped up in his acceptance of a challenge which I ventured then to throw out. He writes, " Skinner hat mir auf meinen ARW-Aufsatz erwidert, nur dann sei meine Hypothese von dem Einfluss der Vorlesungspraxis auf den Gebrauch der Gottesnamen bewiesen, wenn sie im einzelnen sich durchführen lasse. Ich denke, im vorstehenden ist das nunmehr zur Genüge geschehen und für Gen. 12–50 dieser Einfluss endgültig nachgewiesen." I will try to show that he has not succeeded.

It may be necessary at the outset to put the reader on his guard against a misleading assumption which underlies much of what is written on the opposite side of this controversy. It is usually asserted, and constantly taken for granted, that the documentary analysis of the Pentateuch depends on the distinctive use of the divine names in different sections to such a degree that if this criterion can be shown to be unreliable the whole edifice crumbles to the ground. That is a very great exaggeration. Dahse ought to know this, for he quotes no fewer than four passages from various writers (one of them friendly to his enterprise) in which the case is stated with perfect precision and clearness. Yet he sets these aside as " shilly-shally " (" halb ' Ja ' halb ' Nein ' ") evasions ; and roundly asserts (p. 121) that " im Grunde genommen auch heute noch die ganze Quellenschei-

dung von dem Gebrauch der Gottesnamen abhängt"![1] There is really no cause for evasion: the issue is very simple and easy of apprehension. It is *true* to say that the use of the divine names was the critical fact first observed (by Astruc in 1754) which furnished a positive clue to the separation of documents in Genesis, and that it is still regarded as a valuable aid to the analysis. It is *untrue* to say that it is the sole criterion, or that apart from it there would be no evidence of diversity of authorship in the Pentateuch at all. A moment's reflexion might convince any one that if Astruc's discovery had never led to anything beyond itself—if no difference could be observed between documents except their use of the names for God—it would have lost all its interest long ago. Its whole value springs from the fact that almost immediately it led on to the discovery of characteristic differences in the documents—"clearly marked and distinctive linguistic character," "numerous differences in subject matter, and distinguishable varieties of religious and historical points of view" (as Dahse's friendly correspondent puts it). These characteristic features were of course not all perceived at once; but having been worked out by patient and minute research they now afford criteria of

[1] Dahse devotes nearly five pages of his book (116 ff.) to a series of extracts from Gunkel's commentary, to show that the analysis still depends on the names for God; and he does me the occasional honour of associating my name with his. There I believe he does a grave injustice to Gunkel, as he certainly does to me. It is an injustice to Gunkel to cite the words which refer to the divine names and omit nearly all the other criteria adduced in connexion with them. As for my own observations, I should hope that any one with eyes in his head will see even from the sentences quoted that I am utterly sceptical of any analysis that depends solely on isolated occurrences of *Yahwe* or *Elohim*. If he had had occasion to read my book through, Dahse would have found that on p. 155 I have ventured to suggest a division of sources which sets aside a universally attested occurrence of Elohim. The paragraph in which he professes to sum up the effect of these citations (p. 121) contains misunderstandings or misrepresentations of the plain meaning of language which are difficult to reconcile with a dispassionate regard for an opponent's position.

authorship sufficiently striking to enable us in many important cases to dispense with the evidence of the divine names. That this is no empty vaunt is capable of experimental proof from two incidents in the history of the problem. (*a*) There was a stage of Pentateuchal criticism when practically only two writers were recognised in the Book of Genesis, an Elohist and a Yahwist. In 1854 Hupfeld showed to the ultimate satisfaction of all critics that there were really two writers using the name *Elohim*, and he succeeded in separating them with a very remarkable approach to finality. This important critical operation was necessarily carried through without assistance from the names for God, and in fact it turned out, as Hupfeld himself perceived, that the general affinities between the two Elohists were not nearly so close as those between one of them and the Yahwist (J)[2]. Yet every critic would admit that the achievement ranks with the surest results of literary analysis. (*b*) After Exodus vi. 2 the divine name ceases to be a criterion of the three sources distinguished in Genesis. One Elohistic document (now called the Priestly Code [P]) regularly uses *Yahwe* henceforward, and the other (E) uses sometimes *Yahwe* and sometimes *Elohim*. But, although this fact increases the difficulty of distinguishing J from E, it does not in the least affect the separation of P from J, which can be performed with as much certainty in Exodus and the following books, without the criterion of the divine names, as in Genesis, where that test is available. It is clear, then, from these examples that in the division of sources which is accepted by the majority of critics the divine names have not the exclusive importance which is attributed to them in the ill-considered utterances of controversial writers on the subject. Similarly the style and character of Deuteronomy stand out clearly from the rest of the Pentateuch, and are entirely independent of the divine name used. In fact the only part

of the documentary theory which is largely dependent on the names for God is the separation between J and E.[1] There the analysis is often uncertain even with the help of the divine names ; and of course it would be still more precarious if that test were proved to be worthless. Now the distinction between J and E is certainly an element of the accepted documentary theory, but it is by no means its most important element. It ought to be clearly recognised that the really vital points in the critical position are the relations to each other of the combined JE, of Deuteronomy, and of the Priestly Code. These relations are established, as we have seen, on grounds which are independent of the use of the divine names by the various writers ; and therefore the critical theory would still in all essentials remain intact even if it could be proved that the distribution of the divine names has nothing whatever to do with diversity of documents or of authorship.

After this lengthy explanation the reader will perhaps understand how an adherent of the documentary hypothesis can examine the question of the divine names in Genesis with an easy mind, and without feeling that he is entering on a combat *pro aris et focis*. At the same time it is my purpose to meet Dahse squarely on his chosen field of textual criticism.

I have only to add in the way of introduction that I shall endeavour as far as possible to bring the various matters in

[1] It is noteworthy that the quotations from Gunkel and others referred to in the last note are confined to the JE sections of Genesis—the only sections *within* which the divine names are important for the analysis. On p. 53 Dahse quotes from Driver the remark that if the untrustworthiness of the MT were established " it would leave untouched what is after all the most important element in the critical analysis, viz., the separation of P from JE " ; and calmly takes this as an admission that apart from the divine names J and E could no longer be distinguished ! Driver's words certainly imply that the internal analysis of JE would be " touched " (by the removal of *one* criterion) ; he has never said or implied that there are no *other* criteria by which an analysis might still be effected.

dispute within the comprehension of general readers, whose judgment is otherwise apt to yield to the loudest pretensions and the most assiduous assertion. With this aim in view I have thought it advisable to introduce explanations of technical points which Dahse quite rightly takes for granted as understood by the specialists whom he addresses. Fortunately, in England it is not only specialists who are interested in these discussions ; and the more this unprofessional interest can be cultivated the better it will be for the cause of truth. For it remains true that the common sense of mankind, when fairly enlightened, is the " ultimate solvent " of all critical and speculative theories whatsoever.

I. Exodus vi. 2, 3.

Dahse begins with an examination of the text of Exodus vi. 2, 3, quoting from Dr. Carpenter a sentence to the effect that these verses contain the real key to the composition of the Pentateuch. In the Hebrew text they read as follows :

" And *Elohim* spoke to Moses and said, I am *Yahwe* ; and I appeared to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob as *El Shaddai*, but by my name *Yahwe* I did not make myself known [or ' I was not known '] to them."

The crucial importance of these words must be apparent to the least critical reader. Three names for the Deity are used : *Elohim*, which is the generic name for God, applied alike to the true God and to heathen deities ; *Yahwe*, the proper name of the God of Israel, and in fact *the* name *par excellence* of the true God ; and *El Shaddai*, a somewhat rare title of the Deity, whose etymology and historic origin are obscure. And the verses distinctly state (1) that God had revealed Himself to the three patriarchs under the name *El Shaddai* ; (2) that He had not disclosed to them His true name *Yahwe* ; and (3) that this name is now (for the first time) made known to Moses. It is evident that the author of

these statements cannot have written any passage which implies on the part of the patriarchs a knowledge of the name *Yahwe*, and in particular any passage which records a revelation of God to them under that name. It is conceivable that the writer himself might have used the name *Yahwe* in speaking of God, just as a historian might speak of the childhood of Charlemagne, although no one could have thought of applying that honorific title to him during his early years. But it would not be a very extravagant assumption to expect that the author of Exodus vi. 3 would avoid the anachronism of calling God *Yahwe* before that name was known, and restrict himself to the use of *Elohim* or *El Shaddai*. How far these observations will carry us in the analysis of the Pentateuch we shall see presently.

According to the generally accepted documentary theory of the Pentateuch, the verses Exodus vi. 2, 3 belong to what is called the Priestly Code. As the result of minute and protracted investigations, critics have arrived at an almost perfect consensus of opinion regarding the contents of this document, and it is important here to note that in the course of these investigations the distinctive use of the divine names has come to play a very secondary part. The analytic process has been guided by a number of characteristic features of language and style and thought which make it a comparatively easy thing to detect a fragment of this document even if no divine name occurs at all. If now we take the Priestly Code as it has emerged from the hands of the critics, we find some remarkable correspondences with our reading of Exodus vi. 2, 3. We find, in the first place, that the name *El Shaddai* actually occurs in the histories of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob : twice in self-revelations of God (xvii. 1, xxxv. 11) and once in an utterance of Isaac (xxviii. 3).[1] It appears nowhere else in this document. We note next that

[1] Outside of the Code it occurs three times : for details see below.

the writer himself, when speaking of God in the third person, up to Exodus vi. 2 invariably uses *Elohim*, save in two instances (xvii. 1, xxi. 1*b*)—by a scribal error, as some think—after Exodus vi. 2 he regularly uses *Yahwe*. Moreover, the first disclosure of the name *El Shaddai* to Abraham (xvii. 1) is in the form "he said to him, I am *El Shaddai*," exactly corresponding to the "he said to him, I am *Yahwe*" of Exodus vi. 2. This careful distinction of three stages of revelation, marked by the names *Elohim*, *El Shaddai*, *Yahwe*, is in strict harmony with the affirmations of Exodus vi. 2, 3: the name *El Shaddai* was revealed to the patriarchs, while the name *Yahwe* was reserved for the crowning revelation to Moses. Whether the critical construction be sound or not, we see that there is ample justification for the statement of Dr. Carpenter that Exodus vi. 2, 3 has proved the "key" to the analysis of the Pentateuch.

But to meet Dahse on his own ground, we must of course start anew from the foundation. We must try to obliterate from our minds all that we have heard about a Priestly Code, about the sources of the Pentateuch, or about its composite authorship. We must take the bare words of the text by themselves, and inquire whether they be consistent with the supposition that the Pentateuch is a literary unity and the work of a single author. Now we observe (still using our Hebrew Bibles) that the name *Yahwe* is freely used in Genesis and the first five chapters of Exodus. I have already admitted that this fact does not prove that the writers were ignorant of the theory that *Yahwe* was first revealed to Moses. But when we see that there are whole sections of Genesis where *Elohim* alone is used, and others in which *Yahwe* is used, there is surely a presumption that those who held that theory are likely to be the authors of the former and not of the latter. But not to press that point, we look again at our Hebrew text and find the express statement that from

the days of Enos men " began to call by the name of *Yahwe*," i.e., to invoke the Deity under that appellation (Gen. iv. 26). The very same phrase is used of Abraham (xii. 8, xiii. 4, xxi. 33) and of Isaac (xxvi. 25). And that is not all. The name *Yahwe* is constantly found on the lips of the patriarchs (more than forty times) and (to crown all) it is twice used by Yahwe Himself in self-revelations to Abraham (xv. 7) and to Jacob (xxviii. 13).[1] The inference is irresistible that these passages cannot have been written by the same author as Exodus vi. 2, 3, *if the Hebrew text be correct.* The Pentateuch, therefore, is not a unity ; and even if we should never be able to take another step in disentangling its sources, we have to recognise that the axe is already laid at the root of the tree.

We can now understand how Dahse, in his perfectly legitimate attempt to discredit the documentary theory of the Pentateuch, is laid under a necessity to undermine the authority of the Hebrew text. He must either challenge the accuracy of the Hebrew transmission of the divine names throughout Genesis, or make out that the passage in Exodus means something different from what the Hebrew most undoubtedly says. As a matter of fact he essays both ; and we have now to examine his treatment of the text of Exodus vi. 2, 3, to which he devotes the first five pages of his book. It is impossible to follow all the windings of his argument, which indeed occasionally leads us up a blind alley, where we have simply to retrace our steps. But I will try to deal fairly and candidly with the really material points on which his whole position seems to hinge. And I do so with sincere respect for the thoroughness of his research and the acuteness of his reasoning.

[1] It is a not unimportant confirmation of the critical theory that these two passages are duplicates of two self-disclosures of the Almighty to the same two patriarchs in the PC, the אני יהוה of xv. 7, xxviii. 13 corresponding to the אני אל שדי of xvii. 1, xxxv. 11. See Gunkel, *Genesis*. Ed. 2, p. 342 *f.*

1. His first point is that the word נודעתי, "I made myself known" or "I was known," is represented in all texts of the LXX by εδηλωσα, which is the equivalent of הודעתי "I made known." Thus for the statement, "by my name Yahwe I was not known," we obtain the sentence "my name Yahwe I did not make known." Now I propose for the sake of argument to make Dahse a present of this reading. Not that I consider it to have any claim to be preferred to the Hebrew. True, it is supported by the Targum of Onkelos, the Peshitta, the Vulgate, and one Hebrew codex. But there is an almost equal array of external evidence in favour of נודעתי: the Samaritan Pentateuch, the Targum of Jonathan, and all Hebrew codices except one. I believe that an impartial textual critic would say that the external evidence of the Versions is pretty evenly divided between the one reading and the other. My preference for the Massoretic reading, however, rests chiefly on the consideration that there is an obvious reason why נודעתי should be rendered by a causative verb, but none at all that I can think of for changing an original הודעתי into נודעתי. The clause שמי נודעתי, although perfectly unexceptionable in syntax, is nevertheless a somewhat subtle Hebrew idiom, and one which a translator might naturally evade without being unfaithful to his text. That the translators actually found הודעתי in their original is certainly possible, but it is not proved; still less is it shown to be a superior reading to the Massoretic נודעתי; for if הודעתי had been the authentic text it is difficult to account for the change to נודעתי. If it be set down as a copyist's slip, we have to ask which is more likely: that the clerical error is on the side of the overwhelming majority of Hebrew MSS. or on the side of the single codex which reads הודעתי. The agreement of a single codex with one or more versions is not sufficient

evidence that the variant reading was once widespread in Hebrew, or that it lies behind the versions in question. There are such things as chance coincidences. But I do not insist on this point, because I am prepared to argue that it makes not the slightest difference to the critical implications of the verse whether we read הודעתי or נודעתי.

2. Nor, again, is it necessary for our immediate purpose to join issue with Dahse on the soundness of the text at the beginning of verse 2, "and *Elohim* spoke to Moses," where he thinks that *Yahwe* stood originally instead of *Elohim*. The former, it appears, is attested by five Greek cursives, by the Old Latin version, and by a citation in Justin. It is also the reading of the Samaritan Pentateuch. The old Latin and Justin are fairly taken as presumptive evidence that the reading is pre-Hexaplaric; i.e. it was found in LXX MSS. before Origen undertook the task of bringing the LXX into closer correspondence with the Hebrew in the monumental work called the Hexapla. It does not follow that it is the older reading, or even that it existed in Hebrew MSS. Many errors had crept into the LXX text before Origen; and for what we know this may be one of them. It seems to me, indeed, that Dahse is much too ready to assume a Hebrew original for any Septuagintal variant which strikes him as significant. On the other hand we must admit that in this case there is one consideration that pleads in favour of יהוה being original. The tendency of the LXX is to substitute θεος (אלהים) for κυριος (יהיה) rather than *vice versa*; hence, as Dr. Buchanan Gray has remarked, "wherever (ο) κυριος appears in LXX it deserves attention as a possible indication of the original text." Let us grant, then, that the κυριος of the Old Latin and Justin and the יהוה of the Samaritan Pent. in Exodus vi. 2 is a

possible indication of the original text, and that all the remaining LXX evidence, as well as the Massoretic text, may have to be set aside ; how would this affect the use of the passage as a key to the analysis of the Pentateuch ? Would it inflict a very deadly blow on the documentary theory if its supporters had to admit that a writer who has avoided the name Yahwe up to this point had anticipated by half a verse the disclosure of the name which he is about to record ? I hardly think so ; and for that reason I waive the point here, and pass on to others of more importance.[1]

3. We come now to issues of really vital interest. The first is the genuineness of the name *El Shaddai* in Exodus vi. 3. Dahse seeks to prove by a somewhat intricate line of argument that the name is not original, but was introduced into the text by an editor at a comparatively early date (before the time of Origen) and he reaches the same conclusion regarding five out of the six cases where the name appears in Genesis. It is necessary to examine this position very carefully ; but the questions raised are extremely complex, and the reader may be prepared for a rather tedious discussion.

Let us look first of all at the actual occurrences of the name. The Hebrew reads *El Shaddai* in Genesis xvii. 1, xxviii. 3, xxxv. 11, xliii. 14, xlviii. 3, xlix. 25. The LXX renders ο θεος σου in xvii. 1, xxxv. 11, ο θεος μου in xxviii. 3, xliii. 14, xlviii. 3, and ο θεος ο εμος in xlix. 25. In Exodus vi. 3, it has θεος ων αυτων. There are traces of pre-Hexaplaric readings : omission of σου in xvii. 1, xxxv. 11, of μου in xlviii. 3, and of ων in Exodus vi. 3 ; but as

[1] Dahse is entitled to make ithe most of the circumstance that in Gen. xvii. 1 יהוה stands (by error, as I believe) in an account of the self-revelation of God ; and so in xxviii. 13 ; and to argue that from analogy the same name should be read in Exod. vi. 2. But what of xxxv. 11, where אלהים is all but unanimously supported by the LXX, or xlvi. 2, where no LXX variant is recorded at all ?

these do not materially affect Dahse's final conclusion we shall do him no injustice if we neglect them here.

Now the first thing that strikes us is that the LXX invariably renders *El Shaddai* by ο θεος followed by a possessive pronoun in the person appropriate to the context. It looks as if the translators had not understood the word שדי, but had the notion that somehow it expressed a closeness of personal relation between the Deity and His worshippers. I confess that I have no satisfying explanation to offer of this strange idea,—that שַׁדַּי was equivalent to a possessive pronoun. Eerdmans thinks that the LXX pronounced the name as אל שֵׁדִי (*El Shēdī*), "God my demon," and understood *El Shaddai* as the special guardian deity of the individual patriarchs. That explanation is not quite convincing because it fails to account for the change of the first personal pronoun or adjective to the second or third where the circumstances required it; but I can suggest nothing better. Anyhow, I am in no worse case than Dahse himself; for the difficulty has to be faced in xlix. 25, the only passage in which Dahse allows the name to be genuine. If he can produce an explanation of the ο εμος in that verse, it will probably suit all the other cases as well. In the meantime I think that we are entitled to hold by the *prima facie* impression which the usage of the LXX makes upon us, viz., that *Shaddai* was a puzzle to them, and that they concealed their embarrassment as best they could.

But let us see how Dahse succeeds (or does not succeed) in eliminating *El Shaddai* from all these passages except one. The writer of Exodus vi. 3, he argues, must have found in Genesis three separate self-revelations of God, to Abraham Isaac and Jacob; and if he wrote באל שדי he must have found the name in each of these. Now we find such revelations in the case of Abraham (xvii. 1) and of Jacob (xxxv. 11); but there is none in the history of

Isaac. The only passage which the writer of Exodus vi. 3 could have had in view, according to Dahse, is xxvi. 24; and there *El Shaddai* does not occur. Therefore it cannot have stood originally in Exodus vi. 3! Further, in xxvi. 24 God calls Himself "the God of thy father," and similarly to Jacob in xxviii. 13. But the God who is to Isaac and Jacob the God of their father must have named Himself to Abraham "thy God"; and this is how we read in the LXX of xvii. 1. Consequently their Hebrew text must have read אלהיך, "thy God," and we must accept this as original! In the same way we must read in xxviii. 3 אלהי, "my God," in xxxv. 11 אלהיך (or simply אל), in xliii. 14 אלהי, in xlviii. 3 אלהי (or אל), and in Exodus vi. 3 אלהיהם, "their God." The only genuine instance is xlix. 25. A "theological redactor" (*Bearbeiter*) found the name here, and proceeded to insert it in the other passages. Fortunately for Dahse's detective pursuit, he overlooked xxvi. 24.

Such arguments carry no conviction. But since this hypothesis of a theological redactor is an essential part of Dahse's main contention, I will point out some of the difficulties under which it labours.

(1) One would like a better reason than Dahse gives for retaining *El Shaddai* in xlix. 25[1] while deleting it in all other cases. To be sure the theory would break down unless the name were left in one case; for the supposed theological redactor must be allowed a little capital to start operations with. But that is not a reason that can be seriously advanced; and Dahse does not advance it. What he says is that the LXX rendering in xlix. 25 is unique. But is it so very unique? Is the difference between μου and ο εμος so great that a translator who rendered שדי

[1] The received Hebrew text has את שדי, but of course I agree with Dahse that אל is the true reading.

by the one might not also have rendered it by the other? One would have thought that a passage in which *El Shaddai* stands in poetic parallelism with "God of thy father" is the place of all others where we might suspect that it stands for an original אלהי, if one were to indulge such suspicions at all.

(2) The procedure attributed to the redactor is arbitrary and irrational in the extreme. How could it have occurred to any man to manipulate the text by multiplying instances of a most unusual divine name? How does it happen that he confines his operations to the histories of the three patriarchs? Why did he select these particular passages and leave others untouched? Why did he pass over such revelations as xv. 7, xxviii. 13, as well as xxvi. 24? It cannot have been to give an air of reality to the statement in Exodus, for, according to the theory, he was himself responsible for the insertion of the name in Exodus vi. 3. What could have suggested its insertion there? Was it because he took exception to such empty phrases as "my God," "thy God," "their God" on solemn occasions like those before us? That motive would be creditable to his religious instinct, but it is certainly not a probable one. In any case it would not explain his choice of the particular name *El Shaddai* as a substitute. Dahse may reply that he is not bound to answer such questions as these: he has satisfied himself that the LXX has the superior text and has suggested an explanation of the Hebrew, and that is enough. But with all respect I submit that the questions are pertinent. Those who do not share Dahse's confidence in the LXX have a right to ask which of two theories is more reasonable: that the strong, clear-cut sense of the Hebrew is the result of redactional action for which it is impossible to find any adequate motive, or that the comparatively weak and pointless LXX reflects the ignorance

of Greek translators making the best they could of an unintelligible original.

(3) We have to consider the time at which such a redaction would have been possible. Dahse is at some pains to show that *El Shaddai* must have been found in the Hebrew text in most of the passages in the time of Origen. We may safely assert that it was found in all of them long before then. The Massoretic recension had been fixed by the middle of the second century A.D., and there can be no reasonable doubt that in all essential respects it lay before Origen in the form in which we now have it. But more than that: the Hebrew is supported by the Samaritan Pentateuch. Hence if any such redaction as Dahse supposes ever took place, it must have been at latest in the fourth century B.C., nearly 100 years before the Greek translation was made. I will not deny the possibility that Hebrew MSS. of an older date may have been in the possession of the Alexandrian translators; but surely the hypothesis that their MSS. had escaped a redaction which must have been carried out at least a century earlier is too incredible to be entertained on such slender grounds as Dahse has produced.

(4) Expressions like "my God," "thy God" are extremely rare in the patriarchal history (xxvii. 20 being the only case at all parallel to those imagined by Dahse): and that should make us cautious in substituting them for a well authenticated Hebrew reading. Still, if there *had* been a redactor on the look out for opportunities of inserting אל שדי there is no apparent reason why he should have passed over xxvii. 30 any more than xxviii. 3, especially if, as Dahse thinks, the original LXX of xxvii. 20 was simply ο θεος σου (without κυριος).

(5) It is by no means clear that Exodus vi. 3 presupposes a separate revelation of the divine name to Isaac. It is

perhaps enough that Isaac knew the name *El Shaddai*; and *that* we learn from xxviii. 3. At all events xxvi. 24 is a broken reed for Dahse to rely on. We read there certainly of a revelation of God to Isaac; but it is neither as *El Shaddai* nor as "thy God," but as the God of Abraham. Therefore, if "their God" were the right reading in Exodus vi. 3, it must be understood not distributively of each separate patriarch, but collectively, the revelation to Abraham covering the case of Isaac and (if need were) of Jacob also. In precisely the same way we may hold that the Hebrew reading אל שדי is to be taken collectively, i.e., that the disclosure of the name to Abraham includes its disclosure to Isaac; and we may accept this sense all the more readily because the name is actually used by Isaac (xxviii. 3) in passing on the blessing to Jacob.[1]

I hold, therefore, that Dahse has entirely failed to dislodge the name *El Shaddai* from Exodus vi. 3.[2] It stands

[1] From the standpoint of the critical theory it would be natural to explain the omission of Isaac by the supposition that the section of the Priestly Code in which the revelation to Isaac was recorded had been suppressed in the course of the redaction. I do not myself believe, however, that that is the true explanation. In the older Yahwistic tradition there are two disclosures of the divine name *Yahwe*, one to Abraham (xv. 7) and the other to Jacob (xxviii. 13), but none to Isaac. The authors of the Priestly Code adhered to this tradition of a twofold revelation of the name; only, in accordance with their theory, they changed *Yahwe* into *El Shaddai*. See the footnote on p. 300 above.

[2] Dahse promises (p. 5) that the reason why *El Shaddai* was inserted in the 6 passages mentioned, and not in xxvi. 24, will be explained in the last part of the volume. He seems to refer to p. 157, where he points out that in xliii. 14 it occurs at the beginning of a new Seder (perikope of the Synagogue lectionary), and adds that the Seder-division shows us why it stands just here: it was inserted here as in xvii. 1, xxviii. 3, xxxv. 11 and xlviii. 3, "after the reading-lessons had been introduced!" Rarely has a point of exclamation concealed such looseness of argument. How in the world do we see that the interpolation is later than the Seder-division? Is it because it never occurs twice in one Seder? Surely that is not very wonderful, seeing there are 37 Sedarim in which it does not occur at all. Moreover, as far as that goes it might just as well have been inserted in xxvi. 24. I suppose that what Dahse would have *liked* to say is that it never occurs except at the beginning of a Seder; but he could

there, the signature of an incomplete revelation under which the patriarchs lived. It stands also as the contrast to the name *Yahwe*, which is now for the first time made known to Moses. But here we have to meet another contention of Dahse, directed this time against the very citadel of the critical position, viz., the genuineness of the reading *Yahwe* in verse 3.

4. Dahse thinks it doubtful if the word יהוה stood after שמי in the original text, so that *possibly* we may be right in reading simply " my name I did not make known." The evidence he adduces is of the slightest. The word is omitted only in two unimportant cursive MSS. of the LXX, a MS. of the Ethiopic version (which is derived from the LXX), and in citations of Justin, Philo, Eusebius, Theodoret, and a few later writers. Dahse appears here to be conscious that he stands on weak ground, for he proceeds to strengthen it by urging that the authority of Justin's citation is much better attested in regard to the κυριος at the beginning of verse 2, which we have already discussed. I must leave it to expert students of the LXX to say whether all this is sufficient to prove that the omission of κυριος points to a pre-Hexaplaric text, although I cannot think that a decision in this sense will be very confidently pronounced. In any case it is not the *only* pre-Hexaplaric text, the κυριος being supported by the consensus of all other LXX codices. The question is, which of the two represents the original LXX, and again, whether the original LXX or the Massoretic text (supposing the two to differ)

not put it that way in view of xxviii. 3, where the name stands in the middle. If he means that it is too remarkable to be a mere accident that in 5 cases (including Exod. vi. 3) out of 6 it stands at the beginning, we must remind him that the phrases " my God," etc., which are supposed to have invited the interpolation, must have stood (on his view) in precisely the same places *before* the Sedarim were instituted, and nowhere else (except in xxvii. 20). The coincidence is no more remarkable in the one case than in the other.

represents the original Hebrew. And these questions can only be decided by considerations based on the meaning of the passage.

Hence it is of importance to note the use which Dahse would make of the shorter reading, supposing it to be established. If, he says, the *Yahwe* be not original here, then Exodus vi. is not a parallel to Exodus iii., but a continuation of it. He alludes to another part of the documentary theory : viz., the recognition of a third document (known as the Elohistic), which records the first revelation of Yahwe to Moses in Exodus iii, 14, 15, and consistently avoids the name up to that point. On that view Exodus iii. 13 f. and vi. 2 f. are parallel accounts of the same incident by two different writers (E and P). Dahse's reading of vi. 3 enables him to repudiate that analysis, and to hold that vi. 3 refers back to and presupposes iii. 13 ff. But what follows ? Simply this : that the " name " revealed to Moses, and not revealed to the fathers, *is* Yahwe after all ; only, the revelation was not made on this particular occasion but a short time previously. In other words, Dahse will have succeeded in overthrowing one particular point in the documentary theory, but he leaves intact the key to the position, in the statement that the name Yahwe was first made known to Moses.

5. But in order to appreciate the full force of Dahse's contention, we must take account of another assertion which he makes. He will not admit that the formula אני יהוה at the end of verse 2 is a new self-manifestation of God. That depends entirely on whether or not the name has been revealed before. Critical writers hold that it appears here for the first time in a particular document ; Dahse denies this ; and until that point is settled it is idle to discuss whether the phrase in the instance before us marks a new disclosure of the divine name. It is at least

a very solemn re-affirmation of it. But look at the verse again. Dahse, if I understand him aright, concedes that "my name" *means* Yahwe even if the writer did not expressly say so. Thus we cannot get behind the statement that God did not reveal the name Yahwe to the patriarchs, whereas He *does* reveal it to Moses. The only advantage that Dahse can derive from his two contentions is the opportunity of maintaining that the revelation did not take place in Egypt but a short time previously at Sinai. And that leaves the main critical position untouched.

6. We can now see how utterly irrelevant is the distinction between נודעתי, "I was known," and הודעתי, "I made known." Dahse apparently thinks it important. He remarks in a footnote on page 2, after citing two examples of the use of *Yahwe* in Genesis, "not however in words of God Himself, cf. LXX Genesis xv. 7, xxviii, 13." I suspect that he has in mind an ingeniously futile notion of his lively confederate, H. M. Wiener, who has learned from the anthropologists that "many savages" have an intense aversion from uttering their own name, while making no objection to being accosted by it, or even to its being divulged to a stranger by a third party. The Israelites of the Mosaic Age being in a "very rudimentary" intellectual condition, we may believe that Moses was capable of attributing this superstitious feeling to his God; and there you have the wide difference between הודעתי and נודעתי in Exodus vi. 3. We need not discuss this solution: it will be time to do that when some evidence is produced of the existence of the superstition in question amongst the Hebrews at any stage of mental development. Here it is enough to say that it does not meet the real difficulty, which is to know how, without a previous revelation, the patriarchs were in a position to "accost" the Deity by His true name. For surely Dahse, as a Christian theolo-

gian, knows that in the thought of Old Testament writers a knowledge of the divine name can only be gained through a self-revelation of the Deity. It is neither a human invention, nor discoverable by human guess-work. Therefore if he admits the use of the name *Yahwe* by the patriarchs (and I do not understand him to deny this), he must allow us to postulate such a revelation, even if it were not recorded. And if, as I believe to be the case, his assault on the integrity of Exodus vi. 2 f. has demonstrably failed, the only resource by which the unity of the Pentateuch can be saved is to follow the example of two Catholic writers[1] whom he mentions, and maintain that in the original text of Genesis i.–Exodus iii. 12, *Yahwe* never occurred at all.

My reply to Dahse, as regards Exodus vi. 2, 3, may be summed up under three heads. I claim to have shown (1) that he has failed to make good His objections to the Hebrew text of the verses; (2) that if we grant some of his positions the evidential value of the passage for the purpose of critical analysis is not greatly affected; and (3)

[1] Hummelauer and Hoberg (see p. 21 f.). Another Catholic writer, Prof. Schlögl of Vienna, has arrived at the same conclusion. He has published in the *Expository Times* (Sept. 1909, p. 563) a "zusammenfassende Statistik" of the results reached by himself and his pupils in Seminar; and winds up with the following *Machtspruch*: "When we consider that the tendency to use יהוה for or along with אלהים was incomparably greater than the contrary, those few passages which support יהוה as against אלהים are of little account. The conclusion is therefore justified that the name יהוה did not originally occur in Gen. i. 1–Exod. iii. 12. It is consequently quite unscientific to determine the analysis of a source by the names of God." His reasoning comes to something like this: in 118 cases where M.T. has *Yahweh*, "other texts" (no matter what!) have *Elohim* or *Yahweh Elohim*: therefore, in all read *Elohim*. In 30 passages *all* the texts read *Yahweh*: therefore change it to *Elohim*. In 59 places where M.T. has *Elohim* the "other texts" have *Yahweh* and in 47 *Yahweh Elohim*: therefore, read *Elohim*. "Those texts which have the name אלהים instead of יהוה are less important": nevertheless still read *Elohim*. Could arbitrariness further go? I have no doubt that the work of the Hebrew Seminar at Vienna is very thorough and meritorious; but it is really a little too much to expect independent students to invest its decisions with a Papal infallibility.

that if we grant *all* his contentions he gains his end only by emptying the words of definite meaning and significance. They would read thus: "And Yahwe spoke to Moses and said, I am Yahwe: and I appeared to Abraham Isaac and Jacob, being their God; but my name I did not make known to them." So we are left with the following bald and jejune statement as the gist of the communication imparted to Moses on a solemn occasion: that Yahwe had appeared to the three patriarchs but without giving His name! Whether the meaning be that, while the patriarchs knew the name, it was not Yahwe who revealed it; or that, they being ignorant of it, it had been revealed to Moses at an earlier time; or that it is now revealed for the first time; or that the name is something other than *Yahwe*—something ineffable, which had not been disclosed before and is not disclosed now—we cannot tell. Such is the plight to which we are reduced by a textual criticism which is divorced alike from exegetical intelligence and historical and religious insight.

JOHN SKINNER.

DID JESUS LEGISLATE?

THIS is to-day a question of urgency and importance; for on the one hand modern society is in many of its current opinions and sentiments placing itself in evident antagonism to the Christian tradition in morals; and on the other hand there are menacing problems, economic, social and international, where the world seems to the Christian believer to need the guidance which the teaching of Jesus alone can afford. To give only a few instances, the passage of the act legalising marriage with a deceased wife's sister appears to many churchmen to bring the law of the State into conflict with the canons of the church. The Protestant denun-

ciation of the *Ne Temere* decree often ignores that what is involved is nothing else or less than the right of a church to fix the conditions of marriage which it will recognise as valid for those who accept its authority; we may deplore the ecclesiastical exclusiveness of Roman Catholicism, but in condemning it we must beware of asserting the principle that a church is bound to accept as final the decision of the State regarding this relationship. More recently still the Report of the Royal Commission on the question of divorce has raised in a very acute form the issue whether Christ has committed to the church a definite law on this subject, which it must in loyalty to Him seek to maintain through the State.

Taking the last subject as our starting-point, three questions in regard to the teaching of Jesus confront us. Did He absolutely forbid divorce, or did He allow it when either partner had been guilty of fornication? But whichever way we answer this question, a second at once emerges, did Jesus ever intend His declaration on this matter to be treated as legislation which His followers must endeavour to enforce in society generally? In trying to answer this second question we are at once led on to a third: Is the teaching of Jesus to be treated at all as legislation? The first and second questions may be dealt with very briefly, as the writer desires to concentrate attention as much as possible on the third as of vital interest to the Christian Church in its present relation to and influence on human society.

I.

In Matthew's Gospel there are two references to the subject of divorce; the first (v. 32) is in the Sermon on the Mount either in enforcement of the teaching of Jesus regarding the lustful look as itself adultery, or less probably as a separate illustration of the contrast between the old

law and the new. Here fornication is admitted as a valid reason for divorce. In this setting we have not a historical, but a topical context; and we must, therefore, turn to the second reference (xix. 3–9) in order to discover if the concrete historical occasion of the teaching casts any light upon it. Jesus is replying to a question put to Him with a hostile intent by the Pharisees, "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause" (v. 3)? When His emphatic appeal to the intention of the Creator as forbidding divorce, evokes the further question, fraught with even the greater peril of bringing His claim into direct conflict with the authority of Moses, "Why then did Moses command to give a bill of divorcement, and to put her away?" (ver. 7), He lays down a principle of far-reaching significance, as we shall see in the further discussion; it was man's "hardness of heart" which necessitated the modification of the Creator's intention in the legislation permitting divorce. Again, as in the first passage, divorce is declared to involve adultery, and again the exception "for fornication" is made.

Confining our attention for the moment to this Gospel, and ignoring what the other Synoptics testify as to the teaching of Jesus, we may ask: Is it likely that Jesus would in these circumstances, when He was asserting the original intentions of the Creator against the modification made for "the hardness of men's hearts" in permitting divorce at all, weaken His own position by stating any ground on which divorce might be legitimately sought? Was it not His habit of thought and mode of speech to state the maximum moral demand in any circumstances without any of the limitations and qualifications which human casuistry, the haunting shadow of morality, is only too ready to discover and apply? It would be more in the manner of Jesus to affirm this ideal relation absolutely.

If the exceptions were not in the original utterance of Jesus, how has it found a place in the report of the first evangelist? The explanation is not far to seek. Matthew regarded Jesus the Christ as the fulfilment both of law and prophecy; and so it was natural for him to treat the teaching of Jesus as the new law. He had an interest in the formation of the Christian community; accordingly the new law is presented by him not as abstract principle, but as concrete legislation for that community. In that community, as Paul's teaching shows, divorce was allowed; and for the evangelist it would seem incredible that such a practice could exist apart from the sanction of the Master. Without being conscious of introducing anything new into Jesus' teaching, the evangelist would feel warranted in giving explicitly what he believed to be implicit in it. A comparison of sayings, e.g. the beatitudes in Matthew and Luke, drawn from the common source, the Q of Harnack's reconstruction, or the Logia of other scholars, shows that it was the evangelist's practice to remove any ambiguities or difficulties for his readers by adding the necessary explanatory words.

This conclusion is confirmed when we turn to the parallel passage in Mark x. 1–9; there divorce is forbidden without any qualification whatever. So also is it in Luke xvi. 18, where the saying about divorce is introduced out of proper historical context as an illustration of the inviolability of the law. When we look concretely at the historical situation the probability that Jesus never uttered any qualification of His absolute prohibition of divorce will rise to a certainty. He had doubtless before His mind the laxity of the scribal interpretation of the law of divorce on the one hand, and the actual case of Herod, who had divorced the daughter of Aretas that he might marry Herodias, who for the same base end had divorced her hus-

band Philip. It is certain that the enemies of Jesus in questioning Him about this matter desired not only to bring His claims into conflict with the authority of Moses, but also to arouse against Him the anger of Herod and still more of Herodias so that He might share the Baptist's fate. What Jesus had in view in His teaching was not then the general question of divorce, but the practice which prevailed, with the sanction of some of the scribes at least, of divorcing one wife in order to marry another. This Jesus condemns without any hesitation and qualification; and it would simply have weakened the force of His denunciation had He gone beyond what the immediate occasion required to deal with the question of divorce generally, and to indicate the circumstances in which divorce might be legitimate. While Jesus does bring to bear permanent and universal principles, it is with concrete cases arising out of the immediate historical situation that He deals; He does not indulge in general moral discussion.

II.

But even if Jesus allowed divorce for fornication, or forbade it as a general moral precept, it does not at once follow, as seems to be taken for granted, that He intended that His precepts should be at once translated into the legislation of general society. Against such a conclusion there are two considerations. The first of them is this, that Jesus expressly refused to interfere with the existing authorities in church or state. If He intended to legislate about marriage and divorce, why did He so indignantly refuse the request to settle a family quarrel about property (Luke xii. 13–15)? Even if coveteousness was the petitioner's motive, the quarrel would involve issues of justice or injustice, right or wrong! why should Jesus intervene in one case, and not in the other? When He cleansed a leper,

He was careful to send him to the priest, that he might be pronounced clean (v. 14). He must have known something of the evil as well as the good of Roman rule; and yet He gave no encouragement to the withholding of taxes from Cæsar, but enjoined the payment as a duty parallel to that to God (Matt. xxii. 15–22). Even although in the interests of godliness and goodness He had challenged the scribal interpretations of the Law, He bade the disciples accept the scribes as interpreters of the Law (xxiii. 2, 3). This acceptance of the existing order, and abstinence from the reform of it, even where improvement was desirable, is not fully explained by the historical necessity of His vocation, that at any cost He must avoid even the appearance of a political Messiahship; but had a deeper ground in His positive method of changing men by divine truth and grace rather than by interfering with institutions. The work of inward transformation could be carried on without any outward revolution; and the premature attempt at reform would have hindered the urgent duty of winning and changing men. The method of Jesus is moral and religious, and not primarily social, ecclesiastical or political.

The second consideration here is that Jesus Himself offers us two rules of action which explain and justify this acquiescence in the existing order. One of them has already been incidentally mentioned. As Jesus explained Moses' permission of divorce as an adaptation of the law to the moral incapacity of the subjects of it, so doubtless in the society around Him He recognised standards and practices which fell far short of His ideal, but which were the best of which the people then were capable. Whenever, in the scribal interpretation of the law, the law was made an encouragement of moral laxity, Jesus did not refrain from the necessary condemnation; but when the law

did serve as the protective shell of the moral life, even while falling short of the moral ideal, Jesus was prepared to acquiesce in it. So tolerant of and patient with human imperfection was He that He did not in the manner of the Pharisees unduly increase the burden of the law. This was not moral indifference, but His recognition of the necessary conditions of moral progress.

A second rule of Jesus' own conduct was confessed when He bade Peter pay the temple tribute, "lest we cause them to stumble." The freedom of sons must not be claimed when such a claim might cause moral offence to another. This is Paul's method also in dealing with the "weak" and the "strong" in the church at Rome (Romans xiv.). Problems are not to be raised even if the raising of them might mark a moral advance, where there is the possibility of involving less developed moral natures in perplexity and difficulty regarding their duty.

Can these considerations be applied to a question such as divorce? If Jesus did not seek to dictate to Jewish church or nation, still less must the Christian Church arrogate to itself in modern society the authority to bind or loose laws or institutions. It will only provoke antagonism by such dictation; and it can hope to influence modern society only by the method of Jesus. That it should hold up the ideal of Jesus of marriage as an indissoluble bond, so that divorce should not even come within the range of possibility for those who are united in the Lord, must be insisted on. Here what the Master commands and forbids should be uttered with no uncertain voice as its testimony for Him, and discussions as to whether Jesus did or did not allow divorce for fornication can only weaken the testimony it must bear as to what the Christian ideal is. If we suppose the case of a Christian who desires to realise the Christian ideal and suffers the wrong of the infi-

delity of the other partner in the relation, we may well ask the question: Is it most in accord with the Christian ideal to claim the relief of divorce, or to seek by a moral solicitude to recover the sinful again to virtue and grace? Divorce surely has no place in the Christian ideal of marriage as Jesus Himself presented it.

But the more strenuously and courageously this ideal is affirmed by the Church for all who would be its members, the more need of learning from Jesus how to deal with the world around. The Church must recognise that the society in which it finds itself does not consist of Christians only, all ready and able to take His yoke which His grace alone can make easy, or His burden which that same grace alone can make light. It must in its influence recognise Jesus' two rules. What does the "hardness of heart" of men and women in this relation necessitate in adapting the Christian ideal as actual legislation to the moral situation? While the best practicable must be striven for in law, it must fall far short of the best ideal in morals. There must also be the intent not to cause others to stumble morally. Much tact is needed to distinguish when the Church may make concessions or must enforce obligations.

III.

This conclusion will, it is hoped, find further confirmation in the answer which we can give to the last of the three questions proposed. Are we at the right point of view in regard to the teaching of Jesus when we regard it as in any sense legislation? Several considerations bearing on this wider question have been advanced in dealing with the two narrower, and may be very briefly restated. First of all, Jesus in His teaching deals with concrete moral situations, to which He applies permanent and universal principles; but He does not elaborate these principles into a

code of laws of wider application than the occasion demands. We may and must apply these principles more widely to our varying moral situations; but not as social or civil law, but as moral ideal and influence. Secondly, Jesus did not aim at an immediate or direct transformation of the existing human society in its standards, customs, institutions, and laws, but sought to gather around Him a community in which His ideal would find realisation not as compelling law, but by constraining love. He was not a second Moses, for the fourth evangelist shows his insight in the contrast which he states, "The law was given by Moses; grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (John i. 17).

Thirdly, modern scholarship forces us to recognise a determining factor in the mind of Jesus, which the expositions of His teaching hitherto have not adequately admitted. Without accepting any of the extravagances of the eschatological school, who find in the teaching of Jesus only the vivid expectation of the imminent advent of the transcendent, supernatural Kingdom of God, and while emphasising the predominance of religious and moral conceptions, we must yet acknowledge that there is in the teaching of Jesus the belief in, and the hope of the speedy advent of God's Kingdom, the sovereignty on earth of the divine truth and grace. Only man's unbelief hindered and delayed that advent. While there are sayings that suggest a gradual progress of the Kingdom, as some of the parables in Matthew xiii., yet Jesus had not present to His mind a long historical vista, a continuance of His community for centuries upon earth; and He made no provision for its own organisation, or for its ordering of human society generally. When He was so vividly conscious of the higher order of life as imminent, an order in which "they neither marry nor are given in marriage" (Matt. xxii. 30), is it likely that He would legislate regarding marriage and divorce,

or indeed any of the interests of the lower order of life?

That Jesus was led by His expectation of the coming of the Kingdom of God to lay all the stress on the principles of that Kingdom, and to withhold His interest and attention from the details of social organisation has proved to be altogether to the advantage of the religion which has its source and object of faith in Him. It is the permanent and universal in man's relation to God, and consequently in the relationships of men to one another, which is the content of His teaching. Because He did not, after the manner of the casuist, apply His principles in the local and temporal details of the ordering of a community, His teaching has proved itself so adaptable to varied conditions and varying circumstances. A comparison of Christianity with Islam or Buddhism shows its superiority in its true universality. Gautama and Mohammed both organised and legislated, and accordingly, so far as their communities are loyal to their founders, the fetters of time and place hinder them from movement, for monasticism is the rule of the one, and polygamy and slavery are incorporated in the social order of the other. Had Jesus legislated after the manner of Gautama or Mohammed in the matter of divorce, He would have abandoned His higher standpoint of a revelation of God, and an ideal for man which have value in all lands, and are valid for all time. It is quite conceivable that Jesus might not have spoken a single word about marriage or divorce, had He not been questioned by His opponents on the subject, and had not the case of Herod forced attention upon it, just as He said nothing about slavery and many other topics of great and wide moral interest. That when challenged to express an opinion on this topic He should have affirmed the ideal of marriage as an inviolable bond according to the original intentions of the Creator, is entirely in accord with His

purpose and method; but that He should have condescended from the height of that ideal to prescribe the circumstances in which that ideal might be modified seems to the writer at least entirely improbable.

There are doubtless Christian believers to whom the position now stated will bring disappointment; they both demand and expect Jesus to be a second Moses; they want their Christian life hedged about by laws and rules. But this is surely entirely to misconceive the Christian religion, which is not law imposed by an external authority, but truth which makes its own appeal, and is its own witness to man's moral insight and spiritual discernment, and grace, which so meets the moral and religious need of man as to evoke by its very nature the faith which fully receives and freely responds to it. We do not need to import the Epistles of Paul into the Gospel of Jesus to be led to the conclusion that in the teaching of Jesus during His earthly life, even as in the life in Him as the Risen Saviour and Lord, we are not under law, but under grace. The gracious invitation in Matthew xi. 25–30 is to a yoke and a burden that is the freedom of the children of God. Whenever, even in our zeal for the supreme Lordship of Jesus Christ, we represent His teaching as a legislation to be imposed on ourselves or others we do misrepresent the kind, aim, and ground of His authority as the effective Saviour who liberates us from every bondage into the freedom of the children of God. We must ever be on our guard against lapsing from the evangelical to the legal point of view, from the new to the old covenant.

But further, this anxiety to get from the very lips of Christ Himself a law to which we must ourselves submit, and which we must try to impose on others, is surely a distrust of the presence and operation of the Spirit in imparting wisdom and prudence to the Christian community

according to its varying needs for such higher guidance. May not the Christian conscience of to-day be the organ of the continued revelation of the Christian ideal, a revelation which we may be confident will not supersede, or contradict the teaching of Jesus, but will give direction in situations and for necessities which lay entirely beyond the historical horizon in His earthly life? To rely, as some do, on traditions, precedents, canons in dealing with the living moral issues of the age, such as marriage and divorce, is surely to abandon the distinctively Christian standpoint. If we cannot expect, and rely on the present guidance of the Living Lord through His own Spirit on this question, but must fall back on, if not the words of Jesus Himself, yet some decision of the Christian Church in days past, what are we to do in the many instances of altogether new moral problems which are pressing for a Christian solution from the Church as Christ's present interpreter?

These considerations are advanced not in the interests of a lower morality than the Christian ideal presents, but rather to indicate the historical process of a gradual approximation to that ideal which not only man's moral capacity, but also the constitution of human society shows to be alone practicable. Legislation for the hardness of men's hearts must still be recognised, while its moral imperfection is being urged. The higher requirements must not be prematurely forced lest there be moral offence. There must be tolerance of moral immaturity and incapacity, and patience with the slow growth of moral conviction and habit. The Christian ideal must be kept before modern society as a constant and potent inspiration to progress in moral standards and social institutions. The Christian Church must influence the world around by the integrity, purity, and beneficence of the lives of its members, and not try to coerce it to submit to laws which have not yet even

the assent of the common conscience. Most of all must the Christian Gospel be so ministered as the power and the wisdom of God unto salvation, that the world will be brought within the Church, not to be subjected to a foreign and galling yoke, but to be emancipated into a life in which holiness will be attained by the way of a joyous freedom in Christ. Thus and only thus will the moral and social problems which are so menacing to-day find their solution in a grace which takes law up into liberty.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

THE HISTORIC SETTING OF THE PASTORAL EPISTLES.

(iii.) *The Historical Setting.*

THIS is the aspect of the Pastoral Epistles to which I have given more particular study, not only as being the one which really weighs most against a Pauline origin with cautious men of all schools, but also as that on which I most differ from the rest of those who hold to their authenticity. It has occupied my attention for a good many years, owing to the fact that, in writing in 1899 on the Apostolic Age, I felt it wise to approach so difficult a subject as the Pastorals first of all from the side which seemed least dependent on subjective estimates as to Paulinism and other large questions ; and this meant starting from the concrete personal notices and the historic setting, which really afford more data than is generally realised. In the carrying out of this plan, however, I had, owing to a publisher's time-limit, to commit myself for the moment to hypotheses which I had not leisure to test from all points of view. Very soon I had the sad experience, which comes to those who print prematurely, of realising that the particular form of my theory was defective, while none the less it still seemed to be on the right lines.

Perhaps, then, I may be pardoned, if, in order to make clear just where I stand now as compared with my earlier position, and as an object-lesson in method, I indicate briefly the chief steps by which I moved away from a theory which never satisfied all the data even as I saw them, to one which at least satisfies all the essential requirements of the case to the best of my present knowledge.

The *crux* of the whole matter is 1 Timothy. Even Dr. Moffatt, who sums up against full Pauline authorship, writes in his recent *Introduction* (p. 398): "Were it not for 1 Timothy, it might be plausible to seek room for the other two within the lifetime of Paul, but all three hang together, and they hang outside the historical career of the Apostle."

Even when I framed my first theory on the basis of the conviction that Paul was never released from his imprisonment in Rome as recorded in Acts, but was beheaded as the result of his appeal to Cæsar, as a Roman citizen guilty of the mortal offence of disturbing the public order in the provinces, I was unhappy about the seeming necessity of separating the date of 1 Timothy from that of the kindred letter to Titus. But I felt forced to do it, on the assumption universal among those whose books I had consulted, and which it did not occur to me in my haste to test, namely, that Paul's hope (iii. 14, iv. 13) of joining Timothy (at Ephesus) before very long—though he might be delayed longer than he hoped—implied that he was at liberty when he wrote. Accordingly, he had not yet been arrested in Jerusalem; since from that time forth to his death after the two years' confinement at Rome, in which Acts lets him pass from our sight, he was not master of his own movements. Therefore, 1 Timothy, if genuine, must have been written *before* Paul's arrival in Jerusalem, but subsequent to his final departure from Ephesus, after the riot there (Acts xx. 1), the time apparently alluded to in 1 Timothy i. 3, "I exhorted thee to stay

on in Ephesus when (I was) going into Macedonia." In that case it seemed most natural to suppose that Paul, having sent Timothy back at the last moment with the elders summoned to Miletus (to receive a solemn charge in relation to their Church and the dangers which already threatened its faith and practice), had followed this up on the voyage to Jerusalem with a letter of instructions, adding to what he had been able to say to him on the spur of the moment. But besides the difficulty of explaining why Paul should in it allude to the earlier charge of a year before, rather than this more recent one, there was the yet greater difficulty of the affinities in style and contents between 1 Timothy and Titus, the latter of which, on my hypothesis, was not written till some three years later, *after* Paul's arrival in Rome, and after he had left Titus behind in Crete, where his ship had tarried for a time at Fair Havens (Acts xxvii. 8 f.).

As I thought over the matter at more leisure, I came to realise that all this sacrifice of verisimilitude for the sake of the common assumption referred to was needless. Nay, I had already set it aside when dealing with the letter to Titus, which, on the basis of the reference to Crete in Acts xxvii. 8, I had assigned to the Roman imprisonment. For this involved that Paul might, at a certain stage in his appeal case, have seemed to see release so clearly in sight as to make plans for wintering at Nicopolis (in Epirus) and there being joined by Titus (iii. 12). But further, and more important (because by general recognition), somewhat confident forecasts of release and consequent journeying were to be found in the so-called "Imprisonment Group," viz., Philemon (22) and Philippians (i. 25 f., ii. 23 f.). *Why, then, should not Paul have written* 1 *Timothy also from his Roman imprisonment, at a time when he was optimistic as to the speedy settlement of his appeal in his own favour?* Now when was this most likely to be? Why not at the very beginning of his stay

in Rome, when he was still full of the presumption created by the hearings in Cæsarea, and particularly the opinion of Agrippa that but for his having already appealed to Cæsar he might, on what this representative of Rome had himself heard of the case, have been at once set free ? It is altogether probable that the more the provincial from Tarsus got to know of Roman policy in the capital itself, and of the ways in which justice was administered there under a Nero, especially with a Jew-loving Poppæa at his elbow, the less likely he was to speak of his release as a mere matter of time, possibly a very short time.

I infer, then, on further reflexion, (1) that all the so-called " Imprisonment Epistles " were written at a relatively early stage in the two years before Paul's appeal case was finally decided against him ; (2) that Philemon and the closely related Colossians, and indeed the probably contemporary " Ephesians," date from the first year, preferably the first half-year of this period, while Philippians represents a rather later stage, marked by a state of the appellant's mind in which hope and despair of release were more evenly balanced (ii. 17), though on purely religious grounds (" in the Lord," ii. 24), like the welfare of his converts, he was inclined on the whole to count on the more favourable issue (i. 25 f., ii. 23 f.) ; and lastly, (3) that 1 Timothy, as well as Titus, belongs to the earliest stage of Paul's stay in Rome, when his mind was in much the same state of expectation as when he wrote Philemon, only not at identically the same season, but rather earlier. This last result follows from two considerations. Timothy is already with Paul when he writes Philemon and Colossians ; further, Tychicus is named in the latter as its bearer (as well as of " Ephesians," probably the "epistle from Laodicea" of Col. iv. *fin.*), whereas in Titus iii. 12 Paul names Tychicus as one of two possible substitutes for Titus at his post in Crete. Presumably Paul

decided, after sending off the letter to Titus by "Zenas the lawyer and Apollos"—probably on their way to Asia (so at any rate Apollos) to get witnesses, or at least affidavits, for his appeal case, and carrying 1 Timothy to Ephesus—that he needed Tychicus for the mission to Asia on which he was bearer of Colossians and its companion letters. Accordingly, it seems as if 1 Timothy, like Titus, was written *quite early after Paul's arrival in Rome*, possibly in view of information reaching him through Tychicus or Aristarchus (cf. Acts xxvii. 2; Col. iv. 10). At that date, or possibly a little later, his plans included wintering at Nicopolis (perhaps after visiting Ephesus), in order, it may be, to consolidate work already begun in Epirus (Rom. xv. 19; cf. 2 Tim. iv. 10), and be ready to start thence on his long-interrupted journey to Spain, when the spring opened the sea to navigation. These two letters may, then, have been despatched about early summer in 60 A.D., by the same messenger (say Apollos) travelling to Ephesus *viâ* Crete.

Whether 1 Timothy actually found Timothy at Ephesus is doubtful. He is already with Paul when Philemon was written, at what we have seen reason to believe was a comparatively early stage of his stay in Rome, when he was as yet confident of release; and it is unlikely that Timothy would have left his post soon after Paul's urgent charge by letter that he should remain there. We infer, then, that Timothy "crossed the letter on its way," and unexpectedly appeared in Rome, possibly with Epaphras, who brought news from Colossæ which led to the writing of Colossians and Philemon. It was probably their joint report on the state of the Pauline Churches in proconsular Asia generally which drew from Paul the closely related circular letter known to us as "Ephesians." These may well have been written and despatched in the care of Tychicus in the summer or early autumn of this same year, A.D. 60.

The date of Philippians, written while Timothy was still at Paul's side, is hard to define. But to judge from what it implies as to the considerable effect of Paul's presence upon the spread of the Gospel in Rome (i. 12–14), the more cautious tone in which he refers to his appeal case (ii. 23 f.), and the comparatively late arrival of the Philippian contribution to his needs (iv. 10), we should infer that it was not before Paul's first winter in Rome. Perhaps we may best view Epaphroditus' illness—of which the Philippian Church had already had time to hear and which was caused by his taking risks in conveying its belated gift to Rome—as due to his travelling at an unseasonable time, i.e., winter. Paul may, then, be writing in spring 61 A.D., when Epaphroditus would naturally return (ii. 25–30). He promises to send Timothy shortly, to bring him fresh news of them ; but meantime he is keeping him back until he can see further ahead in the matter of his case, which he expects will be soon (ii. 19, 23). Whether this programme was carried out or not, Timothy would not return to Ephesus to take up his duties again there, until after it became apparent that Paul's case would be yet further delayed in reaching an actual hearing. This would become clear some time in summer. Hence we may imagine Timothy back in Ephesus before the winter of Paul's second year in Rome, as the trial could hardly come on save in spring or summer owing to the difficulty of witnesses reaching Rome from the East, particularly Judæa, during the winter months ; and this would now mean the spring or summer of 62 A.D.

Fairly early, then, in Paul's third year in Rome, according to Luke's hints in Acts xxviii. 30 f., his case reached the important stage when the appellant stated his plea in reply to the charges against him ; and to Paul's eye the omens went against him as to the final issue reserved for a later hearing. He feels that the hour has arrived to set his house

in order; not only to collect his few private possessions left for the time with friends elsewhere, like his cloak, books, etc., in the keeping of Carpus at Troas (probably his host when he passed through on his last journey to Jerusalem, perhaps in expectation of passing that way again *en route* for Rome and Spain); but also to give his final instructions to those of his helpers on whom the chief burden lay of carrying forward his great unfinished work. Among these Timothy occupied the most trying post; and he was, too, Paul's special son in the faith. To him, therefore, the Apostle addressed his last extant letter, our 2 Timothy, probably in the early summer of A.D. 62, reinforcing much of the charge more fully set forth in 1 Timothy, but with more personal touches, drawn from memory of their earlier relations. It contains his last will and testament to the younger man, as chief heir of his own spiritual treasure, while their Lord continued to delay His manifest appearing in power and glory. Its sum was: "Be thou sober in all things, do an evangelist's work, fulfil to the full thy ministry," whether at Ephesus or elsewhere. "For I am already being poured forth as a drink offering, and the season of my departure is just upon me."[1] His last earthly desire is to see Timothy once more, and be cheered in his almost total solitude, as regards old friends, by his affectionate and loyal sympathy. And so he bids him leave his post in Asia[2] for this final personal ministry of love, and hasten to his side "before winter."

[1] iv. 6. The metaphors here used are prominent among those special points of contact between 2 Timothy and Philippians (see ii. 17, i. 23) which confirm our view of their historical sequence. Another striking resemblance in thought in afforded by 2 Timothy ii. 10 and Philippians i. 12 f., 25.

[2] 2 Timothy iv. 12: "But Tychicus I have sent to Ephesus," seems to imply that Timothy might not be there when the letter reached him, but be fulfilling his quasi-apostolic ministry as Paul's substitute elsewhere in Asia; cf. iv. 5, and the general tone of a passage like ii. 1.

All the personal references which occur between the first statement of the request for his immediate presence in iv. 9, and the end of the letter, seem appropriate to the situation as just described, save those in one verse, viz.: v. 20. This comes in with odd abruptness between Paul's remembrances to Prisca and Aquila and the family of Onesiphorus (ver. 19), and the greetings sent to Timothy by certain Roman Christians. It runs as follows: "Erastus stayed in Corinth, and Trophimus I left at Miletus sick." The latter would be a strange piece of news to send across half the world to a friend of this same Trophimus apparently resident in Ephesus, only some miles from Miletus itself. It can hardly have stood here originally, and probably is a personal notice later detached from some insignificant letter written to Timothy on an earlier occasion, in order to be preserved by being attached after Timothy's death to the *personalia* at the close of a letter which promised to enjoy greater permanence. The fugitive note in question may well have been written by Paul after his farewell to the Ephesian Elders, to Timothy, who quite likely had been sent to summon them to Miletus and himself to remain at Ephesus for a season. It informed him that Erastus, whom we find in Acts xix. 22 associated with Timothy in a journey into Macedonia, probably on the collection business then in hand, had remained in Corinth (of which he was seemingly treasurer), instead of joining Paul at Miletus; while Trophimus, an Ephesian (Acts xxi. 29) and one of the collection delegates, had had to be left behind at the last moment owing to sickness (which proved only of such duration as to allow him to be with Paul just before the arrest in the temple at Jerusalem). Why Timothy should have withdrawn at this point from the party conveying the great Gentile offering to the poor saints at Jerusalem, though Acts xx. 3 f. mentions him among those destined for this duty, we need not attempt to

define,[1] any more than we need try to say just why Timothy was with Paul when he wrote 2 Corinthians from Macedonia, although he had apparently, according to 1 Timothy i. 3, been charged quite recently to stay on in Ephesus to check certain nascent abuses—an allusion which Paul's later address to the Ephesians elders helps to clear up (Acts xx. 29–31). But just as in the one case it may be that Paul, disappointed in his hope of being met early on his way to Macedonia by Titus with news from Corinth, while on his arrival in Macedonia he was " afflicted on every side—without fightings, within fears " (2 Cor. ii. 12 f., vii. 5)—summoned Timothy to leave Ephesus and join him ; so it is quite probable that his sense of the growing dangers threatening the Ephesian Church (Acts xx. 29 f.) made him change his plans so far as to leave Timothy behind in charge. Nor is it needful to suppose that Timothy was ever permanently withdrawn from this special duty during the rest of Paul's life.

While, as we have just seen, it is probable that Timothy resumed charge of the Church of Ephesus once at least between the time when he first received such a commission, as Paul was leaving the city after the riot described in Acts xix., and its formal renewal in 1 Timothy ; still, that original commission may well have been regarded as fundamental, especially to the mind of the local Christians. For when we remember that Acts xx. 1 records a solemn assembly of the Ephesian Church at which Paul " exhorted " it before saying farewell prior to " going into Macedonia," it is natural to suppose that on that occasion he also " exhorted " Timothy to represent him among the Ephesian " disciples " in his absence. Thus, when the time came, later on, that it seemed needful both to brace Timothy to greater courage and persistence in his efforts to control

[1] His presence, as a substitute for the Apostle himself, would be most valuable in the great centre of Asian Christianity at such a critical time as that implied in Paul's speech at Miletus.

dangerous tendencies at work in this Church, and to strengthen his hands by rallying to him the Church's public opinion through reminding it of the Apostle's authority as always behind Timothy, Paul would, in writing, naturally go back to the analogy of his first solemn action in the matter. In this the local Church was, no doubt, a consenting party. That is, the exact reference in i. 3 ff. was made quite as much for the Church's sake as for Timothy's, since this was the only "exhortation" of the kind of which the Church could be expected to be cognisant, and to which it would attach full importance.

Such a view of the case fits in excellently with what is, indeed, widely recognised,[1] viz., that 1 Timothy, as distinct from 2 Timothy, is in tone and manner largely an "open letter," such as Timothy might communicate at least to the Church's elders, if and as need arose, owing to the resistance of any section of the Church to his cautions or censure.

Once this wider potential audience is allowed for, we cease to find any difficulty in a good deal that has been thought strange in a letter to an intimate friend and disciple, even one of a temperament apt to be unduly daunted by confident contradiction or challenge, especially when coming from men older than himself and supported by a good many among the local Christians. There are not a few passages which gain fresh fitness and force when read in this light. "I speak the truth, I lie not" (ii. 7) is a case in point.[2] But the principle applies especially to those enforced by the

[1] Thus in the article on 1 Timothy in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* it is rightly called "a pastoral letter upon Church order addressed by the Apostle Paul to the Asiatic Christian communities in and round Ephesus (i. 3) . . . The writer really has the Church in his mind all through." But this in no way excludes its being addressed primarily to an individual, as it purports to be.

[2] Another is 1 Timothy vi. 6–10, with its general "we" followed by "But thou, O man of God" (v. 11); while in 17 ff., the danger of riches is reverted to.

formula "Faithful is the saying" (λόγος), presumably as being virtually called in question by some section of the local Church. This is the case with the central idea of "Salvation" itself, that of grace to sinners (1 Tim. i. 15): so with that of faithful endurance as inspired by Hope in a living God as guarantor of life eternal, in 9 (cf. 8b), 1 Tim. iv., and again in 2 Tim. ii. 11–13. In Titus iii. 8 the thought emphasised is Christian care for "fair deeds" of beneficence: and of like spirit is the remaining maxim, "If a man seek the office of oversight, he desireth an honourable work" (1 Tim. iii. 1), followed by the qualifications needful in the aspirant. Amidst these occurs a little argumentative aside (iii. 5) addressed, as it were, to would-be overseers: "If a man knoweth not how to rule his own household, how shall he take charge of the Church of God?"

But besides these more obvious examples, we may take a verse like 1 Timothy iv. 14, where the "gift," more diligent exercise of which Paul is pressing in a fatherly way upon Timothy by reminding him of the solemn conditions of its original manifestation, is referred to as given not only through prophetic designation (cf. i. 18) but also with "the laying on of the hands of the presbytery" (*διὰ προφητείας μετὰ ἐπιθέσεως τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ πρεσβυτερίου*). Now, when we compare this with the parallel passage in 2 Timothy i. 6, where in keeping with its whole appeal as based mainly on the personal relations of the two, as of father and son in Christ, "the laying on of *my* hands" is referred to, we can hardly fail to trace in the former case the influence of the probability that this passage will be read in the presence of the presbytery of the Church in which Timothy is being urged to exercise his high gift more strenuously (cf. the parallel case of Paul himself in Acts xiii. 1–3). Incidentally, too, one may note how strongly against the theory of forgery are the allusions in i. 18, iv. 14 to "prophecy" as condition-

ing Timothy's call to his ministry : and similar water-marks of early and authentic origin are scattered throughout the Epistles. Even the absence of any explicit indication of place *whence* and *whither* they were (to be supposed as) written is distinctly alien to the habits of forgery, which tries to satisfy the natural curiosity of the public for which it is intended. Again, the marked differences of situation presupposed by them, as well as the large number of otherwise unknown or obscure names occurring in allusive fashion, are hard to explain, save on the basis of authenticity.

Nor is it really a tenable view that the present letters have been built up on the basis of Pauline *reliquiæ*, as they have been called, fragments of slight notes such as the one which we have seen reason to suspect as lying behind the " erratic block " embedded amid the salutations at the end of 2 Timothy. No attempt to work out any theory on these lines has ever been made to the satisfaction of any one save the author in each case ; [1] indeed, they are hardly put forward seriously, rather than as make-shifts to meet the obvious fact that there are Pauline elements in our Epistles, in spite of any difficulties about them as a whole—a fact which only a few rigorous extremists now deny. As has been said, however, the really abiding difficulty to most unbiassed minds is simply the fact that, as Professor Peake puts it (p. 61), " the attempts to place them in the period covered by the Acts of the Apostles have not succeeded " hitherto ; and, as he rightly shows, the alternative attempts to place them outside Paul's otherwise known life, common as they have been especially in England, are really not allowable. All our earliest evidence is against any release from the imprisonment in which Acts leaves Paul, though it was altogether

[1] Thus Holtzmann thought that the theory of sheer invention was easier to conceive than that of partial genuineness, and Jülicher now takes the same view : see Wohlenberg, 58 f.

to its author's purpose to show the opposite, however briefly, even suppose he were contemplating returning to the last phase of his career in a third work—for which there is really no evidence, but much against it. This Dr. Peake (pp. 61–63) shows conclusively enough as regards Acts and 1 Clement,[1] the latter of which clearly suggests that both Peter and Paul were dead before the Neronian horror of summer A.D. 64, since its victims are said to be "gathered together unto" Peter and Paul, i.e., in the place of reward (ch. vi.). But there is yet another witness, for those at least who accept the authenticity of 1 Peter, a witness carrying back the date of Paul's death yet nearer to 62, to which we have assigned it (according to Ramsay's Chronology). For it is widely admitted (e.g., by Dr. H. B. Swete, *Comm. on St. Mark*, p. xvii.), that Peter would not have addressed Christians generally in Galatia and Asia, where so much of Paul's work lay, during the lifetime of that Apostle, and without a word of explanation. Yet Peter did not survive the summer of 64, and his Epistle is dated by Dr. Hort about A.D. 63.

If, then, the Pastorals are Paul's at all—and this view is held by English scholars for the most part, including men of fine theological and historical instinct, like Lightfoot, Hort, Sanday, Lock and Gwatkin, as well as by Weiss and not a few other foreign scholars—I may fairly claim that some such theory as I have been expounding has marked advantages over theirs as to date and setting, by placing them within the known limits of Paul's life. It cannot be shown that the mere lapse of four or five years would materially lighten the difficulties felt on the score of style and

[1] Whether its author meant by the famous phrase (c. 5) "the bound of the West," when read *in the light of its context*, Rome or rather Spain, may be left an open question, since in any case he implies (c. 6), that Paul did not survive summer 64. Moreover, his idea of a mission to Spain (if he had it) might be no more than an inference from Romans xv. 28.

thought, such as they are ; while the difficulty of dating any Pauline Epistles after 64 or even 63 is enormous.

I am quite aware that to many such a construction will seem both new and problematical.[1] That is but natural, since apart from the sketch of it in the article " Paul " in the new *Encyclopædia Britannica*, which is essentially on the same lines, though I would now amend it in one or two details,[2] I do not know that it has before been broached. It is true that attempts of a somewhat similar kind, besides my own earlier one, have been put forward in Great Britain and America, not to speak of the Continent. Most of those known to me, however, are marred by falling into the same error as formerly led me astray in relation to 1 Timothy, as though it must be prior to Paul's imprisonment on account of its confident reference to an early visit to Timothy. Accordingly, they either separate 1 Timothy by an incredible interval from the kindred letter to Titus,[3] or place Titus also prior to Paul's arrest at Jerusalem,[4] and so several years prior to the Imprisonment Group, with which both seem too closely related to be so separated in time and conditions. This latter view also sacrifices Paul's one known point of contact with Crete, which makes it natural to date Titus subsequent to the voyage to Rome—a point on which I have just noticed that the Rev. J. Macpherson, writing in

[1] The very fact, however, that it *is* a synthesis of so large a number of detailed phenomena of various kinds, personal and other, seems to give it a claim to be on the right lines. If it is not, it should be easy to refute it by some of the many data involved ; and its author only hopes that it will be thought worth testing, and not simply left on one side by workers in this field.

[2] E.g., the account of the origin of the misplaced matter forming 2 Timothy iv. 20, 21*a*, which I too hastily adopted from others without noticing that Paul was not likely to pass Miletus on his way to Macedonia.

[3] As Rev. J. Macpherson, in the *American Journal of Theology* for 1900, pp. 23 ff.

[4] So W. E. Bowen, *The Dates of the Pastoral Epistles*, 1900, p. 21 f., and T. C. Laughlin, *The Pastoral Epistles in the Light of one Roman Imprisonment*, an inaugural address at the Pacific Theol. Seminary, 1905, p. 27.

The American Journal of Theology for 1900 (pp. 47 f.), reached the same conclusion expressed in my *Apostolic Age*, published about the same date. I find that he also places all three Pastorals in the two years of Paul's Roman imprisonment, though he has no satisfactory solution of 2 Timothy iv. 20 to offer, and places 2 Timothy next to 1 Timothy, while he thinks Titus was written subsequently, when its recipient was in Dalmatia or had returned once more to Crete. His statement, however, of the conditions under which the Pastorals were written is very brief, and a little confused[1] as to 1 Timothy, the bulk of his paper being a full discussion (pp. 23–44) of the question, "Was there a second imprisonment of Paul in Rome?" which he answers very conclusively in the negative.

Before closing, let me add some further words on the final challenge any theory accepting the Pastorals as genuine must face, viz., What have you to say touching the alleged un-Pauline religion of these Epistles? What is their bearing on one's views of the great Apostle of the Gentiles, the champion of Salvation by Faith, as opposed to Legalism? I admit that this *is* the final issue, and that if one were forced to accept the religious estimate of the Pastorals assumed by those who reject them, one would be bound to draw the like conclusion. But is this estimate the right one? Does it not rest on too narrow and rigid a reading of Paul and Paulinism in the other Epistles, and of religious experience itself? The question is a large one, and is not strictly within the scope of the present paper. It is one, however, which I have carefully considered in studying the Pauline writings as a whole, when writing on Paul for the *Encyclo-*

[1] Particularly as regards the promised visit in 1 Timothy iii. 14, which on his theory, also, involves the writer's being already in Rome. Nor does he relate the Pastorals to the other Imprisonment Epistles at all.

pædia Britannica, to which I must be content to refer for the full argument on which my conviction rests. It is based largely upon the way in which the thought and expression of the whole series of letters bearing Paul's name overlaps and blends along many lines, particularly when justice is done to Colossians and Philippians—and I have no personal hesitation in adding Ephesians [1]—as uniting the Pastorals to the earlier Epistles more obviously than would otherwise be recognisable. While there is wonderful development and variety in the forms and applications assumed by Paulinism, especially when we compare the letters farthest from each other in time and conditions, there is no contradiction in idea or even in spirit from first to last, if only one allows for the fact that Paul is in all adapting his message, as a true missionary ever must, to the actual needs of his readers under conditions, both intellectual and moral, which vary immensely in certain cases. I believe, too, with Sir W. M. Ramsay,[2] that " there was some development in his power of expressing his Gospel in a way that should be intelligible and convincing to his converts, morally undeveloped as they were," compared with himself, even after years of Christian faith : that he was singularly able, through his sympathetic eye for the realities of life, to learn from experience in this matter ; and that he came to recognise more and more that the forms in which he would most naturally and helpfully express his Gospel, if considering himself alone, were not those actually most helpful to all types of readers. In fact, some of his freer and more spontaneous utterances in the earlier Epistles had created mis-

[1] I observe with satisfaction that Prof. P. Gardner in his recent study on St. Paul (*op. cit.*), while noting its slightly " more advanced phase of Pauline thought " as compared with Colossians, inclines to accept Ephesians as really from Paul's pen.

[1] Expositor, VIII. i. 374.

understanding [1] and been abused by those of less deep moral experience and insight. What was love to do under these conditions? That was ever his supreme concern. What did the expediency of charity counsel in the way of further adaptation and even condescension of his Gospel to human capacity and need? It is only when we so conceive the problem, as it faced Paul the Missionary, that we are able to do justice to the more rudimentary and categorical forms of instruction which abound in the later Epistles,—in large proportion in Philippians and Colossians, still more in Ephesians, most of all in the Pastorals. Witness the practical directions of all sorts in the second part of Colossians and Ephesians, and the injunction in Philippians (iv. 8 f.) to reckon with whatsoever things are worthy of reverence, just, pure, lovely, of good name,—in a word, anything held excellent and praiseworthy. To this he adds "the things which ye both learned and received and heard and saw in me, these practise, and the God of peace shall be with you." Here he sets forth the Christian ethical tradition (παράδοσις) as received through him; and if one is minded to press such language into contrast with that used in other connexions, where the inner dynamic of all is laid bare in the personal attitude of grateful trust and love towards the Christ

[1] Similarly it is probable that a plausible footing for a teaching of the Law as expedient even for Gentile Christians, such as is implied in 1 Timothy and Titus, was afforded by Paul's conservative attitude to the Law as having a certain claim upon the allegiance of "Israel after the flesh," even when justified by faith in Christ. Harnack has recently, in *The Date of the Acts*, called attention to this practical limitation of Paul's fundamental principles, which might well seem to give the Law, especially as having some partial footing in the Patriarchal period to which Paul makes no polemical references in his Epistles, an abiding significance for the religious life of all Christians. But just as Harnack argues that when the Paul of the Epistles is rightly interpreted, viz., as one who could so consider the actual situation as regards Israel's special prerogatives, he ceases to be inconsistent with (but rather includes) the Paul of the Acts; so the same Paul, the missionary who treated both Jew and Gentile according to their actual state and needs, could well be the author of the Pastorals.

of God—as the language of the Pastorals is often pressed—why, one can easily style this "moralistic" and "sub-Pauline" and anything else that may be supposed to condemn these Epistles as unworthy of the evangelic Paul. This whole line of criticism is liable to the greatest unreality and exaggeration. The fact is that *fides qua creditur* and *fides quæ creditur* cannot be thus easily severed (cf. 1 Tim. i. 19 for both), at any rate as they appear in any of the New Testament Epistles. Christian faith—which is often the best equivalent for ἡ πίστις—whether in the more subjective sense or in the more objective sense found in the Pastorals (as elsewhere in St. Paul, for it is not really peculiar to them), always has implicit in it a distinctive content as conditioned by Christ, its immediate object.[1] But this implicit element

[1] Compare Sir W. M. Ramsay in the Expositor, VII. ix. 172 ff., also for July, 1912, 88 ff. As regards the term πίστις itself in the Pastorals, there is, as A. Klöpper puts it, "a peculiar changing shade of meaning in the idea, as between subjective faith and objective content of faith, or rather between personal faith and corporate faith" (*Gemeindeglaube*). But how inevitable that "faith" as personal should take common or collective form as "the faith"! This phenomenon appears already in Galatians i. 23, "preaches the faith which he once used to ravage," and Philippians i. 27, "with one soul striving along with the faith of the Gospel" (συναθλοῦντες τῇ πίστει τ. εὐαγγ.), with which we may compare 2 Timothy i. 8 συνκακοπάθησον τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ, and 1 Corinthians xiii. 6 συγχαίρει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. So in Ephesians iv. 4, he speaks of "One Lord, one faith, one baptism," and in iv. 13 of "all attaining to the unity of (the) faith and of (the) insight into the Son of God." In fact, I venture to say that he who will patiently think out (with the aid, say, of Lightfoot's commentary) even the following extract from Paul's very personal letter to Philemon, will be less ready to find the religious ideal of the Pastorals "sub-Pauline"; and such passages may be multiplied from the whole Imprisonment Group. "I thank my God always . . . hearing of thy love and the faith which thou hast toward the Lord Jesus and toward all the saints, (praying) that the communicativeness (κοινωνία) of thy faith may become effective in (virtue of) insight (ἐπίγνωσις) into every good thing (ideal of action, cf. Col. iii. 10 and context) that is in us, directed towards Christ" (4–6). Here we have a hint as to the true meaning of the "insight into the truth" (ἐπίγνωσις ἀληθείας), as it is in Christ, which meets us in the Pastorals (1 Tim. ii. 4; 2 Tim. ii. 25, iii. 7, Tit. i. 1), and which is strictly akin to the use of "insight into His will" (ἐπίγνωσις) in Colossians i. 9 f., ii. 2 (where its object is "the mystery of God, even Christ," quite as in 1 Timothy iii. 16), and iii. 10 (cf. Philemon 6), and to "the doctrine (λόγος)

naturally becomes more and more explicit in "principles (λόγοι) of the faith and of the fair instruction" (διδασκαλίας 1 Tim. iv. 6), especially as erroneous interpretations of this content, both theoretic and practical, develop amid the Gospel's working in actual human nature, biassed in certain definite directions by Jewish or Hellenic training. This would be specially true in such an active-minded and morally unsettled environment as the cities of proconsular Asia, where also the assumption must have been common that one man was as good as another in the function of "teacher." Particularly would this be the case with the moral ideal of Christian conduct, which is what Paul chiefly means by "healthful" or "sound," as distinct from "ailing" or "morbid" teaching, in the Pastorals. What is most emphasised in these letters as needful, as also in the Imprisonment Group, is a growing *insight* (ἐπίγνωσις) into the moral implications of personal faith in Christ, as distinct from barren intellectual notions [1] about Him and His Salvation, to which the Greek mind was specially prone. But is not this exactly what one would expect to be the situation already by 60 A.D., in the province of Asia? And there, too, surely some recognised norm of ethical and doctrinal principles must by this time have taken some sort of shape. Indeed, it has never been shown by sound analogy, either from the New Testament or from religious experience at large—least of all from the foreign Mission field—that "the pressing need of the Church," either in Asia or Crete, was *not* already in 60 A.D., "to maintain the true Pauline tradition against certain moral and speculative ideas," whether by "adherence to"

of the truth of the Gospel" in Colossians i. 5, which "bears fruit" in devoted living (*ib.* 6, 10). All this, moreover, is rooted in Paul's earliest teaching in certain connexions, as when the Thessalonian converts are described as chosen "unto salvation in sanctification of spirit and belief of the truth . . . through our Gospel."

[1] Compare James ii. 14 ff. for a similar tendency in Jewish Christians to a "barren" or "dead" faith, without "the fruits of righteousness."

more or less " formulated statements of the sound teaching " (particularly the Pauline ethical tradition or deposit), or by emphasis on the security of that tradition as handed on by certain of the regularly contributed ministers of the community (2 Tim. ii. 1 ; cf. 1 Tim. v. 17, Tit. i. 5, 9), in contrast to certain volunteer teachers of a self-opinionated type, often with an eye to material gain (Tit. i. 10 f. ; cf. 2 Tim. iv. 3 f.). How else were " the interests of discipline and doctrine to be conserved ? " Such a method has about it nothing necessarily " hierarchical " (such associations are simply imported from later times, when the idea of " apostolic succession " conditioned by *sacramental orders* had arisen) ; it is only a common-sense provision that the teachers shall be truly *representative* of the faith by which the Church (general and local) had been actually begotten and built up. In the establishing and consolidating of such methods of orderly teaching throughout the Churches which looked on Paul as their ultimate human founder or, at least, as the chief Gentile Apostle, what more natural than that " Paul's lieutenants " should be viewed as " possessing the central deposit of the Apostolic faith, and having the duty as well as the right of exercising the authority with which that position invested them " ? [1]

What I urge, then, is that in matters fundamental to Paulinism, and to the true Pauline spirit and attitude, there is no radical contrast between the Pastorals and generally admitted letters of his, particularly those nearest them in time and conditions ; the difference, so far as it exists—and this is apt to be exaggerated in our mind owing to the proportion of specific directions in the " pastorals " from their very scope—is one of degree and perspective. The contrast is still further made artificial by overlooking the

[1] I quote for convenience the terms in which Dr. Moffatt states the phenomena in the *Encyc. Brit.*, xxvi. 993.

fact that "faith," in the more personal and dynamic sense, is in them presupposed as long present and rooted in the very habit of the Christian soul; whereas in certain of the earlier Epistles Paul is earnestly contending for its recognition as the root of the whole matter of salvation, over against Judaising emphasis on the Mosaic Law, and that often on its ritual side, as the very condition of saving faith and acceptance with God. The perspectives are quite distinct; and only when this is fully realised can any good Paulinist—and I claim to be one—be easy about the tone and emphasis of the Pastorals, which after all is what tells on the mind in the long run. Thus, Dr. Denney complains that "the general impression one gets from the Pastoral Epistles is that, as a doctrine, Christianity was now complete and could be taken for granted. . . . There is nothing creative in the statement of it; and it is the combination of fulness and of something not unlike formalism that raises doubts as to the authorship." Here, allowing for a little over-emphasis, one can agree in principle, and only ask, Why should Christianity not be taken for granted by Paul at this late stage of instruction, as regards its essential features of faith and practice? And in fact, Dr. Denney himself largely admits our whole case when he adds, in speaking of Titus iii. 4 f., "St Paul could, no doubt, have said all this, but probably he would have said it otherwise, and not all at a time." [1] Thus, it becomes a mere matter of opinion as to the expediencies of the case, if what Paul might well have said—had he seen reason for so doing—one denies that he did say. In a word, a large part of the feeling against the Pastorals as unworthy of Paul's inspiration is highly subjective, and sacrifices Paul the Missionary Apostle to Paul the theologian or the self-contained fanatic for one way of putting things—even if the

[1] *The Death of Christ*, 1902, 202 f., quoted in Moffatt's *Introd. to the Lit. of the New Testament*, p. 412.

deepest and most morally effective way to himself, though others could not so grasp it. Full sympathy with all the facts of the case, alike for Paul himself and his correspondents, is the thing most needful in order to set the Pastorals in their true and vital light.

If these principles be sound, and if the historical setting be in the main such as we have pictured (and that is all one would venture to claim), then the value of the Pastorals for a full-orbed appreciation whether of Paul or of Paulinism, in their sanity, sympathy and true spirituality—as concerned above all for the great end, Christlike character, not only as inner and personal but also as realised socially in a community of holy and loving life—becomes also manifest. They cast back light upon an element in Paul, as the practical pastor of souls and organiser of the Christian life on a social basis,[1] which otherwise we are apt to overlook amid the splendour of his familiar pleas for the innerness of religion and for the freedom of the Gospel as spirit and power, rather than letter and impersonal law or sacred ritual. They show him clearly to have been all along, as we work out the lines running back from them through all his letters, not the doctrinaire, self-pleasing prophet or theologian, pitiless towards human limitations of insight and unable to adapt his high message to lower natures than his own, but rather the true Missionary or Apostle of Jesus Christ, full of prophetic insight indeed, but also (like his Master, in whom he saw God incarnate) caring even for those weak in faith, and willing to condescend in methods of teaching to the slow of heart and mind.

Accordingly, I accept the challenge that the final issue in this, as in every question of authenticity, turns on a true

[1] "Without these Epistles we might take a maimed view of Paul's character and philosophy. They show in what way he regarded the family," and "the family as the basis of the organised Church" (Sir W. M. Ramsay, Expositor, VII. ix. 178).

interpretation of Paul and Paulinism. In other words, one's attitude to the Pastorals forms—where one has studied them at all carefully—a test of the adequacy of one's insight into Paul and his spirit. And, as at present advised, I judge that the rejection of them as in general tone and attitude un-Pauline, argues either defective exegesis or a one-sided and partial view both of Paul and Paulinism.

Such is the view of the Pastoral Epistles to which I wished to invite attention. I hope at least to have shown that the issue is not the closed one which it is often represented, especially by the tone in which the negative conclusion is assumed as a kind of dogma or test of critical competence and open-mindedness. The fact is that either conclusion has its difficulties ; [1] and had time allowed, I think I could have shown that those of the negative theory are really greater [2] than those of the view which accepts the good faith of their own claim to Pauline origin, once it is freed from the incubus of having to assume Paul's release and subsequent activity, against which all really early external evidence seems to witness irrevocably.

VERNON BARTLET.

SUGGESTIONS ON THE HISTORY AND LETTERS OF ST. PAUL.

III. BELIEF AND BAPTISM.

WHAT is the force of the term "believe" (πιστεύω) in the Acts ? Does it necessarily imply that all who "believed" were converted and permanently became Christians

[1] Prof. Peake sums up those on both sides with his wonted fairness (*op. cit.*, pp. 69 f.). I hope I have succeeded in modifying, if not removing, most of those attaching to the positive side, and shown reason for getting beyond his intermediate position, viz., that while "the Epistles cannot have come from Paul's hand in their present form, yet they contain not a little Pauline material" (p. 71).

[2] Compare Wohlenberg, *op. cit.*, 63–66.

in the complete and final sense ? The answer to this question is of some historical importance, as will appear. First, however, let us take the general question, without prejudice due to the special cases which will come up.

The example of Simon Magus seems conclusive. Simon believed (Acts viii. 13), and was baptized. Yet it is hard to suppose that he became in the final sense a Christian, although for the time he was a member of the Church. The language of Luke, on the whole, suggests the opposite. Simon, it is true, after baptism, "continued with Philip; and beholding signs and great wonders wrought, he was amazed" (ἐξίστατο). Yet no word is said to mitigate the final condemnation pronounced on him by Peter: "thou hast neither part nor lot in this matter; for thy heart is not right." He is not described as repenting, but only as asking in fear of the future that Peter should pray for him.

It seems beyond question that Luke knew the reputation which Simon acquired,[1] and that he regarded the subsequent history of Simon as the natural result of what occurred at the beginning of his connexion with the Christians.

Luke seems to regard belief as the first stage in a process. The second stage is "turning to the Lord" (xi. 21), of which the seal is baptism (ἐπίστευον καὶ ἐβαπτίζοντο, xviii. 8, cp. viii. 13): it is a subsequent stage consequent on believing. Later ensues the settled Christian life of those who are styled in the perfect tense πεπιστευκότες, who are in the state that ensues for those who have believed (xxi. 20, 25, xix. 18, etc.).

A process is here presumed which regularly and usually passed through these stages; and in various places, e.g. xviii. 27, this process is described as a whole by mentioning

[1] Without accepting as historical the presumptions of the Pseudo-Clementine treatises, one must regard them as having a certain foundation in the belief and tradition of the Church about Simon.

only the first stage, belief, and assuming that the normal continuation followed. The context is the proof that "belief" implies all this. But is that always the case? does πιστεύω always imply that the person who believed went on through the later stages, and became a Christian in the fullest sense? If so, why should Luke often add a second verb, indicating one or other of the subsequent stages? I think that the state of mind called πιστεύειν sometimes advanced no further than intellectual assent and emotional impression; and it would not be safe to assert that belief always was followed even by baptism.

The preceding remarks lead up to the consideration of two cases. The first is Acts xiii. 12, "then the Proconsul (Sergius Paulus), when he saw what was done, believed, being astonished at the teaching of the Lord." Was the Proconsul converted to Christianity, or was he merely impressed deeply by what he saw and heard?

The question is roused by an interesting though incomplete inscription which was found at Pisidian Antioch in 1912. It is the beginning of a record of the political career of L. Sergius Paullus the younger, who may be recognised confidently as the son of the Proconsul of Cyprus. Professor Dessau confirms my opinion on this point, and in a letter which he kindly sent, he adds a brief statement of the family career in Roman Imperial history, with the comment, "evidently none of this family was Christian." In this I quite agree, but in my turn I ask, "Does Luke say that the Proconsul was Christian?"

The text is engraved on a block of stone, which once formed part of the wall of a building, in good letters of about 70 to 100 A D. Copied at Salir, one of the outlying quarters of Antioch, by Mr. J. G. C. Anderson and myself.

L Sergio, L(uci) f(ilio), Paullo
filio, quattuorvir(o) v(iarum) c(urandarum) tri[b(uno)]
mil(itum) leg(ionis) vi Ferr(atae), quaest(ori),

"To L(ucius) Sergius Paullus the younger [1] (lit. son), son of Lucius, one of the board of four commissioners of streets, tribune of the soldiers of the sixth legion styled Ferrata, quaestor." The rest of his career was engraved on a separate stone, which has not yet been found. The second *filio* distinguishes him from a well-known father; and the character of the lettering shows that, as Mr. Anderson remarked, the inscription should be assigned to the Flavian period. L. Sergius Paullus must have been an official in the province Galatia before he attained the consulship,[2] most probably Governor; and the inscription was then placed in his honour by the Colony Antioch. Inscriptions in honour of governors are very common there; but inscriptions in honour of senatorial officials other than Governors are very rare (unless the official belonged to an Antiochian family).

The Proconsul of Cyprus, L. Sergius Paullus (such is the correct Roman spelling), had a son who passed through the regular senatorial career; and the first stages in the career of the latter are recorded in this inscription. He had also a great-grandson of the same name, who was consul about 150 A.D., and again in 168.[3] The family, therefore, was one of the ordinary Roman official type; and is in the last degree unlikely to have been Christian or to have sprung from a Christian ancestor. A Christian family would disappear from the official lists: their religion did not readily lend itself to the requirements of official life, or lead to Imperial or popular favour, although there certainly were some few Christian officials.

Is it, however, the case that Luke regarded the Proconsul

[1] In Greek inscriptions the same distinction is much more frequent, and is usually expressed by *νέος* or *νεώτερος*.

[2] If he had attained the Consulship, this would in ordinary course be stated after his name and before the earliest office of his career.

[3] The interval seems too long for the consul of about 150 to be regarded as grandson of the Proconsul of Cyprus in 47.

of Cyprus as a Christian? That depends on the force of πιστεύειν. The word is quite capable, certainly, of this sense; but I doubt if the words of Luke here imply more than intellectual belief accompanied by amazement at the marvel which he had seen, i.e. some very deep impression on the mind, but nothing beyond that of a permanently religious character.

The use of ἐκπλήττομαι elsewhere by Luke—three times in the Gospel, here alone in Acts—does not suggest that astonishment was a sure prelude to conversion. The use of the almost synonymous ἐξίσταμαι by Luke is equally unfavourable to that view. Mere astonishment is not the state of mind which favours real conversion; it produced the unreal and evanescent conversion of Simon Magus.

Meyer-Wendt and others consider that the Proconsul was converted; and Blass even connects ἐπίστευσεν ἐπὶ τῇ διδαχῇ τοῦ κυρίου—"he believed in the teaching of the Lord, being astonished (at the miracle)"—regardless of the order and of the analogies which he quotes (Luke iv. 32; Mark i. 22); but he has not persuaded Wendt to accept this translation, and is not likely to find others ready to follow him. Mr. Rackham, on the contrary, has a judicious and convincing note, in his edition of the *Acts*, to which I may refer the reader; and he concludes that a real conversion of the Proconsul would have had more serious consequences, whereas Paullus "had no more dealings with the Apostles, who leave Cyprus."

Luke lays full emphasis on the highly favourable impression which Paul made on the first Roman official with whom his mission work brought him in contact. This is in accordance with his general plan, and illuminative of his purpose in this history (as is pointed out in *St. Paul the Traveller*, pp. 304–309). It is unjustifiable to go further, and to think that the Governor was converted.

Some will be disposed to set no value on Mr. Rackham's first argument: "it seems incredible that at this date a Roman Proconsul could have been converted:—it would have made a great stir in the Church and in the world, of which some echo must have reached us." Admitting all this, they would simply add that Luke, being not a trustworthy historian, incorrectly represents Paullus as having been converted. Thus the mistranslation of the statement in the *Acts* would be made into a charge against the trustworthiness of the writer.

One piece of evidence seems conclusive. Luke iv. 32 uses the same words about the people of Capernaum as about the Proconsul, "they were astonished at His teaching," but they were not converted. The Proconsul was astonished at Paul's teaching; he admired it as a moral and intellectual display; he was delighted with the boldness and the power of these itinerant lecturers; but this spirit Luke does not regard as favourable to real conversion, and he adds the words to show the limitations of the case.

The other case is Acts xvii. 34: "certain men also clave unto him and believed, among whom was Dionysius the Areopagite, and Damaris," etc. In this case I believe that no Church was formed, and no baptism administered at the time. Doubtless the effect produced on a few persons was genuine and deep, but Paul did not then remain in Athens to follow it up. This we gather from a casual phrase of his, which opens up a wide question, and must be reserved for a separate Section IV.

IV. The Firstfruits of Asia.

A good deal of difficulty has been found in this description, which is applied by St. Paul in 1 Corinthians xvi. 15 to the household of Stephanas of Corinth. It has been understood to imply that Stephanas was the first convert

who belonged to the province of Achaia. What, then, is the relation between this and Luke's statement in Acts xvii. 34, as just quoted ?

It is contended that Dionysius or Damaris or some Athenian must have been the first convert in the province, and therefore either Luke's narrative is inconsistent with Paul's words, or there is some other meaning in the phrase "firstfruits of Achaia."

Dr. Steinmann [1] maintains that Athens was not a city of the province Achaia, but, as a free and allied city, it was outside the province, an *externa civitas*.[2] If this were so, many interesting questions would arise ; on which we need not enter. The previous question is whether Dr. Steinmann's statement, that in Roman usage Athens was not part of Achaia, can be accepted as correct : he admits, of course, that popular Greek usage might have loosely called Athens a city of the province, but infers that, if St. Paul spoke in that way, he followed, not Roman, but Greek custom.

Perhaps it would be well to state first my own opinion, and afterwards to add the discussion of Dr. Steinmann's view, which is necessarily very technical and full of Roman minute details.

No church was, as I think, founded in Athens during the first visit of St. Paul, which was hurried and came to an abrupt end.[2] How much is implied by the term "believed" is very doubtful (see the preceding Section) ; but at least it remains far from probable that any person was baptized there at this time. Matters did not go so far as baptism. Dionysius may then have made no further progress

[1] *Leserkreis des Galaterbriefes*, pp. 88–94.

[2] The reception of the address, which Paul delivered before the Court of Areopagus, and the cold and significant words of the Court, showed that for the time there was no "open door" in Athens. Paul had tried a philosophic way there, but in Ephesus returned to his ordinary method.

than Sergius Paullus, who, as we have seen, never became a Christian in the fullest sense, and therefore never was baptized. Now the household of Stephanas was baptized, and I should suppose that only baptized and established converts would be called "firstfruits." If Aquila and Prisca were converted by St. Paul (as seems probable,[1] though by no means quite certain) they would not be firstfruits of Achaia, as they were strangers in Corinth: the description is restricted to provincials of Achaia.

It is possible that the "household of Stephanas" as a whole, not Stephanas alone, is meant as the "firstfruits," and that a single earlier convert here or there would not impair the right of this entire household to be called the "first." Households frequently seem to have gone as a whole: the family was the real unit in a pastoral sense, and the congregation had to be worked through families. The relation to the family was an extremely important matter in the eyes of St. Paul, when giving pastoral advice;[2] and some traces of this fact in social life appear in the Acts (see x. 2, xi. 14, xvi. 15, 31–34, xviii. 8, compare also 1 Cor. i. 16, John iv. 53).

What is meant is that, whether or not the first to believe, Stephanas with his whole household was the first to throw in his lot with and actually to begin the young congregation in Corinth by resolving and asking to be baptized.[3]

In passing it may be remarked that friends have asked why I have not replied to Dr. Steinmann's book, which is

[1] It seems most probable that Luke implies, though he does not expressly say, that they were St. Paul's converts. He trusts to the sense and discernment of his readers, as he does in the case of Titius Justus and of Crispus. The circumstances show without any formal statement that they were converted by Paul.

[2] See EXPOSITOR, Feb., 1910, p. 178.

[3] On the difference between the mere presence of individual believers and the existence of a fully formed congregation I have written in the *Expository Times*, 1912, Oct., Nov.

written to a large extent in polemic against my views. I have waited till time should reply. The constitution of the province Galatia has been gradually revealed, and many difficulties have been cleared away. The subject, however, is an extremely complicated one, and can never be understood without a great deal of careful and minute study and a considerable knowledge of Roman provincial administration. In this respect I regret to be obliged to say that Dr. Steinmann's book leaves much to be desired; and I cannot find in it any argument to which I could reply without a long and detailed discussion of Roman law in the Eastern provinces generally and in Galatia specially.

Our points of view on these matters are hopelessly diverse. On one page after another I find in his book statements at which I can only wonder. It is unprofitable to carry on a discussion when there is so little in which we are agreed: there must be some common foundation on which we could build up detail by detail a serviceable structure of reasoned knowledge. Otherwise nothing can be gained by controversy.

Of this I find examples on every page that I look at; and I now take one wh ch lies outside of the Galatian question: Athens and the province Achaia and the meaning of "first-fruits of Achaia."

Here we are entirely outside of the province Galatia. Dr. Steinmann, however, cannot shake off the thought of Galatia. He goes into the question, not for its own sake, but in order to bang the South-Galatian theory. With this idea his mind is prepossessed, and consequently he has not been so careful about matters of Roman history and antiquities as he otherwise would have been.

Dr. Steinmann's conclusion, p. 94, seems to amount to this, that, if Paul used the term Achaia to include Athens, he was not in accordance with Roman ideas and custom,

since Roman usage of the term Achaia excluded Athens (*Athen von der roemischen Provinz Achaja ausgeschlossen war*). Accordingly, he considers that Achaia meant the country of Greece, and that this was an old Greek pre-Roman usage, derived perhaps from the fact that the Achaean League included almost the whole of Greece; but he quotes no proof of such Greek usage, and it is contrary to everything that I know or have been taught from childhood.[1] What I have always learned and understood as the accepted teaching is that Achaia to the Greeks of pre-Roman time was the strip of land on the north coast of the Peloponnesus, between Arcadia and the Gulf of Corinth, and that Corinth itself was not a part of Achaia in the Greek sense. The use of "Achaia" for Greece as a whole is Roman, due to popular inaccurate usage, like the Roman use of "Asia" for the kingdom of the Attalids and thereafter for the Roman province. Dr. Steinmann simply assumes that this wide use of the term Achaia was beyond all doubt a very ancient (Greek) custom (*ohne Zweifel sehr alt war*). From every statement in this conclusion and every step in the argument I would dissent: and, especially, the method of substituting a "beyond doubt" for the quotation of ancient authorities is unscientific and valueless.

On p. 108 Dr. Steinmann says that in Pauline usage "Achaia is equivalent either to Corinth or to the whole of Greece, including Athens"—a pretty wide choice, destructive of any belief that the learned scholar has reached any clear geographical view—"and therefore is in no case fully coincident with the Roman official circuit of the province."

Now Dr. Steinmann proves at considerable length that Athens was a free and allied city (*libera* and *foederata*). This

[1] He actually quotes Pausanias's express statement, vii. 16, 7, that the Romans used the name Achaia in the sense in which the Greeks used Hellas, and Pausanias's explanation of the origin of this Roman usage.

proof was unnecessary : every one admits the fact, which is a matter of the most rudimentary knowledge. The question is whether such cities were or were not reckoned as cities of the province. That concerns not Athens alone, but a number of other free and allied cities. It does not answer the question to quote at length the privileges of such cities. Those privileges were honourable and highly esteemed Governors dismissed their lictors when they entered a free city. The citizens did not pay tribute.[1] The lawsuits in a free city were decided according to its own laws by the elected magistrates.

This whole subject requires retreatment. Dr Steinmann follows mainly Marquardt, *Staatsrecht* i., and quotes none of the more recent investigations on constitutional and legal points. He quotes Mommsen's History, but not his later articles. I shall use these along with Liebenam's *Städteverwaltung im roem. Kaiserreiche.*

This " freedom " was after all little more than nominal. Holm iv. 147 remarks that modern ideas of independence should not be introduced into the *libertas* of the " free " cities. It was absolutely inconsistent with Roman system to have a state within a state. The " free " state could exercise its freedom and use its laws only in so far as conduced to the well-being of the Empire.[2] " Even in the East, where Roman favour allowed many privileges to exist, it was evident that this ' freedom ' meant really nothing, since the word of any Roman governor could nullify it." [3] When Maximus was sent to govern Achaia, Pliny wrote to him, viii. 14, urging him not to deprive Athens and Sparta of that nominal and shadowy freedom which they had had.

[1] We assume that all *liberae civitates* were also *immunes*. Yet contributions and taxes were frequently imposed on them : see Liebenam, p. 466.

[2] *Ein Staat im Staate war undenkbar*, Liebenam, p. 472.

[3] Liebenam, p. 473.

The right of "free" cities to govern according to their own laws caused after all no very great practical difference. True, the ordinary cities of the province had to accept the Roman law, but in practice Rome allowed great influence to local custom in the civilised Eastern provinces. Hence the law as administered in these provinces was a sort of compromise between strict Roman law and native custom. In some notable cases extraordinary care was taken to act according to the usage of the city. On this subject see Mitteis' *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht*, Liebenam, p. 466 ff., and the authorities quoted by him. I have followed Mitteis in my *Histor. Comm. on Galatians*.

Dr. Steinmann quotes as a proof that Athens and other allied cities were outside the province the fact that the Areopagus Court decided a criminal case in the reign of Tiberius. Doubtless it did so; but that was the privilege of all free cities: we know it for Amisos in the province of Bithynia-Pontus from Pliny's correspondence with the Emperor Trajan, while he was acting as governor. It is certainly wholly inconsistent with Pliny's conception of his duties and power to say that Amisos was outside of his province: he had distinct duties there, but these were narrower than in the ordinary cities of the province (*civitates stipendiariae*). The question as to the limit of his power in Amisos exercised his mind a little, but there was no question that he had power there. He was doubtful whether he should prohibit the continuance of clubs (*eranoi*) in Amisos, and consulted Trajan on this point. The Emperor's reply was that Amisos should be allowed to keep its clubs if they were in accordance with its own laws. A hint, however, is appended that the proconsul should keep himself informed whether the clubs tended to encourage riotous conduct and unlawful assemblies. The Emperors always reserved the power of annulling the rights of a *civitas foederata*, if this

seemed advisable for Imperial interests ;[1] and, if clubs in Amisos were found conducive to disorder, the analogy of Imperial policy in other cases shows that the governor would be directed to interfere and probably to do away with the agreement (*foedus*). But Amisus was one of the Pontic cities associated in the provincial cult.

He tries to demonstrate that "*Athen gehöre gar nicht zur Provinz Achaia.*" There is, of course, a pedantic sense, almost a legal fiction, in which this statement is true under the Empire.[2] In certain matters of courtesy and form the fiction of independence of the "allied" and the "free" cities (*civitates foederatae*) and *liberae* was maintained. Marquardt points out that their autonomy was rather shadowy—I need not go into details—but he did not know, what is now proved, that, although the free city administered its own law there was always allowed an appeal to the Roman governor of the province, and that even an appeal to the Emperor could only take effect through the governor and with his sanction. This is known both for Achaia prov., and for Asia prov. I quote Mommsen in *Zft. der Savigny-St. f. Rechtsgesch.*, 1890, pl 36 f. : "*es ist für die Stellung der freien Städte von Wichtigkeit dass sowohl von Athen wie von Kos nicht bloss an den Kaiser sondern selbst*

[1] As Marquardt says, p. 74, Augustus deprived several *civitates foederatae* of their *libertas*, because they were using it in a way dangerous to public peace, Suet., *Aug.* 47. Byzantium was originally *foederata* (Tac. *Ann.* xii. 62) : after the province Macedonia was formed, Byzantium was subject to the governor on the footing not of *foederata* but of *libera civitas* (Cic. *in Pis.* iii. 6). In A.D. 53 it was subject to Bithynia and was *stipendiaria* (Tacitus *l.c.*) ; but Pliny then calls it *libera* (*Nat. Hist.* iv. 11). Vespasian deprived it of *libertas* (Suet. *Vesp.* 8), which it regained and kept till Severus punished the city for a short time (Dio lxxiv. 14).

[2] Dr. Steinmann applies facts and principles of the Republican period respecting the allied and the free cities too directly to the Imperial time. It has now become clear that the Imperial administration interfered very freely with the rights of these cities, whenever there was any occasion ; the tendency of discovery is to illustrate this truth.

an den Proconsul appellirt werden kann. . . . Nicht minder bemerkenswerth aber ist es, was Ramsay mit Recht der Inschrift entnahm, dass der Staathalter danach der Appellation an den Kaiser und überhaupt wohl der Beschickung des Kaisers aus seiner Provinz Folge zu geben wohl berechtigt, aber nicht verpflichtet ist."[1] Why did not Dr. Steinmann quote this important fact, which puts a very different aspect on the whole question ?

I do not fancy that even Dr. Steinmann would press the fiction of the freedom of allied cities to the extent of maintaining that they as allies of Rome (*foederatae civitates*) were independent of the Emperor. The Emperor was the ultimate fountain of law for them ; and any matter can be appealed from the Athenian courts to him. The governor of Achaia is an intermediate power ; appeal to him is made from the city courts ; and even an appeal to the Emperor must be sanctioned by the governor of the province before it can go forward to Rome.

To talk about Athens, or Kos, or Amisus, or Tarsus, or Mopsouestia in Cilicia, or Sagalassos, or Ephesus, or Smyrna, or a host of other cities, as being in any real sense outside of the province in which they were situated, is mere trifling. Many of them were outside the Roman Empire in the legal sense that an exile from Rome might live there ; they administered their own affairs, indeed, but according to a *lex civitatis* which was fixed by Rome ; their rights could be diminished or taken away by the Emperor, when he thought advisable ; and, although the governor of the province did not interfere in their suits, yet any suit could be carried before him by appeal. The last is a decisive criterion : the governor of the province is the higher power in all law-cases, while the city officials are the subordinate power. The advantage of being free (*libera et immunis*) was in some

[1] Reprinted in his collected papers on legal subjects, vol. iii. p. 388.

respects great,[1] but in other respects this freedom would have been positively prejudicial, if it had not been in practice completely disregarded.

There is one grave and fundamental misconception which pervades the whole of Dr. Steinmann's reasoning on this subject. He seems to have never taken into consideration the great variety of privilege and honour and standing which existed among the cities and other units out of which a province was built up. This inequality of rights is a general feature of Roman administration at all periods. Cities were not treated all after the same fashion: they enjoyed very different standing according to their individual character and deserts towards Rome, or according to historical circumstances. As in Italy in the period from 270 to 89 B.C., so in the Eastern provinces in the first and second centuries, there was a wide diversity of rights and standing among the cities. The most privileged and honourable class was the Colonies: these were in Greece, Corinth and Patrae, in Macedonia Philippi, in Asia Parium and Troas, in Galatia Antioch and the Pisidian colonies. Next came the allied cities (*foederatae*) which were also free and immune from tribute. After them came the cities which were free and exempt from tribute (*liberae et immunes*) without having a treaty with Rome.[2] After them came the ordinary cities, which were subject to tribute (*stipendiariae*). Then the *demoi* or peoples which did not possess the Hellenic city constitution, but apparently were organised on the Anatolian village system (though we really possess no trustworthy knowledge about them). Last of all come the *ethnê*, in which

[1] Marquardt points out that the privilege of sheltering a Roman exile, while an apparent honour as implying independence, sometimes meant that the exiled Roman made himself a tyrant in the city where he settled.

[2] Practically they had the same rights as the *foederatae*, but the rights of the latter were perhaps a little more permanently certain, and the former could not call themselves friends.

Rostowzew recognises the population of the great Imperial estates, whose position approximated to that of serfs (though technically they were free), and whose organisation continued to be as in the pre-Roman period with the Emperor substituted for the ancient lord, priest or king or noble.[1]

In such a province as Asia all these various classes of states were brought together as a body. The ἔθνη were hardly perhaps honourable enough to be ranked along with the really free peoples. They were the private property of the Emperor and looked to him, not to the governor of the province. The Emperor's procurator and slaves managed their affairs. So far as they were outside of the province it was because they were unworthy of that honour : they corresponded in status rather to the people of client-kingdoms, not yet worthy of admission to the rank of provincials. Yet these *ethnê* are in certain inscriptions ranked as members of the Commune of the province Asia, and this is the absolute proof that they enter into the ultimate and fundamental being of the province.

In the province of Achaia there were some differences from Asia ; but the general principle remains the same.

Now why should the free and allied cities be deemed by Dr. Steinmann too honourable to be degraded into the province, when the *Coloniae*, whose burgesses were all Roman citizens[2] and which were, so to say, outlying portions of Rome itself, serving as garrisons in the province, are ranked by him as parts of the province ? That he does so rank them, though he never actually says so, is proved by the

[1] These estates had in many cases belonged to one or other of the great Sanctuaries, whose gods were often extremely wealthy as owners of lands and lords over the cultivators. Brandis on "Asia" (Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclop.*, p. 1556 f.) gives a different explanation of ἔθνη in this usage ; but Rostowzew rejects it in his *Studien zur Gesch. des röm. Kolonats*, p. 262.

[2] The *incolae*, who had not Roman citizenship in a *colonia*, were not burgesses and had no place in the popular assembly : they were mere residents, yet they had many privileges.

fact that his whole argument is directed to show that, while Corinth was part of the province, Athens was not. Had he forgotten that Corinth was a *Colonia?*

There is, of course, a sense in which the *Coloniae* were outside the province ; all its citizens, as Romans, were even more completely emancipated from subjection to the provincial governor than the citizens of free and allied cities. Corinth was the capital and official residence of the proconsul of Achaia. Pisidian Antioch was the military centre and a sort of secondary capital of the southern part of the province Galatia, Lugudunum (Lyon) of the Three Gauls. It was a special honour to a province to contain one or more *Coloniae* which represented the full Roman qualification as the ideal in front of the province. The province is, ideally speaking, a sort of imperfect Rome : the *Colonia* is the perfect Rome in visible and material form within the province. It is false to the Roman idea of the province to put the *Colonia* outside of it.

The case of Smyrna is an excellent parallel to that of Athens. Smyrna is given by Marquardt as only a free, but not an allied city. He has, however, omitted the evidence of Cicero in his Eleventh Philippic ii. 5, which is quite conclusive : " a city which ranks among our most faithful and most ancient allies." The account of the Asian War and the treaty that ended it in Livy xxxvii. f. must be understood as implying a treaty, though the treaty (being of older date) is not mentioned.

As an allied state Smyrna had the right of sheltering exiles from Rome, i.e. exiles who were expelled from the Roman Empire could go to live there and had the right of being received as citizens. This constituted it a *civitas extera*, i.e. outside the Empire and the province (Marquardt, page 80, with note 1). The same right belonged to Thessalonica (as he says) and Cyzicus and Patrae ; but surely

no one would argue that in any real sense these were not parts of the provinces Macedonia and Asia and Achaia.

As regards Smyrna, Tacitus has preserved the report of the argument which it laid before the Senate in support of its claim to construct a temple dedicated to Tiberius and Livia and the Senate (*Annals*, iv. 55). Now Smyrna was the oldest ally and the most faithful friend of Rome in the East, occupying an honourable position corresponding to Marseilles (Massalia) in the West. Its chief glory and its special characteristic as a city of the Empire was its faithfulness. It laid its case before the Senate because it was a city of the province. It had no standing in this matter except as a city of the province. The Commune of the province had resolved to have this temple as a new seat of the Imperial cult, and eleven cities of the province claimed the honour of being chosen as seat of the new temple. Smyrna was one of these. It assumes to have the right to compete for the privilege: other ten cities claimed to be preferred. All the eleven present their claim as cities of the province. If Smyrna had been *extra provinciam*, it would not have sought an honour which was reserved for the province. If other cities had thought that Smyrna was not a city of the Province, they would have argued that Smyrna was disqualified as being outside the province. The right to compete is accorded to Smyrna by universal consent.

The argument in this case is the most perfect proof that Smyrna was a city of the province Asia, accepted and honoured as such by the Senate and by the whole province. Yet, if there were any city which was pre-eminent in the East as the friend and ally of Rome, the conspicuous "free and allied city" in the fullest sense, that city was Smyrna. Athens had massacred its Roman inhabitants, joined Mithradates, and been besieged and captured by Sulla. In that same war Smyrna's sympathy and loyalty to Rome had been

conspicuous. In the public Assembly the citizens, hearing of the sufferings of Sulla's soldiers from the winter cold, stripped themselves of their outer garments (which were of thicker material), and sent them to the shivering Romans. Any honour and privilege that attached to a *civitas foederata* belonged above all others to Smyrna; and yet it claimed the title "first and fairest (city) of (the province) Asia."

It is instructive to read the previous chapter (iv. 15) in which Tacitus describes the nature of the case. The Commune of Asia was the expression of the provincial unity and loyalty: it was the association of all the cities of the province in the common worship of the Imperial god and his divine ancestors. To be a member of the Commune was to be a member of the province.

It would be valueless to argue that Smyrna in its case before the Senate appeals to its conduct in 195 B.C., when it dedicated the first temple to Rome long before a Roman prov. existed, and to infer that the construction of a temple to Tiberius did not prove it to be a city of the province. The point, however, is this. Smyrna might build its own special temple to the Emperor, and this would prove no provincial connexion; but the temple, which it was finally selected by the Senate to build, was a temple of (the province) Asia, and only cities of the province could have such a temple. A special legate of the proconsul of Asia was appointed to superintend the building.

Dr. Steinmann, p. 94, is possessed with the strange idea that Achaia could acquire a Roman name only in 44 A.D., when it was given to the senate as a province separate from Macedonia.[1] But even when it was under the same governor

[1] He forgets that it was made a separate province in 27 B.C. He also forgets that the constitution of Achaia was regulated by the *lex Mummia*, imposed by its conqueror in 146 B.C. (Liebenam, p. 469), Macedonia by the *lex Aemilia*, 167 B.C.

as Macedonia it was the Roman province Achaia, and not merely a part of Macedonia. The province was *Macedonia et Achaia* [1] (Tac. Ann. i. 80, v. 10; Dio Cass. lviii. 25): Cicero often speaks of Achaia, meaning the Roman province.

If free cities were outside the province, not merely Athens, but also Sparta, all the Eleutherolacones, Delphi, Thespiae, Tanagra, Abae, Pharsalus, Elatea, Patrae, Nicopolis, Mothone, Pale and Pallantion, also the Ozolian Locrians and Amphissa,[2] were so. Brandis in Pauly-Wissowa i. 191 adds Thyrreion (*foed.*), Plataea (*lib.*) and states that it is false to think that Achaia did not become a province until 27 B.C.: it was a province from 146. In 67 A.D. Nero made all Greece free: Vespasian at once revoked the freedom. The freedom released the country from taxation, but did not take it out of the Empire: moreover this act was a freak and not a sober Roman device for government.

The democratic constitution was suppressed in the free cities, and a timocratic organization was substituted by Rome.

In C.I.L. viii. 7,059 an official is mentioned as being governor in Athens, Thespiae, Plataeae, and Thessaly, from which Brandis (Pauly-Wissowa i. 194) infers that Thessaly belonged to the same province as Athens, Thespiae and Plataeae, i.e. to Achaia.

The criticism to which Dr. Steinmann's argument about Athens exposes itself is this. Whereas Marquardt's account accommodates itself naturally to the new evidence, because he confines himself to stating the actual facts and their necessary implication, and therefore the more recently discovered facts come in to complete the picture, which he draws in bare outline; Steinmann, on the contrary, selects

[1] Like Lycia et Pamphylia, two provinces under one governor: so Galatia et Cappadocia 72–106 A.D. and the Tres Eparchiae.

[2] Marquardt gives two inconsistent lists, p. 325, 10, and p. 328, 2.

certain facts from Marquardt to suit a preconceived purpose; he groups them to produce a certain effect; he slurs over the facts stated by Marquardt which tell against him, mentioning some of them without pointing out their bearing on his case; he argues from our lack of knowledge, which is false and unscientific method; and the consequence is that the newly discovered facts are dead against him. Let any person read through Marquardt's non-partisan statement in the light of the new knowledge, and he will see for himself that this is so.

While Marquardt mentions that, so far as the right of sheltering Roman exiles was concerned, certain cities in the provinces were *exterae*, he never applies practically this pedantic survival of ancient right. In practice he always treats these provincial allied cities under their province, showing his opinion that they after all belonged to the province, and he lays little stress on their special standing. He expressly calls Amisus the most easterly city of the province Bithynia (p. 350), and gives its municipal custom as a proof of Roman behaviour towards provincial cities (p. 143); and so on. Only with regard to Athens he infers too much from the shadowy liberty[1] that was left to it, and says that it was exempt from the authority of the proconsul; the authorities on whom he relies are not sufficiently clear to prove this, and Mommsen (quoted by Steinmann) expresses the fact more carefully; "Athens was not under the fasces of the proconsul," i.e. when he entered the city the proconsul was not preceded by axe-bearing lictors; cases were carried on appeal from courts in Athens to the hearing of the proconsul.

Marquardt mentions that Athens differed from the rest of the province Achaia in never using the provincial era;

[1] Pliny, *Epist.* viii. 24; Dio Chrys., ii. p. 200 R.; Plutarch, *præc. ger. reip.* 32, § 8 (quoted by Marquardt, p. 86).

and Steinmann religiously follows him, quoting this as a very weighty fact. There is nothing in this antiquated fallacy. (1) There prevailed extreme and capricious variety in regard to chronology in Hellenistic and Hellenic cities; and Athens, like many other Greek cities, dated by its own magistrates. (2) No provincial era was used in Achaia,[1] and neither Athens nor any other city of the province dated by a provincial era (Kaestner *de Aeris*, 66 f., Kubitschek *Aera* in Pauly-Wissowa *Real-Enc.*). This piece of evidence is worse than valueless; it is fictitious. Why does not Dr. Steinmann learn Achaian facts before writing about the province?

Even in regard to the chief glory of Athens, the University and its administration, the Emperor interfered as he pleased. It was required that the four Masters of the Schools should be Roman citizens; and this regulation, according to Mommsen, must have been made certainly early in the Empire and probably by Augustus. The regulation was relaxed by Hadrian, who permitted the head of the Epicurean School (and probably the others on the same principle) to be chosen from Non-Romans. This we learn from his rescript, which was discovered and first published in 1890 and immediately commented on by Diels, Mommsen and others.[2]

Dr. Steinmann's long discussion of the rank of Athens and its relation to the province is vitiated by neglect of important facts. The neglect was, of course, unintentional:

[1] Some rare cases in which a provincial era seemed to be used by a city of Achaia are now better explained: the dating is not from the foundation of the province, but from a different era.

[2] *Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Philosophie*, iv. 487 f.; *Zft. d. Savigny St. f. Rechtsgesch.*, 1891, p. 152 f. It is an interesting fact that the students of the School co-operated in the selection of a Scholarch (as was previously known) and were even empowered to depose an unworthy Professor and appoint a successor to him (which was revealed by the newly discovered inscription containing this rescript.

he would not have passed over any fact bearing on his subject, as his whole intention is to be judicial and complete. But he simply follows a book published in 1881, taking it as the final statement of the law, though any one who studied Roman law or Roman history, or the Eastern provincial administration would have put him right, if he had sought to learn what is known on the subject.

Now it was a great source of wealth to the city that the Governor should reside, or should even hold the assizes, in it,[1] and any free or allied city which had the opportunity would not have wasted it by vainly pleading that it was outside the province. Many free and allied cities were seats of *conventus :* Thessalonica and Antioch were always the residence of the governors of Macedonia and Syria, Ephesus and Tarsus of the governors of Asia and Cilicia. Ephesus and Tarsus, and Smyrna and Laodiceia on the Lycus were *conventus* from the beginning. In Ephesus (Acts xix.) the Secretary (γραμματεύς) warned the people in the theatre that if they did not dissolve the irregular assembly (i.e. not permitted in the νόμος, *lex civitatis*), the city would be called to account (obviously before the proconsul, whom the Secretary has just previously mentioned as the fountain of justice).

Dr. Steinmann admits that several allied and free cities of this class were the residence of the governor of the province, and that in others the Roman assizes (*conventus*) were held by the governor. These admitted facts give away his case. What meaning does Dr. Deissmann attach to the expression that those free cities were outside of the province, if these facts are true ? It was the basis of provincial administration that a governor could not reside outside his province, or exercise his power legally anywhere

[1] On this enrichment see, for example, *Cities of St. Paul,* p. 273.

except in his province. Now at the *conventus* the governor exercised the full and absolute authority over the provinces ; he represented the judicial dignity and the power of Rome. If Athens or Smyrna or any of the other free and allied cities were outside the province, the governor could not possibly exercise his supreme judicial authority or fix his residence permanently in any of them. To be the residence of the governor of the province, a city must be in the province.

He attempts to bolster up his case by pleading that Thessalonica and the others were not allied, but belonged to the lower class of free cities. The rights of the two classes, however, were the same ;[1] the superiority of the allied cities lay in the more assured permanence of the rights. The question that concerns us is whether these rights caused the city that possessed them to be ranked outside the province or not ; and although Ephesus or Tarsus might lose its rights more easily than Athens or Amisus, yet so long as it possessed those rights, the effect on status was the same. In fact, allied cities are frequently described simply as "free" (for example, so always by Pliny) ; and the occurrence of a city in a list of *liberae civitates* does not prove that it did not belong to the other and higher class of *foederatae*.[2]

Except in certain quite unimportant details, therefore, the free and allied cities were regularly counted as cities of the province. They ranked along with the other cities as members of the Commune or Association of provincial cities. Ordinary usage and so far as is known Roman custom ranked them as provincial cities ; they were places into which the governor of the province entered in perform-

[1] Marquardt asserts this quite positively, p. 80 : see also Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, iii. p. 654, *n.* 4, and 658.

[2] See Mommsen, *loc. cit.*

ance of his duty, although he respected the rights which they possessed. Paul and Luke thought and spoke of Athens and Smyrna and other free cities as cities of Achaia or Asia, and they were justified by Roman custom. Dr. Steinmann's case is valueless and founded on misconception and omission of evidence, sometimes on actual errors in facts.

W. M. Ramsay.

THE LITERARY RIDDLE OF THE "EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS."

Keenly as the questions of the authorship, destination, and purpose of the "Epistle to the Hebrews" have been debated in recent years, it can scarcely be said that there is anything like general agreement regarding any of the crucial points. This, it seems to me, is largely due to a defect of method, the failure to determine with precision what the problem is which demands a solution, to settle upon a fixed starting point, and to proceed in a reasoned orderly fashion from ascertained fact to inference, and from the better known to the less known. A brilliant lead was given by Harnack in his well-known article in the *Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*. But subsequent discussion has concentrated mainly on the merits and defects of Harnack's suggestion of Prisca and Aquila as the probable authors. As a consequence the real outstanding merit of his contribution has in great measure been lost sight of. His greatest service undoubtedly was to show that for New Testament Introduction the first problem is *how to explain the fact that a writing of such power and historical significance has come down to us without any indication of its authorship or original destination.* That there is extant no primitive Christian tradition as to the authorship is a matter of universal knowledge. But the

destination is equally undetermined. "To the Hebrews" is not the only title under which the writing anciently circulated. At an equally early date it was spoken of in certain quarters as "To the Alexandrians." If the work is a geunine letter, as we shall find reason to believe that it is, both these titles are far too vague and indeterminate for either to have been the original address. There can be no doubt that they represent two distinct, not to say conflicting, attempts on the part of early Christian literary criticism to supply a blank in the tradition, the one based upon the "Alexandrianism" of the Epistle, the other upon the way in which it attempts to show that the new revelation is superior to and supersedes the old. In all this we have the strong support of Zahn, the leader of Conservative New Testament scholarship in our day, and one of the greatest scholars and most subtle intellects ever occupied with the study of Christian antiquity.

Such is the problem Harnack sought to answer from the starting point of the authorship. How could the Church have forgotten so notable a writer? Surely there must have been something about the authorship which it was glad to forget. So he threw out the suggestion that the author may have been a woman, and that the Church forgot the fact because of the early Christian dislike to women as public teachers. He elaborates his case with great skill, and has made several eminent converts, notably Dr. Rendel Harris. But the great majority remain unconvinced. Is it really the case that there are traits in the Epistle which point to a woman as author? Does not the interchange of the singular and the plural of the first personal pronoun admit of a far simpler explanation than the hypothesis of a joint authorship? If Aquila and Prisca, with the latter as the ruling spirit, wrote the Epistle, is it not more probable that the Church would have attributed the real authorship to

Aquila, instead of forgetting the authorship and with it the destination altogether.

I think that Harnack is entirely on right lines, in holding that the first task of historical criticism with reference to the "Epistle to the Hebrews" is to explain why it comes to us without any genealogy. But his own explanation lands him in a cul-de-sac. Is it not equally probable that there may have been something in the circumstances of the original recipients of the Epistle which led the Church to forget the history of a writing addressed to them? The more adequately and naturally we can explain how this may have come about, the stronger will our case be.

Of course our argument is entirely futile unless the "Epistle to the Hebrews" is a genuine letter addressed to a definite church-community. If it is a treatise, or even what Deissmann calls a purely literary epistle, it may have circulated from the very outset without any address or author's name. The opinion has also been advanced that it is really a published sermon; and of course a sermon may be published anonymously and with nothing to indicate who its original hearers were. But while this latter view agrees far better with the intimate personal character of the writing than the other that it is a treatise meant for Christendom or some large section of it quite generally, there are certain features in the work itself which are utterly incompatible with it. (See, for example, ch. xiii. vers. 22 to 24 compared with verse 19.) It is impossible to hold that the whole writing as we now have it was delivered as a sermon, and the theory that what was originally a sermon was afterwards, with the addition of a sort of epistolary epilogue, sent as a letter to some particular congregation in which the preacher was specially interested, is open to many serious objections, of which perhaps, from our point of view, the most serious is that it explains nothing. It leaves the problem just where

it found it. Nor is it consistent with what we know of the spontaneous and occasional character of early Christian literature generally. Those who hold so far-fetched and artificial a view of the origin of the "Epistle to the Hebrews" have to do more than point to certain phrases and modes of thought suggestive of the speaker rather than the writer. They have to account for his having made in this particular instance such a use of his sermon. Any one who is by profession more of a speaker than an author tends naturally to fall into a style which suggests an imaginary audience. Besides, our Epistle, if not a treatise or a purely literary production, was doubtless written with a view to its being read aloud to an assembled congregation.

Everything about the writing seems to me to point to its being *a genuine letter, addressed to a specific group of believers* by some one who knew them well and was keenly interested in them. If the Epistle was merely a literary form, it is all the more difficult to account for the absence of a definite epistolary opening. For in that case the epistolary opening is an essential part of the body of the writing, whereas in the case of a real letter, the address and the author's name are more of the nature of externals. They are not organically related to the contents or the purpose of the letter, and may quite well belong to a separate sheet which might easily be lost. Still more cogent arguments in favour of our position are furnished by the writing itself. The writer identifies himself in the fullest possible way with those he addresses (ii. 1). He is afraid of their drifting away (ii. 1), being disloyal, like the Israelites in the wilderness (iv. 11), not keeping a firm hold of their profession (iv. 14), and to being backward in coming to the throne of grace (iv. 16). He warns them to take heed, lest there be in any of them an evil heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God (iii. 12). He knows their past history as well as their present spiritual

pulse. They have been and are liberal with their substance in ministering to "the saints" (not improbably the members of the mother Church at Jerusalem (vi. 10). There is persecution ahead of them, and he is not sure whether they will have the constancy to endure (11 and 12). There seems to be some difficulty between the office-bearers and the unofficial Church-members (xiii. 7, 24). Indeed it seems to me that the Epistle must be addressed not only to a definite Church-community, but to one in great measure homogeneous—more homogeneous in fact than any large mixed Christian congregation could have been. Everything speaks, I think, for the view of Zahn (and Harnack) that it was sent to a "House-Church" in Rome. I would be inclined to add that this particular "House-Church" had a well-marked distinctive character of its own, and that the writer, whether or not a man of note in wider Christian circles, was probably one of themselves.

In favour of the "House-Church" theory may be urged not only ch. x. 25 according to Zahn's acute interpretation of it ("not deserting your own special meeting"), but the whole general trend of the letter. The arguments for a Roman destination are common property, and there is no need that I should elaborate them further. We proceed now to ask what else can be determined regarding the recipients. We have seen that there is no genuine primitive tradition on the point. But till recent years it was never doubted that the letter was meant for "Hebrews," that is persons who had passed over to Christianity from Judaism. This is still the opinion of an overwhelming majority of scholars of all schools. But a convinced and thoroughly competent minority hold that there is nothing distinctively Jewish Christian about it, and that it was addressed to Gentiles. I need not recapitulate the grounds upon which these conflicting opinions are respectively based. They

can be found in any good Introduction. Suffice it to say that on both sides there are arguments which the other cannot afford to neglect. On the one hand the Epistle certainly aims at justifying the new faith to minds accustomed to regard the old as a perfect revelation of the divine mind and will. Author and readers seem alike steeped in Jewish presuppositions. On the other hand I find no sign of any tendency to relapse into Judaism. The dangers of which the author is afraid and against which he warns his readers so insistently are of quite another order. His fear is *lest they drift away from all vital religion altogether.*

All the conditions of the problem, it seems to me, are satisfied by the hypothesis of *a small "House-Church" of Latitudinarian Jewish Christians with an interest both in Judaism and in Christianity largely speculative and sentimental.* There is certainly a strong background of Jewish interests and sympathies. Just as certainly the general outlook is not Jewish, but universalistic; and the affinities are closest with that semi-speculative reconstruction of Jewish thought and religion which we call "Alexandrianism." A writer so skilful and so well acquainted with his readers as our author is scarcely likely to have used such a method of argumentation unless he believed that it would serve his purpose with them. If the Epistle is a real letter, we must suppose that the recipients had at least a tinge of "Alexandrianism." Again our Church was liberal with its money, though the author is afraid that they will be found wanting in the day of persecution—a combination which we have no difficulty in understanding in the case of a group of rather well-do-to Latitudinarians. Further, it is those of this religious type who are specially tempted to forsake their own particular assembly, and to roam about in quest of new sensations. Perhaps also they are peculiarly difficult to please in the matter of office-bearers. (The office-bearers

in question may well be those of the Roman Church generally and not of the sectional group.) But the strongest point in our case is that more than any others they are in danger of "falling away from the living God," that is, according to what seems to me both the most natural and the most serious interpretation which the phrase can bear, *losing their grip upon vital personal religion.*

Our hypothesis explains, I think, those phenomena of the Epistle which have made some postulate a Jewish Christian, and others a purely Gentile, destination. It finds a place for, and a measure of truth in, both the titles under which it was anciently known "To the Hebrews" and "To the Alexandrians." It conflicts with no genuine tradition, while, finally, I believe that in the light of it we can see how the Epistle may have come to us without any genealogy. Our Jewish-Christian House-Church, I take it, ceased to exist as a separate organisation. Perhaps the writer's fears were only too well grounded, and in the days of fiery trial, it proved faithless. Or it may simply have become merged in the General or Catholic Church of Rome. In either event a letter addressed to it would lose all official character, and there would be neither community nor individual specially interested in keeping alive its traditions. The less creditable its end, the more would this be the case. The faithful remnant who had joined the main stream of Christian faith and practice would have no desire to remember, still less to remind their fellow-Christians, that once they had belonged to a sectional group which had ceased to exist because it lacked some essential Christian grace. The letter itself would become the property of some private individual—a representative direct or indirect of its former official custodian, or of the Church member who at the dissolution of the House-Church treasured its history and possessions sufficiently to preserve it. For years it may

have lain unnoticed, emerging at a later date when nothing was remembered of its original history. Afterwards it won its way slowly to canonical recognition, because of its inherent excellence, its "Catholic" and Apostolical doctrine, its venerable antiquity, and perhaps not least because it was quoted by Clement of Rome. Indeed Clement, who was probably a Jewish Christian, may have been a member of the original "House-group," and even the preserver of the letter. If so, we can well understand why in certain quarters he was regarded as its author. I throw out this tentative solution of the "literary riddle of the Epistle to the Hebrews," thinking that at all events it is worth discussion, and hoping that the discussion will increase our understanding of one of the most entrancing of the New Testament documents.

JOHN DICKIE.

PLEA FOR FULLER CRITICISM OF THE MASSORETIC TEXT, WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE FIRST PSALM.

THE study of the Old Testament has fascinated multitudes, in the Christian Church as well as in the Church which first received and has preserved the sacred oracles. Ardent scholars have applied themselves to the investigation of the language used by the Prophets and the Psalmists, and have given to others the results of their labours, that the meaning of the Prophecies and the Psalms might be better understood. As these researches, however, have been deepened and extended, especially within the past century, it has come to be recognised that the received Hebrew text, in spite of the immense labour and care bestowed on it by the Massoretes in early mediaeval times, is not a perfect work. Though this has naturally formed the foundation on which learned and skilful commentators have—often unsuspectingly—based their expositions, this

foundation has at many points proved insecure, and the superstructure they have raised has, at many points, fallen to the ground.

The truth is that frequent transcription of the Hebrew text during the course of many centuries has conduced to deviation from the original, through inadvertence on the part of the scribes,—for there has been no miraculous intervention constantly preventing transcribers from making mistakes. Many of these changes may seem slight in themselves; there may merely be the substitution of one letter for another resembling it ("mis-spelling"), or the omission of a letter or a word; but the consequence has often been a very serious change in sense; and now, in these later ages, many difficulties present themselves, baffling all attempts to find a solution. Too often have some critics, in despair, pronounced certain passages "hopelessly corrupt."

Much, indeed, has already been accomplished in getting behind the received text, and recovering more reasonable readings at points where little or no sense could be evolved. Intelligent study of the ancient versions, executed centuries before the Jewish editors had fixed the present text for us, and comparison of the renderings given by those old translators of the Hebrew text before them with what we now possess, may sometimes lead to the restoration of right readings. The Septuagint Version in particular—though the text of this itself has suffered at the hands of successive transcribers and editors—is frequently most helpful in guiding to better readings than those which appear at the corresponding points in the Massoretic text. More limited assistance is afforded by the Syriac and the Latin Versions, and by the Targums.

The object of this paper is to point out that even *the Massoretic text itself, when patiently and carefully studied, gives more help for its own correction than any external guide.*

The disciplined critic who earnestly applies himself to the study of the traditional text will frequently perceive the genuine reading through the disguise of a "corrupt" form. Intelligent cultivation of this field will yield more fruit, with comparatively little labour, than can be obtained elsewhere, frequently with greater expenditure of time.

To illustrate this thesis, let us carefully examine the Massoretic text of the First Psalm.

In the first verse, an old scribe inserted a Note-line—though this now appears only in some printed editions—before the expression "walketh not in the counsel of the unrighteous," in order to give forewarning of a suspected reading;[1] and when we bethink ourselves, it does seem strange to read of walking "in the counsel" of the ungodly. Instead of the form בַּעֲצַת, it might be better, by changing the first consonant to another closely resembling it, to read כַּעֲצַת, "according to the counsel"; but it would be still better to change the third consonant so as to obtain the form בַּעֲדַת, as Olshausen has already suggested, and thus secure the meaning "in the company of the unrighteous."

At the beginning of the second verse also, a Note-line was inserted—and still appears in many printed editions—calling attention to another difficulty, which, as may be perceived by one who is acquainted with English only, is presented in the repetition of the same word "law" in both clauses. Instead of reading "in the law of the Lord [is] his delight, and in His law doth he meditate day and night," one would naturally, on the first thought, deem it better, at the second occurrence, not to have the form וּבְתוֹרָתוֹ, but rather the pronominal compound וּבָהּ, "and in it" (or "and therein"). The presence of the Note-line, however, before the *first* occurrence of the word "law,"

[1] See the author's treatise on *The Note-line in the Hebrew Scriptures*, especially pages 78 ff.

rather points to the conclusion that this, and not the second, is the form to be suspected. The proposal of Lagarde, to change בְּתוֹרַת into בְּיִרְאַת, does not commend itself, especially because the resultant meaning would be "in the fear of the Lord [is] his delight"; more appropriate is the suggestion of Grätz, to read בְּתְעוּדַת (cf. Isa. viii. 16, 20), which, with its genitive, would mean "in the testimony of the Lord"; the most likely substitute, however, resembling the Massoretic reading, would seem to be בְּהוֹדַת,[1] which makes the expression mean "in praising the Lord."

Considerable difficulty is experienced with the first clause of the fourth verse, which is usually rendered, "Not so [are] the ungodly. But it must be noted that the Hebrew term כֵּן, here translated "so," is really an adverb, indeclinable, instead of a plural adjective, as required by the rules of grammar. Perceiving this, Cheyne, in his latest commentary on the Psalms, has felt constrained to supply another verb than the copula at this point, in order to make fair sense: "Not so [fare] the wicked."

Let it further be observed here, that apart from הָאִישׁ, "the man," at the beginning of the Psalm, הָרְשָׁעִים is the only word that has the article; but why should *this* term be thus distinguished, while the ה is absent from the other plurals following? The answer to this question seems to be that the ה originally formed no part of the word to which it is now prefixed, but rather was an element of another word preceding. Let it also be noted that, in the ancient Hebrew script, as well as in the Phœnician alphabet, and in the characters appearing in the Mesha inscription and the Siloam inscription, מ and נ (like our M and N, m and n) are very similar in form, so that one might readily be mistaken for the other.[2] Moreover, as the letters ו and

[1] The Hiphil construct infinitive of יָדָה.

[2] See another instance of confusion below, in verse 5; also Gen. xxiii. 17 and 20, where וַיָּקָם ("and it [viz. the field of Ephron. . . .] arose to Abraham") is certainly a transcriptional error for וַיִּקְנוּ ("and it was bought . . . by Abraham").

ר, even in the modern characters, are closely resemblant, one or the other, if both occurred together, might be inadvertently omitted by a transcriber. Hence לא כן הרשעים may probably have originally been לא כמהו רשעים, i.e. לֹא כָמֹהוּ רְשָׁעִים, "Not like him [are] unrighteous ones."

After this, the Septuagint repeats "Not so!" (*οὐχ οὕτως*) from the beginning of the line; and, strangely enough, many modern critics agree in regarding this as a genuine reading: indeed, Wellhausen (in the Polychrome edition of the Psalms) ventures on no other change in the whole Psalm. There seems no sufficient reason, however, for adding "Not so!"

The next point which claims attention is the pair of monosyllables כִּי אִם, which, as here, is the normal consequent of a negation in Hebrew (see verse 2; also Gen. xxxii. 29; 1 Kings xviii. 18, etc.),[1] though sometimes כִּי alone is deemed sufficient (see Gen. xvii. 15; xix. 2; xlv. 8, etc.). An indispensable necessity here is the pronoun "they" to resume mention of the "unrighteous," if not, indeed, further to accentuate the contrast between them and the righteous man. The required הֵם may quite legitimately and simply be secured, and the antithesis properly expressed, by changing כִּי אִם כַּמֹּץ either into כִּי הֵם כַּמֹּץ (assuming that אם was inadvertently *substituted* for הם by a transcriber), or into כִּי אִם הֵם כַּמֹּץ (assuming that הֵם was inadvertently *omitted* after its resemblant אִם); on either alternative, the resultant meaning becomes, "but *they* [are] like the chaff."

After the beginning of the fifth verse, the admonitory Note-line again appears,—this time to question the correctness of at least one form if not more. It does seem somewhat strange to read that the unrighteous shall not "arise" (or "stand up") in the judgment,—for such is the normal

[1] Cf. Lat. *sed* after *non*, Gr. *ἀλλά* after *οὐκ*, Ger. *sondern* after *nicht*.

meaning of יָקֻמוּ (see Gen. xiii. 17; xix. 1, 14, 15, 31, etc.); "stand," in the sense of standing firm and holding one's ground, would rather be expressed by a different word, viz., יַעַמְדוּ (see Josh. xxiii. 9; 2 Kings, x. 4; Esth. ix. 2, etc.). The rendering given by Cheyne in his latest commentary on the Psalms is "maintain themselves," but this is certainly not the meaning of the word in the Hebrew text. By a slight change of מ for נ,[1] and transposition of this letter so as to form the closely resemblant word יִנָּקוּ, the meaning of the clause becomes "unrighteous ones shall not be acquitted in the judgment."

In the next place, one may question whether the Massoretes were right in assuming that עֵדַת (part of the second last word in verse 5), is the construct form of the noun עֵדָה (as in verse 1), so that the clause in which it appears should be rendered "sinners in the company of just [men]." Bearing in mind that the dominant idea in the verse is *judicial procedure*, there is good reason for holding that עֵדַת is rather the construct infinitive Qal (in segholate form) of the verb יָעַד, to "arraign" ("indict," or "charge with commission of an offence," or "cite to appear at the bar of judgment").[2] A better reading of the last two words of this verse in Hebrew is thus בְּעֵדַת צַדִּיקִים, "when just men arraign [them]."

In the last verse of the Psalm, as fixed by the Massoretes, difficulty has always been felt with the verbs forming the predicates in the two clauses. To say that the Lord "knoweth" the way of the righteous sounds something like a truism; while still greater difficulty is felt in understanding and accepting, as a fitting conclusion to the verse, the statement that the way of the unrighteous "shall

[1] See note [2] p. 381.

[2] See 1 Kings xxi. 10, where ויעדוהו should, fully written, be וְיַיעֲדוּהוּ, "and let them indict him"; also Mal. iii. 5, where עֵד should be יַעַד, "an accuser."

perish." It has been suggested, indeed, that the closing verb-form תֹּאבֵד (Qal) should rather be the suffixed Piel form תְּאַבְּדֵם ("shall destroy them," or "shall ruin them"); the difficulty, however, is thereby merely lessened, not removed. Obviously, we expect here a clear *contrast* between the righteous and the unrighteous, as in the preceding verses. A simpler and fairly satisfactory solution will be found by substituting the resemblant form יְתָאֵב, an Aramaic mode (see the cognate participle in Amos vi. 8) of writing יְתָעֵב, "he abhorreth" (cf. Job ix. 31; xix. 19; Ps. v. 7, etc.). After fixing this, we naturally turn to ask what verb-form, resembling יוֹדֵעַ in the first clause, would there express a fitting antithesis to "abhorreth." Choice seems to lie between יְרֻעָה, "He is friendly with" (see Prov. xiii. 20; xxviii. 7; xxix. 3), and יְדֻצָּה, "He delighteth in" (see Isa. xlii. 1; Ps. xliv. 4; cxlvii. 11, etc.); from the nature of the case, the latter must be preferred.

After giving effect to these emendations, the Psalm will assume something like the following form in English:—

1. Blessed is the man who walketh not
in the company of the unrighteous,
nor standeth in the way of sinners,
nor sitteth in the seat of scoffers;
2. But whose delight [is] in praising the Lord,
and [who] meditateth in His law
day and night.
3. He shall be like a tree
planted beside water-courses,
that giveth fruit in its season,
and whose leaves wither not;
And all that he doeth prospereth.
4. Not like him [are] unrighteous ones,
but *they* [are] like the chaff
which wind driveth away.
5. Therefore unrighteous ones shall not be acquitted in the judgment,
nor sinners when righteous men indict.
6. For the Lord delighteth in the way of righteous men,
but the way of unrighteous ones He abhorreth.

JAMES KENNEDY.

A SWISS FÉNELON:

DR. GODET AND THE EMPEROR FREDERICK.[1]

THE biography of Dr. Godet, the illustrious theologian of Neuchâtel, has a special interest for readers of the EXPOSITOR, in which so many of his most important articles appeared. The work has been carried out with filial devotion, exquisite tact and unfailing literary skill by his accomplished son, M. Philippe Godet. This is in the strictest sense a personal narrative, based on private correspondence and journals. The author modestly declines any attempt to estimate his father's position as scholar and divine. It is the man and the Christian who stands before us in life-like portraiture. The charm of his outward presence, which we realise from a series of remarkably fine illustrations, corresponded to the beauty of his mind and character.

Although by his writings Dr. Frédéric Godet influenced thousands of British readers, he visited our island only once in his long life of eighty-eight years. The occasion was the meeting of the first general Presbyterian Council at Edinburgh in 1877. In Scotland he felt himself "at home," and in London he joined with pleasure in Free Church worship. He confessed, however, that his visit was partly spoiled by his imperfect knowledge of our spoken language, and that in the meetings of the Council he suffered "the torment of Tantalus." On this brief holiday he laid the foundation of many friendships, and at his home in

[1] *Frédéric Godet* (1812–1900) d'après sa correspondance et d'autres documents inédits, par Philippe Godet (Paris, Fischbacher; Neuchâtel, Attinger Frères), 1913.

Neuchâtel he received from time to time English and American visitors. He was a Protestant without bigotry. One of his best friends and warmest admirers in later years was the brilliant Abbé Le Camus, afterwards Bishop of La Rochelle, who studied his expository writings and recommended them from the pulpit.

With Germany Dr. Godet had through life the closest associations. His mother, by the influence of her relatives of the Vautravers family, was appointed governess to the three-year old son of Prince William of Prussia, Frédéric Godet, who was at the time a student of theology in Berlin, was presented to the Princess Augusta and four years later was called to succeed his mother in the care of the child who was afterwards the Emperor Frederick. A considerable part of this large volume is occupied with letters that passed between the Prince and Dr. Godet. These contain hitherto unpublished material of unique interest. We propose in this article to tell the story of the long and happy relationship between the Swiss Fénelon and his royal pupil.

The Summons to Berlin.

In June, 1838, M. Godet, then aged twenty-six, was invited by Prince William of Prussia (afterwards the Emperor William I.), to accept the tutorship. When the message arrived, the young theologian wrote in his Journal: "What new prospects such a call opens before me! How it puts me outside all my plans, all my tastes even, and all my wishes! To give up preaching, to give up that sweet life of the manse, of the family, of close friendships, which I think of as my greatest happiness! . . . And then mamma is coming home! At her age, to leave her for ten, twelve years! And why? To live in a continual dependence—to make awkward blunders;—with my character, which

is so ill-adapted to win the affection of children! . . . Then the constant struggle between my religious principles and my position! The deficiency of my knowledge in so many respects! What a list of reasons for refusing—if one can refuse!—But, on the other hand, if it is God who calls me, tastes, inclinations, friends, relatives, comforts, independence—ought they not all to be sacrificed? . . . My heart is like a stormy, restless sea; a thousand little feelings blow over it and disturb the calm in which alone it can reflect with purity the light divine. . . . How can I place myself before God in that silence of soul which will enable me to hear His answer?" He recalled, as a possible indication of the will of Providence, the fact that he had that spring received Fénelon's writings as a present, and added, "Oh, if my soul could bear some resemblance, however distant, to that of Fénelon! If I might have something of that serenity, that affability, that charity, that gentleness combined with strength, that humility never separated from dignity! I do not speak of talents, intellect or grace. How can I think of them? Lord, pardon! Lord, forgive and bless me once more! Lord, enlighten, direct! Have pity on Thy poor child—so blind and full of pride."

A week later his letter of acceptance had gone to Berlin, and he thanked God for help in composing it. In the calm summer evenings at Châtillon, amid the hay-fields and the flowers, he prepared himself for his responsible task by reading the Letters of Fénelon.

The following characteristic passage may be quoted from the letter on which he had spent so much thought and care: ". . . I shall not forget, and never shall be able to forget, that a prince, like every other human being, has for the future a soul to be saved and for the present a happiness to seek and find which those earthly blessings

so abundantly granted him by Providence are insufficient to secure. I shall therefore encourage the prince, your son, to regard all that outward splendour in the midst of which he is called to live, as an obligation, a duty, rather than as the source of his real pleasures. I shall try to show him that the spring of true joy rises, not beneath or beside him, but far above, by the throne of that Saviour God, who, although invisible, is everywhere, even in the midst of the world, inexpressibly near to our hearts. And in this way I think I shall have given him the knowledge of a blessing more real than all those with which his birth has surrounded him, and a sure haven against the storms which may perhaps disturb his earthly life."

The Prince's Childhood.

The Swiss tutor arrived at Babelsberg in September, 1838, when his royal pupil was seven years old. Frederick William had as his comrade Rudolf of Zastrow and both were confided entirely to M. Godet's charge.

"My bed," he wrote, "was placed between those of the children; the prince slept on my right, Rudolf on my left, and when I lay down to rest a few hours after them, I could touch their heads in blessing."

The prince was a merry, affectionate, rather mischievous boy, with a sense of humour. On the occasion of some court festivity, when he saw his tutor for the first time wearing his pulpit gown and bands, he remarked, "M. Godet, dare one laugh when dressed like that?"

Corporal punishment was forbidden, but once M. Godet found it necessary to break through this rule, as the Prince obstinately refused to go to his drill-master for a lesson. When the chastisement was over, the child threw himself into his friend's arms, saying, "You were right to whip me; I deserved it."

From the first, he regarded the son of his dearly-loved governess as a friend rather than a schoolmaster. M. Godet's charming manners pleased the relations of his pupil. A week after his arrival at Babelsberg, we find him writing to friends :—

"I am gradually feeling my way in this new world. I think the little one is fond of me ; I am studying his character. A few days ago I had to spend the evening with the Prince and Princess Royal and other great personages, and I know they were not altogether dissatisfied with me. May I never forget the words of St. Paul : 'If I desired to please men,[1] I should not be the servant of Christ.' I feel that I need the trust of these persons if I am to carry out my vocation successfully ; but how easy it is to seek to purchase that trust at a price which nothing could justify me in paying ! There lies the danger."

Prince William recognised the lovable qualities of the scholar whom he had called to so anxious a position. At their first meeting M. Godet remarked that he felt the disadvantage of having neglected other departments of knowledge in order to specialise in theology. The Prince interrupted him with the remark, "But is not that the most important branch of all ?" After chatting pleasantly for a few minutes, he said, as he left the room, "This is a first meeting which we shall both remember." He valued especially the religious instruction which his son received. M. Godet knew how to make the Bible a living Book to children. After Easter, 1839, he wrote to Emile Perret : "I am telling the two boys the story of the Old Testament. . . . We have got to Jacob. . . . That's the true food for children, I am more than ever sure of it. At Easter we read the story of the Passion. I could often see that the

[1] The French translation of Galatians i. 10 is "Si je voulais plaire aux hommes."

hearts of these two children were deeply stirred. The little prince's eyes were sometimes full of tears. . . . As a rule, everything that is beautiful—combining that word with all that is holy and true, finds a ready response in his heart. He is captivated by it and carried away. Thus, after we have read some Psalm in which there is a burst of feeling, and those brilliant sparkles of the life in God which flash from the heart of David, the little one cries out, 'Oh, what a lovely Psalm! I must copy out that verse.'"

At the age of eight the Prince, who was kept in bed on account of a slight illness, asked for an exercise book and said, "May I write a Psalm like David?" "Certainly," replied M. Godet. A little later, happening to open the note-book he found the following lines written by the child:

"*Psalm of Prince Frederick, June* 2, 1839.

"Praise the Lord, for it is He that hath made us. He is the King of kings. Who can find a more glorious palace than His? Sing psalms unto the Lord. God is the Lord, the Eternal one. We are His children. He is the shepherd and we are His flock. Sing to His Name."

A year later M. Godet wrote, "After a short address I gave them on the words 'Watch and pray, lest' . . ., the Prince said in a tone of earnest feeling which I shall never forget, 'There is no man who can say such beautiful words as Jesus.'"

In 1843 Frédéric Godet became engaged to Caroline Vautravers, whose mother had been governess to the children of Prince Charles of Prussia. He left Berlin in the autumn of the following year, leaving to his successor, Curtius, the further care of the Prince's education. As a mark of gratitude, Prince William gave him a pension, and the title of royal chaplain at Neuchâtel. With the Princess (afterwards the Empress) Augusta, M. Godet

corresponded after his return to Switzerland, and he received many letters from his former pupil which are published for the first time in this volume.

Letters of Student Days.

At the age of seventeen Frederick William sent to his friend a letter covering fifteen pages, and along with it a "confession of faith." Dr. Godet kept these two documents among his most cherished private papers, and his biographer quotes only this one passage from the letter:

"You and your excellent mother," wrote the Prince, "cared for me in my early childhood, and my youth: to each of you I shall owe a debt of gratitude during all my life. I have never understood as clearly as I do now what I owe to you both . . . You developed within me the love and trust for the God who desires only our good. I thus possess for all my life a support which will never fail me. I think so often of you both, and should dearly love to see you again! . . . Accept once more my sincerest thanks for all your kindness and all your excellent lessons, which I hope you will always continue to give me as my kind and faithful friend. May God reward you and bless you, along with all your family.

"Your ever faithful and grateful friend,

"Frederick William."

When Godet's daughter was born in 1849 the Prince, at his own request, became her godfather.

From Bonn he wrote soon after attaining his majority: "There are so many moments when I long to have an intimate talk with you and to open my heart freely, for you are one of those who know me best. You understand me better than a thousand others; you have seen me grow under your eyes and develop into a being who is attached to you as to very few besides."

From Dr. Godet's reply the following passage may be cited: " . . . You don't neglect private prayer, I trust, my dear Prince. For my own part I feel every day how the most intricate affairs are easily ordered, how irritable feelings grow calm, how difficulties are quickly smoothed away by the power of prayer. Can you believe that I talk with God even about a change of servant and similar matters, and that I find in my daily experience that He does not disdain to guide with His mighty divine hand these little things of ordinary life? The truth is, there are no little things. The smallest thing may have incalculable results. May not the choice of a servant influence the whole life of a family, and the life of a family react on the fate of a whole country? On the smallest hair of the head of the humblest beggar may hang the weight which will decide the fate of a country and therefore of the world. That is why the very hairs of our heads, those hairs which *we* do not number, are numbered, as Jesus says, by our heavenly Father. Sweet assurance! Let us see that we take it to ourselves and make joyful use of it by speaking to God about *everything* that pre-occupies and disturbs us. Nothing that fills our hearts is too small for Him. If the king said to you, 'At any hour, you may come to me without knocking; day and night my room is open to you, and all my power is at your service for everything that concerns you' —what a privilege! Is not an equal, nay, an even greater privilege contained in that magnificent permission; '*Pray without ceasing.*'"

In the autumn of 1850 the Prince, in passing through Switzerland, had a meeting at Zurich with M. Godet, his wife and his mother. After the interview the Neuchâtel pastor wrote to Bonnet: "I cannot tell you what a joy it was to me. To see him once more, and to see him *like that*, so well inclined, so modest, so straightforward and frank,

so much riper, so truly religious ; it was more than I could ever have dared to hope. He showed to my mother, who also went to Zurich, to my wife, who accompanied her, and to myself, a friendship, a confidence, a tenderness which were greater than I could tell you in words. There is already a true heart-relationship between him and his God —a relationship in which many things, which he learned from the mouth of man, had been taught him by God Himself."

After his escape in a railway accident near Bielefeld in 1851, the Prince wrote to his friend : " I regard that event as a sign that my life will be often threatened with dangers, but that the divine Hand will defend me from them."

In the same year, Frederick William and his parents visited England for the great Exhibition. " During May," he wrote to M. Godet, " I enjoyed a most delightful visit to the Queen of England and her charming family. My parents, my sister and I were received with open arms, and we felt as much at our ease as if we had always lived there. The immense Exhibition was majestic and imposing. What a fine country, and what interesting studies may be made in it ! "

Betrothal to Princess Victoria.

In May, 1856, came the letter announcing the Prince's engagement to Queen Victoria's eldest daughter.

" It does me good," he wrote, " to talk to you about my happiness, for I know with what feelings you will receive these lines—you, who were the guide of my childhood and youth. You know what full and perfect confidence I have in you, and my only wish is that my promised bride may soon make your acquaintance, so that she may understand, by judging you for herself, why it is that I love you so dearly.

"If you only knew what a calm has entered my soul since I have known that I possess a heart upon earth who is willing, for love of me, to forsake her family and her native land to follow me and share the burden that Providence has laid upon me! I know now what it means to be happy, and the ardent love we feel in our hearts for a being on whom we would gladly pour forth all our own most precious possessions. If I have ever had cause to praise God for His goodness and His grace towards me, this time more than ever His hand has guided me towards happiness and the fulfilment of my desires."

The marriage of the Princess Victoria, like that of her royal mother, was very evidently a love-match. The Prince promised to send her portrait to M. Godet and closed his letter as follows: "Farewell, my dear friend; take your part, as you have always done, in my joy and happiness, and be sure that my affection, my attachment and my trust in you will endure to my latest breath."

The beautiful letter sent from Neuchâtel in reply should be read in the original. M. Godet accepted a pressing invitation to visit the young couple at Berlin a few weeks after their marriage. He found in their home "the most trustful affection, a true fear of God, and a domestic happiness which is still unclouded."

Birth of a Son and Heir.

From Windsor, in November, 1859, the Prince wrote about the recent birth of his eldest son. "My wife bids me send you her affectionate good wishes. We very often speak of you, and recall with pleasure your visit to Berlin soon after my marriage. Now you have a new acquaintance to make, whose existence must sometimes appear to you almost inconceivable. Can I be a father—I, whom you knew almost at the same age as my boy! . . . I assure

you that sometimes I cannot look at this dear child without the tears coming into my eyes. For on the one hand I do not know how to make myself worthy of such a happiness sent me by the God who had already given me all I could desire in my home, thanks to that companion who is all in all to me on earth. On the other hand I cannot forget the keen anxiety I felt at the time of his birth. . . . And afterwards, the delight in my heart, the joy of my family and of the whole country! . . . These impressions cannot fade from my heart and my imagination. Since this event happened I have made many new discoveries in my inner life."

When the Prince Consort died, his son-in-law wrote to Godet :—

" My home life brings me every day an increase of happiness, if that were possible. All the troubles and worries of the outside life of action are left on the threshold of the door that leads to my *home*. . . . The sorrow caused us by the loss of my dear father-in-law, my wife's closest and tenderest friend and my own second father, came like a thunder-clap to disturb our tranquil life. We have lost the one who seemed destined to guide us during many, many years. . . . It will be my task now—a task laid upon me by the confidential relationship into which I have entered with my mother-in-law—to help my wife and her mother in the education of my young brothers and sisters and to try to act as a support to that sorely tried Queen who has never until now known more than the pictured image of sorrow. My children are growing on and prospering, thank God, and they afford us a joy beyond what words can tell. You know from your own rich experience what happiness rises in a father's heart as he sees these tiny creatures developing, especially at the age of my children, when every day brings a new discovery. The King and

Queen are as well as their high position allows. The fate and the life of those whom God has placed on thrones are never enviable, and no turning aside is possible, especially in our days, from the thorny path on which crowned sovereigns must walk."

Meetings with Dr. Godet.

In 1862 the Prince again arranged to meet M. Godet as he passed with his wife through Switzerland in the holiday season. "He has become very much a man," wrote the pastor to Arnold Guyot. "The Princess likes serious, solid reading, and I am going to send her your *Earth and Man*, giving away my own copy, as I want to be useful to this charming pair."

Every reference in Dr. Godet's letters testifies to the true happiness of the Crown Prince's home life, and the perfect trust between husband and wife. As years passed on, the Prince wrote with the same entire satisfaction of household joys shared with his English consort and their children. The Royal pair met Dr. Godet from time to time in Switzerland. He was their guest at La Farraz in 1864, when the Princess was nursing her youngest son Sigismund. The party stayed rather late one afternoon in the woods, and the young mother exclaimed as she hurried towards the house, "Oh, won't nurse scold me!"

In 1867 M. Godet told the Prince that he was resigning his pastorate for a professor's chair in the University of Neuchâtel. In taking up a position which enabled him to carry on his literary work without interruption, he quoted the words, "*Deus* nobis haec otia fecit," with the emphasis on the first word—surely an ideal motto for a professor of theology!

From a letter of M. Godet to the Prince, dated January 12, 1868, we take the lines:—

"It is sometimes difficult even for an honest heart to understand clearly what is the Lord's will. We need for that purpose a total absence of passion, and a deep inner calm. God does not cry aloud; He speaks to us in our ear. If there is noise in the heart, His voice is drowned."

We are reminded of Calvin's words in his letter to Coligny, when the gallant soldier was a prisoner at Ghent: "Comme s'il vouloit parler à vous privément en l'oreille." [1]

The Franco-German War.

In November, 1870, the Prince wrote to Dr. Godet from the German Headquarters at Versailles: "What shall I say to you of this war? I bow before the God who has hitherto guided and protected us, and who will watch over the welfare of our Germany which is at last re-united (as far as the peoples are concerned)—our country which has sacrificed so many noble patriots in these bloody battles. May He give us the peace for which all the world is longing. . . . I can assure you I have a genuine horror of war, and that I pray God with all my heart that this may be the last campaign in which I shall be compelled to join. Can we really be living in the nineteenth century, in which civilisation and morality have reached their summit? What must heathen nations, whom we want to see partaking the blessings of our epoch, think of these two nations who are murdering each other, while they proclaim that their own cause alone deserves to be called holy and just! We

[1] Calvin's beautiful letter is quoted in full in Delaborde's *Gaspard de Coligny*, vol. i. pp. 348, 349. The following words—written three centuries earlier, express the spirit of Dr. Godet's oft-repeated counsels to his royal friend: "Seulement je vous prieray de penser plus oultre, c'est que Dieu en vous envoyant ceste affliction, vous a voulu comme retirer à l'escart, pour estre mieulx escouté de luy. Car vous sçavez assez, monseigneur, combien il est difficile parmy les honneurs, richesses et forces du monde, de luy prester l'oreille our ce qu'on est par trop distrait ça et là, et comme esvanouy, sinon qu'il use de tels moiens pour recueillir ceulx qui sont à soy."

have good reason to bend our heads before the barbarians, who do neither more nor less than we do. But what is the alternative? If we are challenged, we are bound to defend ourselves till we can obtain guarantees for a lasting peace. My own personal ambition is to bring to our great German Fatherland the blessing of a stable and a fruitful peace. Never have I dreamed of creating for myself a name through streams of blood and heaps of corpses. Although the victories gained by my brave troops will have their glorious place in history, I shall never shake off the nightmare vision that I have had to sacrifice so many young lives."

The Emperor William I received Dr. Godet in Berlin at the close of the war, and after telling of his son's gallantry in the field, closed the interview with the remark, "You will meet Fritz to-morrow, and you will be pleased to see what you have done."

The Last Years.

The Crown Prince was only fifty-six when his life was threatened by the first symptoms of a malignant malady. Amidst the sorrows of his closing year (1887–88) he remained in constant touch with his friend. In 1885 he had written from Andermatt: "My eldest son [the present Emperor] the father of three fine boys, is leading a soldier's life at present. He loves that profession and is well fitted to adorn it. My other son, Henry, is devoted to the Navy, and is getting on capitally, so that I hope he will one day distinguish himself in that Service, which with us is only about twenty-five years old."

He added these striking words: "As life goes on, I feel myself growing older, and the conviction takes an ever firmer hold upon me that God's purposes are not ours and hat our one duty is that of reverent submission to His holy will!"

For the writer of this letter less than three years remained. He had already accepted for himself those lines which Dr. Godet so frequently quoted in thinking of the past :

"Was ich gelebt, bedecke Du !
Was ich noch leb, regiere Du ! "

In May, 1887, a month before Queen Victoria's first Jubilee, Dr. Godet wrote to a friend in Strasbourg, that a deep shadow had been hanging over the Prince's life, although the latest news was hopeful. " I lived as under a nightmare in thinking of that most fearful of all maladies with which the Prince seemed to be threatened."

The last of the Prince's letters in this volume is dated from San Remo in November, 1887, and is full of solicitude for his beloved tutor, who had been obliged, at the age of seventy-five, to relinquish his professorship. As to his own condition the dying Prince wrote : " My state is certainly grave ; but as I feel no pain or weakness ; as I sleep well and have a very good appetite, while the prescribed remedies are evidently suiting me, we do not lose courage. I put myself wholly in the hands of God, who in His mercy will order my lot as it pleases Him. I have so often been exposed to perils and dangers from which His grace has preserved me that I can trust myself to Him now as in the past, and say, ' Thy will be done.' . . . My wife is nursing me like a true sister of mercy, and with wonderful calm and skill."

In February, 1888, the Prince underwent the operation of tracheotomy ; in March he returned to Berlin to reign—and to die. The Empress kept Dr. Godet informed as to his state, and wrote to him in later years in language of the tenderest affection. In 1891 she received the aged theologian at Homburg and thanked him for his visit and for the " precious letters " he had brought. Her solicitude during his last illness is gratefully recalled by the biographer.

If any further proof were needed of the holy influence which this modern Fénelon exercised on the life of his royal pupil, we should find it in the closing words of the Crown Prince's last letter from San Remo :—

"And now, my dear friend, farewell. Let me assure you, once again, that I bend as meekly before the Eternal One and resign myself as completely to His will as in the days when I was still a little child entrusted to your care."

The last words of Dr. Godet to the sufferer were dated May 4, 1888, five weeks before the end :—

"I have been reading over again in these days the story of your visit to the Mount of Olives. It was from that spot that He ascended. Unite yourself with Him that so you may rise together."

JANE T. STODDART.

THE DIVINE NAMES IN GENESIS.

II. THE PERICOPE-HYPOTHESIS.

THE main thesis of Dahse's treatise cannot be more succinctly stated than in his own words (p. 99) : "The divine names have nothing to do with this or that document, but are *variable elements of the text.*" His most original contribution to the investigation of the subject is an attempt to trace this variation through successive redactions of the text based upon the divisions of the Law in the lectionary of the Synagogue. The general idea that the distribution of the names for God is somehow influenced by the Synagogue reading is indeed not new ; but so far as I am aware Dahse is the first who has worked it out in elaborate detail, and constructed a theory by which the perplexing phenomena of the present text may be explained. It is this theory which I now proceed to expound and to criticise.

Its complexity is such that I almost despair of carrying the attention of the reader with me through the labyrinth of discussion into which we must enter.

Perhaps a short preliminary explanation will be found useful. For the purposes of the Sabbath reading in the Synagogue, the Pentateuch was divided into sections on two different systems. On one system, which was introduced in the Synagogues of Palestine, the Law was read through in three (or three and a half) years, and was divided into short sections called Sedarim. The other scheme, which seems to have originated in Babylonia, contemplated a reading of the Law in one year; consequently its sections, called Parashas (פרשיות, pl.), are on an average three times as long as the Sedarim. Thus the number of Parashas is 54, and that of the Sedarim is normally 154, although it is variously given as 161, 167, and even 175. In Genesis there are 43 (or 45) Sedarim and 12 Parashas. Now Dahse's theory, very roughly stated, is that the LXX text, as regards the divine names, is regulated by the Seder-division, while the Hebrew is influenced by the Parasha-division. And since the former division is known to be older than the latter, he concludes that the LXX represents an earlier stage of the text than the Hebrew. That, by the way, is a pure assumption. From the fact that the Seder-division is the older, it by no means follows that any problematical influence of that division on the divine names is prior to the fixation of the Massoretic text.

But here we must digress for a little to consider a question which Dahse has not thought it worth while to discuss, although it is surely vital to the argument, viz. the antiquity of the Synagogue lectionaries. On this point we have no certain information. Jewish tradition, which on such matters is utterly unreliable, attributes the system partly to Ezra and partly to Moses. Dahse assumes that the

Sedarim were arranged by Ezra in connexion with the final redaction of the Pentateuch (p. 161); but he has no proof of this apart from his own speculative combinations. An eminent Jewish scholar, Dr. Büchler, who has discussed the subject with great learning in the *Jewish Quarterly Review*,[1] arrives at the conclusion that the system was slowly developed under definite historical influences extending over four centuries. The earliest stage was the reading of prescribed portions of the Law at the three annual Feasts, which was introduced, as the result of a dispute with the Samaritans, about 200 B.C. The next was the selection of lessons for four special Sabbaths, and this dates from the time of the victory of the Pharisees over the Sadducees in B.C. 79. As to the completed Sedarim-lectionary, with which we are here concerned, all he ventures to say is that it was in use before the Christian era, and that it was considered ancient by Josephus in his time. He thinks the Parasha-division may have been introduced in the Synagogues of Babylonia by Rab about 200 A.D. Now these views may be right or they may be wrong; but the fact that they are advanced by a distinguished authority makes it very hazardous to build a hypothesis on the assumption that the Sedarim are of great antiquity. But, further, I think we can with great probability assign a superior limit for their introduction. The Samaritan Pentateuch has a division into sections (קצ׳ם) which is entirely different from the Jewish. Is it likely that if the triennial cycle had been known from the time of Ezra the Samaritans would have ignored it and devised an independent system for themselves? We may reasonably infer that the Sedarim are of later origin than the time when the Samaritans took over the Pentateuch from the Jews.

This is not the only inconvenient fact with which Dahse

[1] Vol. v. p. 420 ff.

deals in too summary a fashion. He is aware that the division of the Sedarim varies in different MSS.; that, e.g., while his authority, Baer, gives 43 in Genesis, the standard Massoretic authority, Jacob ben-Hayyim, gives 45, and that the latter has sections beginning at xi. 1, xxii. 20, xl. 1, xlix. 27, where the former has none; and, on the other hand, that the former has beginnings at xii. 10, xvii. 1, where the latter has none.[1] Dahse says this is immaterial to his system (p. v.); and indeed I am disposed to agree with him, for his theory seems elastic enough to fit a great many divisions of the text. But a theory to which it makes no difference whether or not a new Seder begins at xii. 10, or whether chaps. 16 and 17 form one Seder or two, may surely be suspected of undue laxity of principle.[2] But let us now resume our exposition.

If Dahse's hypothesis were, as a superficial reader might be apt to imagine, that the LXX and the Hebrew keep to one divine name throughout a Seder and a Parasha respectively, the issue would be simple. It would be easy to test the theory, and if it were found correct it would be all over with the documentary analysis of Genesis in so far as it depends on the use of the divine names. But the system is much more complex than this. (1) The editors had a mixed text to start with, i.e., one in which יהוה and אלהים occurred in irregular alternation. Of course it is this mixed original text that we want to get back to in order to see whether it affords any clue to a division of sources. Dahse's theory bars the way. He assures us that the original text is hopelessly obscured by subsequent editings, *more* hope-

[1] On the different divisions which obtained in different Massoretic schools, see Ginsburg, *Introduction*, pp. 33–35. It is much greater than I have stated above.

[2] As a matter of fact, Dahse makes a great deal of the division between xii. 1–9 and xii. 10–xiii, 18, and also of the fact that xvii. 1 is the commencement of a Seder.

lessly in the Massoretic text than in the LXX (p. 95). Still it is something to know that there *was* an original mixed text, and, though we can no longer be sure, we may surmise that it had something to do with a diversity of authorship to which so many independent circumstances point. (2) The editors behind the *Septuagint* (who operated with Sedarim) were guided by the following rules. They never (practically) change an *Elohim* into *Yahwe*; but in certain circumstances they change a *Yahwe* into *Elohim*. If they found either name used consistently throughout a Seder, they allowed it to stand. But if a Seder contained both *Yahwe* and *Elohim*, their practice was to let *Yahwe* stand at the beginning or end, and elsewhere to change it to *Elohim*.[1] (3) The editors of the *Massoretic text* (operating with Parashas) were "influenced" by the Parasha-division to this extent that they replaced "the *Elohims* standing in the middle of the Sedarim by *Yahwe*," but only in "Elohim-stellen . . . die mitten zwischen Yahweabschnitten lagen" (p. 94),—whatever that may mean. Whether they are supposed to have worked on the original mixed text, or on the recension already prepared for the LXX, Dahse nowhere expressly informs us, and I have been unable to discover for myself. These appear to be the leading features of the hypothesis, so far as they can be made out from Dahse's not very lucid or consecutive description.

Now before proceeding to test the theory in detail, I think it is not unfair to raise at once the question of its inherent credibility. There are three points to consider :—

1. We have to ask what time can be allowed for these postulated redactions. The Samaritan text agrees with the Massoretic as regards the divine names in all but eight or

[1] P. 93 : ". . . die Stellen wo יהוה = *κυριος immer* den Anfang und Schluss (resp. ersten und letzten Gottesnamen) eines der alten Sedarim . . . enthalten."

nine cases,[1] so that, on Dahse's theory, both the assumed redactions must have been completed in the Synagogues of Palestine before the two texts parted company. We have seen reason to believe that the Seder-division of the Law is much younger than the Samaritan Pentateuch, and therefore the redactions could not even have been commenced until a long time after the separation had taken place. And apart from that, is it credible that the LXX translators had got hold of an obsolete Palestinian recension, which must have had a very short lease of life, and made it the basis of their version ? That by itself is not absolutely impossible ; but it will require pretty clear evidence to establish a theory in the teeth of so many improbabilities.

2. We must have some respect for the psychology of the supposed redactors. We are not at liberty to attribute to them *any* course of action that might bring about the actual result, as if they were dilettante triflers amusing themselves by inventing an elaborate cipher to tax the ingenuity of twentieth century critics. We must treat them as reasonable human beings, working from intelligible motives for intelligible practical ends. In short, we must be able to see that their *modus operandi* is directed to some useful purpose connected with the public reading of the Law. How does the theory stand this test ? To take one example : what could have induced the LXX editors, in a " mixed " Seder, to leave the first and last יהוה standing, and to change the rest ? Obviously, thinks Dahse, it was to indicate that *Yahwe* and *Elohim* are one God (p. 97). Granted that the hearers needed that reminder, one fails to see how this device would help them. It would no doubt ensure that

[1] According to the text of Walton's Polyglot, Sam. reads אֱלֹהִים for יהוה in Gen. vii. 1, xiv. 22, and xx. 18 ; יהוה for אֱלֹהִים in vii. 9, xxviii. 4, xxxi. 7, 9, 16 ; and adds אֱלֹהִים in xxxv. 9. The Sam. reading in vii. 1 is not quite certain. In xiv. 22 the names are a late addition to the text.

on the Sabbath when a " mixed " Seder was read they would hear both names ; but when the lesson was an " unmixed " Seder they would be left to their own untutored reason. Why should the suggestion of identity be more necessary in the one case than the other ? Would not consistency rather demand that at least in " unmixed " lessons marked by *Elohim* this name should be once changed to *Yahwe* to avert polytheistic misconceptions ? All very trivial finical questions, no doubt ! but a textual critic has no right to avoid triviality by vague and unconsidered generalities.

3. It is a most unwarranted assumption that editors of the text would have deliberately altered the divine names from any such artificial motive as that on which Dahse's hypothesis rests. The close agreement of the Jewish and Samaritan Pentateuchs in this respect, as contrasted with their frequent differences in other matters, seems to me a conclusive proof that the most scrupulous attention was paid to the divine names in the transmission of the text. Nor am I prepared to admit that even the LXX editors and copyists ever introduced wanton changes of the names of God. In comparison with the Jews and Samaritans they were somewhat careless, and they may often have substituted what they believed to be the better reading ; but that they would have made *systematic* alterations of the kind here supposed I see no reason to believe.[1]

[1] Dahse will no doubt appeal to the Elohistic redaction of an entire section of the Psalter, and perhaps also to the regular use of *Yahwe* in the Targum of Onkelos, as evidence of a free handling of the divine names in authoritative Jewish circles at a late period in the history of the text. I deny the force of either analogy. The regular substitution of one divine name for another in writings *not yet canonised* affords no ground for the supposition that at a much earlier time sporadic changes might have been made in the oldest and most highly venerated part of the Canon, the Law. Still less is the levelling tendency of a *translation* (the Targum) an index to what would have been permitted in dealing with the sacred text itself. In any case one fact is not annulled by another. The agreement of the Heb. and Sam. is a critical fact which is explicable only by extreme care

But it will be said that these historical and *a priori* objections must give way to literary evidence, and that if the pericope-hypothesis shows a reasonable correspondence with the facts it must be accepted as proved. That will depend on what we consider to be a reasonable correspondence. The discoverer of a new theory is apt to be satisfied with a degree of approximation to fact which a less interested person finds disappointing; so that unless the correspondence be *exact* (which in this case it is not) there will be room for difference of opinion as to the value of the discovery. We must make the best of it, however; and I will now go on to examine how far Dahse's solution accounts for the distribution of the divine names in the different sections of Genesis.

We may first of all dispose of the very exceptional cases where an אלהים in the Hebrew is represented by (ο) κυριος in the LXX. It seems to me that Dahse here somewhat misunderstands the position of his opponents. He constantly argues as if the only possible explanation of the rarity of the instances where κυριος = אלהים were the shrinking of copyists from the use of the sacred tetragrammaton. For my part I have never believed that that is the chief cause of the phenomenon in question. I hold that the differences between the LXX and the MT in either direction are due to errors that have crept in during a long series of transcriptions, and that the main reason why ο θεος is substituted for κυριος so much more frequently than κυριος for ο θεος is simply that ο θεος came more readily to the pen of a Greek scribe than the Hebraic κυριος. Be that as it may, there are only three cases in Genesis

in the handling of the names from the time when the two texts diverged; and that is surely a more reliable indication of the feeling of the earliest editors than any preferences which may have asserted themselves in a later age.

xii.–l. where Dahse admits that κυριος stands for אלהים, xxi. 2, 6; xxviii. 20 (he might at least have mentioned xix. 29, if not also xvii. 15, xxx. 17, xlviii. 9 [O.L.]). It is important for him to shew either that יהוה is the original Hebrew, or that ο θεος is the original LXX. I will not here pause to discuss the readings. It is enough to say that as regards xxviii. 20 he seems (pp. 96, 106) to make out a good case for יהוה as the original text; but as regards xxi. 2, 6 his reasoning (pp. 102, 111) appears to me utterly weak and inconclusive.

We come at last to the crucial test, a comparison of Dahse's theory with the facts that lie before us in the two texts, the Massoretic and the Greek. And here my observations are so opposed to Dahse's generalised statements that I find it necessary to visualise them, in order that the reader may see at a glance how the matter stands. In the following synopsis I register the occurrences of the names יהוה and אלהים (J = יהוה, E = אלהים) for each Seder in Genesis xii.–l., first according to the MT and then according to the LXX. The second line gives the readings of the larger Cambridge LXX, except in a few cases where another reading seems better attested; but in a third line I have noted those readings which are expressly claimed by Dahse as original. The material is taken from his own table, save in the few places where I have happened to detect an error. For the present I confine the examination to chaps. xii.–l., because in the first eleven chapters the frequent occurrence of the double name κυριος ο θεος in the LXX creates a special and complicated problem.

Par.	Seder.	Contains	Names.	Remarks.
III (12^{1}–17^{27})	9	12^{1-9}	MT: } LXX: } J 6 times	
	10	12^{10}–13^{18}	MT: JJJJJJJ LXX: EJEEEEEJ[1] *E	* ? 13^{4} (see Dah. pp. 102, 92 f.)
	11	Ch. 14	MT: J LXX: –	14^{22}: Sam. E [2]
	12	Ch. 15	MT: JJJJJJJ LXX: JJJEEJE -- ? ?	15^{2} (p. 13) 15^{4} (p. 102, 105) 15^{8} (p. 12 f.) 15^{18} p. 41, 109 f.)
	13	Ch. 16	MT: JJJ–JJJJJ LXX: JEJJJJJJJ E	16^{11} (p. 110, cf. p. 22, 32)
	14	Ch. 17	MT: JEEEEEEEE LXX: JEEEEEEEE	$17^{7, 8}$ omitted
IV (18^{1}–22^{24})	15	Ch. 18	MT: JJJJJJJJJJ LXX: EJEJJJJJJJ J J	$18^{1, 14}$ (p. 92, 102)
	16	Ch. 19	MT: JJJJJJJEE– LXX: JJJJJJJJEJ E E	19^{13} (? p. 110) 19^{29a} (p. 111)
	17	Ch. 20	MT: EEEEEEJ* LXX: EEEEEEJ	* 20^{18} : Sam. E
	18	Ch. 21	MT: JJEEEEEEEEEEEEJ LXX: JJJEJEEEEEEEEEJ JE	$21^{4, 6}$ (? see p. 102, 111 f.)
	19	Ch. 22, 23	MT: EEEEJEJJJJ*E LXX: EEEEJEJJJJ E [3]	* Par. IV. ends here (22^{16})

[1] One might have accepted J for the first E (12^{17}), with Boh. OL, etc., but Dahse (p. 40) argues strongly for E.

[2] I agree with Dahse (p. 11) that the name is interpolated both in MT and Sam.

[3] J only with "angel," "oracle," of Yahwe, and in the phrase "Yahwe-Yireh," where Dahse says (wrongly) it could not be altered.

Par.	Seder.	Contains	Names.	Remarks.
V (22^{1}–25^{18})	20	24^{1-41}	MT: JJJJJJJJ LXX: JJJJJJJJ E	24^{27a} & 24^{40} omitted in D.'s table 24^{40} Dah. ὁ θς μου ? (p. 13, 103)
	21	24^{42-67}	MT: } J 6 times LXX: }	
	22	25^{1-18}	MT: } E once LXX: }	
VI (25^{19}–28^{9})	23	25^{19}–26^{34}	MT: JJJJJJJJJJJ LXX: JEJJJJJJJJJ E	26^{28} (Dah. ? p. 112)
	24	27^{1-27}	MT: } J 3 times [4] LXX: }	
	25	27^{28}–28^{9}	MT: } E twice LXX: }	
VII (28^{10}–32^{3})	26	28^{10}–29^{30}	MT: EJJJEE*JE [5] LXX: EJ–JEJJE	28^{13b} added, * 28^{20}. See p. 408. above
	27	29^{31}–30^{21}	MT: JJJJEEEEEEE LXX: JJJJEEEEEEE	
	28	30^{22}–31^{2}	MT: EEEJJJ LXX: EEEEEJ *	* 30^{24}. See p. 417 below
	29	31^{3}–32^{3}	MT: JEEEEEEE–JEEE LXX: JEEEEEEEEE–EE	$31^{5, 29}$ omitted [6]
VIII (32^{4}–36^{43})	30	32^{4}–33^{17}	MT: JEEEEE LXX: JEEEEE	32^{10} added
	31	33^{18}–35^{8}	MT: } E three times LXX: }	
	32	35^{9}–36^{43}	MT: E–EEEE LXX: EEEEEE	
IX (ch. 37–40)	33	Ch. 37	No divine names	
	34	Ch. 38	MT: JJJ LXX: JEE	

[4] Dahse (p. 103) seems to say that the middle name (27^{20}) was originally ὁ θς σου.

[5] E only with "angels" or "house" of God.

[6] On Par. VII. see the tables on p. 418 below.

Par.	Seder.	Contains	Names.	Remarks.
	35	Ch. 39, 40	MT: JJJJJEJJJE LXX: JJJJJEJJJE	
X (41^{1}–44^{17})	36	41^{1-37}	MT: } E 5 times LXX: }	
	37	41^{38}–42^{17}	MT: } E 4 times LXX: }	
	38	42^{18}–43^{13}	MT: } E twice LXX: }	
	39	43^{14}–44^{17}	MT: } E twice LXX: }	
XI (44^{18}–47^{27})	40	44^{18}–46^{27}	MT: } E 5 times LXX: }	46^{1b} omitted
	41	46^{28}–47^{31}	No divine names	
XII (47^{-28}–50^{26})	42	Ch. 48	MT: } EEEEEE– LXX: } EEEEEEE	
	43	Ch. 49, 50	MT: JEEE–E LXX: JEEEEE	50^{17} omitted

I do not know whether Dahse will maintain that these statistics bear out his pericope-theory, or whether he will challenge them. If he elects for the latter alternative, there is certainly a whole jungle of problematical restorations of the original LXX in which he may take refuge, and through which it will be difficult for a non-expert critic to follow him. I will deal with some of his ventures in this field in other connexions; in the meantime I will only say that he has no right to make capital of our ignorance by subjective speculation as to what the original LXX *must* have been. His theory must be judged in the light of the textual data which we possess; and behind the readings best established as original no theorist is entitled to go. For it is not a readjustment here and there that will save this

theory, but a wholesale reconstruction on a scale which no sane scholar will either attempt or justify.

The plain truth is that between Dahse's observation of the facts and mine there are irreconcileable and sometimes unaccountable discrepancies. A good many of his generalisations appear to be simply loose and inaccurate. The number of "mixed" Sedarim is not 9 but 18; "mindestens *ein* יהוה = *κυριος*" (p. 92) being enough to constitute a mixed section. It is not true (p. 93) of Seder 26 that elsewhere than xxviii. 13a, 16 we have אלהים = *ο θεος*, for there are two Js (xxviii. 20, 21) for the originality of which in the LXX Dahse has expressly argued (see above). The statement on p. 94 that Par. VI. has "at the beginning purely J-passages, and at the end three more," if true, would be fatal to the theory, and is contradicted on the next page; as a matter of fact the Parasha ends with two Es. In S. 16 it is not only the last, but the last two, names that are E in the MT. Ss. 17, 18, 19, even apart from "specially motived passages," were not purely Elohistic in the LXX (see J in xxi. 1b, xxi. 2, xxi. 4 ?, xxi. 6 ?); and even if they had been they would have been none the less "mixed" by the presence of "motived" Js, and there would have been nothing to prevent MT from regularly changing E to J. S. 10 has two Js (xiii. 4, 18), not "only one," as stated on p. 95. S. 23 is Yahwistic (p. 95) in MT, but not entirely so in the *older* (?) LXX form (xxv. 21b). S. 35 contains two Es; therefore is not Yahwistic (*ibid.*).—Other statements are justified only by operations on the text which seem to me doubtful and arbitrary. S. 12 is brought under the theory (p. 92) by no fewer than four changes of the text (xv. 2, 4, 8, 18), all precarious, and the last seemingly in opposition to what Dahse has himself said on p. 41. Similarly S. 13 is manipulated not only by the change of J to E in xvi. 11 (for which as the earliest *Septuagint* reading there

is a good deal to be said), but also by *neglecting* (nicht angeführt !) " fünfmal αγγελος κ " (p. 92), for which there is no real justification (see below). Chap. xviii. (S. 15) is excluded from the mixed Sedarim by twice changing E to J, on very weak evidence, amounting in the case of xviii. 1, even in Dahse's estimate, only to a " vielleicht " or a " wohl." Pars. VIII. and XII. are classed as Elohistic (p. 94) by explaining away the two Js (xxxii. 9 (10), xlix. 18) through the rule that " sacrifices, prayers and praises are offered only to Yahwe, not to Elohim " (p. 96), which again is an unreal restriction (see below). Indeed the variety of motives assigned for the retention of J by the LXX in particular cases is such as to discount heavily the value of a theory which requires to appeal to them all. And lastly it is an absolute *non sequitur* to argue (p. 93) that because there are " mixed " sections in the MT as well as in the LXX, therefore *all* the mixed Sedarim of the LXX must have been mixed in the Hebrew basis of that version. I do not profess to know all that Dahse may have had in his mind in writing these pages (92–95) ; but taking the statements as they stand I find them utterly untrustworthy and misleading. Probably few will take the trouble to check them in detail as I have done ; but having done so I repeat that to the best of my judgment the facts are as I have given them above, and at any rate not as stated by Dahse. And I might fairly decline to debate a question on fundamental data which I conceive to be wrongly reported.

It is needless, then, to discuss minutely whether Dahse's theory fits the facts tabulated above ; it manifestly does not. But I will point out one or two things. Taking first the recension supposed to lie behind the LXX, in the 14 " unmixed " Sedarim the rule is observed that the LXX has made no change on the original, and so far the theory may be said to be vindicated. Yes, but only on the assumption

that here the original text has been preserved by the Hebrew; otherwise we cannot tell what havoc the LXX may have made of sections originally mixed. Again, in the "mixed" Sedarim, it is true that there are only two (19 and 26) which do not either begin or end with J, and of these two it may be said that the first or last J of the original has been retained. I will not absolutely deny that there may be evidence of design here (though I greatly doubt it); but even if it be so it is quite as explicable on the supposition that the LXX is dependent on the MT as on the reverse assumption. I fear this is the only triumph that Dahse can claim for his hypothesis. In all other respects it is plain as day, from the synopsis above, that the treatment of the mixed Sedarim is governed by no principle whatever, unless it be the negative principle of making as few mistakes as possible.

Coming next to the alleged Massoretic recension, we find it encumbered with still greater difficulties. What is conceived to have taken place is a Yahwistic redaction, confined to mixed Sedarim, and applied to these only under peculiar conditions. It is of course possible to represent that the uniform use of J in six out of the eighteen originally mixed Sedarim (Nos. 10, 12, 13, 15, 23, 34) is due to an operation of this kind; but what of the remaining twelve? Dahse tells us that we are not to look for the alteration except in "Elohimstellen die mitten zwischen Yahweabschnitten lagen" (p. 94). The language is studiously ambiguous. What is a *Stelle?* what is an *Abschnitt?* If *Abschnitten* means Sedarim, the absence of the redaction in the majority of mixed Sedarim would no doubt be explained; but then the operation ought not to have been performed in any one of the six just enumerated. If, on the other hand, *Yahweabschnitten* are sections beginning or ending with an isolated J, the conversion of Nos. 10, 12 and 13 (*not* 15, 23 or 34)

would be accounted for, but its absence in other instances (e.g. Nos, 14, 17, 29) becomes inexplicable. Again, if *Elohimstellen* means (as apparently it must) individual occurrences of E within the Seder, the rule will be found to be frequently violated on both sides (Nos. 15, 16, 18, 19, 26, 28, 29, 35); and it rarely makes any difference to the working of the theory what position the names occupy in the Seder, or the Seder in the Parasha. It would seem, in fact, that the Parasha-division could only affect the treatment of the opening and closing Sedarim of the Parasha; of these it could never be said that they stand "mitten zwischen" J-sections. Now that consideration would have prevented the redaction in S. 34; and there are only three other cases (Nos. 14, 29, 43) in which it could have had any influence on such an editorial process as is here imagined. It is time to ask whether it be really conceivable that any man or body of men should have been governed by the whimsical notions attributed to the Massoretic editors. We could understand a systematic alteration of E to J throughout the Pentateuch; we could even understand such an operation being restricted to mixed Sedarim; but a Yahwistic redaction which refused to touch a mixed section unless it was flanked on both sides by the Tetragrammaton is too remote from the normal practical working of the human mind to be received as a credible explanation of the distribution of the divine names in the Hebrew text, even if it could shew a much closer correspondence with the facts than is actually the case. I submit then that no case has been made out for a Yahwistic redaction of the basis of the LXX by Hebrew editors governed by a regard to the Parashas. If there had been a redaction at all, the facts would be much more naturally explained by a tendency to assimilate isolated occurrences of E to the Js on either side of them, than by the complex system elaborated by Dahse.

And finally one would like to know why the MT is to be accepted as having preserved the original in the " unmixed " Sedarim, and to be regarded as secondary in the " mixed." Does not this amount to assuming that it is to be trusted when it tells in favour of the hypothesis, and discredited when it makes against it ? [1]

We have not by any means exhausted the list of vaguely arbitrary statements for which Dahse makes himself responsible. I propose to follow him point by point through his analysis of Parasha VII (p. 95 ff.), which seems to have caused him more difficulty than any other in chaps. xii.–l. It extends from ch. xxviii. 10 to xxxii. 3, and includes Sedarim 26–29. He commences with what seems the irrelevant remark that no one has yet noticed how this Parasha begins and ends " artificially " with the " angels of God " (xxviii. 12 ; xxxii. 1). This statement is not quite correct. The last phrase is not in xxxii. 1, but in xxxii. 3, and it is not מלאכי אלהים but מחנה א׳. Wherein the artificiality of the commencement and ending consists, and how the theory is affected by it, does not appear.—In xxviii. 13 he rejects the second J (with the LXX) as an interpolation in the Hebrew text. It makes no difference to the argument whether it be rejected or retained. But it is read not only by Hexaplaric MSS. of the LXX, and by the Sahidic and Ethiopic versions, but also (in place of *ο θεος*) by the Old Latin ; so that it has a good claim to be regarded as the original reading of the LXX. We cannot, in view of xxvi. 24, say that the

[1] Even Dahse's own theory, untenable though it is shewn to be, works out in a manner eminently favourable to the MT. For in the first place it involves the admission, as we have seen, that in all unmixed Sedarim the MT has preserved the original names. Further, it implies that in mixed sections every J of the LXX must have stood in the original text, so that where MT and LXX agree in reading J, the MT is again true to the original. These two maxims between them account for about 126 names out of 216. Why should we suspect the soundness of the MT in the remaining 90 cases ?

sense demands it ; but at least the sense is better with it than without.—In xxviii. 20 I have already admitted the force of his contention that J is the original reading (LXX, κυριος ο θεος or κυριος).—We come next to xxix. 31, 32 33, 35. Dahse allows that in all four instances J is the oldest attested LXX reading (as MT), but says he has already shewn that in the first three אלהים or אל is the original. Of *vv.* 31 and 33 I can discover no previous discussion, and I see no reason for going behind the common tradition of MT and LXX. On *v.* 32 he has argued that the real form of the name of Jacob's eldest son Reuben (ראובל) " proves that יהוה cannot be original." I hope to deal with that type of argument in another connexion, and will only say here that it rests on a complete misconception. It is true, however, that the Peshitta here reads *Elohim*, and to that no answer can be made except that the Peshitta is much younger than the original LXX, and that a reading of that version unsupported by Greek evidence is no sufficient reason for questioning the soundness of the MT.[1] In *v.* 35 he allows that J is the true text, but on the inadequate and erroneous ground that it speaks of the " praise " of Yahwe, and that " one offers sacrifice, prayer and praise only to Yahwe, not to Elohim " (but see xx. 17, cf. xxii. 8, xxvii. 28).—Again, we have differences in xxx. 24, 27, 30. In *v.* 24 the textual evidence for E (against MT) is stronger than usual (LXX, Aquila, Symmachus, Peshitta); on the other hand *all* Hebrew MSS. and Sam. have J, which is the reading that naturally commends itself to those who believe on other grounds that two different explanations of the name Joseph are likely to have been derived from different sources. In *v.* 27 the LXX is supported by the Peshitta alone ; but

[1] On p. 27 we find the statement that xxii. 11, 15 are the only cases where a J of MT, rendered by E in Pesh., is translated by κυριος in the LXX. Dahse must have been nodding here.

Dahse adds the purely subjective consideration that Laban would not be likely to speak of the blessing of Yahwe ! Why not ? He does that very thing in xxiv. 31, where there is no dispute as to the text, and where (the Seder being " unmixed ") J must, on Dahse's own theory, be regarded as original. In *v.* 30 he accepts J as original.—Lastly, on xxxi. 3–xxxii. 3 he declines to discuss xxxi. 49 because of the notorious corruptions of the text.—He adds the general remark that after " name " and " angel," Yahwe is always represented in LXX by *κυριου*. The former statement is true, but has no bearing on Par. VII, where the expression does not occur. The latter is incorrect (see Num. xxii. 22–35 *pass.*), and in any case it is clear from Gen. vi. 2, xxi. 17, xxxi. 11 that the LXX cannot have had any aversion to substituting E for J in this connexion. But let us adopt all these suggested amendments, and see how far the result bears out Dahse's theory. We have to distinguish three stages of the text : the original Hebrew ; the original LXX (which proves to be almost identical with our present LXX) ; and the Massoretic text. We get the following scheme :—

Seder 26 (xxviii. 10–xxix. 30)	Orig.	EJ-J E JJE
	LXX	EJ-J E JJE
	MT	EJJJEEJE
27 (xxix. 31–xxx. 21.)	Orig.	EEEJEEEEEE
	LXX	JJJJEEEEEE
	MT	JJJJEEEEEE
28 (xxx. 22.–xxxi. 2)	Orig.	EEEEEJ
	LXX	EEEEEJ
	MT	EEEJ J J
29 (xxxi. 3–xxxii. 3)	Orig.	JEE ?EEEEE ? ?EE
	LXX	JEEJEEEEEE?EE
	MT	JEEEEEEE-JEEE

Compare this with Dahse's summary (p. 96) :—

" Seder 26 is Elohistic, only the 1st (and connected therewith the 3rd) name is J ;
,, 27 Beginning (xxix. 31 ff.) Yahwistic, then Elohistic ;
,, 28 Elohistic, the last name (xxx. 30) Yahwistic ;
,, 29 Beginning (xxxi. 3) Yahwistic, then Elohistic."

It would seem that Dahse's generalisations are as wide of the mark as ever, and that after all these adjustments of the text he has come no nearer to a proof of his hypothesis. We note in particular (1) that the MT exhibits the tendency to substitute J for E only in three passages at most (xxx. 24, 27, xxxi. 49), while in two (xxviii. 20, xxxi. 11) it changes J to E, and in one (xxviii. 13b) it supplies J for a blank in the LXX. (2) That the LXX, in violation of its alleged principle, has three times changed an original E into J (xxix. 31, 32, 33). (3) That the characterisation of a Seder as " anfangs jahwistisch, dann elohistisch " is merely a device to save the theory by breaking up a mixed Seder into two unmixed sections. It holds good of S. 27 only *after* the LXX redaction, and therefore cannot be appealed to in explanation of the perfectly arbitrary treatment of the divine names in the LXX of this section. Further comment is superfluous.

I refrain, for the reason already given, from following Dahse through his discussion of the first eleven chapters. It is besides quite unnecessary to do so ; for if the theory breaks down (as I believe I have proved that it does) as regards chaps. xii.–l., it fails entirely. I will now ask the reader to dismiss it from his mind and to look once more at the tables given above to see what light they shed on the relations between the LXX and the Massoretic text. It will be found that in 23 out of the 35 Sedarim there is perfect agreement between the two texts ; that in 6 there is only

one divergence ; in four there are 2 ; and only in two are there so many as 3 and 5 respectively. In all, the divergences number 22 if we exclude cases where a name in one text stands for a blank in the other, or 30 if we include such cases. The total number of occurrences of Yahwe and Elohim in these 39 chapters is 211 in one text and 214 in the other. Here I venture to reaffirm the opinion expressed by me in the International Critical Commentary on Genesis (p. xxxv.), that that proportion of differences (from one-tenth to one-seventh of the whole) is not so great as to invalidate any critical conclusions properly deduced from the Massoretic text by itself ; and further, that the variations are quite adequately explained as accidental aberrations of the LXX, usually in the substitution of ο θεος for κυριος, but occasionally in the opposite direction. Let us only conceive (what the solid agreement of the Hebrew and Samaritan—differing, it will be remembered, only in some eight or nine cases—fully justifies us in assuming) that the MT has preserved the original names with substantial fidelity, and that the LXX is dependent upon it, and I think that any one not obsessed by a predilection for fine-spun theories and circuitous solutions will perceive that the facts are sufficiently accounted for in this simple way, as they certainly are not by the arbitrary and unintelligible pericope-hypothesis with which this article has dealt. It is really carrying a prejudice in favour of the LXX too far to throw the whole textual tradition into the melting-pot, and then to bring out "this calf." I am not now discussing the merits of the documentary theory ; my concern is with the Massoretic text. But one remark may be made : whatever may be urged against the documentary theory of the Pentateuch it cannot be said that on textual grounds it is demonstrably false. I believe I have shewn that the pericope-theory of Dahse may be so characterised. JOHN SKINNER.

THE FORMS OF HEBREW POETRY.

I. Introductory.

Failure to perceive what are the formal elements in Hebrew poetry has, in the past, frequently led to misinterpretation of Scripture. The existence of formal elements is now generally recognised; but there are still great differences of opinion as to the exact nature of some of these, and as to their relation to one another; and large questions or numerous important details of both the lower and higher criticism and of the interpretation of the Old Testament are involved in these differences. An examination of the forms of Hebrew poetry thus becomes a valuable, if not indeed a necessary, means to the correct appreciation of its substance, to an understanding of the thought expressed in it, in so far as that may still be understood, and, where that is at present no longer possible, to a perception of the cause and extent of the uncertainty and obscurity.

More especially do the questions relating to the two most important forms of Hebrew poetry—parallelism and metre—require to be studied in close connexion with one another, and indeed in closer connexion than has been customary of late. I deliberately speak at this point of the *question* of parallelism and metre; for, on the one hand, it has been and may be contended that parallelism, though it is a characteristic of much, is never a form of any, Hebrew poetry, and, on the other hand, it has been and still is sometimes contended that metre is not a form of Hebrew poetry, for the simple reason that in Hebrew poetry it did not exist. Over a question of nomenclature, whether parallelism should be termed a form or a characteristic, no words need be wasted; the really important question to be considered later on is how far the phenomena

covered by the term parallelism can be classified, and how far they conform to laws that can be defined. A third form of some Hebrew poetry is the strophe. This is of less, but still of considerable importance, and will be briefly considered in its place; but rhyme, which is not a regular feature of Hebrew poetry, and poetical diction need not for the purposes of the present survey be more than quite briefly and incidentally referred to.

The first systematic treatment of any of the formal elements of Hebrew poetry came from Oxford. There have been few more distinguished occupants of the chair of Poetry in that university than Robert Lowth, afterwards Bishop of London, and few lectures delivered from that chair have been more influential than his *De Sacra Poesi Hebraeorum Praelectiones Academicae.* These lectures were published in the same year (1753) as another famous volume, to wit, Jean Astruc's *Conjectures sur les mémoires originaux dont il paroît que Moyse s'est servi pour composer le livre de la Genèse.* It is as true of Astruc as of Lowth that "in theology he clung to the traditional orthodoxy"; [1] yet Astruc was the first to apply a stylistic argument in a systematic attempt to recover the original sources of a portion of the Pentateuch, and Lowth, by his entire treatment of his subject, marks the transition from the then prevailing dogmatic treatment of the Old Testament to that treatment of it which rests on the recognition that, whatever else it may be, and however sharply distinguished in its worth or by its peculiarities from other literatures, the Old Testament is primarily literature, demanding the same critical examination and appreciation, alike of form and substance, as other literature. Owing to certain actual characteristics of what survives of ancient Hebrew literature, documentary analysis has necessarily played an important part in modern

[1] T. K. Cheyne, *Founders of Old Testament Criticism*, p. 3.

criticism of the Old Testament ; and if, narrowing unduly the conception of Old Testament criticism, we think in connexion with it mainly or exclusively of documentary analysis and questions of origin, Astruc may seem a more important founder of Modern Criticism than Lowth. But in reality the general implications of Lowth's discussion of Hebrew poetry, apart from certain special conclusions reached by him to which we shall pass immediately, make his lectures of wider significance than even Astruc's acute conjectures ; and we may fairly claim that, through Lowth and his two principal works, both of which were translated into German, the *Lectures* by Michaelis, the *Isaiah* by Koppe, Oxford, in the middle of the eighteenth century contributed to the critical study of the Old Testament, and the appreciation of Hebrew literature in a degree that was scarcely equalled till the nineteenth century was drawing to its close.

It is a relatively small part of Lowth's lectures that is devoted to those forms or formal characteristics of Hebrew poetry with which we are here concerned : of the thirty-four lectures one only, the nineteenth, is primarily devoted to that form with which Lowth's name will always be associated, though the subject of parallelism was already raised in the third lecture. The maturer and fuller discussion of this and kindred topics was first published in 1778 as a preliminary dissertation to the translation of Isaiah. Briefly summed up, Lowth's contribution to the subject was twofold : he for the first time clearly analysed and expounded the parallelistic structure of Hebrew poetry, and he drew attention to the fact that the extent of poetry in the Old Testament was much larger than had generally been recognised, that in particular it included the greater part of the prophetic writings.

The existence and general characteristics of parallelism as claimed by Lowth have never been questioned since,

nor the importance for interpretation of recognising these; nor can it be questioned, once the nature of parallelism is admitted, that parallelism occurs in the Prophets as well as in the Psalms, and in many passages of the Prophets no less regularly than in many Psalms. If, then, *on the ground of parallelism*, the Psalms are judged to be poetry, the prophetic writings (in the main) must also be regarded as poetry; and, if, on the ground of parallelism, a translation of the Psalms is marked, as is the Revised Version, by line divisions corresponding to the parallel members of the original, a translation of the Prophets should also be so marked; and by failing so to mark the prophetic poetry, and thereby introducing an unreal distinction between the form of the Psalms and the form of the prophetic writings the Revised Version conceals from those who use it one of the most important and one of the surest conclusions which were reached by Lowth in his discussion of Hebrew poetry.

Whether after all parallelism is itself a true *differentia* between prose and poetry in Hebrew, may be and will be discussed; but it will be useful before proceeding to a closer examination either of parallelism or of other alleged *differentiæ* between prose and poetry, to recall the earlier scattered and unsystematic attempts to describe the formal elements of Hebrew poetry.

It has always been recognised that between mediaeval Jewish poetry and the poetry of the Old Testament there is, so far as form goes, no connexion; nor, indeed, any similarity beyond the use, especially by the earliest of these mediaeval poets such as Jose ibn Jose and Kaliri, of acrostic or alphabetic schemes such as occur in Lamentations i.–iv. and some other poems in the Old Testament. It was more especially from the tenth century A.D. onwards, and in the West, and more particularly in Spain, that,

under the influence of Arabic culture, and in some measure too, perhaps, of Syriac poetry, a type of Hebrew poetry flourished which was governed by metre and rhyme ; [1] and the metre of this poetry was quantitative. The same period was also, and again owing to the influence of Arabic culture, an age of Jewish grammarians and philologists. These recognised the difference between the old poetry and the new, but contributed little to the knowledge of the form of the older poetry beyond a tolerably general acquiescence in the negative judgment that that older poetry was not metrical. In any case, no living tradition of the laws of the older Hebrew poetry, the poetry of the Old Testament, survived in the days of the poets Chasdai (915–970, A.D.), Solomon ibn Gabirol (1021–1058, or 1070), Judah hal-Levi (born 1085); of the grammarians and philologists, of whom some were poets also, Dunash ibn Labrat (*c.* 920–990), Menahem ibn Saruk (*c.* 910–970), Abu-l Walid, Ibn Ezra (eleventh century), and the Ḳimḥis (twelfth century). The older poetry had long been a lost art. Whatever these mediaeval scholars say of it has, therefore, merely the value of an antiquarian theory ; and however interesting their theories may be, they need not detain us longer now.

But there exist a few far earlier Jewish statements on the formal elements of the poetry of the Old Testament which run back, not indeed to the time of even the latest poems within the Old Testament, but to a time when, as will be pointed out in detail later on, poetry of the ancient Hebrew type was still being written. Statements from such a period unquestionably have a higher degree of interest than those of the mediaeval Jewish scholars. Whether

[1] The introduction of rhyme into Hebrew poetry is attributed to Jannai ; rhyme was also employed by Kaliri. Both Jannai (probably) and Kaliri were Palestinians, and both lived in or before the ninth century A.D. : see Graetz, *Gesch. des Judenthums*, v. 158, 159.

as a matter of fact they point to any discernment of the real principles of that poetry, and whether they do not betray at once misconceptions and lack of perception is another question. At all events, it is important to observe that while the authors of these statements were Jews, the readers with a view to whom they wrote were Greeks. So far as I am aware, there is no discussion of metre, or parallelism, or in general of the formal elements of Hebrew poetry, in the Rabbinical writings, using that term for the writings of the Jews in Hebrew or Aramaic between the beginning of the Christian era and the gradual permeation of Jewish by Arabic scholarship from the seventh or eighth century A.D. onwards. We owe the earliest statements on Hebrew poetical forms to two Jews who wrote in Greek —to Philo and to Josephus.

Philo's evidence is slight and indirect as to the poetry of the Old Testament. In the *De vita Mosis* i. 5 he asserts that Moses was taught by the Egyptians "the whole theory of rhythm, harmony and metre" (*τὴν τε ῥυθμικὴν καὶ ἁρμονικὴν καὶ μετρικὴν θεωρίαν*); but he nowhere states that the poems attributed to Moses in the Pentateuch are metrical. Of Jewish poetry of a later age he speaks more definitely, if the *De vita contemplativa* is correctly attributed to him, and if the sect therein described was a Jewish sect. It is asserted in this tract (cc. x. xi.) that the therapeutæ sang hymns "in many metres and tunes," and in particular in iambic trimeters.

The three statements of Josephus on the subject are much more specific and definite. Of Moses he says, in reference to Exodus xv. 2 ff., that "he composed a song to God . . . in hexameter verse" (*ἐν ἑξαμέτρῳ τόνῳ*);[1] and again, in reference to Deut. xxxii., that Moses read to the Israelites "a hexametrical poem" (*ποίησιν ἑξάμετρον*),

[1] *Ant.* ii. 16. 4.

and left it to them in the holy book.[1] Of David he says that "he composed songs and hymns in various metres (*μέτρου ποικίλου*), making some trimetrical, others pentametrical." [2]

These exhaust the direct testimony of Jews, who lived while poetry similar to that in the O.T. was still being written, to the metrical character of that poetry. It is possible that we have an indirect testimony to more specific Jewish statements or theories in certain of the patristic writers. It will be sufficient here to refer to what is said by Origen and Eusebius and Jerome[3]; all these scholars belong to a period before the new style of poetry adopted by the mediaeval Jews had begun to be written, though perhaps none of them belong quite to the age when the older poetry was still practised as a living art.

Origen's reference to the subject of Hebrew metre is to be found in a scholion on Psalm cxviii.1 (LXX.). He agrees with Josephus that Deuteronomy xxxii. is hexametrical, and that some of the Psalms are trimetrical; but as an alternative metre used in the Psalter, he gives not the pentameter, as Josephus had done, but the tetrameter. At the same time he clearly recognises that Hebrew verses are different in character (*ἕτεροι*) from Greek verses. Ley finds two further statements in Origen's somewhat obscure words; (1) that the metrical unit (*den vollen Vers*) in Hebrew consists of two stichoi, not of a single stichos; (2) that Hebrew metre was measured by the number of accented syllables.[4]

Eusebius refers to metre in Hebrew poems as follows:

[1] *Ant.* iv. 8. 44. [2] *Ant.* vii. 12. 3.

[3] The passages from these and other patristic writers have been brought together and discussed by J. Döller (*Rhythmus, Metrik und Strophik in der bibl.-hebr. Poesie*, Paderborn, 1899; see pp. 18–35).

[4] The scholion in question was published by Cardinal Pitra in *Analecta Sacra*, ii. 341, and reprinted thence by Preuschen in the *Zeitschrift für die AT. Wissenschaft*, 1891, pp. 316, 317; in the same *Zeitschrift* for 1892 (pp. 212–217) Julius Ley translated and commented on the Scholion.

"There would also be found among them poems in metre, like the great song of Moses and David's 118th Psalm, composed in what the Greeks call heroic metre. At least it is said (*φασὶ γοῦν*) that these are hexameters, consisting of sixteen syllables; also their other compositions in verse are said to consist of trimeter and tetrameter lines according to the sound of their own language."[1] The reference to Deuteronomy xxxii. and Psalm cxviii. and the specific metres mentioned are as in Origen; but whether or not Origen suspected or asserted measurement by accented syllables, Eusebius clearly refers to a measurement by syllables, and thereby produces the impression that the Hebrew hexameter was of the same nature as the Greek: whereas Origen distinctly asserts that Hebrew metres are as compared with the Greek *ἕτεροι*. At the same time, the final words in Eusebius have something of the character of a saving clause.

Scattered over Jerome's writings are a larger number of specific statements, which may be summarised as follows:

1. Job iii. 2–xl. 6 consists of hexameters; but the verses are varied and irregular.[2]

2. Job, Proverbs, the songs in Deuteronomy (i.e. Deut.

The text being still none too well known or accessible, it may be well to reproduce it here. The words commented on are *Μακάριοι οἱ ἄμωμοι ἐν ὁδῷ, οἱ πορευόμενοι ἐν νόμῳ κυρίου*, and the scholion runs as follows:—*οὕτω γε στίχος ἐστὶν · οἱ γὰρ παρ' Ἑβραίοις στίχοι, ὡς ἔλεγέ τις, ἔμμετροί εἰσιν · ἐν ἑξαμέτρῳ μὲν ἡ ἐν τῷ Δευτερονομίῳ ᾠδή · ἐν τριμέτρῳ δὲ καὶ τετραμέτρῳ οἱ ψαλμοί. οἱ στίχοι οὖν, οἱ παρ' Ἑβραίοις, ἕτεροί εἰσιν παρὰ τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν. Ἐὰν θέλωμεν ἐνθάδε τηρῆσαι, τοὺς στίχους ποιοῦμεν. "Μακάριοι οἱ ἄμωμοι ἐν ὁδῷ, οἱ πορευόμενοι ἐν νόμῳ κυρίου." Καὶ οὕτως ἀρχόμεθα δευτέρου τοῦ ἕξης· ἱστέον τοίνυν ὅτι οἱ Ἕλληνες οἱ ἑρμηνεύσαντες πεποιήκασι τὸν παρ' Ἑβραίοις στίχον ἐν τούτοις δύο (ὡς [ὁ] τοῦτο ἀντίγραφον γράψας οἰονεὶ πεποίηκε τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ στίχου μετ' ἐκθέσεως · τὸν δὲ δοκοῦντες δεύτερον, μὴ ὄντα δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ λεῖμμα τοῦ προτέρου μετ' αἰσθήσεως · καὶ τοῦτο πεποίηκεν ἐπὶ ὅλου τοῦ ῥητοῦ.*

[1] *Praep. Ev.* xi. 5. 5: the translation given above is Gifford's.

[2] Hexametri versus sunt, dactylo spondæoque currentes; et propter linguae idioma crebro recipientes et alios pedes non earundem syllabarum, sed eorumdem temporum. Interdum quoque rhythmus ipse dulcis et tinnulus fertur numeris lege metri solutis: *Praef. in Job* (Migne, *Patr. Lat.* xxviii. 1082).

xxxii.) and Isaiah "Deuteronomii et Isaiae Cantico" are all written in hexameters or pentameters.[1] Yet elsewhere[2] "Deuteronomii Canticum" is said to be written in iambic tetrameters.

3. Psalms cx. and cxi. are iambic trimeters.[2]

4. Psalms cxviii., cxliv. and Proverbs xxxi. 10–31 are iambic tetrameters.[2]

5. Lamentations i. ii. are in "quasi sapphico metro"; but Lamentations iii. in trimeters.[2]

6. The prophets, though the text of them is marked off by commas and colons, are *not* metrical.[3]

But these statements occur in such connexions, or are accompanied by such qualifying phrases, as to indicate that Jerome did not intend them to be taken too strictly, or as exactly assimilating Hebrew poetry in respect of its measurements to classical poetry. Thus, the hexameters in Job are said to admit other feet in addition to dactyls and spondees; the "sapphic metre" of Lamentations i. ii. iv. is qualified as "quasi"; and in forestalling incredulity, such as the Emperor Julian is said to have expressed, as to the existence of metre in Hebrew literature, Jerome speaks of the Hebrew poems as being "*in morem* nostri Flacci"—after the manner of Horace.

There is one further important observation to be made with regard to Jerome: the authorities whom he cites for his statements are not his own Hebrew teacher, but Philo, Josephus, Origen and Eusebius,[4] to the first two of whom Origen in turn may refer indefinitely in his phrase ἔλεγε τις.

[1] Quae omnia hexametris et pentametris versibus . . . apud suos composita decurrunt: *Praef. in Chron. Eusebii* (Migne xxvii. 36).

[2] Ep. xxx. (ad Paulam): Migne xxii. 442.

[3] *Praef. in Isaiam:* Migne xxviii. 771.

[4] "If it seem incredible to any one that the Hebrews really have metres, and that, whether we consider the Psalter, or the Lamentations of Jeremiah, or almost all the songs of Scripture, they bear a resemblance to our Flaccus, and the Greek Pindar, and Alcaeus, and Sappho, let him read

From this we may with some probability conclude (1) that Jerome's views of the nature of Hebrew poetry do not represent those of Jewish scholarship of his day; but (2) that they are a reproduction of the statements of Josephus, or deductions made by Jerome himself from or in the spirit of Josephus' statements. On whom Eusebius relied for the statement (φασὶ γοῦν) that the Hebrew hexameter contained sixteen syllables we cannot say, but his informants were scarcely Jewish contemporaries of his.

If, then, any theory or tradition of the metrical character of the old Hebrew poetry formulated by those who actually wrote it still survives, our primary source for it is Josephus. But does what Josephus says depend on a previously existing theory or tradition? In all probability it does not. Josephus, in commending Hebrew poetry to his Greek readers, followed his usual practice of describing things Jewish in terms that would make a good impression on them. And so he calls Deuteronomy xxxii. hexametrical—a term which some modern scholars would still apply to it—but he gives his readers no clue to, even if he himself had any clear idea of, the difference between these hexameters and those of Greek and Latin poetry. Neither he nor any of the Christian scholars who follow him define the nature of the feet or other units of which six, five, four and three compose

Philo, Josephus, Origen, Eusebius of Caesarea, and with the aid of their testimony he will find that I speak the truth" : Preface to the translation of Job (Fremantle's translation, p. 491) : Migne xxviii. 1082. This was written about 392 A.D.; but Jerome had expressed himself to much the same effect ten years earlier in a passage, partly cited already in the original, in his Preface to the Chronicle of Eusebius : "What can be more musical than the Psalter? Like the writings of our own Flaccus and the Grecian Pindar it now trips along in iambics, now flows in sonorous alcaics, now swells into sapphics, now marches in half-foot metre. What can be more lovely than the strains of Deuteronomy and Isaiah? What more grave than Solomon's words? What more finished than Job? All these, as Josephus and Origen tell us, were composed in hexameters and pentameters, and so circulated amongst their own people."—Fremantle, p. 484 : Migne xxvii. 36.

the hexameters, pentameters, tetrameters and trimeters respectively of which they speak; and, indeed, so loosely are these terms used that Jerome describes Deuteronomy xxxii. on one occasion as hexameter, and on another as tetrameter. Some modern scholars continue to use these same terms, but define more or less precisely what they mean by them; and the Hebrew hexameters of the modern metrist have far less resemblance to a Greek or Latin hexameter than any of the numerous English hexameters with which English poets have at intervals experimented from the age of Elizabeth down to our own times. There is no reason for believing that Josephus, Origen, Jerome really detected, or even thought that they detected any greater similarity; Jerome's "quasi," Origen's ἕτεροι, cover, as a matter of fact, a very high degree of difference.

Early Jewish observations on Hebrew metre are neither numerous nor valuable; but observations on the characteristic parallelism of Hebrew poetry seem to have been entirely non-existent earlier than the times of the mediaeval Jewish grammarians. Josephus was stimulated to discover or imagine metre in Hebrew poetry by his desire to commend it to the Greeks; he had no such stimulus to draw attention to parallelism, for that corresponded to nothing in the poetry of Greece or Rome. And another cause worked against the recognition by the Jewish Rabbis of the part played by parallelism in Hebrew poetry. But before defining this cause it will be convenient to record the extent to which Lowth's analysis of parallelism was anticipated by the mediaeval Jews.

Dukes[1] drew attention to the fact that D. Ḳimḥi in his comment on Isaiah xix. 8 calls parallelism כפול ענין, במלות שנות and that Levi ben Gershon had called it an elegance (דרך צחות) and also noted the fact that the same

[1] *Zur Kenntnis der neuhebr. religiösen Poesie* (1842), p. 125.

style was customary with the Arabs. Schmiedl, in 1861,[1] drew attention to the still earlier use by Ibn Ezra of these same expressions as well as of some others with reference to parallelism. So far as I am aware, similar observations in writers earlier than Ibn Ezra have never yet been discovered.[2] Ibn Ezra's observations may be summarised as follows : it is an elegance of style, and in particular a characteristic of the *prophetic* style, to repeat the same thought by means of synonymous words.[3] Whether in regarding parallelism as peculiarly characteristic of the prophetic style (דרך הנבואות) Ibn Ezra anticipated Lowth's observation that Old Testament prophetic literature is, in the main, poetical in form, is doubtful : for the examples of parallelism given by Ibn Ezra are drawn, not from the prophetical books, but from the prophetic poems attributed to Jacob, Moses, and Balaam.

Far more important is Ibn Ezra's insistence that parallelism is a *form* of poetry, and that when a writer repeats his thought by means of synonymous terms he is not adding to the substance, but merely perfecting the form of what he had to say. This represents a reaction against a mode of exegesis that treated such repetition as an addition to the substance.

It was this mode of exegesis, doubtless, that militated against the discernment of the real nature of parallelism by earlier Jewish scholars. How could interpreters who attributed importance to every letter and every external peculiarity of the sacred text admit that it was customary in a large part of Scripture to express the same thought twice over by means of synonymous terms ? If the fact

[1] In *Monatschrift für Gesch. u. Wissenschaft des Judenthums*, p. 157.

[2] Cardinal Pitra was of opinion that Origen's scholion given above recognised parallelism, but this is doubtful.

[3] Ibn Ezra cites as examples Genesis xlix. 6a, b, Deuteronomy xxxii. 7c, d, Numbers xxiii. 8.

that ויצר in Genesis ii. is written with two yods, though it might have been written with one, was supposed to express the thought not only that God "formed" man, but that He formed him with two "formations," to wit, the evil inclination and the good inclination, how could two parallel lines convey no fuller meaning than one such line standing by itself? The influence of this exegetical principle lingers still; at an earlier time it was far-reaching. For example, in Lamech's song (Gen. iv. 23), "the man" and "the young man" are treated not as being, what in reality they are, synonymous terms with the same reference, but as referring to two different individuals, one old and one young, whom Lamech had slain. Again, the reduplication of the same thought is not recognised in—

> Therefore, the wicked shall not stand in the judgment,
> Nor sinners in the congregation of the righteous (Ps. i. 1),

Rabbi Nehemiah, a Rabbi of the second century A.D., said "'the wicked' mean the generation of the Flood, and the sinners mean the men of Sodom." [1] If no other difference of reference could be postulated between two parallel terms or lines or a statement that is otherwise repeated, it was customary to refer one to the present world and the other to the world to come.[2] "Day and night" is a sufficiently obvious expression for "continually"; and a poet naturally distributed the two terms between two parallel lines without any intention that what he speaks of in the one line should be understood to be confined to the day, and what he speaks of in the second line to the night; thus, when a Psalmist says (xcii. 1),

> It is a good thing . . .
> To declare thy kindness in the morning
> And thy faithfulness in the night,

[1] *Sanhedrin*, x. 3.

[2] See e.g. *Sanhedrin* x. 3 for several examples of second-century exegesis of this kind.

what he means is that it is good to declare both the kindness and the faithfulness of God at all times. Yet even some modern commentators still continue to squeeze substance out of form in Psalm xlii. 9 (8), by making—

> By day will Yahweh command his kindness,
> And in the night his song shall be with me—

mean more than that the Psalmist is the constant recipient of God's goodness; and herein these modern commentators follow, in misconceiving the influence of form, the early Jewish interpreter Resh Lakish (third century A.D.) who explained the verse thus: "Every one who studieth in the Law in this world which is like the night, the Holy One, blessed be He, stretches over him the thread of grace for the future world which is like the day."[1]

To sum up this part of our discussion: Jewish Rabbis in the second century A.D. misunderstood the parallelism that is characteristic of most of the poetry of the Old Testament, and, with the exception of Philo and Josephus, no Jews appear to have given any attention to any metrical laws that may also have governed that poetry; and what Josephus says on that subject is expressed in Greek terms, was written as part of his apology for all things Jewish, and appears at most to imply that Josephus had some perception of difference of rhythm in different Hebrew poems. The account he gives wears a rather more learned air, but is in reality as vague and insufficient as the account given to Dr. Dalman by some of those who supplied him with his specimens of modern Palestinian poetry.[2]

And yet, in the second century A.D. Hebrew poetry

[1] Talmud B. *Chagigah* 12b; ed. Streane, p. 64.

[2] "In modern Arabic folk-poetry the purely rhythmical has begun to drive out the quantitative principle so that a distinction may be drawn between quantitative and rhythmical poems." . . .

"I have never been able to discover how the composers of this folk-poetry go to work in the composition of these poems. To the question whether there was nothing at all in his lines that the poet numbered so as

of the type found in the Old Testament had not yet become a long obsolete type, as it had become when the new art of rhymed, metrical poems without parallelism was brought to perfection in the tenth to the twelfth centuries ; contemporaries of Josephus were still employing parallelism with as much regularity and skilful variation as the best writers of the Old Testament period ; and in all probability, in many cases at least, rhythmical regularity of the same kind, and as great, accompanied these parallelistic compositions, as is found in any of the Biblical poems. Later than the second century A.D. neither parallelism nor, perhaps, the same kind of rhythm can clearly or even probably be traced ; and certainly, when the new Hebrew poetry was created it dispensed with parallelism—with parallelism, at all events, as any constant feature of the poems.

Without prejudging the question whether parallelism in Hebrew necessarily constitutes or implies poetical form, it will be convenient at this point to take a survey of those parts of ancient Jewish literature outside the Old Testament in which either parallelism is conspicuous, or other features are prominent which distinguish those parts of the Old Testament which are commonly regarded as poetry. Most of this literature, especially the latest of it, survives only in translation ; and with regard to much of it it is disputed whether it actually runs back to a Hebrew original at all. The exact date, again, of much of it is uncertain, and I shall, therefore, attempt no rigid chronological order of mention ; in general the period in question is from the third or second century B.C. to the second century A.D.

to secure regularity (*Gleichmass*), I received from several different quarters the reply, that nothing at all was numbered, that for the folk-poetry there was only one standard (*Mass*)—absolute caprice. No doubt it may be supposed that the individual poet instinctively imitates the form of some poem that is known to him."—G. H. Dalman, *Palästinischer Diwan*, pp. xxii., xxiii.

Of the apocryphal books it was clear even before the discovery of the Hebrew original that Ecclesiasticus (c. 180 B.C.) must have possessed all the characteristics of ancient Hebrew poetry; even the alphabetic structure of li. 13-30 had been inferred by Bickell. But Ecclesiasticus may well be older than some of the latest poems in the Old Testament.

The first book of Maccabees (c. 90 B.C.) contains two poems eulogising Judas (iii. 3–9) and Simeon (xiv. 6–15) respectively. It also refers (ix. 20, 21) to an elegy on Judas, and cites the opening words—

> How hath the valiant man fallen
> That delivered Israel—

from which it is easy enough to discover the opening of a poem constructed after the same form as elegies in the Old Testament—

> איך נפל הגבור | מושיע ישראל

In ix. 41 a distich of some poem seems to be cited.

In Judith xvi. 2–17 we find a long poem of praise and thanksgiving; in part, it is a close imitation of earlier poems in the Old Testament; but its parallelistic, as was also presumably its rhythmical, regularity is by no means least where it is most independent, as, for example, in the lines—

> She anointed her face with ointment,
> And bound her hair in a tire;
> And she took a linen garment to deceive him,
> Her sandal ravished his eye,
> And her beauty took his soul prisoner,
> The scimitar passed through his neck.
> The Persians quaked at her daring,
> And the Medes at her boldness were daunted.

Not only the Apocrypha, but the Pseudepigrapha, contain much, the New Testament, perhaps, a little, that was originally written in Hebrew and was poetical in form. Among these specimens of late Hebrew poetry we may

certainly include the eighteen "Psalms of Solomon" (c. 50 B.C.) and some of the most ancient elements of the Jewish liturgy, such as the "Eighteen Blessings," and the blessings accompanying the recitation of the Sh^{e}ma^{c}; possibly also the Magnificat and other New Testament Canticles. Several of the apocalypses also include poems; in those which he has edited more recently, Dr. Charles has distinguished the poetry from the prose by printing the former in regular lines. Without admitting that *all* parts thus distinguished by him or others possessed poetical form in the original, I think it may be safely said that such apocalypses as the Twelve Patriarchs, the Book of Jubilees, the Apocalypse of Baruch and IV. Esdras do each contain *some* such passages.

Now of these books or passages which show the same characteristics as the poetry of the Old Testament, some at least were written by contemporaries of Josephus, and also of those who after 70 A.D. founded that Jewish school at Jamnia of whose methods of exegesis (in the second century A.D.) examples have been given above. At the very time that the Rabbis were examining scripture with eyes blind to parallelism, other Jews were still writing poems that made all the old use of parallelism. This may be proved by reference to the Apocalypse of Baruch: for with regard to this book I believe that it may be safely asserted [1] (1) that it was written in Hebrew, (2) that it was written not earlier than c. 50 A.D., and therefore (3) that its author was in all probability a contemporary, though perhaps an elder contemporary of Josephus and the founders of Jamnia. But this book contains a long passage (xlviii. 1–47) that is among the most regular and sustained examples of parallelism in the whole range of Hebrew literature; a sufficiently large portion of it may be cited here to

[1] Cf. R. H. Charles, *The Apocalypse of Baruch.*

prove this; the translation is in the main that of Dr. Charles; for the line division, which in one place involves an important change of punctuation, I am responsible.

2 O my Lord, Thou summonest the advent of the times, and they stand before Thee;
Thou causest the power of the ages to pass away, and they do not resist Thee:
Thou arrangest the method of the seasons, and they obey Thee.
3 Thou alone knowest the goal of the generations,
And Thou revealest not Thy mysteries to many.
4 Thou makest known the multitude of the fire,
And Thou weighest the lightness of the wind.
5 Thou explorest the limits of the heights,
And Thou scrutinisest the depths of the darkness.
6 Thou carest for the number which pass away that they may be preserved,
And Thou preparest an abode for those that are to be.
7 Thou rememberest the beginning which Thou hast made,
And the destruction that is to be Thou forgettest not.
8 With nods of fear and indignation Thou givest commandment to the flames,
And they change into spirits,[1]
And with a word Thou quickenest that which was not,
And with mighty power Thou holdest that which has not yet come.
9 Thou instructest created things in the understanding of Thee,
And Thou makest wise the spheres so as to minister in their orders.
10 Armies innumerable stand before Thee,
And they minister in their orders quietly at Thy nod.
11 Hear Thy servant,
And give ear to my petition.
12 For in a little time are we born,
And in a little time do we return.
13 But with Thee, hours are as a time (?),
And days as generations.
14 Be not therefore wroth with man; for he is nothing;
And take not account of our works; 15 for what are we?
For lo! by Thy gift do we come into the world,
And we depart not of our own will.
16 For we said not to our parents, "Beget us,"
And we sent not to Sheol, saying, "Receive us."

[1] I suspect corruption in *v.* 8a, b. In the original text "flames" was probably a parallel term to "spirits" (cp. Ps. civ. 4), and not, as in the present text of the versions, that which changes into spirits.

17 What, then, is our strength that we should bear Thy wrath,
Or what are we that we should endure Thy judgment?
18 Protect us in Thy compassions,
And in Thy mercy help us.

The Apocalypse of Esdras (IV. Esdras) was probably written shortly after 100 A.D., and though it contains nothing quite so regular and sustained as the passage just cited from the Apocalypse of Baruch, a considerable number of passages are printed both by Professor Gunkel [1] and Mr. Box [2] as poetry, and, in some (viz. viii. 20–30) at least, with good reason.

Whether much later specimens of ancient Jewish poetry than these exist seems doubtful; but in this connexion two recently recovered documents may be very briefly referred to.

Dr. Charles [3] finds a considerable element of poetry in the fragments of a Zadokite work of which the Hebrew text was first edited (with translation and introduction) by Dr. Schechter [4] in 1910. In the opinion of some this work is considerably later than IV. Esdras, but I believe Dr. Charles is right in concluding that the work was written before 70 A.D. The only other remark I need make now is that, except in quotations from the Old Testament, parallelism is not at all conspicuous; whether, therefore, the passages marked by Dr. Charles as possessing poetical form actually do so, turns on matters which have to be considered later. Happily, in this case the question can be considered, not through translations merely, but with the original text before us.

The Odes of Solomon, of which the Syriac text was first

[1] In E. Kautzsch, *Die Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des AT.*, ii. 352–401 (cp. p. 349).

[2] G. H. Box, *The Ezra-Apocalypse.*

[3] *Fragments of a Zadokite work translated . . .* 1912.

[4] In *Documents of Jewish Sectaries*, vol. i.

edited by Dr. Rendel Harris [1] in 1909, were scarcely written before 70 A.D., and may even belong to the second century A.D. and be later than IV. Esdras. The original language of these Odes is still undetermined. But some of them (e.g., v., vi., vii.) are strongly parallelistic in character, though Dr. Harris refrained from distinguishing the parallel members in his translation.

Parallelism can then be shown to have continued into the second century A.D. as a feature in Hebrew poetry, or in Hebrew literature written in a form differing from ordinary prose.

It was long ago pointed out by Lowth that parallelism can be retained almost unimpaired in a translation ; easier still, therefore, was it for Jews to reproduce this feature in works written in the first instance in some other language than Hebrew ; and to some extent they did so. The book of Wisdom, which rests on no Hebrew original, but was written, as it survives, in Greek, is the best proof of this. It is possible that the author of Wisdom attempted to imitate other features of ancient Hebrew poetry as well as its parallelism in his Greek work ; but these are questions that cannot be pursued now.

There is no other considerable book originally written in Greek which employs parallelism throughout ; but it has been held with differing degrees of conviction and consensus of opinion that Tobit's prayer (Tob. xiii.), the Prayer of Manasses, the Song of the Three Holy Children, and the latter part of Baruch were written in Greek, or at least, not in Hebrew ; and a Hebrew original for the Odes of Solomon was postulated neither by their first editor, nor by many who have followed him, though more recently Dr. Abbott [2]

[1] *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon published from the Syriac Version*, 1909 (ed. 2, 1911).

[2] E. A. Abbott, *Light on the Gospel from an Ancient Poet.*

has adduced some evidence which he thinks points to such an original.

The question of the original language of each of these works might, perhaps, with advantage, be reconsidered in connexion with the general question of the extent to which parallelism was adopted in Jewish writings not written in Hebrew. We have on the one hand the clear example of the use of parallelism in Wisdom, and on the other the exceedingly slight use of parallelism, for example, in the Sibylline oracles; and we may recall again in this connexion the avoidance of parallelism in mediaeval Hebrew poetry. These avoidances or absences of parallelism are certainly worthy of attention in view of the ease with which this feature of Hebrew poetry could have been reproduced in Greek works, and even combined, if necessary, with the use of Greek metres like the hexameters of the Sibylline oracles. Was it merely due to the fact that the one was writing in Hebrew and the other in Greek, that the author of the Apocalypse of Baruch in his loftier passages employs the form of ancient Hebrew poetry, whereas his contemporary, St. Paul, even in such a passage as 1 Corinthians xiii., avoids it? Or may we detect here the influences of different schools or literary traditions?

G. Buchanan Gray.

THE ROOTS OF ST. PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF SIN.

There are some eight sources from which it must be held that St. Paul drew his teachings on the subject before us. First and second, there are two Jewish or Old Testament dogmas; Death is caused by sin—Crucifixion is a death which implies a peculiar curse. Third, fourth, fifth and sixth, we have to look to St. Paul's personal experiences—of helplessness in sin; of sudden miraculous conversion;

of a new life of moral victory through Christ; of conflict between flesh and spirit. Seventh and eighth, there are two moral postulates enunciated by Paul as a Christian: That Christ did not die gratuitously—that no flesh shall glory before God.

I.

We begin, then, with two dogmatic postulates which St. Paul learned while he was in the Jews' religion and which he never questioned. And first of all, death was *the wages of sin*. Or again, *Sin entered into the world and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all sinned*—whatever perplexities of interpretation attach to the last words, there is no mistake about the main thesis.

This position manifestly reproduces Jewish theology. We cannot say that it reproduces the teaching of Gen. iii. When correctly interpreted, that chapter, as it is shaped in our Bibles, says nothing about the origin of death, unless indeed its closing portion confirms the old Hebrew belief that man is naturally mortal. The utmost possibility it contemplates as open to the first human pair in Eden is that they might have eaten magic fruit from the tree of life, and so have lived forever. If that was not to happen, being dust-born they were dust-doomed. Nor does the Fall story seek to explain the origin of sin. It deals with other problems, which pressed hard on primitive man, and have not ceased to torment his descendants. Why must men work so hard at tilling a thorny and niggardly soil? Why must women bear their little ones in such cruel labour? Why is the serpent so revolting in his grovelling gait, and again—for so the Hebrew naturalists evidently taught—in his habit of eating dust? The story answers these questions. It was not always so! There was a Saturnian age to begin with, when our first parents lived in a lovely and bountiful garden. But the cunning serpent beguiled Eve,

and she persuaded her husband ; they ate magic fruit from the tree of knowledge, the one thing withheld from them ; and so their miseries—nay alas ! *our* miseries too—began.

True, the death penalty which had been threatened was not immediately inflicted on them. The explanation is no jejune modernism, such as Dr. Clemen offers in his study of the Biblical Doctrine of Sin, about the *workings* of death beginning at once. That far-fetched suggestion is out of place. God, we are told, learned the facts in answer to a few searching questions. The man and woman tried to excuse themselves ; and up to a certain point their excuses are accepted. The serpent is guiltiest of all. Everything that lives is to hate him, and he is to be visibly degraded. The woman, his first victim, is next to him in guilt, and receives appropriate punishment in the agonies of child-birth. The man, less weak than she, has yet shown himself fatally complaisant, so his pleasant work is to become hard drudgery among weeds. The origin of sentient evil—not of sin, but of pain, unnatural pain—is thus accounted for to primitive minds. An act of sin explains it, with far-reaching consequences for men, women and serpents ; but those who first spoke and first listened to the Fall story did not dwell upon this primeval sin for its own sake. Intrinsically, what was a sin ? To the early Hebrew, possibly not much more than it is to the self-complacent average modern mind.

Still, there the story was, in the Hebrew Bible ; and its theological consequences could not possibly be limited to those drawn from it at the first. We have evidence that, before the days of St. Paul, Jewish theology had been working at further problems arising out of the legend. Not to speak of inferences carried backward from the Talmud, writings earlier than the New Testament like Sirach and the Book of Wisdom, and writings contemporary

with its later parts such as the Apocalypses of Ezra and Baruch, show this process at work. The tempter, the serpent, was now explained as diabolical. Adam's sin, it was now taught, had somehow introduced death. There was in man's heart—not in his *flesh*, as Paul writes—an evil *Yetzer*. The relation of this to Adam's first act of guilt was left extremely vague, though there was at any rate room for a view which has been ascribed to the Talmud, that the human race started with an inclination towards evil, and that Adam's rashness could do no more than increase the inclination, fearfully enough, in his posterity.

Even St. Paul writes not dissimilarly. Thus he leaves us in the dark as to how far his doctrine of Adam is a distinct or more ultimate root of his doctrine regarding sin. He concurs with Jewish theology in tracing death to sin (Rom. v., 1 Cor. xv.). He recognises that the story of Adam constitutes in some sense the supreme illustration of that fatal connexion. But he has another doctrine which we must glance at shortly—that of the sinful flesh. And the relation in Pauline theology between the flesh and Adam's sinful act is a matter of uncertain and precarious inference—no more to be cleared up than the origin of the *Yetzer* in Jewish theology. The one clear ringing note that sounds out is this—Death came by sin.

II.

St. Paul's second borrowed dogma asserts that death by crucifixion implies a specially awful curse. The doctrine rests, as we all know, upon scarcely more [1] than a single verse in Deut. (xxi. 23), quoted once in Gal. (iii. 13) with a slight softening. St. Paul in his Christian period writes that one hanged on a tree is *ipso facto* accursed; he does not explicitly say, with the Old Testament passage, cursed by

[1] St. Paul makes a severely dogmatic use of Deut. xxvii. 26 also.

God. This dogma makes even clearer to us than the last how the young Saul necessarily must regard the crucified Jesus—as a heinous impostor. A dead Messiah meant no Messiah at all, but a sinful man exposed and punished. A crucified Messiah—blasphemous paradox !—meant one upon whom God's curse notoriously rested. To persecute the followers of such a one was plain duty for every loyal Hebrew.

III.

Without for the present following St. Paul's thoughts along this line to their further phases, we have to speak of the third great root of his doctrine of sin, as revealed in the personal experiences of his unconverted days. Later Jewish theology, which we need not hesitate to carry back to the earliest Christian age, declared that man's inborn taint of sin found appropriate remedy in the law. From his eighth day onwards the male Jew was pledged to his religion by the rite of circumcision ; but for a time religion led him on a wide leash. The child was wisely enough regarded as not more than half responsible for his deeds. Then a happy day came about the age of twelve—they reach physical maturity in the East sooner than we of the West—when the child assumed the responsibilities of a man, took on himself the yoke of the law, fought with his sins, overcame them. When a child was growing up in a zealous Pharisee atmosphere, all this business of what we may call confirmation would be transacted in the most solemn earnest.

Paul gives us a record of his inner history in the seventh chapter of Romans. I see no reason why we should evaporate this narrative, with Dr. Denney, into a merely ideal human biography. It is personal and literal. As a child, Saul had been alive without the law. We who spend our days under less legal systems of religion can hardly (I fancy) imagine the complete relief from moral responsibility that

exists, so long as a child knows that the hour of accountableness has not yet struck. His parents or his teachers may have to answer for him, but he personally has nothing to answer for in the meantime. In the case of Paul we must think of an innocent and noble nature, but one morally quite unripe. Even a child of exceptional gifts would be singularly at rest in the legal system. He knows there are grave ordeals in front of him; but he knows that, before facing these, he will have put on the whole armour of righteousness as supplied by the law. All must "come right."

So it may have proved for many, but so it did not prove for Saul of Tarsus. This exceptional young Pharisee gave himself enthusiastically to fuller study of the law and to careful personal obedience, but with grievous results. Innocence and happiness fled away. He struggled and struggled, only to fail. The law which was to be his saviour and champion proved his worst enemy. It showed him his sin; apart from it, he might never have known what sin was. That eager will of his could not meet the law's claims; that almost morbidly acute conscience of his discovered taint after taint within him. Outwardly all went well. There was no more punctilious Pharisee than he. Touching the righteousness that was in the law he was blameless. But, within the shell of this outward success and seemingly well-earned esteem, there was a miserable baffled man, who grasped every day anew at peace with God, and who had to confess to himself every night that he had once more failed.

This is very like the picture furnished to us in many an Augustinian or evangelical autobiography of later ages; yet there are differences. Later orthodoxy teaches that man is wholly bad until the grace of God masters him. Not till he is radically upon God's side does struggle begin. Previously there had been a sort of peace—in willing obedience to evil. Bunyan tells us in the *Holy War* how Mansoul

tore down the image of Shaddai and erected in its place the image of Diabolus. Nor is this extravagance peculiarly Puritan ; it could be followed far back, I believe, among the church fathers. Calvinism only carries it to a logical issue in declaring mankind " utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil." Briefly, unconverted men are devils.

The teaching of St. Paul was not this. Drawing from the experiences of a bitter past, he did not find that such was the true description of the trouble. He had never been willingly carried along upon the current of evil. There were two inclinations in his make up ; but the flesh had the mastery, and the spirit was impotent. St. Paul is as dogmatic as any Calvinist in asserting the impossibility of doing right, while unregenerate ; but not of wishing to do right. He affirms, with deep pathos, the existence of a longing hopeless wish. It is hardly strange that dogmatic interpreters refused to find unregenerate man in Romans vii., or even that critical theology sometimes tries to revive the mistaken interpretation of that chapter as recording a Christian's conflicts. But there can be no real doubt that Paul is portraying his past self. This root of his doctrine about sin is not a borrowed dogma, but a grievous fact in his personal history. And yet St. Paul interprets the fact in almost dogmatic fashion as the inevitable lot of man. He did not conceive himself as exceptional, but as a purely typical human being. At the most, he might be more conscious than some others were of the state of the case. But inward division and helplessness were the lot of all sinners.

What shall we say to these things ? Calvinistic orthodoxy never tires of telling us that, in everything gloomy which St. Paul says about the natural man, he is right, and that only our own shallowness or hardness of heart keeps us from full sympathy with him. This will not quite do.

There are manifold ways of approaching God's Kingdom. Struggle and failure are not the only possible initiation of the religious life. No religion which contains in its canon such a document as Psalm cxix. can afford to impose the Pauline experience, to say nothing of the Calvinistic, as *de fide* for every disciple. "I will never forget thy precepts, for with them thou hast *quickened* me"—this is the very experience St. Paul sets aside as unthinkable; "If there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law." No forensic skill can harmonise the wording of these two scriptures. We must maintain the spirit of both, but hardly the letter of either.

Yet we must grant that the experience of St. Paul is profoundly significant. If any one cares to say that it is essentially of deeper quality than the chastened piety of the Psalmist within his narrow round, I do not know that we can refuse it that tribute. Happy they who, discovering the Slough of Despond, press on through it and emerge on solid ground upon the side towards the Celestial City! But not unhappy they who, serving the same Lord and seeking the same home, find their days "Bound each to each by natural piety."

IV.

The fourth root of St. Paul's doctrine of sin is his sudden conversion on the Damascus road by the vision and voice of the glorified Jesus. We may take different views of the event. We may say, like Professor Feine, that the miracle is a scientific certainty, necessary to account for the known facts of Paul's experience. Or, if we like, we may take the high-flying anti-miraculous line, and declare that the vision was a psychological illusion, though one that happened to teach wholesome truths. Or, once again, we may prefer to

hold that the vision was a true revelation from heaven to earth, without committing ourselves to any theory of its mechanism. In any case, we have to recognise that Paul raised no nice questions. To him it was frankly and plainly a miracle. In a violent and unnatural if most gracious way, he was born into the Christian faith and added to the list of men who had seen the Lord after the Resurrection. The fact as a fact was among the bases of his experience and the sacred springs of his Christian beliefs. Jesus was alive, was in heaven, was ruling God's world. He was not an impostor or a blasphemer. Jesus was Lord. He was Messiah in an even more eminent sense than if He had occupied the throne of David at Jerusalem.

Yet this immense upheaval in belief—this transvaluation of almost all his values—did not lead to St. Paul's abandoning his Jewish dogmas about sin and death. Death, even Christ's death, was still the wages of sin; only, it was the wages of our sin, not of His. Death on the cross was still the bearing of a Divinely imposed curse; only, it was the curse due to Jewish disobedience through long ages towards a Divinely imposed law. The Jewish dogmas and the personal experience combined, strangely, interestingly, to create Paul's Christian doctrines.

Objection may be brought against the statement just given of each of these two Pauline affirmations. First: How could Paul teach that Christ died vicariously for us, if we still die? The answer is surely plain. To St. Paul, the death of a Christian is a painful anomaly. There was need of a special revelation from heaven to enable him to assure the Thessalonians that the pious dead have lost nothing. The typical Christian experience is to survive and be caught up into the clouds to meet Christ. Paul confidently anticipates that experience for himself when he writes 1 Thessalonians, and even when he returns to the theme in 1

Corinthians. Only in 2 Corinthians does he contemplate and accept the probable prospect of dying; only in Philippians does he speak of his longing to join Christ even by death, and of death itself as gain. Characteristically, then, according to St. Paul, the Christian is one for whom—in the words of a late epistle—Christ has *abolished death*.

Objection may also be taken to the view that St. Paul regarded the curse which Jesus bore as resting upon Jews rather than upon all mankind. Was not Paul the great apostle of Gentiles?—He was indeed; yet he was Jewish by birth and by many of his deepest sentiments. In Romans ii. the highest compliment he can pay to a good man is to call him a true Jew. In Romans xi. he startles us by his reassertion of the essential and abiding superiority of Jewish Christians over their Gentile fellow-believers. What wonder if his theology of the plan of salvation is largely concerned with Israel's prerogatives and with God's method of honouring the law of Israel before superseding it to make room for the eternal covenant of grace? Even the Epistle to the Hebrews regards the atonement of Christ as offered "for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first covenant." We read in Genesis i. with a kind of pathetic wonder how God made the great luminaries sun and moon; then—in a parenthesis—"he made the stars also"! Why may not the New Testament speak similarly? The work of Christ is essentially achieved on behalf of Israel; but—"He saves the Gentiles also"!

V.

The fifth root of St. Paul's doctrine of sin was his experience of victory as a Christian man. What he had vainly sought by arduous effort from his youth onwards came to him now as the gift of the new life. It became easy to do right. The spell was taken off him. Sin had

no more dominion under grace. What the law could not do, God had done through Christ; and henceforth the law's requirement was fulfilled. There was a gulf between the new and the old. In Paul's own life there lay the deep cleft of conversion. In the history of the universe there stood Christ's cross. Henceforth the very creation round about him was new, and all was divine.

This also, like the last-mentioned source of his teachings, is not merely laid alongside St. Paul's Jewish dogmas, but enters into fruitful union with these. Once more we moderns might desire to cross-question, to sift, to pick and choose. We cannot be refused the right to make the attempt. It is a fair question, whether the jurisprudence of the Apostle and his ethical experiences really cohere as homogeneous and verify each other. But Paul knew no distinctions and felt no hesitations. His creed was to him a single tremendous divine revelation, and the jurisprudence of Christ's death played no small part in the peace and joy of St. Paul's new life. In its own place, each element is vital. Certainly, without the new and happier experience, St. Paul's creed would never have come into existence. His victory is so immense, and he describes it in terms so glowing, that he has been supposed to teach the absolute sinlessness of every Christian. That is perverse and absurd, yet it is the exaggeration of a truth. For once again St. Paul does not think of himself as exceptional, but as typical. His helplessness under law, in the flesh, was no idiosyncrasy but broadly human; and so is his Christian victory. Here too, then, there is perhaps a tinge of dogma, even while St. Paul is closest in touch with experience. Yet surely there is something also of dogma, and of a dogma far from being superior to the apostle's, when sundry moderns would write off all St. Paul's insight into the Christian life as a thing without any message for us.

Either way, St. Paul's experience of victory is the fifth root of his doctrine about sin.

VI.

Sixthly : What is the origin of St. Paul's doctrine of the flesh ? Is the doctrine, as has been hinted, to be explained out of personal experiences, with help from the Old Testament or from Jewish theology ? Or does it go back to Greek and Hellenistic thought ?

We grant that St. Paul uses a multitude of terms from Greek philosophy, especially from Stoicism—reason, conscience, things which are seemly or proper, and so forth. But it does not follow that in making Christianity speak Greek he was Hellenising its essence. Every apologist has to translate religion into a dialect which is intelligible to his hearers ; the task is difficult and delicate, but unavoidable. And it is possible to achieve success. While the terms employed are new, the thought may be essentially unchanged. The Greek dogma, which St. Paul is supposed to have borrowed, tells us that matter is evil and the body the prison of the spirit. Does Paul say that ? It finds the appropriate remedy for sin in asceticism. Does Paul teach that ? When death comes, sin is abolished. Does Paul say anything like that ? In words he may ; *he that hath died hath been justified from sin* ; but the underlying thought is quite different. Moreover, " flesh " in this wide sense is a Hebrew and not a Greek term. It is surely a paradox to say such a word is the vehicle and proof of a specially Hellenic and non-Biblical stream of influence in St. Paul's thinking.

But, if flesh is not equivalent to matter, what does it mean ? Does it, as some would contend, mean sexuality and sensuality ? If so, a great deal of popular Catholic theology goes back to St. Paul. Various pieces of evidence are

marshalled in support of such an interpretation. In Paul's lists of works of the flesh, sexual sins come first. The commandment which in Romans vii. is declared to have broken Paul's heart because he could never fully obey it—the command *Thou shalt not covet*—may also be rendered *Thou shalt not lust*. The body is the enemy which, according to a striking passage in 1 Corinthians, Paul buffets and brings into subjection; this certainly might suggest to us the most unruly of all bodily appetites. But there is evidence on the other side. Surely there is no temptation which so little needs a special commandment to prove its dangerousness as a sensual thought. "I had not known sin except the law had said Thou shalt not covet." Would any decently pure-minded lad sum up his history in such terms if he were thinking of sensual cravings? When sex begins to assert itself, with its train of unwelcome promptings by day and disorderly images by night, it is more likely to result in morbid horror of self than in a state of mind "which had not known sin except for the law." It was in some different region, we may feel confident, that St. Paul's temptations lay.

Again, he tells us in 1 Corinthians vii. that he was a man singularly free from the trouble arising out of sensual suggestions. Had he been so troubled, he must have applied to himself the remedy he offers to others—that of marriage; but there was no need. Of course he is writing here of his Christian period. Still, the gift of which he speaks is quite a distinct one from the great gift of spiritual life. And, I say again, he describes himself—in defiance of the prejudices of generations of celibate exegetes, who would have it forsooth that his stake in the flesh was a sensual temptation—he describes himself as exceptionally immune from such promptings. And once more; the processes of sex, far from being radically evil to St. Paul, are in a way

sacred things. This very animal body, with its maleness and its femaleness, has been bought with a price; its members are members of Christ; it is the temple of the Holy Ghost; with it—with the body—we are to glorify God.

I would suggest that the primary motive for St. Paul's identification of the flesh with sinfulness is his appeal to the Spirit as the source of ethical power. We are to conceive that, under Christianity, St. Paul became a new creature in many distinct ways. His old hard legal piety as a Pharisee passed away, and he plunged neck-deep into the stream of early Christian enthusiasm. There had probably been no visions in the early life of Saul; once they had begun, they never ceased. He now spoke with tongues more abundantly than all others. The "newness of the spirit" superseded for him the "oldness of the letter." Concurrently, as we know, his ethical life was revolutionised. In lieu of helplessness, he found infinite power at his disposal; and with the insight of genius he recognised there also "one and the selfsame Spirit." This doctrine of spirit *versus* letter being formulated, the other contrast of spirit and flesh moved forward voluntarily—so to speak—from the pages of the Old Testament, and fixed what name should be given to the power of sin within man. Sensual sins were obviously to be included among works of the flesh; they were even to be placed at the head of such lists; but they had no claim to exclude others. Nor can they cover the whole ground when we are formulating Paul's doctrine of sin.

On this interpretation, one must confess, the term "flesh" gives us but little light regarding the thoughts of St. Paul. Can it possibly be argued that there is much to be learned from it? When anger and pride are referred to the flesh, what meaning remains to the much emphasised statement that Paul holds the flesh to be the seat of sin?

Perhaps something further should be added as to possible

developments in St. Paul's later teaching. We might connect these with his having had to look death in the face, and to accept the unwelcome prospect of ultimately dying. Both 2 Corinthians ii. and Romans vi. speak with a new emphasis of the *mortal body* or of *mortal flesh*; while in Romans viii. we have the still more unambiguous statement, that the body—the Christian man's body—is doomed to death *because of sin*. Over against the still uncancelled principle, that the characteristic effect of Christ's work is to abolish death, we seem to meet with a new position, perhaps not unconnected with personal experiences, that the characteristic destiny of the sinful human body is to die. We might further illustrate this change in outlook by the series of St. Paul's statements regarding baptism. In Galatians we find mysticism, but of a comparatively undeveloped type; baptism is a *putting on of Christ*. In Romans, baptism has become baptism *into Christ's death*. And in Colossians baptism is viewed as a disembodiment—a getting rid of *the body of flesh*. Still further, the new position may be thought to have modified Paul's doctrine of Christ's own body. He now seems clearly to teach that Christ must necessarily have died not simply as man's representative (or again, as the bearer of Israel's curse) but as having come into perilous contact with non-ethical human conditions by assuming *the exact likeness of a body of sinful flesh*.

It is even conceivable that St. Paul might never have become a Christian, if he had always lived in the grip of this train of thought. But it was not so with him. During a considerable period, the sinlessness of Jesus and His substitutionary sufferings filled the whole field of the Apostle's vision. Afterwards it became possible for him, with unshaken Christian faith, to embark upon a new working-out of the ethical process of redemption—Romans vi.–viii., to which nothing corresponds in the scheme of Galatians—

with a darker view of the " flesh " and of the " body." But, if this was a later development, it certainly was not brought in from Greek thought. Rather, so far as we can trace definite antecedents, St. Paul's doctrine of the flesh is due (apart from the language of the Old Testament or the Jewish doctrine of the *Yetzer*) to personal experiences of the stubbornness of sin and the inevitableness of death.

VII.

We now come to moral postulates laid down by St. Paul as a Christian man. The first of these, our seventh root of doctrine, is found in Galatians ii. 21. Christ *did not die gratuitously*. Any Christian (it is implied) may appeal in argument with his fellow-Christians to this certainty, that Christ's death was needful and not superfluous. According to 1 Corinthians xv., such teaching was part of the pre-Pauline theology of the early Church. " I delivered unto you that which also I received "—the words plainly refer to a human channel of tradition, i.e., to the Church of Jerusalem —" that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures." This, then, was general early Christian belief. Is it not also *fact*, and plain to Christian eyes ? A foundation has been laid already, once for all, by the hand of God ; even Jesus Christ. No doubt the fact comes to us associated with a certain amount of intellectual interpretation ; but that is true of most facts. Paul assumes too that every Christian will grant the principles of interpretation made use of. He assumes that God means us, in some measure, to understand the death of Christ. The crucifixion is for him not simply one more moral mystery in this world of heart-breaking tragedies. There is light in the darkness when we recognise that Christ died for our sins.

I venture to think that the Apostle's plummet reaches deeper soundings here than elsewhere, and that it would be

well to dissociate the catholic Christian faith, that Christ died for sin, from the doubtful Jewish dogma that all death is due to sin. In the first, not the second, is an ultimate rallying-point for faith. Between the Christian mind and the modern levity which trifles with sin, there stands—the cross. It could be no minor evil from which mankind were redeemed at so heavy a cost, " with precious blood, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot, even the blood of Christ."

VIII.

The other moral postulate, the eighth root of St. Paul's doctrine, is found in the statement that no man dare glory before God (1 Cor. i 29). Traditionally, Augustinianism has blackened the character of man to the uttermost in order to establish his helplessness and so to magnify the grace of God. But, if we keep St. Paul's grand postulates in mind, our doctrine of grace will stand secure without support from exaggerated and impossible doctrines regarding human sinfulness. These may well cause us difficulty ; but every Christian ought to accept the postulate of a God high and lifted up in the glory of his Divine purity.

IX.

If it were possible to add yet one more to the long list of influences that co-operated to shape St. Paul's doctrine regarding sin, one might wish to explain in a word that the assertion found at Romans ii. 14—Gentiles, without the law, do by nature the things of the law—belongs to a different order of thought from the eight foundation-stones or fountain springs which we have passed under review. This one is ethical ; these others were theological or religious. It might prove impossible to harmonise Paul with himself. Will number nine ever perfectly accord with the eight previous sources of doctrine ? If it is true that " they that are in the flesh cannot please God," how can it also be true that

"Gentiles," even if fitfully, "do by nature the things of the law"? Theologians who discover an antinomy in the doctrine of sin may claim that St. Paul gives them materials for their conclusion. Perhaps that is true. On the other hand, it is plain that St. Paul coins no such epigrammatic formula. And yet it is much that he should recognise, if hardly oftener than in a single passage, genuine moral processes in the life of unregenerate men.[1] This passage, much more probably that any passage regarding the flesh, may be of Greek *provenance*. It has a very Stoical ring.

One might suggest in closing that St. Paul's Jewish dogmas are the least authoritative part of his teaching; that his personal experiences, while profoundly significant for every Christian, are yet touched with idiosyncrasy, precarious in intellectual statement, and not wholly free from paradox; and that it is his Christian postulates alone which are absolutely central for those who share with him the evangelical faith.

ROBERT MACKINTOSH.

THE FELLOWSHIP (Κοινωνία) OF ACTS II. 42 AND COGNATE WORDS.

ONE of the practices or notes of life mentioned in Acts ii. 42, as those in which the early disciples of Christ "continued steadfastly" was ἡ κοινωνία, rendered 'fellowship' both in the Authorised and Revised Versions. Both these versions are, however, mistaken in connecting τῇ κοινωνίᾳ with τῶν ἀποστόλων ("in the apostles' teaching and fellowship"); still more mistaken is the rendering of the Vulgate, *communicatione fractionis panis*, only made possible by the unauthorised insertion of καὶ before τῇ κλάσει τοῦ ἄρτου, and even then an incorrect translation. Rightly interpreted

[1] I set aside the perversely ingenious view that the good Gentiles spoken of in Romans ii. are the Gentile Christians.

then, 'fellowship' (ἡ κοινωνία) stands by itself as a characteristic of the Christian life together with "the teaching of the Apostles, the breaking of bread and the prayers."

It is sometimes assumed that ἡ κοινωνία is solely connected with the form of early communism described in verse 44. "They that believed were together, and had all things common"; and because the common life so described was both local and temporary it is inferred that this note of the early Christian Church was also transitory and not intended to be lasting or universal.

This inference seemed to be strengthened by the comparatively rare occurrence of the word in other parts of the New Testament. Such occurrence is, however, more frequent than appears to the English reader either of A.V. or R.V.[1]; and so far from passing away from Christian experience when the early days of 'gladness and singleness of heart' came to an end in the Church of Jerusalem ἡ κοινωνία became a permanent possession of the faithful, manifesting itself in many ways and finding expression in varied forms. And even though the primary reference in the passage we are considering is to some form of communism, the word must not even here be pressed into meaning a system of equal distribution of property. The instances both of Barnabas and of Ananias and Sapphira disprove that. The generosity of Barnabas is mentioned as exceptional. And Ananias, disciple though he was, was at liberty to keep his own. The expression then indicates generally that there was among the first converts to the faith a life of companionship and of readiness to impart to one another the means of subsistence. But, as we shall see, the word came to connote far more than this in the experience of Christian life.

[1] ἡ κοινωνία occurs nineteen, or possibly twenty, times in other passages of the New Testament (in Eph. iii. 9 it is a variant for οἰκονομία). It is variously rendered by "fellowship," "contribution," "communion."

What gives a special significance to this primitive form of Christian socialism is that it represents an effort to continue the life of discipleship and companionship with Christ which had been enjoyed by the Twelve, and by others, who had "companied" with them during the earthly ministry. Little is said of this companionship in the New Testament narrative. But there are many notes of an intimate and loving friendship. His disciples are "the same as brother and sister and mother" (Matt. xii. 50); they are His "little flock" (Luke xii. 32); they are His "little children" (John xiii. 33); and "those whom He hath chosen out of the world" (John xv. 19); above all, "those who had continued with Him in His temptations" (Luke xxii. 28). The interest and sweetness of such intercourse must have been incomparable. No condition of partnership and brotherhood could be imagined more entrancing and more full of spiritual joy than that. For nowhere is life more enjoyable than in a community of comrades inspired with high ideals and directed by a leader whom all trust, and who is felt to be showing to his followers the way to a fulfilment of deeply cherished hopes. With Christ, in His intercourse with His disciples, this ideal grew to absolute perfection. The question, then, arose quite naturally, could that bright and blessed life be continued? It was indeed a *κοινωνία* in which all who had known Jesus would long to continue stedfastly till the end came. For at first this common life of fellowship was upheld and brightened by the near prospect of the coming of the Lord (1 Thess. iv. 15).

Nor, again, did the ideal of 'a fellowship' with Christ pass away when the earliest hopes of the *parousia* vanished. It remained throughout Apostolic times and long afterwards. It is still present, if not as a prevailing Christian term, yet as a living and eternal principle of the Christian

life which invisibly binds together in 'hoops of steel' all communities which name the name of Christ.

As a classical and vernacular word κοινωνία was not connected with any system of philosophy or ethics, and, with one possible exception, came into the New Testament vocabulary without definite pagan association which would involve caution in introducing it to Christian use. The exception is suggestive and interesting.[1] Among the papyri inscriptions recently discovered in Egypt there is a certificate of Pagan sacrifice, such as was granted for exemption from persecution. The date is A.D. 250. In it the attesting witness writes: "I, Aurelius Syrus, as a participant (κοινωνός) have certified Diogenes as sacrificing along with us." The quotation emphasises St. Paul's contrast between the Christian communicant (κοινωνός) and the communicant of demons (1 Cor. x. 18 f.), and throws some light on the associations which gathered round the word in its Christian use.

Even from the first we have seen that the meaning of κοινωνία went far beyond and deeper than the sense of almsgiving and participation in worldly possessions. From the first it implied a principle of brotherhood and spiritual fellowship which lies at the root of true Christian Socialism. Its position on its first occurrence in the New Testament (Acts ii. 42) is suggestive. It comes between 'the doctrine or teaching of the Apostles' and 'the breaking of bread.' Christian fellowship, the result of Apostolic teaching, leads on to its highest expression in the eucharistic 'breaking of bread.' And as Christian experience was enlarged fresh associations were brought into the word. 'Fellowship' is hardly an adequate rendering of κοινωνία, although it has been adopted in most passages where the word occurs by the editors both of the Authorised and Revised Versions; and indeed it is difficult to suggest a better English equiva-

[1] G. Milligan, *Greek Papyri*, 48. 19.

lent. But *κοινωνία* implies a closeness of union approaching to identity. Hence the significance of its use to express the believer's union with the "Son of God, Jesus Christ our Lord" (1 Cor. i. 9), and with the Holy Ghost (2 Cor. xiii. 14 and Phil. ii. 1); still more significant and touching is the communion with the sufferings of Christ which His servants are privileged to share (Phil. iii. 10 *κοινωνίαν τῶν παθημάτων αὐτοῦ*, and Rev. i. 9 *συγκοινωνὸς ἐν τῇ θλίψει . . . καὶ ὑπομονῇ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*). Compare with these the striking passage where St. Paul speaks of himself as "filling up that which is lacking of the afflictions of Christ" (Col. i. 24). St. John, after a long experience of *κοινωνία* as a binding force in the Christian life, adduces it as the foundation motive which impelled him to write his Epistle: "That which we have seen and heard declare we unto you also, that ye also may have fellowship (*κοινωνίαν*) with us; yea and our fellowship (*κοινωνία*) is with the Father, and with His Son Jesus Christ" (1 John i. 3). In other words, "continuing steadfastly in the fellowship" was still a note of the Christian life in the generation in which St. John lived.

With St. John indeed it is the predominant and determining note of Christianity. For the fellowship as defined by him is only another word for that brotherhood or brotherly love (*φιλαδελφία*) which makes the difference between darkness and light (1 John ii. 9 f.), and is therefore the essential characteristic of one who calls himself a Christian. It creates the whole atmosphere of the first epistle of St. John. And though the word *φιλαδελφία* (*philadelphia*) is not Christian by origin[1] it gathered a new and wider and deeper significance by its introduction into the Christian vocabulary. St. Paul, writing to the Thessa-

[1] Liddell and Scott give one instance only of its occurrence in classical Greek. It was, however, a favourite place-name. Three cities were so called. The adjective *φιλάδελφος* is beautifully used of "sisterly tears" (*φιλάδελφα δάκρυα*), Soph. Antig. 527.

lonians (1 Thess. i. 4) speaks of them in one of the most beautiful of New Testament phrases as, "divinely taught to love one another." They were *naturaliter Christiani*. Hence "no need to write to them concerning brotherly love." 1 John i. 9 f., cited above, shows how close the connexion had become between *κοινωνία* and *ἀγάπη* and *φιλαδελφία*.

Another verbal note of a less obvious nature may be adduced. Of the two Greek prepositions implying association or union one (*σύν*) indicates a much closer or more intimate connexion than the other (*μετά*). It is the first that came into Christian use to signify the union of the believer with Christ. It is in this sense that St. Paul writes of dying, being buried, and living with Christ (Rom. vi. 8, 2 Cor. xiii. 4, Phil. i. 23, Col. ii. 20) and of our life being hidden with Christ (Col. iii. 3). So, too, close companionship with Christ was a condition of Apostleship (Acts i. 21). But as the preposition *σύν* is in close etymological connexion with *κοινός*,[1] to be "with Christ" (*σὺν Χριστῷ εἶναι*) is equivalent to be in union or fellowship with Christ (*ἐν κοινωνίᾳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ εἶναι*).

But apart from the extension of the Christian vocabulary to emphasise this continuity of the *κοινωνία* the figurative language of the New Testament, with its parables and similitudes, points in the same direction. The illustrations of the Christian life suggest the same thought of association and brotherhood and companionship in work. Christians are fellow-labourers, fellow-athletes, fellow-soldiers. They are a holy temple with its several stones "fitly framed together for a habitation of God in the Spirit" (Eph. ii. 21), or they are like a human body, "knit together through that which every joint supplieth" (Eph. iv. 16, Col. ii. 19), each member of which is dependent on the other members (1 Cor. xii. 14 foll.). And this fellowship is not to cease

[1] For this connexion *see* Buttmann's Lexilogus *sub voc.* *κελαινός*, p. 375, note *a*.

with the life on earth. The Christian looks forward to a common citizenship in heaven (Phil. iii. 20, Heb. xiii. 14) and to "the general assembly and Church of the firstborn who are enrolled in heaven" (Heb. xii. 2 f.).

Apart from similitude and parable the spirit of 'fellowship' animates the whole of the New Testament. The history of Christianity would have been very different if the same spirit had continued to be the predominant influence. But events belied the early promise. The four great notes of the Apostolic times were all infringed or broken within the memory of the generation which upheld them. (1) The teaching of the Apostles was challenged by false Apostles (Rev. ii. 2), by Judaisers (Gal. i. 6), and by adversaries like Phygelus and Hermogenes and Diotrephes (2 Tim. i. 15, 3 John 9); (2) the earliest contention in the Church arose from a dispute concerning the daily distribution of food (Acts vi. 1 foll.); (3) the Eucharist itself gave occasion to abuse and scandals (1 Cor. xi. 20); (4) and we learn from the Epistle to the Hebrews of neglect by some of the daily prayers of the Church (Heb. x. 25).

Still we may believe that in every age thousands of the faithful have 'continued steadfastly' in this charter of the Christian Church. And Christ Himself, around whom first the brotherhood of the disciples gathered and worked, still summons all His followers to join Him in the fellowship for the furtherance of the Gospel and the advance of His Kingdom.

ARTHUR CARR.

TWO NEW TESTAMENT PROBLEMS.

I

ST. PAUL'S FATE AT ROME.

IN THE EXPOSITOR for March, Sir W. M. Ramsay has urged afresh that Paul was released from Rome in 62 A.D. and remained free till *c.* 65 A.D. But though I follow him in

his general attitude to the Acts, I cannot agree with his exegesis of it in this matter. He argues[1] that the Jews never presented their case against Paul at Rome, feeling that they had no prospect of success after the failure of their efforts to induce the Roman provincial authorities to yield to their pressure on the spot ; and that for this reason the case simply went in Paul's favour by default at the end of the two years referred to in the closing verses of Acts. Against this I would urge : (1) If Luke had meant this to be understood, it would have been easy for him to have said so. That is what the analogy of the end of his Gospel, to which appeal is made, would demand, viz., *a clear summary statement* of what was to be developed more fully in the beginning of the sequel, the third writing which Sir W. M. Ramsay assumes the author of Acts here to have in mind. Yet nowhere does Acts point to any plan of Paul's beyond " seeing Rome also " ; which is now fulfilled.

(2) " The analogy between the case of Paul and the trial of Jesus " tells all the other way. " In both instances the Roman judge throught that the accused party was innocent." Yes, and yet in the sequel Jesus was put to death ; therefore by analogy Paul also, in spite of the finding of the trials actually recorded.

(3) Such an issue I still see hinted at in Luke's record of Agrippa's comment, " This man might have been set free, if he had not appealed to Cæsar " ; but he had, and the reigning Cæsar was Nero ! That is how I believe Luke meant his readers to read these words (together with his silence as to a favourable issue at the end of the book), relying upon the Christian estimate of Nero after 64 A.D. to guide their reading, in view of what was, moreover, the notorious fact as to the fate of Paul. Paul's doubly recorded foreboding at Miletus that he would never again see the Ephesian elders

[1] Like Prof. K. Lake, in *The Interpreter* for 1909, pp. 147–156.

points the same way ; and so does the very fulness with which Acts records the preliminary hearings in Palestine, as though meant to suggest the proper and normal verdict, as distinct from that of an " abnormal monster " like Nero—which is naturally passed over in silence as well known and dangerous to refer to explicitly from the Christian standpoint.

(4) The real cause of Paul's condemnation at Rome was the development of the aspect of the case against him only alluded to but not pressed with witnesses in Cæsarea, viz., his dangerous effect on law and order among the Jews in the provinces generally, especially Asia (Acts xxiv. 5, 9 ; xxv. 7 f.). Though the Jews may have felt that there was no hurry ; that with the lapse of time the chapter of accidents (e.g., as to the weight which Festus' favourable report would carry) was on their side ; yet they intended to work up and present this side of their case, if needful, relying on influences at Rome, e.g. " the partiality of the powerful Poppæa," to help them in the last resort. Sir W. M. Ramsay himself says that the Jews " played a waiting game. This procedure was clever : it meant success to a certain degree : it was economical for the Jews, and expensive for Paul." May we not say rather, on the analogy of the case of Lampon, as reported by Philo *In Flaccum*, that since they were not sure of their case in view of the opinion of Agrippa and the probable tenor of Festus' report to Rome, they determined at least to shut Paul up until the legal time-limit was about to expire, and so harass him all that time with anxiety as to the final issue. Meantime they might intrigue at Rome, in order to prepare the ground for the most favourable hearing possible, when their witnesses (e.g. from Asia) should at last be brought forward. That they let the case go by default within the period open to them by usage is most unlikely. Indeed, does not the fact that Luke specifies not eighteen months, which to judge from third

century usage was the limit for capital charges sent on appeal from the provinces, but "two whole years" as spent by Paul in confinement awaiting trial, suggest that the Jews had at least given notice within the legal limit that they would press their case as soon as the winter of 61–2 was over and their witnesses could arrive?

(5) The nature of the references to his prospects made by Paul in Philemon and Philippians respectively, is against the theory that the Jews did not support their case at Rome. For if so, we should expect the tone of Philippians, as nearer the end of the time-limit for such action, to be *more confident* than that used in the earlier Philemon; whereas the opposite is the case. That is, Paul had growing cause to doubt the issue of the case as time went on and he knew more of his actual prospects as seen in Rome itself.

(6) Finally, this new view is excluded by the joint witness of 1 Peter and 1 Clement, which (as I have pointed out in the article "Paul" in the *Encycl. Britannica*) do not permit of Paul's having survived the Neronian persecution of 64, in which Peter also suffered. For Clement says (c. 6) that the Neronian victims of 64 were "gathered together," in the place of reward, unto these two Apostles just referred to. These last two arguments seem to me fairly decisive against Sir W. M. Ramsay's theory, and the latter of them against any theory of St. Paul's release from the imprisonment at Rome, where Acts lets him pass from our view.

VERNON BARTLET.

THE NEW CODEX "W."

THE publication of the new Greek uncial MS. "W" marks a further epoch for the textual history of the Gospels in Greek.

From the wonderful land of the Pharaohs this treasure has come to us. It is not to be known as the "Freer" MS., but

as the "Washington" MS., and the symbol W—selected, I believe, by Dr. Gregory—is therefore not inappropriate.

The MS. has been known to scholars to some extent for about four years. And attention has already been called to the fact that the MS., while having the regular ending to St. Mark after xvi. 8, yet incorporates in this section at verse 14 *the answer* of the eleven when upbraided for their unbelief which was hitherto unknown in Greek, and only partially known from a Latin quotation of St. Jerome. But the MS. has interest far beyond what we had thought possible from such preliminary information, and the noble and public-spirited publication in facsimile at Mr. Freer's expense puts the whole text before us.

The Editor, Professor H. A. Sanders, of the University of Michigan, has issued a companion volume, in which a digest of many readings is offered with the supporting authorities, and also a complete collation of the text with the Oxford edition of 1880. With the phototype edition in our hands for reference, it is easy to check the collation which proves to have been made with great care and faithfulness. We have to congratulate Mr. Sanders on the conclusion of his editorial work. The Editor leaves the all-important question of date until the very last (chapter v.,) as he "wished the MS. to exhibit its great worth unaided by the prepossession which attaches to hoary age." In this (too brief) chapter he discusses both the paleography of the "first quire of John," which is written in a different hand, and the matter of the date of the MS. as a whole.

I am entirely at one with him in placing the date in the fourth century. Thus to ℵ and to B must be added a fresh contemporary witness. But this witness, unlike ℵ and B in four and three short-lined columns respectively, has been copied from a third or early fourth century papyrus *book*. I do not think Mr. Sanders lays enough emphasis on this,

for there is an exceedingly close relation to W in its book-form in Oxyrynchus papyrus No. 2 (Grenfell and Hunt, vol. i.). In this document we have under our hands the exact type of papyrus in book-form of the third century,* which must have served as a model for W. Of this G. and H. write: "Part of a sheet from a papyrus book, which had been folded originally to make two leaves. . . . The papyrus was found near the "Logia" a day or two afterwards. Though the writing is somewhat later in style than that of the 'Logia' there is no likelihood of its being subsequent to the beginning of the fourth century, and it may with greater probability be assigned to the third. It may thus claim to be a fragment of the oldest known MS. of any part of the New Testament."

See G. and H. further remarks as to papyri in book-form in vol. ii.

Now the vellum MS. W corresponds as to size, form, and length of lines in a most remarkable and exact manner with *Oxyr*[2]. The inner margin of the papyrus is double the width of that in W. After making allowance for this, the width of the page corresponds almost exactly with that of W. The length of the lines is practically identical. Owing to the papyrus contracting $\overline{\Upsilon\Upsilon}$ (*prim.*) in the first line, and the MS. writing *ΥΙΟΥ* in full, *ΥΙΟΥ ΑΒΡΑΑΜ* begins the second line in the MS., while *ΑΒΡΑΑΜ* is the first word of this line in the papyrus, but they run along together almost identically after making allowance for the "στιχοι" spaces in W, and certain slight differences in spelling, as *ΔΑΥΕΙΔ* against *ΔΑΥΙΔ*.

Passing to line 6 *seq.* on folio B of the papyrus (Matt. i. 16) note how they continue to run together.

* Burkitt (*Introduction* to Barnard's *Clement of Alexandria*) and Turner (J. T. S. *Historical Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament*, January 1910, p. 186) both accept the THIRD century for this fragment.

B 1 6	papyrus	[Ε]ΓΕΝΝΗCΕΝ ΪΩCΗΦ ΤΟΝ ΑΝΔΡΑΜ[Α	[Room has to be made here for τον].
2 1 16	W	CΕΝ ΤΟΝ ΙΩCΗΦ ΤΟΝ ΑΝΔΡΑ ΜΑΡΙΑC	
B 1 7	papyrus	ΡΙΑC ΕΞ ΗC ΕΓΕΝΝΗ[Θ]Η ΙC Ο ΛΕΤΟΜΕΝΟC [XC]	
2 1 17	W	ΕΞ ΗC ΕΓΕΝΝΗΘΗ ΙC ΟΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΟC XC	
B 1 8	papyrus	ΠΑCΑΙ ΟΥΝ ΓΕ[ΝΕ]ΑΙ ΑΠΟ ΑΒΡΑΑΜ ΕΩC	Corresponds exactly allowing for αι before γενεαι in MS.
2 1 18	W	ΠΑCΑΙ ΟΥΝ ΑΙ ΓΕΝΕΑΙ ΑΠΟ ΑΒΡΑΑΜ Ε	
B 1 9	papyrus	ΔΑΥΙΔ ΓΕΝΕΑΙ ΙΔ ΚΑΙ ΑΠΟ [Δ]Α[Υ]ΙΔ' [Ε]ΩC ΤΗC	ΙΔ expanded in MS. W.
2 1 19	W	ΩC ΔΑΥΕΙΔ ΓΕΝΕΑΙ ΔΕΚΑΤΕCCΑΡΕC	
B 1 10	papyrus	ΜΕΤΟΙΚΕCΙΑC ΒΑΒΥΛΩΝΟ[C] ΓΕ[ΝΕΑΙ] ΙΔ ΚΑ[Ι]	
2 1 20	W	ΚΑΙ ΑΠΟ ΔΑΥΕΙΔ' ΕΩC ΤΗC ΜΕΤΟΙΚΕ	
B 1 11	papyrus	ΑΠΟ ΤΗC ΜΕΤ[Ο]ΙΚΕCΙΑC ΒΑΒ[Υ]ΛΩΝ[Ο]C ΕΩC	
2 1 21	W	CΙΑC ΒΑΒΥΛΩΝΟC ΓΕΝΕΑΙ ΙΔ [ ]	(Space in MS.)
B 1 12	papyrus	ΤΟΥ XΥ ΓΕΝΕΑΙ ΙΔ ΤΟΥ ΔΕ ΙΥ XΥ Η ΓΕΝΕ	
2 1 22	W	ΚΑΙ ΑΠΟ ΤΗC ΜΕΤΟΙΚΕCΙΑC ΒΑΒΥΛΩ	
B 1 13	papyrus	CΙC ΟΥΤΩC ΗΝ ΜΝΗCΤΕΥΘΕΙCΗC ΤΗC ΜΗ	
2 1 23	W	ΝΟC ΕΩC ΤΟΥ XΥ ΓΕΝΕΑΙ ΙΔ [ ]	Space in MS. Here ΙΔ not ΔΕΚΑΤΕCCΑΡΕC
B 1 14	papyrus	ΠΡΟC ΑΥΤΟΥ Μ[ΑΡΙ]Α[C] ΤΩ[ΙΩ]CΗΦ ΠΡΙΝ Ἢ CΥΝ	
2 1 24	W	ΤΟΥ ΔΕ ΙΥ Η ΓΕΝΕCΕΙC ΟΥΤΩC ΗΝ	(MS. ΙΥ not ΙΥ XΥ.)
B 1 15	papyrus	ΕΛΘΕΙΝ ΑΥΤΟ[C] ΕΥΡΕΘ[Η] ΕΝ ΓΑCΤΡΙ ΕΧΟΥ †	
2 1 25	W	ΜΝΗCΤΕΥΘΕΙCΗC ΓΑΡ ΤΗC ΜΗΤΡΟC ΑΥ	(MS. supplies γαρ.)
B 1 16	papyrus	CΑ ΕΚ [ΠN̄C] Α[ΓΙΟΥ ΙΩCΗΦ ΔΕ Ο] ΑΝΗΡ ΑΥ	
2 1 26	W	ΤΟΥ ΜΑΡΙΑC ΤΩ ΙΩCΗΦ' ΠΡΙΝ Η CΥΝΕΛ	
B 1 17	papyrus	ΤΗC Δ[Ι]ΚΑΙ[ΟC ΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΜΗ ΘΕΛΩΝ ΑΥΤΗΝ	† Notice above how the lines come together again.
2 1 27	W	ΘΕΙΝ ΑΥΤΟΥC ΕΥΡΕΘΗ ΕΝ ΓΑCΤΡΙ ΕΧΟΥ †	
B 1 18	papyrus	ΔΕΙΓΜΑ[Τ]Ε [ΙCΑΙ ΕΒΟΥΛΗ]ΘΗ [ΛΑΘΡΑ	
2 1 28	W	CΑ ΕΚ ΠN̄C ΑΓΙΟΥ [ ]	(Space in MS.)

In vol. ii. of the *Oxyr.* papyri occurs No. ccviii., part of St. John i. and xx., of which, unfortunately, no facsimile is given, but in which the lines are somewhat shorter. This also is in book-form and attributed to the third century.

In vol. vi., No. 847, plate vi., John ii. G. and H. say: "This leaf from a *vellum MS.* of St. John's Gospel is sufficiently early in date to be of decided value. The rather large calligraphic script is more closely related to the sloping oval type of the third and fourth centuries than to the squarer and heavier style which *subsequently* became common for Biblical texts and of which 848 and 851 are examples. We have little hesitation in referring the MS. to the fourth century.

In this connection observe here on plate vi., lines 5 and 14, the swing to the left of the base of the perpendicular in the letter ϕ (as in W), and line 15 observe ξ in $\epsilon\xi\epsilon\beta a\lambda(\epsilon\nu)$, which corresponds to that most characteristic letter in W, which by itself alone, in my opinion, holds W in the fourth century and is of a form earlier than that visible in ℵ or in B.

One matter to be noticed in connection with the long lines of *Oxyr*[2]. (third century) and W (fourth century) is that these documents must be rather far removed from short-lined bi-linguals or tri-linguals. Hence bi- or tri-lingual traditions (so completely vindicated in the MS. W, as will be seen) are far behind the Diocletian period.

Now let us glance at the text, for we can do no more in a short review. The subject is so vast, and its ramifications so many, that it cannot be dealt with or even sketched in a preliminary notice.

Let us take one of Mr. Sanders' tables only (p. 119). He is speaking of the possible keys to the real *base* of W as shadowed in this list of selected passages from St. John.

Take the well-known verse in x. 9, "I am the door.

Through me if any one enter in he shall be saved and shall come in and shall go out and find pasture." A reference to Tischendorf shows that *και εισελευσεται*, the first of the "pair" of expressions above, is wanting in Δ. Mr. Sanders now shows this Δ omission to be as old as W, for W omits, and to the evidence Mr. Sanders quite properly adds two very valuable old Latins *a* and *e* ("European" and "African" we were told these witnesses were) and *Lucifer* and δ, as well as *Δ[gr]. Now we can see how important it is to bring Tischendorf up to date, and we wish Dr. Gregory very cordially every success in the task which he has undertaken in this respect, for the versions must never be neglected. *Lucifer* joined to *a* shows that this was a genuine omission in the copies of Italy and Sardinia in the fourth century, and *e* supported by W shows that this same base pervaded both Latin Africa and Greek Egypt simultaneously. So that Δδ, instead of standing alone, as readers of Tischendorf might suppose, have rather weighty support for the "shorter" text, which is here not found in ℵB. I am not saying yet that the text here is the true text, for this is a curious place which we have mentioned.

To proceed. Another case of the "shorter" text is to be found previously at viii. 53, where, instead of *μὴ σὺ μείζων εἶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἀβραάμ ὅστις ἀπέθανεν; καὶ οἱ προφῆται ἀπέθανον· τίνα σεαυτὸν ποιεῖς*; we find that D *a b c d e ff₂ l* and *syr sin* [but not the other versions, Egyptian or otherwise] omit *πατρος ημων* and write merely *τοῦ Ἀβραάμ*. To this array W is now to be added. The Latins are thus practically agreed because the absentees can be accounted for (*f* and *q* having been largely revised). We are now face to face with a larger and more interesting problem as to the "shorter" text. Observe again that ℵB are absent

* δ so often opposes Δ that it should always be cited with Δ. The same applies to D *d*.

and also the Egyptian versions, so that here we are clearly on Latin ground. But, lo! *syr sin* adds its voice to our band [*cu* is not extant here to check it, ceasing at viii. 19], so that the international base is much strengthened.

Another curious place awaits investigation in this connection at vii. 1, where we had a reading known to the Latins (*a b ff l r*), but so far only to three Greek cursives and the second hand of another (240, 244, 249, 142 * *; of these 249 is important), and we had not seriously considered it. But W turns up with this reading: *ου γαρ ειχεν εξουσιαν* for *ου γαρ ηθελεν*. For this reading *syr cu* stands (against *syr sin*) and one *boh.* MS. with Chrysostom, so that *syr* and *latin* draw together most decidedly through W and apart from ℵB. We have also found here the common base behind *syr cu sin*, as we have a reading of each, both supported by *a b r*.

Then in ix. 21 another curious revelation awaits us. W omits *αυτον ερωτησατε* with ℵ *b syr sin* and *sah.* This passage about the speech of the blind man's parents is very involved and the original reading doubtful. Some say, "he is of age, ask him"; some vary the order: "ask him, he is of age"; some drop one or other half of the clause, and some, as *sah syr sin.*, modify what is left. But we have again here with ℵ *b sah* and *syr sin* a shorter form than that given by B or D.

Then at x. 15 ℵD and W come together, using *διδωμι* for *τιθημι* as *pers* (and *aeth arab*, as translated, "trado" and "commuto").

Again, for a "shorter" text: xii. 16 —*τοτε* W (no other Greeks) *b c e ff l syr sin pesh diatess* and *pers georg.* This omission, observe, is not an accident, for *e ff l* join the Latins, and they are all fully connected with Egyptian traditions. They are supported, moreover, by *b*, so largely elsewhere with W, and by the Syriacs conjoined (*cu* is wanting,

hence the absence of this witness) and confirmed by *pers*, which was evidently founded on a most ancient Græco-Syriac.

A change of order in xii. 25 appears most significant. For εις ζωην αιωνιον φυλαξει αυτην of all Greeks, W writes φυλαξει αυτην εις ζωην αιωνιον with *syr sah boh aeth*. The Latins follow the regular Greek order strictly, so that the base of W either goes back to a very distant misty period here before all Greeks and Latins which we have, or it is a direct version influence upon W of *syr* or *copt*.

Another change of order, on the other hand, at xi. 17, εν τω μνημιω εχοντα (for εχοντα εν τω μνημειω), while shared with DLΨ, is the *Latin* order of *b c d l r aur* and *vg*.

On the other hand, again, at xi. 48 την πολιν is substituted for τον τοπον by W and *syr sin* only.

xx. 22 αυτοις και λεγει, W and *arm*, *pers*, *georg*.

Again, at xii. 2 εποιησαν ουν αυτω δειπνον εκει και η Μαρθα διηκονει+αυτω writes W with *c* and the Georgian version (illic ministrabat *gat*), and +αυτοις *aeth*, thus, as it were, joining all these traditions together.

Again, a very curious but ancient form is found at xii. 47, και εαν τις μου μη ακουση των ρηματων και μη φυλαξη εγω ου κρινω αυτον. This +μη before ακουση by W is found in no Greek document but Paris[97], but *e* has it and *syr hier* (with *pers*) and *Aug Chr*.

Paris[97] having all the common elements of ℵ and B, thus here (and elsewhere) takes us *behind* ℵ and B*, as 28 sometimes takes us behind W itself.

Then a simple verb for a compound, always a sign of great age, or sympathy with Syriac, is found at xii. 35, λαβη for καταλαβη, with *Origen* (*syr pers*).

* Thus xix. 20, ανεγνωσαν πολλοι W Paris[97], *diatess arm pers*;
xx. 14, ειδεν (for θεωρει) W Paris[97], *c q δ aur sah boh* (*vg*);
xvi. 23, —εν *prim*, W Paris[97];
xvii. 20, υπερ (*pro περι sec*), W Paris[97].

Next xii. 42. For *και εκ των αρχοντων πολλοι*, we find *πολλοι των αρχοντων* as *Chrys diatess* (*boh*, *aeth*, *arm*).

There is no room to proceed here, but with these suggestions a more complete study of Mr. Sanders' list will be found very profitable.

xii. 44. For the order *εκραξεν δε ο Ιησους* *aeth* and the later Arabic seem the only authorities.

xii. 49. *εντολην μοι δεδωκεν* (for *μοι εντολην δεδωκεν*) W *fam.* 1 2^{pe} and *boh* only (—*μοι arm*).

xiii. 37. *υπερ σου την ψυχην μου θησω* (*pro την ψυχην μου υπερ σου θησω*), ℵXW Paris[97] and some bohairic MSS. (see Malan against Horner's codices). As ℵ and *X* join W here this may represent a very ancient bohairic.

Finally consider this point. There is both an underlying and an overlying Coptic sympathy as between W and both Coptic versions. In John x. 32, 41 we come to both the underlying and overlying sympathy with the bohairic version. In John x. 41 *Ιωαννης secund.* is omitted by W 248, *syr sin* and *boh*, but in x. 32 +*ουν* by W has its only support in *boh*. The latter is what I should call the *overlying* bohairic influence on W, by which I mean an influence on W at the last copying of W in Egypt from a Græco-bohairic MS. This is really a very remarkable place. *All* the bohairic MSS. are agreed to add *ουν*. So far as I know, no Greek MSS. do it, although some of the family of W may be found to do so. No Latin MSS. do it; no Syriacs. Of the other versions neither Persian, Arabic, Slav, Georg., Arm., Goth., nor Aeth., nor Sahidic, and that in a place where the addition is most easy and natural, so that the only conclusion is that W and *boh* are hereby most intimately related. The passage is, "Jesus answered them, many good works have I showed you from the Father. On account of which work

(of them) *therefore* will ye stone me?" You will observe that bohairic for *therefore* is the same as in Greek. But it is not as if W might have influenced one bohairic MS., for *all boh* MSS. have it, and therefore I conclude that basic bohairic had it before W in the fourth or third century, and influenced W directly.

In this connection note that W omits καλα in the same verse (with only Evan 220, Evst 54 *b syr sin Thdrt*) and not so *boh*, so that *boh* was not copying W, and the omission of καλα represents the *underlying* text, while the addition of ουν exhibits the *overlying* bohairic influence. This alone places *boh* squarely in the early fourth century at least.

For the distinct *overlying* Coptic, consult further xviii. 29, προς αυτους ο Πειλατος, ℵW *Sah boh* only.*

A peculiar Semitic touch is visible in the first quire of John at iv. 11, εστιν (*pro* εχεις) W alone, in the phrase ποθεν εχεις το υδωρ το ζων; Cf. "whence to thee the living water."

As to St. John the first quire writing appears, on first inspection, *younger* than the rest.

This seems to be borne out by the strange text, which savours of Chrysostom's recension, although it is also derived from a Græco-Lat. But whereas in all the rest of the MS. there is evidence of *copt* or *sahidic* influence from a diglot in copying, here in the first quire of John there is hardly any to be picked up. Upon further test I find the Chrys. text used of John to be very ancient, and doubtless Mr. Sanders is right in considering this first quire to be at least coeval with the rest of the MS. We are much further removed from *e*, only having two agreements. And there is more independence here than anywhere else. The editor considers this

* Paris[97] is with ℵW at xviii. 23, ειπον for ελαλησα, and again below xviii. 31 —αυτον *sec.* with ℵW, but not here in between. It is significant of the correctness of our contention.

first quire to be older than the rest and he has given much study to the subject. At first sight i. 4—*ην* might appear basic, from whence sprang +*ην* and +*εστι*, but I hardly think so. No MSS. agree. No early Fathers quote, and the question arose somewhat late. Wetstein quotes *Cypr.* for —*ην*

I think W omits to avoid the difficulty. But if basic, it would account for the curious turn in *syr cu* and *copt.*

Syr cu. Now life is that which came to pass in Him.

Boh. Life was that (which) is in Him.

Sah. In him is the life. But *Diatess* (Hogg) says simply, "In Him was life."

On the other hand i. 16, +*ζωην* W, could hardly have been dropped by all. Hence we look with more suspicion on —*ην* in i. 4 than we should otherwise do.

There is evidence of retranslation from Latin at iii. 21, iv. 51, iv. 45, iv. 47 ; an unknown recension, but we note that k-r_2 are missing [in fact, r_2 lacks almost exactly this first quire of W, opening where the second quire of W begins], and we only get one line on this recension at ii. 7, where ℶ (representing r_2) goes with *e ff*$_2$ *l μ fossat* and ℵX Greek, with one bohairic MS. (M) in supporting +*και.*

Here are the details of the stranger readings in quire 1.

i. 4. —*ην prim.* See Wetstein *ad loc.*

6. *απο* (*pro παρα*). Retransl.

16. + *ζωην* (*ante ελαβομεν*). *Sah* only (*Horner*) was missing in Balestri.

17. + *δε* (post *χαρις*). = *Latt vett.* and *Dimma* and *boh*, not *sah.*

18. + *ει μη*. No Greeks but most *vett. Latt.*

21. *τι ουν ου ει· Ηλιας*. Cf. B and *copt.*

+ *τι ουν*. Cf. *e.*

29. — *προς αυτον*. Apparently no support.

Ibid. τας αμαρτιας. No Greeks, but *e l r* and some Vulgates

and *Didymus Cypr.* In *boh* ⲘⲪⲚⲞⲂⲒ; in *sah* ⲘⲠⲚⲞⲂⲈ.

Jo. i. 31. *βαπτιζιν* (*pro βαπτιζων*). *e q arm sah* ¼ only.

33. *αυτω*. *e* only. Others *in eum*; *αυτω* doubtless retransl.

46. *τον τω* (*—νιον*). No support. Cf. *ff*$_2$ (friendliest of Latins in this section) "ihm. fil. ios. *qui est* a naz."

51. — *σε*. No support apparently except *arm.*

Ibid. *τουτων μειζω*. Not Latin order.

ii. 2. + *εκει*. Only 131 of Greeks (*testibus Scholz et Birch, non Lake, silet Lake*), also no less than 14 vulgates and *fossat*, but no other Old Latin.

7. + *και*. ℵX. Of *Latt*: ℈ *e ff*$_2$ *l fossat* μ and one coptic MS. Perhaps an old Latin error misreading the "Ait" of some at the beginning of the verse; and as only ℵ and X are guilty among the Greeks this looks very likely.

12. — *εις καπερναουμ*. Error. No support, *ut vid.*

— *εκει* (*εγγυς pro εκει* 508). Error. Hardly any support, *ut vid.*

14. *κολλυβιστας* (*pro κερματιστας*). Seems also an error. *Boh* clear with transliteration *KEPMA*, while *sah* = *NETPAΠEZITHC*.

16. *πωλουσιν τ. περ.* So *sah* and *ff*$_2$ exactly, "vendebant columbas"; also *a b r* with the order, but in the abl. abs.

20. *ο ναος ουτος οικοδ.* New order. *Clem.*

21. *αυτος* (*pro εκεινος*). No Greeks and all Latins "ille," clear retransl.

22. *ηνεστη* (*pro ηγερθη*). So only Matthæi's *co*[illegible] *Chrys.* [see iv. 52]. Clear retranslation

for *a* proves how it occurred, having *surrexit* for the others' *res*surrexit.

Jo. ii. 22. — *οι μαθηται.* New.

αυτω. New.

iii. 2. *τα σημεια ταυτα.* New order among Greeks, but supported by *lat*: *ff*$_2$ alone, and *Orig.* (on Jo. iv. 45).

13. + *εστιν ος.* Only *ff*$_2$ *l* write +is (his) before qui.

ανεβη (*pro αναβεβηκεν*). (Retransl.)

21. *εισιν* (*pro εστιν*). Ψ 2, 28, 67, 254, 511 and all Latins, even δ above *εστιν ex emend.*, but *not Iren* translator, nor *Lucifer* and *a* = est (cf. ℵ *). Hence this illegitimate *εισιν* is *ex lat* and *not old*, for *Iren* est operatus and *Lucifer* est factum, witness against it. (*sah*, "he did them.")

iv. 11. + *και.* Cf. *aeth.*

12. + *το ζων.* New. Probably from reading *vivam* in line above, or *μειζων* above. The Latins, *e*, *etc.*, *boh gr* 69, and very few + *Chrys.* add *hunc* after *puteum.*

17. — *ὁ.* No doubt *ex lat* or *copt.* No Greeks, but *sah* plain $\overline{IC}$.

24. *ος* (*pro θεος*). No Greeks, no Latins, no *boh*, no *syr*, but some *sah* MSS. Perhaps from proximity of *eos* read by some Latins, or contr. bar omitted (69 omits the clause).

27. + *γε* (*post μεντοι*). Although read by *Origen* (see Matthæi who condemns it), it is not the usual style for the N.T. [*Copt* is the same as Greek *MENTOI*]. We must rule it out, and again say it may show comparatively late handling.

29. — *μοι*. Only ff_2 of all authorities and one *boh* MS. Clearly ff_2 is the nearest to us in the actual recension.

Jo. iv. 36. *ζων* (*pro ζωην*). No support. Must have misread *vivam* for *vitam* in the Lat (or transliterated *copt*).

40. *ηρωτουν* (*pro ηρωτων*). *ηρωτον* Evst. 257. Rogabant *a* ? *b d r* (δ), and cf. *boh syr*. Other Greeks all with *text. rec.* except 248 : *ηρωτησαν*.

45. + *τοις*. Retranslation. *Latt*: "in hierosolymis," and *sah EN ΘΙΕΡΟΥCΑΛΗΜ*, *not boh EN* $\overline{\text{ΙΑΗΜ}}$, and so D *d q*.

Ibid. — *αυτοι*. *Cyr*.

47. *ηκεν* (*pro ηκει*). No Greeks. *Latt* = venit or advenit (*sah*, *ει*), some adveniret or advenerat, etc.

48. — *ο prim. ante ιησους* = *Lat.* and *sah* $\overline{\text{IC}}$.

51. *υπηντησεν αυτω οι δουλοι*. *Latin* order of *d e r* and *Chrys*, not *copt*.

52. — *αυτω*. *Sah*, *Dimma*, and *a b* only and one *Chrys*. codex *π*; *ei* fell out before *heri*, no doubt.

v. 2. *τη επιλεγομενη*. No support. (Cf. ℵ* and *sah*, however.) Retransl.

7. *εν οσω*. Cf. *e* and *sah*. And see *Δ*, where *ΕΓΩ* might be almost read *OCΩ*.

H. C. Hoskier.

(*To be continued.*)

RAISE THE STONE: CLEAVE THE WOOD.

A Study of an Oxyrhynchus Logion.

In his *New Light on the New Testament* [1] Adolf Deissmann, my friend and former teacher, has a paragraph which for its truth and picturesqueness has haunted my memory. "Leaving the Epistle to the Hebrews out of account," he writes, "we must say, as the result of a comparison of the New Testament with the contemporary non-literary texts, that the New Testament is the people's book. When Luther, therefore, took the New Testament from the learned and gave it to the people, we can only regard him as restoring what was the people's own. And when at some tiny cottage window, behind the fuchsias and geraniums, we see an old dame bending over the open Testament, there the old Book has found a place to which by right of its nature it belongs. Or when a Red Cross sister finds a Japanese Testament in the knapsack of a wounded Japanese, here, too, the surroundings are appropriate. . . . Time has transformed the Book of the People into the Book of Humanity. . . . Because the New Testament came from the unexhausted forces below, and not from the feeble resigned culture of a worn-out upper class—for this reason alone was it able to become the Book of Humanity. Thus from the simple writings on stone, papyrus and clay that unfold to us the nature of the language of the New Testament and at the same time reveal the peculiar characteristic of the Book there streams a flood of light on the fate of the Sacred Volume in the history of the world: the New

[1] P. 46 f.

Testament became the Book of the Peoples because it was first the Book of the People."

It is a pleasure to me to quote these haunting sentences not only because of their arresting truth and picturesqueness, nor yet because they were written by a distinguished friend who combines very remarkably the rigour and precision of the scientist with that intimacy with the life of the toiling masses which is instinctive in a true pastor and native in a true pastor's son. When I first knew him as a professor in the old University of Heidelberg, with a little lecture-room near the sky and a reputation rising rapidly, Adolf Deissmann had been delivering a series of Christian addresses to working men in the neighbour manufacturing town of Mannheim. To ask him about the work, to watch his quiet enthusiasm as he told of it, and to run one's eye over the teeming contents of his *Zettelkasten*, the box in which workmen were encouraged to place their written questions to the lecturer on points of religious difficulty, was to have a British student's notions of the fundamental bookishness of German scholarship rudely shaken. And in later years, long after those lecture-hours in which he made the Epistles to the Corinthians live again even for students who were sweltering under the heat of a Heidelberg summer afternoon, it was no surprise to me to learn that my old teacher had taken the first opportunity of adding to his equipment as an exegete of the Pauline letters the inestimable privilege of a lengthy journey in the Apostle's footsteps.

I have quoted his words because the principle underlying them, for whose universal recognition among scholars of the New Testament he has done so much, received illustration in an English layman's unpremeditated and unconscious contribution to the solution of a problem which has engaged and perplexed the ablest scholars in Germany,

France, and Britain and America. I feel sure the illustration will appeal to him, and I venture to think the solution will commend itself as adequate and final. If the Bible is a book from the people for the people, if the sayings of our Lord were uttered in the ears of simple men and women in their native language and vocabulary, it need not surprise us that occasionally the secret of their original meaning and force should betray itself to men devoid of academic scholarship. What is hid from the specialist by his very books may be revealed to the "babes and sucklings" of religious insight, the "little ones" of whom, like their Master, it may be said, *πῶς οὗτος γράμματα οἶδε, μὴ μεμαθηκώς*;

I vividly recall the day on which the little brochure of Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt, *ΛΟΓΙΑ ΙΗΣΟΥ*, *Sayings of our Lord*, published in 1897, first appeared in the Edinburgh bookshops. My father, John Green Curtis, though apart from English etymology he knew no Greek and had missed a University education, was one of its first purchasers. He brought me the copy and I had to read it to him, Greek and all, that very evening. All the Sayings interested him intensely, as everything bearing upon the Bible and its central Figure always did. But at once his quick mind fastened instinctively upon the hardest of them, and I had scarcely finished reading it to him when its explanation rose to his lips. He is no longer with us to demur to my writing about him, or to deprecate my placing him among the doctors, though it would have reassured him to be able to lean on Professor Deissmann's unconventional arm. Far more than any other mind I have known, his intuitions as an interpreter of Holy Writ have reminded me again and again of the old Alexandrine scholars, whose pages he delighted to read over my shoulder as I sat at work upon them. The natural affinity of his mind to theirs was, I

dare say, a real advantage to him as an amateur diviner of the sense of those Egyptian Agrapha.

It was the Fifth of the Oxyrhynchus Logia. As it was first published, with its editors' suggested restorations of missing letters, it ran as follows.

[λεγ]ει ['Ιησοῦς, ὅπ]ου ἐὰν ὦσιν [. . . .]ε[. . .] . . θεοι καὶ]. .]σο . ε[. .] ἐστιν μόνος [. .]τω ἐγώ εἰμι μετ' αὐτ[ου]· ἔγει[ρ]ον τὸν λίθον κἀκεῖ εὑρήσεις με, σχίσον τὸ ξύλον κἀγὼ ἐκεῖ εἰμί.

"Jesus saith, Wherever there are . . . and there is one . . . alone, I am with him. Raise the stone and there thou shalt find me, cleave the wood and there am I."

In the following year, in 1898, when Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt republished it in the first volume of their *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, their text had been improved through the eager discussion which its appearance had evoked among the most eminent critics in Europe, and their original notes in explanation had been supplemented by the acumen of scholars like Harnack, Blass, Sanday and Lock. They say: [1] "The difficulties of the fifth Saying have not yet been surmounted. Of the numerous restorations of the three mutilated lines we on the whole prefer that of Blass, [λέγ]ει ['Ιησοῦς ὅπ]ου ἐὰν ὦσιν [$\overline{\beta}$, οὐκ] ε[ἰσι]ν ἄθεοι· καὶ [ὅ]που ε[ἷς] ἐστιν μόνος, [λέ]γω, ἐγώ εἰμι μετ' αὐτ[οῦ] . . . With regard to the last part of the Saying 'Raise the stone,' etc., we do not think that the pantheistic meaning is in itself either probable or relevant to the context, though it might have been imported into it at a later period when the original meaning had been lost sight of. We incline to the view that raising the stone and cleaving the wood are meant to typify the difficult work of life, see Heinrici (*Theol. Literaturzeitung*, Aug. 21, 1897); but we are of opinion that the reference to Ecclesiastes x. 9 (*Whoso heweth out stones shall be hurt therewith; and he that cleaveth wood is*

[1] P. 2.

endangered thereby), in which Professors Swete and Harnack find the key to the problem, raises difficulties greater than those it can solve. The objections to it have been excellently stated by Lock (*Two Lectures on the 'Sayings of Jesus,'* by Professors Lock and Sanday, p. 24, Oxf., Clarendon Press, 1897)."

In this later form, as restored by Blass, the Logion reads thus:

"Jesus saith, Wheresoever there are two, they are not without God, and where there is one alone, I say, I am with him. Raise the stone, and there thou shalt find me; cleave the wood, and I am there."

Obviously the one parallel passage in the Gospels is Matthew xviii. 20, *οὗ γάρ εἰσι δύο ἢ τρεῖς συνηγμένοι εἰς τὸ ἐμὸν ὄνομα, ἐκεῖ εἰμὶ ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν*, "For where there are two or three gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them." But concerning the precise relation of the two sayings to each other there has been no agreement. Before I discuss that relationship let me suggest one or two notes upon the parallel in Matthew. In the Revised Version it closes a short and difficult paragraph, verses 15–20. 15. *And if thy brother sin against thee, go, show him his fault between thee and him alone: if he hear thee thou hast gained thy brother.* 16. *But if he hear thee not take with thee one or two more, that at the mouth of two witnesses or three every word may be established.* 17. *And if he refuse to hear them tell it unto the congregation: and if he refuse to hear the congregation also, let him be unto thee as the Gentile and the publican.* 18. *Verily I say unto you, what things soever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and what things soever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.* 19. *Again I say unto you, that if two of you shall agree on earth as touching anything that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my Father which is in heaven.* 20. *For*

where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them. The paragraph may be composite, a compilation in the Matthæan manner of at least two sayings having a topical or verbal connexion. But the function of the *congregation* in Christian life, the special power and privilege of the *two or three* met in the Master's name, is the common theme. The congregation, in a capacity distinct from the individual's, may effect reconciliation between the estranged, may exercise discipline through excommunication, may unite in prayer with increased assurance, and may count upon the presence of the Lord at their worship. As one thinks of our Lord's own attitude to Gentiles and publicans one winces a little under the doctrine of excommunication in verse 17, and it is not difficult to realise how grave have been the ecclesiastical abuses which have taken shelter under verse 18. But if verses 16–18 have been thus construed in favour of ecclesiastical abuses, verses 19 and 20 have lent themselves to devotional abuse. They have been construed, in ancient times and now, as if efficacy resided in numbers, as if two persons engaged in prayer commanded a thaumaturgical power denied to the individual. It has long been my impression that whereas in verses 15–18 the two or three stand in contrast with the one, as in the verse of Deuteronomy xix. 15, to which they refer back, *One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity . . . : at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses. shall a matter be established,* in verses 19–20, on the other hand, that contrast is no longer essential. It is now the congregation as such, however small, that receives a promise. Is the believing prayer granted to the praying many and refused to the praying solitary ? Is the Lord present only with the two or three met in His name, and distant from the one whose unaccompanied voice ascends to Him ? The Logion would guard

against any such abuse of the utterance, by adding *and where there is one alone, I say, I am with him.* One with Christ at worship is a congregation. None the less the saying in Matthew xviii. 20 contains a sublime promise addressed to the Christian congregation, to Christians, however few, *met for worship.* The term *συνηγμένοι*, corresponding as it does to *συναγωγή*, and the phrase *εἰς τὸ ἐμὸν ὄνομα*, recalling as it does the language of invocation in the Psalter, where the name of Jehovah is the object of adoration, define the "two or three" as *worshippers.* It is the worship, not the number, that secures the Presence.

Clearly, then, the first part of the Oxyrhynchus Logion paraphrases and expands the saying in Matthew. *Wheresoever there are two, they are not without God, and where there is one alone, I say, I am with him* corresponds intimately to *Where there are two or three gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.* But what of the rest of the Egyptian Logion, *Raise the stone and thou shalt find me, cleave the wood and I am there?*

As my father heard it read to him that evening in 1897 the answer came in a flash. At once he said: "It means, Raise thine altar, prepare thy faggot for the fire, and I am with thee." It is just a vivid finish to the earlier clauses. It says in striking yet familiar metaphor what they affirm less picturesquely. *The altar and the fuel are symbols of preparation for worship.* Erect, push into position (the true force of *ἐγείρω* is to raise from a recumbent or fallen position to an upright, not to lift up from the ground) the simple undressed stone, cleave the wood in readiness for the fire,—it is a figure of speech for disposing the heart to worship, using the barest essentials of the ancient rite of sacrifice to set forth the elements of the Christian's approach to his Lord. *Erect the stone and thou shalt find me, cleave the wood and I am there*;—there is no suggestion of panthe-

ism in the saying, no thought of Christ's indwelling in material nature, stock or stone. It is a presence with man, not a lurking in matter, that is proclaimed. Where there are two at worship, God is with them: where there is even only one, Christ is with him: let any man believing set up the altar in his heart and get the fuel ready for his offering of worship, and he will find his Lord at hand, Christ will be there.

It seems to me that this explanation, though something on the way to it has been dismissed by Harnack and by Lock as out of the question, fits exactly into all the requirements of the case. The context and the theme are shown by the Matthew saying to be *worship* in the name of Christ. Pre-Christian worship in Egypt as in Palestine called up to mind an altar and the wherewithal to make a fire for the consumption of the sacrifice. The New Religion which dismissed the altar and its smoking victim from the Temple kept and enhanced the altar and the fuel in the heart. I submit that the latter portion of the Logion thus interpreted is exactly in the manner of Egyptian Christian language and thought. The interpretation is neither obvious nor far-fetched. Every reader of Clement and Origen whose language and style are closely akin to the Logia, knows that, as Biblical interpreters, at their best they are neither the one nor the other. It keeps the true force of the imperative verbs, instead of weakening them into mere conditionals. And the interpretation is not out of harmony with the character of the other Logia, nor with their relation to the Gospel parallels or prototypes.

Against a crude and literal form of this interpretation Professor Harnack sets just two sentences [1]: "It is certainly misleading, but only misleading, that ἔγειρον may also be understood in a ritual sense. But no one can think

[1] Expositor, 1897, vol. vi. p. 335.

of the splitting of wood for a sacrifice; we should in that case moreover be dealing with acts of heathen worship." The very opposite is true. The ritual sense of ἔγειρον is profoundly natural since worship is the theme. The splitting of wood for sacrificial fire was a familiar and everyday act, and it was as familiar to Jewish as to "heathen" worship, that very fact making it suitable for use in an Egyptian Christian Logion. Jewish and heathen forms of ritual were precisely the proper sources for metaphorical material to illustrate Christian truth. Professor Lock contents himself with saying [1]: "But the illustrations of this come from patriarchal times, before the days of the fixed altar in the Temple, and again the plural would be more natural than the singular." For readers of the Old Testament, whether born Jews or proselytes, the patriarchal altar was as familiar as the fixed, and as natural a symbol. In the present context it alone was relevant, since it is the "one alone" whose worship, *anywhere*, without a congregation, is here assured of the presence of Christ. Dr. E. A. Abbott,[2] founding on Septuagint usage, objects that ξύλον ought not to have the definite article if it is to mean *wood* as distinct from *tree*, but the definite article is as appropriate to it as to λίθον, since it is *the* wood, *the* stone, of the sacrifice, that is signified. His objection would be fatal to all interpretations which see in the phrase *cleave the wood* only a description of a carpenter's common work or the like, as if it ran *cleave wood*; it lends a strong confirmation to the view which I have urged.

Of the alternative interpretions of this striking Logion which scholarship has advanced the following are the most noteworthy.

[1] *Two Lectures on the "Sayings of Jesus,"* by Professors Lock and Sanday, Oxford, 1897, p. 25.

[2] *Amer. Jrn. Theol.*, Jan. 1898, p. 15.

(i) Professor Harnack[1] understands *raise the stone* and *cleave the tree* to be simple types of manual labour, quarrying and wood-work, and emphasises the word *alone* in *where there is one alone* as signifying separation from the world. "It is a profound sentence and a valuable parallel, though differently applied, to the evangelic promises of Christ's presence: 'I am with you always,' 'I will not leave you orphans.'" "The sense is: If only a man is truly alone, that is, separated from the world, then Christ is as surely with him as those objects are to which his daily toil is applied. It is just in his earthly drudgery that a man will find Christ as certainly as he has stone and wood before him." "It is not the union of Christ with wood or stone that is expressed, but the union of Christ with the believer." "The explanation . . . excludes every interpretation which regards the stone-lifting and the wood-hewing as anything else than the rough and solitary labour of the day. Was not the Speaker Himself a carpenter and the son of a carpenter? Is He not here speaking out of His own experience of God's nearness, which He had discerned as a living presence during His own work as carpenter, as real as the objects of His toil? . . . The blessing does not lie in the work itself; and yet the saying is a protest against the idea that the nearness of God is a fact for, and to be discerned by, those only who are engaged in fasting, prayer and meditation. No; God is also present at the daily task, but only then when the disciple is actually μόνος—that is, separated from the world."

But this explanation, attractive as it is in itself, is impossible. It abandons the guiding thought of *worship*, and imports a thought foreign to the context. It gives a forced meaning to μόνος, and a loose meaning to ἐκεῖ. ἔγειρον τὸν λίθον cannot mean "quarry stone," nor can σχίσον τὸ

[1] Expositor, loc. cit.

ξύλον mean "work wood." It would be better to explain the labour as the clearing of ground for a garden or a vineyard, cutting down the trees or stumps, clearing the stones or building retaining walls or surrounding walls: but that is still far from satisfactory. In Ecclesiastes x. 9, ἐξαίρων λίθους διαπονηθήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς, σχίζων ξύλα κινδυνεύσει ἐν αὐτοῖς, the parallel noted by Professor Swete and by Dr. Lisco, and commended by Professor Harnack also, as the clue to the Logion, ἐξαίρω is a very different word from ἐγείρω, and λίθους and ξύλα are, true to Greek idiom, plural. Tempting though it is to link the Logion to that passage, and especially since there it is Wisdom, twin term with Logos, that is set forth as assisting the hewer of stone or wood, "profitable to direct" the workman's hand, and "better than strength," yet the settings of the two sayings are dissimilar, and a knowledge of the earlier could hardly be taken for granted in readers of the later.

(ii) A variant of Professor Harnack's interpretation, suggested by the last sentence, would take *raise the stone* and *cleave the tree*, as in Ecclesiastes x. 9, as types of labour, whatever they precisely mean, and would represent the promised presence of Christ as that assistance of the Logos or Divine Wisdom which gives skill and ability, *direction*, to the hand that wields the tool. But the same objections stand in the way.

(iii) Professor Swete,[1] unlike Professor Harnack, prefers an allegorical meaning for the words. The stone and the wood figure the spiritual building-material of the Church. "The wisdom of God pledges Himself to be with the Christian builder, and never more so than when he builds alone and with labour and peril." But this explanation lies under the same disabilities, and is obscurer still

(iv) The view favoured by Professors Lock and Sanday

[1] *Ap.* Lock and Sanday, *op. cit.* p. 24.

and by many others finds in the Logion an assertion of Christ's universal presence in Nature. "Lift yonder stone, and thou shalt find me; cleave yonder piece of wood, and I am there." "In all forms of human life I am present; yea, and under inanimate creation you will find me." The thought is compared with the Prologue to the Gospel according to John, with Ephesians i. 23 (*τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσι πληρουμένου*), and with Psalm cxxxix. 7, 8 (*Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?* etc.). But it is a descent to pass from Christ's presence with worshipping believers to His presence with inanimate Nature. The immanence of the Divine Logos in nature, His omnipresence on earth, is not a thought foreign to the New Testament, but even the Fourth Gospel does not attribute it to Christ's own lips. It seems much simpler to construe the stone and the wood as symbols of preparation for worship or prayer, and thus link them without anticlimax to the *wheresoever* of common or individual worship with which the Logion opens. Not in nor under the stock and the stone, but with the believer who handles them, is Christ's presence affirmed. Still less, of course, is there any thought of a pantheistic identification of Christ as God with the wood or stone.

(v) Not a few scholars, and among them the first editors, Dr. James and Professor Harnack, have suggested as a possible explanation that the emphasis rests on the *raise* and the *cleave*. One must leave no stone unturned, as we say, to find Christ,—but it is surely pointless and unnatural to add "no stick uncleft." As Dr. Lock says, even if this meaning suited the first part of the Logion, which it does not, it does not suit the word *ἐκεῖ* and it would require *πάντα λίθον* rather than *λίθον* alone. On this view the saying would be parallel to Matthew vii. 7 (*Ask and it shall be given you*), and "intended to teach the effort required

in order to find Christ."[1] But clearly effort is the last thing suitable to the context. The presence of Jesus is promised; to meet in His name, to turn towards Him in worship even when alone, is enough to secure it.

(vi) It is sufficient simply to mention the view of Mr. W. E. Barnes that the saying is from a post-resurrection standpoint, and that the stone is the sepulchre, and the wood the cross. "Wherever you are, together or alone, I am with you; and whatever happens, my burial or crucifixion, I am there. Lift up the stone of the tomb and you will find me alive; pierce through the cross and you will find me there too." Something far simpler is required.

(vii) Dr. Charles Taylor, Master of St. John's College, Cambridge, in an interesting discussion of the Logia[2] gives an explanation which approximates to Professor Harnack's but has features all its own. Raising the stone and cleaving the wood are types of everyday labour. "If the work be taken to be a typical form of manual labour, the sense will be that Jesus is present with the disciple who is, by force of circumstances, cut off from the congregation, and from directly religious occupations and service. Thus the saying would strikingly supplement His assurance of His presence with those engaged in preaching His Gospel or assembled in His name, while giving the closest connexion between the second part of the Logion and the words next before it in the first part."

Ingenious, attractive and valuable these interpretations certainly are; they form in themselves an impressive tribute to the suggestiveness and depth of the Logion. But I venture to urge that, in naturalness, in inherent fitness, in justice to the words ἔγειρον, ἐκεῖ and τὸν λίθον, in close adherence to the thought of the Gospel original in Matthew

[1] Harnack, *op. cit.* p. 334.

[2] *The Oxyrh. Logia and the Apocr. Gospels*, Oxford, 1899, p. 52.

xviii. 20, and in maintenance of the consistency and homogeneity of the Logion as a whole, they do not bear comparison with the explanation I have advocated. As I have said, that explanation is not my own, but it laid hold upon me long ago, and it has kept its hold. Nothing that I have read has weakened its appeal to me. If it throws a ray of fresh light upon an ancient saying, the reproach is mine that it has been kept so long under a bushel.

WILLIAM A. CURTIS.

THE DIVINE NAMES IN GENESIS.

III. RECENSIONS OF THE SEPTUAGINT.

IN support of his contention that the divine names are a variable element in the textual tradition, Dahse naturally attaches great importance to various recensions of the Greek and Hebrew text which he claims to have discovered, and in which he thinks the names were deliberately altered under the influence of certain recognisable tendencies. Two such recensions we have already had before us: one the assumed Hebrew basis of the LXX, whose existence I have shown to be highly problematical, and the other the Massoretic text itself. To these he now adds two more, which he identifies first of all in the *Greek* text of two groups of MSS. of the LXX. If he had stopped short at this point it would hardly have been necessary to examine his argument very minutely. But he endeavours to prove that each of these groups "goes back" to a recension of the *Hebrew* text, which may have an authority equal to or even greater than the Massoretic recension; and that is a position which evidently requires very careful consideration. In order to put the reader abreast of the discussion, I will again commence with some explanatory observations.

1. The word "recension," as used by Dahse, is somewhat ambiguous. In its strict sense it denotes a text established by a systematic revision according to certain critical principles consciously adopted and applied by the editor. Three such recensions of the LXX are known to have been produced in the end of the third and beginning of the fourth century, by Origen, Lucian and Hesychius. Of these the most important and the best understood is that of Origen (the Hexapla). Its character, and the critical lines on which its author proceeded, are sufficiently known from statements of Origen himself, of Jerome and of other patristic writers; and its text is preserved in a number of codices which can be recognised as Hexaplaric by unmistakeable external indications. As to the Lucianic and Hesychian recensions there is no reliable tradition beyond the bare facts that they existed, and that at one time they circulated in specified geographical areas. Their text has been lost sight of in the general stream of MS. transmission, and can only be recovered by investigations which are amongst the most delicate and precarious processes of LXX criticism; while the principles that guided their editors are matter for conjecture based on the characteristics of the text thus provisionally ascertained. It is true that some progress has been made in the identification of a certain type of MS. text as Lucianic for a limited number of Old Testament books; but as regards the Hesychian recension only the most tentative steps have as yet been taken towards the recognition and characterisation of its text. Now the recensions to which Dahse here introduces us stand on an entirely different footing. They are *hypothetical* recensions, about which we have no historical information, their existence being merely inferred from the typical textual features observed in particular groups of Greek MSS. No exception need be taken to the use of the term "recension" for a

typical text of this kind, provided the problematical character of the revision be clearly kept in view. It must be understood that the discovery of a family likeness in a MS. group does not warrant the inference that we have to do with a recension of the same kind as, say, that of Origen. All that we are entitled to conclude is that the MSS. in question have transmitted the peculiarities of some earlier single codex (called the "archetype" of the group) which may itself have perished. Whether the archetype embodied a deliberate revision of the text, or whether its distinctive readings were merely accidental, is a separate question, which can only be answered, if it can be answered at all, by a demonstration that the text has been treated in accordance with definite canons, implying a conscious purpose of revision. That demonstration, as regards the divine names, Dahse of course attempts to give; but it is clear that he has failed to grasp the significance of the distinction which I have just pointed out. In previous publications [1] he has sought to identify his two recensions, **egj** and **fir** (see below), with those respectively of Hesychius and Lucian; and he still holds to this opinion [2] in spite of weighty arguments to the contrary advanced by Hautsch [3] and others. It is an arguable position. But there is a curious argument on p. 153 (cf. p. 113) of the work before us which shows how little he is prepared to realise the wide difference between his recensions and the three great historical recensions of which we have knowledge. It had been urged against his identifications that **fir** is more likely to represent the Hesychian recension than the Lucianic. To this Dahse replies

[1] *Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft*, 1908, pp. 18 ff, 164.

[2] *Ibid.*, 1910, p. 281 ff.

[3] *Mitteilungen des Sept.-Unternehmens.* I. *Der Lukiantext des Oktateuch*, p. 4 f. Comp. Moore, *American Journal of Sem. Literature*, Oct., 1912, p. 37 ff.

pertinently enough that the Armenian version, which cannot be supposed to have any connexion with Hesychius, has frequent agreements with **fir**. The instructive thing, however, is that he regards this as a confirmation of his view that **fir** is Lucianic. He is blind to the possibility that it may be something different from both, and much less important than either. When a scholar like Dahse deals with the affiliation of LXX MSS. his opinion is that of an expert, and it might be presumptuous for me to question it. Nevertheless it is the truth that, while his grouping of the MSS. has been accepted by other workers in the same field, his identifications of the groups with the historical recensions have met with no support. Professor G. F. Moore, of Andover, who speaks on this subject with an authority second to that of no living scholar, says in the article referred to above that Dahse "has attempted a classification of the codices in Genesis on a very slender basis, and the identification of his groups on a still slenderer one."

2. In the second place, it is obvious that the establishment of internal Septuagintal recensions, of however comprehensive a character, does not bring us any nearer a proof of the variability of the divine names in the general transmission of the text. It may prove that certain editors of the LXX manipulated the names with great freedom; but that only tends to weaken confidence in the LXX text as a whole, without affecting the stability of the Hebrew tradition which has hitherto been all but universally accepted by commentators and critics of all schools. It is therefore essential to Dahse's argument to show that behind the Greek recensions postulated by him there lie recensions of the Hebrew text, in which the divine names were handled with the same freedom and on the same principles as are found in the families of Greek MSS. which are supposed to

reflect their characteristics. That step also Dahse takes with full assurance. But it is a step on which a judgment may be formed by any one with a competent knowledge of the textual history of the Old Testament, even if he lack the technical training acquired in the minute comparison of LXX MSS.

These, then, are the two points on which attention must be mainly concentrated in what now follows: (1) We must inquire whether there is sufficient evidence that the hypothetical Greek recensions observe recognisable principles in their treatment of the divine names; and (2) we must examine very carefully the reasons assigned for postulating a Hebrew recension behind the Greek. We approach these questions with an open mind, though perhaps with more circumspection than Dahse thinks called for in the circumstances.

But before coming to that, we must look at a very valuable chapter of the book, in which Dahse discusses the influence on the divine names of Origen's Hexapla—a recension about which, as we have seen, there is nothing hypothetical, but one whose importance for the study of the LXX text can hardly be overrated.

1. *The Hexapla of Origen.*

The importance of the Hexapla depends mainly on two facts. In the first place, its influence on the current text of the LXX has been very pervasive. All our extant Greek MSS. are of later date than the time of Origen; and there are few of them, if any, that have wholly escaped the impress of his recension. Some of the most important codices are distinctly Hexaplaric, and most others, even when their fundamental text is different from the Hexapla, exhibit traces of its peculiar readings. But secondly, it is

known that the aim and tendency of Origen's critical work was to assimilate the Greek text to the Massoretic. He did not, indeed, wish to lower the authority of the LXX, which was the accepted canon of the Christian Church in his time; but he sought to indicate the "Hebrew verity" in a way that would be intelligible to a student of his recension. Accordingly, where the LXX differed from the Hebrew he did not venture as a rule on a simple alteration of the Greek; but he gained his end by the use of two critical signs: one (the *obelus* ÷) to mark a word or phrase in the LXX which was not in the Hebrew, and the other (the *asterisk* *) to signify an addition made by Origen to bring it into harmony with the Hebrew. When the LXX differed from the Hebrew, not by a simple *plus* or *minus*, but by having a variant text, Origen did not follow any consistent rule, but *sometimes* he used both asterisk and obelus to show that one phrase was to be deleted and the other substituted for it: that is, if one wished to read according to the Hebrew. Thus, to take a simple illustration from the divine names: if Origen found in the LXX ο θεος where the Hebrew had κυριος he would obelise ο θεος and insert κυριος with the asterisk, thus: * κυριος' ÷ο θεος', showing at a glance what the exact reading of each text was. Now there is a large number of MSS. which Dahse happily designates "crypto-hexaplaric," in which the text of the Hexapla is preserved, but the signs are omitted: hence the reading *κυριος÷ο θεος appears in them as the compound name κυριος ο θεος. And that is only a particular example of a process of accommodation which has affected the transmission of the LXX text to an indefinite extent; and through the far-spread influence of the Hexapla has introduced into the MSS. a degree of conformity to the Hebrew which has greatly obscured

the original character of that version.[1] There is thus a certain danger that owing to the influence of the Hexapla the ordinary text of the LXX may exhibit, in its use of the divine names, a closer agreement with the MT than the earlier LXX did.

Now on this point I have found a perusal of Dahse's chapter immensely reassuring. He discusses in all about forty-four readings out of some 320 divine names in Genesis. In the great majority of cases the Hexaplaric influence appears in the conflate reading κυριος ο θεος which is found in different MS. groups. Dahse clearly shows that in several instances this reading arises through copying the Hexapla with omission of the critical signs, in the way illustrated above; and of course in all such cases the presumption is that the name which *differs* from the MT represents the original LXX. If we may assume that the examination is fairly exhaustive of the traces of Origen's work in the divine names (and I see no reason to suppose otherwise) the influence of the Hexapla has been much more restricted than might have been expected. But we can go much further than this. After all, it is of little interest to us in the present controversy to know that the effect of Origen's work can be traced in this or that MS. or group of MSS., or in this or that secondary version. The real practical question is how far it has affected what may be called the standard text of the LXX, as represented say by the Cambridge

[1] It may be mentioned in passing that Dahse tries to show that the Hebrew used by Origen differed in one or two instances from our Massoretic text. If the difference could be proved in several cases, it would certainly be an important fact; but it would not prove that Origen's Hebrew text was independent of the Massoretic. It might only mean that he relied on a carelessly written MS. of that text. That he followed a *recension* different from the Massoretic, or even a text materially at variance with it, is a position which I do not think any authority on the LXX would maintain.

Septuagint, which always follows the best available uncial. Not, be it observed, because that uncial is necessarily the best witness to the original text of the LXX ; but because the edition affords a convenient standard of primary reference in all comparisons of the various types of text. Or, coming nearer home, the question is whether the statistics given in the synopsis in my last article are vitiated by uncertainty as to the extent to which the readings there adopted have been assimilated to the MT through Hexaplaric influence. And here Dahse's results are still more reassuring. He examines only twenty-four readings [1] in chaps. xii.-l., and in sixteen cases he decides in accordance with the standard LXX. Only in seven or at most eight cases does he prefer another reading : viz. in xiii. 4 (?) xv. 4, xvi. 11, xviii. 1, xviii. 14, xxi. 4, xxiv. 40 (?), xxvii. 20. I am bound to say deliberately that in my opinion the reasons given for the preference are in every instance (except xvi. 11) of negligible value ; but even if we accept them all the difference is inappreciable. Moreover the eight passages were all noted in the third line (or in the footnotes) of the tables in the article referred to. It would appear, therefore, that no misgiving need be entertained as to the possible effect of the Hexapla in invalidating the argument already advanced against the pericope-hypothesis. With that satisfactory finding our present interest in the Hexapla of Origen ceases.

2. *The Recension* egj.

We come now to a group of MSS., bearing evidence of descent from a common archetype, which Dahse identifies with the Hesychian recension. The leading representatives

[1] xii. 17 ; xiii. 4, 10, 13, 14 ; xv. 4, 7 ; xviii. 1, 14 ; xix. 16b,c ; xx. 11 ; xxi. 2, 4, 6 ; xxiv. 40 ; xxv. 21b ; xxvii. 20 ; xxix. 31, 32, 33 ; xxx. 30 ; xxxviii. 7b, 10a.

of the group are three cursives, dating from the tenth to the fourteenth century, whose symbols in the apparatus of the Cambridge LXX are the letters **e, g** and **j**. The main stock of the recensions we are told is **ej** ; **g** frequently parting company with these two. But there is also a considerable number of MSS., more or less closely affiliated with the group, which can be used by an expert critic to ascertain the distinctive readings of the lost archetype. With regard to these, and the general character of the recension, we get no information in the volume before us ; but are referred to an earlier paper of Dahse's in the *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* for 1908 (p. 13 ff.). It will be seen how impossible it is for any one who has not minutely worked over the whole ground to control or verify the readings assigned by Dahse to this recension, and I frankly confess my inability to do so. For my present purpose it will be sufficient if I accept provisionally his determination of the text of the recension. Needless to say, however, I am not prepared to extend even a provisional confidence to all the conclusions which he deduces from the data I shall assume him to have established.

1. Let us inquire, then, in the first place, what are the characteristic tendencies of the recension in regard to the use of the divine names. We read (p. 107) that in our recension the tendency is observable " to use only one and the same name for God in one section." Two readings (iv. 5 and vi. 3) are expressly excluded on account of their uncertainty ; and then we get lists of cases where (1) κυριος ο θεος, (2) κυριος and (3) ο θεος occur in accordance with this principle of assimilation. (1) κυριος ο θεος is quoted as characteristic of the recension in ten passages : iii. 1b, iii. 11, iv. 13, vi. 13, vi. 22, ix. 17, x. 9a, x. 9b, xiii. 4, xvi. 7. But in iv. 13, vi. 13, vi. 22, x. 9a, b, xvi. 7 the double name is the reading of the general text of the LXX (in iv. 13, vi.

13, x. 9b, xiii. 4, *perhaps* vi. 22, it seems clearly Hexaplaric), so that from these instances nothing can be inferred as to the *special* tendencies of **egj**. Hence there remain only three clear cases (iii. 1b, iii. 11, ix. 17) to support Dahse's sweeping generalisation. Then what is meant by a "section" (*Abschnitt*)? It cannot be a Seder, for in Seder 2 (ii. 4–iii. 21) ο θεος occurs no fewer than six times in our recension (ii. 4b, ii. ix., ii. 19, ii. 21, iii. 3, iii. 5), while Dahse himself only cites two cases of κυριος ο θεος (iii. 1b, 11) as *characteristic* of it. In Seder 3 (iii. 22–iv. 26) against one case cited (and that *not* distinctive) of κυριος ο θεος (iv. 13) we have ο θεος five times (iv. 1, iv. 4, iv. 10, iv. 16, iv. 25) and κυριος once (iv. 3). We need proceed no further on *that* trail. Perhaps Dahse's real meaning is better expressed by the vaguer phrase "in the same context" (p. 107). He says (p. 106) that "between vi. 12 and vii. 1 ο θεος never occurs alone in **ej**, but only κυριος ο θεος." Considering that between vi. 12 and vii. 1 the divine name occurs only twice (vi. 13, 22), and that in vi. 22 κυριος ο θεος is the common reading of the LXX (as also in vi. 12, vii. 1), it does not seem a very impressive exhibition of consistency that *once* (vi. 13) **ej**, *following the Hexapla*, reads the double name. Again, "a solitary κυριος appears in the group only once (iv. 3) in the first ten chapters of Genesis." And how often does the reader imagine that (ο) κυριος occurs alone in these ten chapters in the standard text of the LXX? Just three times (iv. 3, iv. 13, x. 9b),[1] and in the last two of these the double name is probably Hexaplaric, and is at any rate the most prevalent LXX reading. So much for κυριος ο θεος. We are invited further to find illustrations of the tendency (2) in the κυριος of xii.

[1] Dahse (p. 38) omits iv. 13, but adds viii. 20. The truth is that both in iv. 13 and viii. 20 the reading is very weakly attested. See the Note on ο κυριος readings at the close of this article.

17, xix. 29a, b, and (3) in the *ο θεος* of viii. 20, xv. 4, xx. 18. (2) It is true that in xii. 17 the group changes *ο θεος* into *κυριος* between two readings of *κυριος* (xii. 8 and xiii. 4) and similarly in xix. 29b; but in xix. 29a the *κυριος* is common to all MSS. of the LXX except 9 (E omits). In this last case the change does bring about a uniform use of *κυριος* throughout a whole Seder; but apart from xix. 29b the uniformity exists already in the LXX: in xii. 17 no such consistency results, *ο θεος* remaining in xiii. 10a, b, 13, 14. (3) On viii. 20, we read (p. 104), "the MT after three times אלהים (viii. 1a, 1b, 15) has in v. 20 יהוה, which our group changes to *ο θεος*." True, but our group in viii. 15 has *not ο θεος* but (in common with the entire LXX except one MS.) *κυριος ο θεος*, which breaks the sequence. In xv. 4 Dahse holds, on the evidence of six cursives and the Old Latin, that no name stood after *φωνη* in the original LXX, that *κυριου* was inserted by the Hexapla (in spite of the fact that *του θεου* is read by two daughter versions of the LXX, the Armenian and Sahidic,[1] of which the former is strongly Hexaplaric), while egj with others insert *του θεου*. If we accept his view the name corresponds with the two which follow (*ο θεος*) and differs from the three which precede (*κυριος*): we see that whichever name was inserted it could not fail to agree with either the one or the other. In xx. 18 *κυριος* is changed to *ο θεος* in harmony with all the other names of Sed. 17. To the same effect we read (p. 104 f.) that in ix. 17 "members of our group have *κυριος ο θεος* following the double name in ix. 12, just as in iii. 11 between iii. 10 and iii. 13, and vi. 13, 22 between vi. 12 and vii. 1." This is true (but on vi. 13, 22 see above); but the next statement is misleading: "in xi. 5 begins in it (the recension) the *continuous* appearance of the solitary *κυριος*." In the very next verse (xi.

[1] Not the Ethiopic, as Dahse says.

6) **ej** have κυριος ο θεος; and although with that exception the reading κυριος is continuous to the end of Sed. 8 and throughout Sed. 9, the recension simply follows the main current of the LXX text.[1]

Dahse further calls attention to the fact that the group has important readings in v. 29, xx. 4, xxvi. 29, xxviii. 20, xviii. 27, xxxii. 9. In v. 29 its peculiarity is the addition of ημων to the κυριος ο θεος of the ordinary LXX, and I do not know in what its importance consists. In xx. 4 for the אדני of the MT the recension has κυριε ο θεος, which Dahse very arbitrarily holds to imply a double name יהוה אדני or אדני יהוה in the original. xxvi. 29 should have been mentioned as a glaring exception to the general tendency of the recension, inasmuch as it breaks a long sequence of κυριος by a solitary ο θεος: its supposed importance lies in the fact that in the speech of a heathen king, Abimelech, **egj** substitute *Elohim* for *Yahwe* of the MT and LXX. In xxviii. 20 the group preserves the κυριος (see above pp. 408,417) which Dahse regards as the reading of the original LXX (MT *Elohim*: LXX κυριος ο θεος). In xviii. 27 it omits in common with the great majority of LXX MSS.) after τον κυριον a μου which is read by the Bohairic and Sahidic versions and eight cursives. Dahse infers that it represents not אדני (MT) but יהוה in the Hebrew. If so, must we not conclude that the main text of the LXX does the same? Finally in xxxii. 9 the recension adds ο θεος to the κυριε (MT יהוה) of the ordinary LXX, to which however the MSS. present variants κυριε ο θεος μου, ο θεος and others. It should be stated that in xx. 4, xxviii. 20, xviii. 27 (also iii. 1b, vi. 13 (?) xviii. 31, xix. 29) there are variants in Hebrew MSS. which are thought to enhance the significance of our recension. To this subject we shall return presently.

It is difficult to form a clear judgment on these conflict-

[1] xi. 8, 9a, 9b; xii. 1, 4, 7a, 7b, 8a, 8b.

ing phenomena as evidencing a special tendency of the recension **egj**. In order to do so we should have first of all to isolate the group from the common text of the LXX, and then to understand how the influence of the Hexapla, which Dahse expressly emphasises, was brought to bear on the recension ; and in neither direction is Dahse's work helpful. I will state only two impressions. (1) It seems fair to say that this recension goes a little, but only a little, beyond the ordinary LXX in assimilating a name to those in the immediate context. I can recognise this leaning in at most seven passages (x. 9b, xii. 17, xv. 4, xviii. 27, xix. 29b, xx. 18, xxviii. 20b) ; but the opposite also occurs (xi. 6, xviii. 20, xxvi. 29). Here the question arises whether these instances are sufficient to prove deliberate purpose on the part of the author of the recension. It seems to me that they are adequately explained as unconscious adaptations to the nearest divine names. One cannot help wondering whether Dahse has ever considered this possibility. (2) The peculiarities of the recension in the use of the divine names are entirely explicable on the supposition that it originated within the sphere of the Greek text. In other words, apart from agreements with Hebrew MSS. (which we have yet to consider), there is nothing whatever to suggest that the changes are determined by reference to a Hebrew original different from that which lay behind the LXX. I do not admit that the addition of μου is a criterion for אדני as distinct from יהוה in the Hebrew (xviii. 27, xviii. 31, xx. 4): it can be naturally accounted for as an inner-Greek insertion suggested by the invariably vocative use of the word.[1]

[1] The ten cases (אדני in xviii. 3, 27, 30, 31, 32 ; xix. 2 (pl.) ; xix. 18 ; xx. 4 : אדני יהוה in xv. 2, 8), where אדני occurs in MT, are all literally or virtually vocatives ; and the μου is never found in the prevalent text of the LXX. But it occurs four times in Boh. and Sah. (xviii. 3, 27, 31 ; xix. 2) ; twice in Eth. (xviii. 3 ; xix. 18) ; and four times in a few cursives other than egj (xviii. 27, 31 ; xix. 2, 18). Dahse may of course maintain either

2. This brings us to the most important question of the supposed Hebrew basis of the recension **egj**. As we have seen, the proof of this is sought in agreements of the recension with a group of Hebrew MSS. With the general subject of variants in Hebrew MSS. I shall deal more fully in my next article: here it is only necessary to consider the coincidences between **egj** and the particular MSS. which are said to support it.

We may start from xx. 4, where nine MSS. of Kennicott (9, 81, 132, 150, 152, 199, 227, 239, 601) and five of De Rossi (419, 455, 507, 766, primo 248) read יהוה instead of MT אדני. Now it is certainly a most unusual thing to find a nest of Hebrew variants like this to any Massoretic reading of the divine name in Genesis. But it must be observed that it is just in the case of יהוה ‖ אדני that variations in Hebrew MSS. most frequently occur. The reason is not far to seek. אדני and יהוה were *pronounced* alike by later Jews (*Adonay*), and the scribe, whether writing from dictation or (according to a copyists' rule) pronouncing each word before setting it down, very readily confused the two names in writing. But curiously enough in xx. 4 the MSS. cited do *not* support **egj**, for **ej** read *κυριε ο θεος*, which, according to Dahse, implies an original אדני יהוה or יהוה אדני, while **g** (with all other MSS.) reads *κυριε*. That is not a very promising beginning for the theory of a Hebrew basis. But we must inquire further whether these nine MSS. of Kennicott form a true "group," as Dahse says they most assuredly do. The presence of nine men in a tavern on one occasion is scarcely presumptive evidence of a conspiracy, though if they are frequently found in company the suspicions of the law may be aroused.

(*a*) that the original LXX read יהוה in all these places, or (*b*) that the *μου* is original and has dropped out of the current text; but neither view is probable.

Now (1), so far as Dahse's tables inform us, no two of these nine MSS. are ever found together again leagued against the MT except in xv. 2, where 150, 152 read יהוה אלהים, for MT אדני יהוה,[1] and in xviii. 31 where 227, 239 read אדני for יהוה; and only in xviii. 31 (and there very doubtfully: see above) does **egj** support them. (2) Only two of them ever support **egj** even singly against MT anywhere: viz., 132 in iii. 1b, xviii. 27, and 199 in xix. 29a.[2] (3) Over against these three, or at most four, coincidences of **egj** with Hebrew MSS. differing from the MT, there are at least twenty-nine cases[3] where **e(g)j** differ from MT without any support from the group, and except in xxviii. 20b without any Hebrew support at all. If that be sufficient to prove that a recension "goes back" to a Hebrew original, textual criticism ceases to be an exact science.

There are some other matters that require clearing up. What is meant when it is said (p. 107) that the recension "goes back" to a Hebrew original? Dahse cannot possibly mean that it is a fresh translation from the original, though his words might convey that impression to an uninstructed reader. All that can be intended is a *correction* of the Greek text by comparison with the Hebrew recension in question, and we have seen how slight is the evidence

[1] Observe again that both these phrases were pronounced alike: *Adonay Elohim.*

[2] I exclude vi. 13 because I do not believe it is a genuine case. K152 there reads יה אלהים, and Dahse, following Wiener, takes the first word to be a shortened form of יהוה: this would agree with the κυριος ο θεος of **ej**. I have not seen the MS., but I have little doubt that the יה is a copyist's error: the scribe had begun to write יהוה, but after forming two letters he noticed that the right word was אלהים, which accordingly he wrote without removing the traces of his mistake. A similar confusion in K109 (on ch. xviii. 27) will be considered in my next article.

[3] iii. 11, iv. 13, v. 29, vi. 13, vi. 22, viii. 20, ix. 17, x. 9a, x. 9b, xi. 5, xi. 6, xiii. 4, xv. 4, xvi. 7, xviii. 13, xviii. 20, xviii. 22, xviii. 26, xix. 16a, xix. 29b, xx. 8 [xx. 18], xxi. 1a, xxi. 2, xxi. 4, xxi. 6, xxvi. 24a, xxvi. 29, xxviii. 20b. In xx. 18 **ej** agree with Sam.

that any such comparison was ever made. But supposing for the sake of argument that it did take place, a single Hebrew MS. would suffice for the purpose, and it is unlikely that the reviser will have used more. We should, therefore, in the assumed case have a parallel to what we have conceded as possible in the case of Origen's Hexapla : viz., the use of a MS. representing the Massoretic recension, but containing variations (such as virtually all MSS. contain) which might be either superior or inferior to our present Massoretic text. There is no occasion to call in the theory of an independent Hebrew recension.

Another point to be noticed is that on p. 107 Dahse puts this recension **egj** between the original of the LXX and the MT, implying that the hypothetical Hebrew basis of **egj** is older than the latter. But if it be older than the MT it must represent a distribution of the divine names older than the Samaritan Pentateuch ; and the first literary trace of it is in Greek codices of the tenth century. What likelihood is there that an unofficial recension should have retained its characteristic features in a recognisable degree of purity through twelve centuries of transmission in Hebrew and Greek MSS., especially in so variable an element of the text as Dahse supposes the divine names to be ?

3. *The Recension* fir.

These three MSS., assigned respectively to the 15th, the 11th and the 13th century, form the " groundstock " of a recension which, as we have seen, Dahse identifies with that of Lucian. We have also seen that this identification is considered by other scholars to rest on very precarious grounds. In the chapter now before us Dahse seeks to prove that the group represents an " Elohistic edition of Genesis " (p. 114) ; and we have to try and see how far that description is appropriate. The statistics

given below[1] are based on Dahse's examination, and are at least approximately correct. It will be seen that in about half the passages examined the recension agrees with the common reading of the LXX. Although we must not assume in argument that the prevalent form of the LXX is older than the recension, it is at the same time impossible to investigate the peculiarities of a particular recension otherwise than by comparison with the general characteristics of the LXX; and until these have been finally ascertained we must use some standard of reference, such as the Cambridge edition. Bearing this in mind, we find that though the recension does shew a very decided preference of ο θεος to κυριος, it shews a still greater partiality for κυριος ο θεος over κυριος and even over ο θεος. Thus while κυριος ο θεος is only three times changed to ο θεος and never to κυριος, it is twenty-eight times substituted for κυριος and nine times for ο θεος. Further, though κυριος is nine times changed to ο θεος and twenty-eight times to κυριος ο θεος, in thirty-five cases it is allowed to stand. These facts are a serious set back to Dahse's theory of an Elohistic recension. It is of no avail to point out, as Dahse does,

[1] In the cases in which Dahse comes to a definite conclusion the recension reads :—

		In agreement with LXX.	For κυριος	For ο θεος	For κυριος ο θς	+	—
1. ο θεος	27 times, viz.	14	9	—	3	1	—
2. κυριος	44 ,, ,,	35	—	1	—	5	3
3. κυριος ο θεος	45 ,, ,,	7	28	9	—	1	—
	116	56	37	10	3	7	3

The MSS. of the recension are frequently at variance, and even Dahse has often to confess himself uncertain what name really belongs to it. That he is invariably right when he expresses no hesitation is probably more than he himself would claim.

that in five passages the retention of κυριος is explained by its occurring at the end (xviii. 33, xxvii. 27) or beginning (xxxviii. 7, xlix. 18) of a Seder, or (xxi. 6) at the end of a pericope in an ancient Christian lectionary (!); or again, that in some half-dozen instances it follows "angel" or "name": there are thirty-five to be accounted for. If finally it be alleged that the predominance of κυριος ο θεος is itself evidence of an elohistic tendency (ο θεος being *added* to an original κυριος), we have to ask why κυριος, though changed to ο θεος in nine cases, is nevertheless retained alone in no fewer than thirty-five, and further how it comes about that κυριος ο θεος appears nine times in place of ο θεος. It seems clear that no principle is consistently followed by the author of the recension in his use of the divine names, or, if there be, that Dahse has not detected it. So far as the interchanges of ο θεος and κυριος are concerned, the facts could be adequately explained by the natural predilection of Greek writers for ο θεος being carried somewhat further in this case than in the main text of the LXX. But it must be admitted that the preference for κυριος ο θεος cannot be satisfactorily accounted for in this way. It might no doubt have come in through conflation at a later stage of the text than the recension fir; and if so, it seems impossible with our present knowledge to determine which component was found in that recension.[1]

[1] Dahse (p. 114) promises a fuller discussion of the κυριος ο θεος readings in a further volume of his textual studies. Meanwhile he appears to hold to the opinion, based on a doubtful interpretation of a statement of Jacob of Edessa, that it was the practice of Lucian (the supposed author of our recension) to combine the marginal reading of the divine names with that of the text of the MSS. which he followed. In that case there would have been over sixty readings to which he found no margin; and we are left with thirteen absolute substitutions of one name for another which are only explicable by the tendency of Greek scribes spoken of above. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that either text or margin represented a Hebrew original.

The grounds on which Dahse postulates a Hebrew basis for the recension **fir** in its use of the divine names are as unconvincing as could well be imagined. In the first place, he points to a single agreement with K650 in xlii. 5. It is true that Kennicott cites 650H as reading לשבר בר for the Massoretic לשבר; and similarly **fir** read (with the Sahidic version) *αγοραζειν σιτον* for the bare *αγοραζειν* of the LXX. But לשבר בר occurs immediately before in *v.* 3, and there also the *σιτον* appears in all LXX co-dices. It would not have been very wonderful if one Greek and one Hebrew copyist had both supplied the accusative from the preceding context without collusion or interdependence. And even if dependence of the one on the other were probable, would that be sufficient evidence for the existence of a whole Hebrew recension in which the divine names were treated on different principles from the MT ? But it is really wasting time to speculate about such probabilities ; for the fact is that K650 is not a MS. at all, but a *printed edition*, and that not of the Pentateuch but of the Talmud ! (see Kennicott, *Dissertatio generalis*, p. 108). The reading has no value whatever ; it is simply one of those cases of inexact citation from memory which abound in the Talmud, and for which there is no reason to assume any MS. authority. But in the second place, Dahse asserts that " the Elohistic tendency has had regard to the Sedarim-division, while the author of the recension ignores this." It is difficult to apprehend so very refined a distinction. It would appear to be Dahse's view that in **fir** we have to do with a double recension : first a recension of the Hebrew text, in which some attention was paid to the Sedarim-division, and then a Greek recension in which the Sedarim were ignored. How does he manage to accomplish such an extraordinarily subtle critical operation ? (*a*) As an indication of regard to the Seder-division he has pointed

out the occurrence of a κυριος twice at the beginning and twice at the end of a Seder. We have seen already how little importance can be attached to that observation. But even supposing it to be significant, does it prove the existence of a *Hebrew* original? Were we not given to understand at an earlier stage of the argument that in Dahse's opinion a regard to the Sedarim was characteristic of the original LXX as a whole? How then can he tell that the text which the "author of the recension" had before him was anything but a Greek MS. of the LXX? (*b*) How does he know that the "author of the (Greek) recension" disregarded the Seder-division? He says that when the reviser supplies out of his own head a name not found in his original (vi. 14, vii. 23, xviii. 19c, xxiii. 9, xxvi. 25a) he is careless what name he chooses, and thus betrays indifference to the prevalent usage of the section before him. Again, I am unable to perceive in that any ground for believing that his original was in Hebrew. But whether it was Hebrew or Greek, so long as it was a recension independent both of the MT and the original LXX, who is to tell us that in the passages cited the names were not found, but were supplied by the second reviser? We know what names were in the MT and in the current LXX; and in all the five passages here referred to [1] these two texts agree in having no divine name at all. But as to what names were or were not in a speculative Hebrew recension of which not a trace has survived, Dahse can have no knowledge whatsoever. There is no conceivable reason why the alleged recensional additions should not have been made to the Greek text of the LXX; and the whole argument merely shews on how frail a foundation Dahse builds his imposing but unsubstantial theory of Hebrew recensions differing from the Massoretic text. "It is true, in general,"

[1] We might add iii. 24, xx. 8, xxviii. 20.

writes Professor Torrey, of Yale, "of the modern use of the Greek Bible for text-critical purposes, that recourse is had far too often to the hypothesis of divergent Hebrew texts, while there is far too little appreciation of the extent to which the Greek texts themselves have been corrupted in transmission."[1] Certainly in Dahse's critical practice we see that tendency carried to most unwarranted extremes.[2]

JOHN SKINNER.

[1] *Ezra Studies*, p. 109.

[2] *Note on the* ο κυριος *readings.*—The name יהוה is ordinarily rendered in LXX by κυριος without the article. In nearly a score of instances, however, we find ο κυριος; and the question suggests itself whether the distinction has any significance. In regard to three cases (iv. 3, 13; viii. 20) Dahse (p. 38 f.) offers the explanation that ο κυριος is used to signify that "in matters of cultus one addressed oneself not to any Elohim indifferently, but to Yahwe." That is an echo of Eerdmans' theory of a polytheistic phase of the Genesis legends, of which Dahse makes a somewhat unfortunate application. He appears to overlook the fact that the presence or absence of the article is a peculiarly Greek feature which has no expression in Hebrew, and therefore must be traced to the translators or later copyists. But the translators of the LXX were far removed from the stage of thought at which it might have been necessary to guard against a polytheistic sense of Elohim. Dahse does not inquire whether the principle holds good in all or most of the other cases; nevertheless his general idea has some justification in actual usage. The facts are these: (*a*) ο κς is used for אדני twice (xviii. 27, 31): now in all other instances of אדני it is represented by a vocative; hence we may say that ο κς is the regular equivalent of אדני wherever the art. is admissible. (*b*) For יהוה, ο κς stands in iv. 3, 13, viii. 20, xii. 8a, xiii. 4, 18, xvi. 2, xviii. 17, 33, xxiv. 16, 48a, 52, xxviii. 13a, xxxix. 23a. Of these iv. 13, xviii. 33 (and perhaps viii. 20) may be set aside as insufficiently attested, but as illustrating a tendency they are here reckoned. Of the fourteen cases no fewer than nine (iv. 3, iv. 13, viii. 20, xii. 8a, xiii. 4, 18, xxiv. 26, 48, 52) refer to acts of worship; and we may add xxii. 9, where a few authorities supply τῳ κῳ after "altar." On the other hand there are many references to worship (e.g. xii. 8b !), where ο κς is not used. The result can hardly be set down to chance; although at the same time the element of chance appears in the five cases above, which have nothing to do with worship (xvi. 2, xviii. 17, 33, xxviii. 13, xxxix. 23), as well as in several variants which are not included.—Dahse does not point out that a slight tendency to favour ο κς is observable in egj. The fact goes to shew that that recension is not based on a Hebrew original.

THE NEW CODEX "W."

When we pass quire 1 at John v. 12, we come back to quite a different recension, agreeing in the main with the character visible in the rest of the work. For, after eliminating "Greek" readings, we pick up *e* several times, also Coptic, and twice the cursive 28 (in two chapters).

There is again most distinct and unmistakeable Latin retranslation.

Observe the details :—

Jo. v. 15. + δε *b f q r fossat syr* (+ ουν D, etc., *copt*) [*non sah*].

Ibid. + και ειπεν αυτοις. New thus and a conflate, but arising out of the ειπεν for ανηγγειλε of *a e q boh syr* and *Gk.* ℵ CL and few curs.

16. + τω (*ante* σαββατω). 237, 251, 264 (*copt*), is no doubt due to retransl. from Latin. [The *addition* of articles is just as much a sign of translation as is their omission.] In hardly any case in the section examined does it come from *syr. Sah* is *Π CABBATON.*

18. αποκτειναι οι ιουδαιοι. change of order with Greek 107 and Ambrose only

19. — τι. 245, 511; *a d e q Tert.*

Ibid. ο (*pro* α). *Epiph Hil Ambr* only (cf. *sah*); ου 17; ἁπερ *Didym.*

20. δειξη (*pro* δειξει), 511, 513 *q* (ostendet); ostendit *e*; δεικνυσιν D 28; demonstravit *Latt.*

21. τους νεκρους εγειρει ο $\overline{\pi\eta\rho}$. Change of order for which no Latins vouch nor Greeks. ο πατηρ, however, is omitted by a few;

and *Tert* in an exceptionally long quotation; hence perhaps this order change.

24. ουκ ερχεται εις κρισιν. *Non latt, non syr*; probably *ex copt*.

v. 36. μαρτυρουσιν (*pro* μαρτυρει). No Greeks at all, but *q* exactly, "testificantur" (*copt*); *a* = "test. dicunt," *e*, "test. sunt," *b* ff_2 *r*, etc., *Tert* = "test. perhibent," all in the plural.

37. — αυτου *sec.* No *Greeks, syr*, or *copt*, but *b r** and r_2 of the Latins, *Ath.*, and they alone.

vi. 2. θεωρουντες. *Chrys. Nonn.* (Retransl. from the "qu. videbant" of all *Latt.*) See 131 and Scholz' note.

16. — οι μαθηται αυτου. No support. (See change or order, *syr.*)

28. αυτω (*pro* προς αυτον). No Greek support. Either *ex copt* or a clear case of retransl. from Latins, who all agree in *ad eum*.

44. + προς με (*ante* και εγω). So only *e boh* [not *sah*], but with *Hil, Ambr, Hier, Vigil*. Clearly illegitimate.

46. αὐτος (*pro* οὗτος), 71. All Latins "hic." Clearly retransl. from *Latt* (or *syr* or *copt*).

53. — μη, but this is * and is corrected. Cf. *sah* (299 τις *pro* μη).

58. τον αρτον τουτον. Order supported by the Latins *e q* only; but *b r* give the order with the expression "carnem meum," while *a c vg* write merely "me."

Ibid. ζηση (*pro* ζησεται). *Al.* ζησει; vivet *a c e* ff_2 *q r vg*.

60. — εστιν. No support apparently, yet I seem to recollect some one who does this.

62. *ειδηται* (*pro θεωρητε*). Only 28 *ιδητε* (cf. *copt*). *Epiph Eus. cf. lat.*

vii. 3. +*και* (−*ουν*). *Syr. Non copt* (=*OYN*), *non sah* = *σε* = *ουν* (one *sah* MS. 73 = *δε*). But 48 = *δε* with *Latt* and *vg* autem.

6. *ουδεπω* (*pro ουπω*). No support. Clear retransl. All Latins *nondum*, but Z* and *vg* necdum.

17. − *θελη.*
ποιη (*pro ποιειν*). } 254 only (and *boh ut vid.*)

28. − *και* (*ante λεγων*). Of Greeks 28 only, but *aff*$_2$ *aur* with *sah* and eight *boh* MSS. against Horner's text.

31. *εκ του ουν οχλου πολλοι* (*pro πολλοι δε εκ του οχλου*). Impossible order, but *ουν* vouched for by 27, 28, 42, 299, 507, and *order* of most Latins. (28 joins a small Greek group as 507, 517, 570, with the order.) [See other sympathy with 299, vi. 53.]

39. *ελαμβανον* (*pro εμελλον λαμβανειν*). So *d e f vg Cypr Vigil.* A few Greeks omit *εμελλον* with some Latins, but only the above go wholly with Freer.

45. + *αν* (*post ειπον*). Cf. *copt.*

46. + *αυτοις* (*post απεκρ*). *Evan* 892, *Evst* 234 (*c*) *foss* and *syr* only. (+ *προς τους αρχ. και φαρ· post υπηρεται*, 69).

But we must pass to the other Gospels.

St. Matthew.

In St. Matthew is to be observed the same Coptic or Sahidic influence as in the other Gospels from copying a diglot *copt-gr*. It seems to me a shade more *boh* than *sah*

here, but not very much. Just about what one would expect after going over the rest, for I took Matthew after Mark.

But I pick up *k* distinctly in Matthew more than the other Latins thus :—

Matt. * ix. 9. Vocabatur *k*. All other Latins have *nomine*, as *copt* and *syr*. This is important for it does away with what might be an error of *homoiotel* in W in another place, viz. :

vi. 20. — *ουδε κλεπτουσιν*, for *k* also omits. So that the parent of W and not the scribe is responsible. Again :

xii. 48. — *εισιν* Evan, 440; Evst, 259. *c k Tert bis* and *boh* (2 MSS.) not *sah*. Truly "African," but very early African, *before Cypr*. Now to show that *vocabatur* comes straight from an early Latin observe—

ix. 15. *αφερηθη* (*pro απαρθη*). W only (28 wanting). All the Latins have *auferetur*, which was basic. *d*, however, reads *tollatur* over against D 1, 25, 71, 273, Evst, 222, *αρθη*; *Tert* alluding, "ablatus est" twice (*copt* and *sah* use different words).

k ends at xiv. Testing beyond in *e* I do not find particular sympathy (as in Mark). Probably *k* might show + *ελθειν* xiv. 30, or *φαγειν* xv. 32 (*e q*).

r_2 is missing also xiv. 1–xvi. 13, but testing beyond, I find—

xxii. 18. r_2 = nequitias = *τας πονηριας* of W against all Greeks *την πονηριαν*, and all the Latins have the abl. abs. except *vg*.

* 28 is wanting here, but has *καλουμενος* for *λεγομενος* in x. 2 alone.

T. And r_2 is nearest with *cognoscens* (γνους) and *nequitias*.

Again:

xxvi. 49. W reads alone προσηλθεν και for ελθων. Only r_2 *a* and *syr* read thus, *accessit* . . *et*. No other Latins. *Sah* and *copt* have "came," but no και.

Note also Matthew xii. 48. — τω ειποντι αυτω X^{or}. *Dimma* E^{lat} a notable conjunction with W^{or}. (*hiat* r_2).

Testing Luke I find no *e* in the unique readings of the first three chapters, but observe *b c e* at i. 65.

It is in St. Mark that *e* comes out so very strong, where available.

In St. Matthew, then, we have more of the *k*-r_2 base.

In St. Mark *e* is dominant in the first four chapters, followed by *c* and *k*, and beyond chap. viii. *k* comes in strong.

In St. Luke there is distinct Latin and Coptic running, as before, upon the surface.

St. Luke must be considered more deeply and throughout in the light of ii. 7, iii. 7, iii. 24–38. But *e* does not seem to be at all the base here, nor *c* particularly, and we must press on to consider St. Mark.

St. Mark.

Here we are face to face with something very strange and very significant. Mr. Sanders goes so far as to say (p. 139), "Certainly some one had to send to North Africa for the beginning of Mark, and the Hesychian recension, which should have been the favourite one in Egypt at this time, seems to have been in large part inaccessible." See also remarks on p. 67.

This is not the way I should put it, for a similar Latin text like *e* (which is that to which he refers) underlies parts of the Greek MS. ℵ, and that in Gospels other than that of S. Mark.

It seems more likely that the text of *e* was in Egypt already for a long while (having come *viâ* Carthage), and that for the reason that W does not only show us *e*, but also *c* (and *c* we know is closely and sometimes alone allied to *aethiopic* readings) and also *b* (as well as D *d*), and beyond all this the *common base* of *b c e* and sometimes of *b c d e*. Of these, *b* never left Italy. How account for it all?

This seems to be the history of it. *d* represents a Roman base if not the original text, at any rate with *b* [apart from a few cases of harmonisation] a base as old as we can get, *b* sometimes controlling later revision in *d*. The *b d* base went to Latin Africa very early, and there was modified to *e*. Adding the glosses of *c*, we find this *b d c e* Latin text reappearing in Greek Egypt *in Greek dress* in the MS. W with and apart from D.

The hardest thing to explain is that after the fifth chapter of St. Mark, W rather drifts away from both *e* and D*d*, while sometimes retaining sympathy with them.

Here is the overlying Coptic influence to begin with:—

Mark i. 6. + ην (*ante* αισθιων), 514 (V^{scr}) and *boh*.
(Mr. Sanders does not notice this.)

Then note—

i. 20. μετα των μισθεντων εν τω πλοιω. New order with *syr sin*, ἐν τω πλοιω being added. Note that *b* omits εν τω πλοιω with *syr pesh* [*mut. sah*, but *boh* agrees with the usual order].

(Mr. Sanders gives four other examples of W with *syr sin* in the first four chapters.

Next we plunge into the Latin base (*e* only begins at i. 21*).

i. 25. + και ειπεν *b c e syr* [*non boh* = λεγων, *mut. sah*].

* At Mark i. 3 we have the long addition by W in Greek, only known in the Latin of *c*. Probably *e* had it also.

26. — το ακαθαρτον *e r*.
και απηλθεν (*pro* εξηλθεν). No Greeks, but so exactly *e* and *f r*.

27. εθαυμαζον (*pro* εθαμβησαν). So the Latins, and evidently Greek retranslation. Here *e* conflates with both.

Ibid. Instead of the usual texts (the Greeks vary), W has τις η διδαχη η κενη αυτη η εξουσιαστικη αυτου. Cf. *e* quænam esset doctrina haec *inpotentabilis*. W *e* alone together thus.

31. αυτω (*pro* αυτοις), *e* and *d* [*contra* D^{gr}].

Ibid. και επιλαβομενος (*pro* κρατησας). Retransl. for *adprehensa*, but here *e* has *tenens*.

37. — και ευροντες αυτον *b c*.
— οτι *c e*.

38. κηρυσσιν (*pro* κηρυξω) — ινα κακει = *b c e* prædicare (— ut et ibi).

39. — και τα δαιμονια εκβαλλειν. Alone.

* 42. — και εκαθερισθη. *b c e*.

* 43. *Om. vers. cum b c* (*e om.* και εμβρ. αυτω ευθυς).

ii. 1. — δι' ήμερων. No Latins but E^{vg}, yet omitted by *Ev.* 245 and NINE Greek lectionaries.

So having established the deep and old Latin base above in the first chapter, including very ancient retranslation and reflex action by Latin on Greek, we now see the *Greek* lectionaries omitting this, *which is a pure lectionary omission*, and due to nothing else. This not only carries our Greek lectionary use very far back, but shows the lectionaries were *Graeco-Latin*.†

* Here *b c* omit with W more than *e*.

† Observe in Mark i. 27,—τι εστιν τουτο omitted by D, and *it* (*præter f*) is also omitted by W and three Greek lectionaries, not by *boh* [*hiat sah*] nor by others, except *aeth syr sin*, which here probably replace *sah*.

Following this in the next verse we have a beautiful illustration of how old our text is, for at

Mark ii. 3. we *add* ιδου ανδρες with Evan 28 2^{pe} alone and *sah.*

Now if this were an *omission* we could not as safely deduce certain facts. But, being an *addition*, we see clearly now how *old* a text we have in 28, which I have tried to point out before. So that concurrently with our old Græco-Coptic-Latin base, and lectionary use, we point to the Græco-Syriac intertwined with it all. (*Syr sin* is wanting here.)

Note further as regards *sah*—

Mark v. 40. + ειδοτες οτι απεθανεν (*post* και κατεγελων αυτου), fam. 13, and SAH only. (*Ex Luc* viii. 53.)

Next consider ii. 3, which is interesting. Instead of και ερχονται φεροντες προς αυτον (or προς αυτον φεροντες) παραλυτικον αιρομενον υπο τεσσαρων, we have και ιδου ανδρες ερχονται προς αυτον βασταζοντες εν κρεβαττω παραλυτικον.

b = et veniunt ad illum *ferentes* paralyticum in grabatto.

c = Venerunt autem ad eum *portantes* in lecto paralyticum.

e = et venerunt ad illum *portantes* in grabatto paralyticum.

f = et venerunt ad eum *portantes* in grabato paralyticum inter quatuor

(while *d* is like the rest : et venerunt ad eum. adferentes paralyticum qui a quattuor portabatur).

Nearest in order to W are *e* and *c* (but *c* uses lecto) ; βασταζοντες = clearly *portantes* of *c e f* (against *b* ferentes), but this word is made to serve for both φεροντες and αιρομενον υπο τεσσαρων. *f* using portantes but once retains alone of the four Latins named *inter quatuor* (υπο τεσσαρων). We go then with *c e* (*b*) against all else. But we supply ιδου ανδρες

with 28 and *sah*, yet 28 and *sah* retain the common Greek and Latin longer version of the verse!

All this Mr. Sanders can only hint at in his notes. We must work it out for ourselves.* It shows first that W 28, 2^{pe} did not influence the Latin of *b c e*, for where is the ιδου ανδρες? It shows that *b c e* did influence W and chiefly *e* here.

Mark ii. 3. προσελθειν (*pro* προσεγγισαι). Cf. accedere *it*, but offerre *vg*.

Ibid. απο του οχλου (*pro* δια τον οχλον with D (præ turba *latt*).

8. — εν εαυτοις *c e*.

† 11. — σοι λεγω. *Evst* 259 (y^{scr}) *e*.

12. θαυμαζειν αυτους (*pro* εξιστασθαι παντας). No Greeks support. Cf. ut admirarentur (— παντας) *e*; ut adm. turbae *c*; ut mirantes (— παντας) *b*.

17. εληλυθει (*pro* ηλθον). Not *e*. An old error of ηλθεν come back *viâ*.?

But we must hurry on. The strongest agreement continues in chapters iii.–iv. between W and *e* and W and *b c e*. In v. 3 we pick up r_2 poterant with W alone εδυναντο for εδυνατο. But I wish to exhibit one more place in full at iv. 1.‡

Common text	ωστε αυτον εις (το) πλοιον εμβαντα καθησθαι εν τη θαλασση.
W.	ωστε αυτον εις το πλοιον ενβαντα καθησθαι παρα τον αιγιαλον.

* P. 67, Mr. Sanders says: "Does W represent the original Greek from which the N. African translation was made, or is it a retranslation from the N. African Latin or can we find an intermediate explanation?" The explanation seems to be that it is a *basic* Latin of *b c e* conjoined = Italy and N. Africa, being translated into Greek in Egypt. See iv. 1.

† Mr. Sanders does not chronicle this.

‡ On p. 66 Mr. Sanders exhibits this but partially and the true picture does not appear.

Common text { και πας ο οχλος προς την θαλασσαν επι της γης ησαν.

W. { και πας ο οχλος εν τω αιγιαλω ην.

This is sheer, clear retranslation from *ad litus* of *b e* (proxime litus *c* ff_2, circa litus maris *a*, super mare *q*, circa mare *d*. and D^{gr} περαν της θαλασσης) ; and secondly, *in litore* of *b c e f* ff_2 *r* (circa mare *a d l q*). And this took place in Greek Egypt, among Coptic surroundings about A.D. 350, or perhaps much earlier.

After chapter v. we drift from *e* and *e* ceases at vi. 9.

Between chapters vi. and viii. observe—

Mark vi. 13. εξεπεμπον *pro* εξεβαλλον alone. Translation of some kind probably influenced by the Coptic, which has a variety of words to express *emittere* and *ejicere*.

vi. 29. κηδευσαι *pro* και ηραν. W and 28 only.

vii. 3. πυκνα *pro* πυγμη. W joins ℵ alone of Greek uncials for this reading. See evidence in my edition of the Morgan Gospels, p. lviii. Here *b* has *subinde* alone of the Latins.

6. αγαπα (*pro* τιμα). W with D^{gr} *a b c* (contra *d* honorat). In St. Matthew it is τιμα, but Clem. Alex., quoting five times, exhibits τιμα but twice, giving αγαπων $\frac{2}{5}$ and φιλουσι $\frac{1}{5}$.

9. στησηται (*pro* τηρησητε). W with D^{gr} 1, 28, 2^{pe} (Cronin) and *itala*.

10. αθετων (*pro* κακολογων) } W alone.
19. διανοιαν (*pro* καρδιαν) }

13. τον λογον την εντολην. W alone, for τον λογον, but *fam* 1 substitutes την εντολην. A curious old conflation of W.

Passing to the eighth chapter, where *k* is available and *e* is wanting, notice—

Mark viii. 2. + αυτων *post* εχοντων. D and 2^{pe} only (not mentioned by the editor in his selected list of readings).

10. προς το ορος (*pro* εις τα μερη) = 28 *syr sin* (complicated by N^{gr} D^{gr}), N εις τα ορη, D εις τα ορια.

11. απ' (*pro* παρ') = *copt* or *lat*.

12. ταυτη τη γενεα (*pro* τη γεν. ταυτη). *Copt* order, not *lat*.

20. — κλασματων. (346) *k* and 1 *boh* MS. and Horner's translation, but not his text nor *sah* (which omits "full" 1 of 4 MSS. only).

23. ενπτυσας (*pro* πτυσας). Cf. *lat*.

25. παντα τηλαυγος. *syr sin pesh f*. [*non Goth*]. Cf. *sah*.

34. — αυτοις. *DΔX* it^{pl}.

38. — λογους. *k sah* and vg^{D}.

ix. 6. λαλει. (*syr sin*).

11. τι ουν (*pro* οτι). *c*.

18. ηδυνηθησαν (*pro* ισχυσαν). 604 (*latt*).

24. το $\overline{\text{πνα}}$ (*pro* ο πατηρ). Possible error from *copt*, or *sah* rather: πιωτ for Father.

25. συντρεχει. 511. *Ex lat?* Dropping επι perforce.

27. — και ανεστη. *k* and *syr pesh* (*syr sin* omits, but substitutes "and he delivered him to his father").

31. λεγει (*pro* ελεγεν). Cf. *k* dicens = *sah*.

36. — εν. Cf. *k*: immedio *sic*.

x. 8. ουκ (*pro* ουκετι). Evan 71, Evst 222, *k* and *d* (*contra* D^{gr}) and ff_2 with DL *vulgates*.

14. *των ουρανων* (*pro του θεου*). Again from proximity of *boh* "kingdom" *μετουρο-* or confusion of *sah* words for God and Heaven.

26. *δυνησεται*. Cf. *k* poterit with *a b* and *d* (*contra* D^{gr}).

32. + *αυτω* (*fam* 13). *k c f* and vulgates G X* with *sah*.

33. — *αυτον sec c* r_2.

Mark x. 45. *λουτρον* (*pro λυτρον*). Cf. *k* = prolium (that is: "profluvium"?) for redemptionem. Absolutely alone of Greeks and Latins.

46. — *Βαρτιμαιος*. Cf. *k*, who gives this verse in very condensed form.

49. — *αυτω*. *c k*.

xi. 2. — *υμων*. ℵ *k*.

12. *εις Βηθανιαν*. r_2 and *boh* (6 MSS.) *syr pesh* (1).

14. *ηκουσαν* (*pro ηκουον*). Cf *k*: audierunt. Other Latins, *audiebant*.

29. *επερωτω* (*pro επερώτησω*). Cf. *k* with *a b c f* ff_2 *i*: interrogo and M of vulgates.

Ibid. *τινι* (*pro ποια*). Clear retransl. [in qua *latt*; cf. *copt*].

xii. 3. + *και απεκτιναν* (*post εδειραν*). 346 [*non* 13–69–124]. (Cf. *k* occiderunt *pro* ceciderunt.)

6. — *ετι ουν* 2^{pe} *c k*.

26. *ανεγνωκατε* (*pro ανεγνωτε*). Retransl.

30. — *εντολη*. 28, 2^{pe} *k* Eus^{Mcell}.

31. + *ομοιως*. Cf. *k* "secunda similis"; *al.* "secundum simile *vel* similem."

33. — *των prim*. *Ex lat*.

34. + οτι (*ante* ου μακραν). 157, 2^{pe} = *copt.*

38. + ταις (*ante* στολαις). Retransl.

44. — παντα οσα ειχεν. Cf. *k om.* ολον or παντα.

So much for *k*; now observe other features —

Mark xiii. 8. — γαρ. 245, 247, *Evst* 259, *sah*, *Aug* and other Fathers (245 is deeply Latin).

Ibid. — αρχαι ωδινων ταυτα. *c.*

12. αναστησονται (*pro* επαναστ.). Retransl.

16. τα ιματια. 61, 435. Retransl. (*syr.* 61 indeterminate).

17. — ταις *sec.* Retransl. "Pregn. et nutrientibus."

20. — κυριος. 435 again, 513, *Evst* 259, with *syr sin.* No Latin *ut vid.*

22 + πολλοι. *Sah alone* (3 out of 5 MSS. (Again this "overlying" Egyptian influence from *error oculi* in copying the diglot, probably in third century.)

Mark xiii. 22. πλαναν (*pro* αποπλαναν). 124 [*non* 13–69–346], 234,* 299 (which sympathizes elsewhere), while 28 = πλανησαι, and 512 = αποπλανησαι. Thus we trace three Greek lines of transmission. *k Cypr* = "errorem faciendum" against the others' "seducendos"; and "evertandos," *Tert*; "seducendum" *a c* ff_2.

25. —αι *sec. Latt.*

27. επισυνστρεψουσιν (*pro* επισυναξει) with 28 alone, against all others, and *against the parallel in Matthew* (επισυναξουσι FLM *al decem arm aeth* (colligent *e*, congregabunt Q g_2 for congregabit most and colligit *k*).

xiv. 5. — τουτο. ℵ*k syr.*

6. κοπον. Confused, but cf. *k* "illic *aedium* facitis."

10. — αυτοις. *a c d ff₂ i k Orig.* D^{gr} 28, 91, 299, 2^{pe} *syr sin.* Perhaps originally from *Lat.* commencement of verse 11. "Ad illi." See *i d.*

13. + εισελθοντων υμων. *sah* (cf. 13–69–124–346, 28, 91, 299, 2^{pe}).

14. — και. *prim, sah lect.* m^{1} and *ff₂.* (Cf. *ff₂* and W in John.)

16. + ετοιμασαι (*post* εξηλθον). 28, 124, [*non* 13–69–346], 299 (*d*) and *sah* (3 MSS. out of 4).

18. με παραδωσει. Cf. *boh* [*non sah*].

22. — αυτων. *Ex Latt.* Only *k*, however, suppresses *illis*, saying "*et dum* manducant." Cf. *syr* retaining *illi.*

Ibid. — εστιν. *Syr.* (Cf. *copt.*)

23. τοις μαθηταις (*pro* αυτοις). New *ex Matt.* Cf. 69, 235, in ver. 22.

27. σκορ πισθησεται (*pro* διασκορπ.). Retransl.

28. + εκ νεκρων. New *ut vid.*, but cf. *syr* elsewhere.

30. αρνηση. *Orig.* Retransl. (order B 346).

31. + οτι. *copt*, 13–69–124–346. See *c* "quod."

41. ιδου —— και. Matter of order. + τελος *Latt*: *Sah syr.* order with *lat* and *pesh* (*syr sin* gives τελος after ωρα with *q*).

47. παρεστωτων. Retransl.

56. — και . . . ησαν. 435, 440, 511 (see above with 435 in thirteenth chapter.

57. — και τινες . . . αυτου. 435, 440, 511.

60. — *ουκ αποκρινη ουδεν.* (Cf. *ff*$_2$ *q* —*ουδεν*), *ουδεν αποκρινη* 28.

Ibid. *οτι* (*pro τι*). B^{gr} Ψ [*non* L] (*τοι* 346), de his *k or* ad ea some *Latt.*

61. — *ο αρχιερευς. c ff*$_2$.

Ibid. *ευλογημενου* (*pro ευλογητου*). 28, 511 and 58, both retranslations, one early and one late. All Latins *benedicti.*

62. *της δυναμεως* (*pro των νεφελων*). Possible *copt* or *sahid* confusion or from *Greek* line above or from *Syr.*

64. *φαινεται υμιν. Copt*; and *sah syr* order but *Δοκι copt* for *φαινεται*, as D 28, Evst 150 *δοκει* (videtur *d*).

xv. 1. + *αυτον. copt sah* and *syrr* and *Diatess*, with 157, 15–69–346–556 [*non* 124]. This looks basic, but *Latt* are without it, not even D^{gr} *d.* (+ *αυτω* 511).

4. *σου ποσα.* New. Confusion of eye in *copt*,

7. *Βαρναβας.* (Cf. 69* Z**lat.* in Matt. xxvii. 16, 17. *Βαραβας* 511 *al. pauc.* and *Βαραβαν* verse 11 by 69. One *sah* MS. in Luke *Βαρναβας.*

11. *Βαρναβαν.*

Leaf lost between xv. 11–39.

xv. 39. — *ο sec.* (— *ο prim.* 69*).
παρεστως Retransl.

41. *διηκονουσαν* (*pro διηκονουν*). (28 : *διακονησαι αυτω* ministrabant *latt*, ministrant *q.* — *και διηκονουν αυτω* 508, Evst 150 *sem* 222 *sem.*

46. + *ευθεως ηνεγκεν* (*post σινδονα*). Cf. *copt syr* — *ευθεως.*

xvi. 1. *εισελθουσαι.* (*om. ινα ελθουσαι c d ff*$_2$).

5. *θεωρουσιν* (*pro ειδον*). Late. Half of a bohairic conflation; see Horner's notes. [*mut sah.*]

6. *τον Ναζ. ζητειτε. c ff*$_2$ *k syrr.*

Ibid. + *αυτου εστιν. k syr* + illius, *c ff*$_2$ *q* + ejus, + *αυτου* D (*hiat d*).

7. *προαγω* (*pro προαγει*). D *k* (*hiat d*).

8. + *ακουσασαι εξηλθον και* (*pro εξελθουσαι*). } *syrr sah* [*non latt*]

10. — *και κλαιουσιν.* Alone (*mut sah syr*).

15. + *αλλα* (following the long addition) + *ΔΕ copt.*

One word more as to the opening of St. Luke.

Testing at the beginning of St. Luke, we obtain different results, but they are interesting as far as they go.

Luke i. 5. *Αβιλ* (*pro Αβια*), perhaps from immediate proximity of *εβολ* in *copt* in line above, or from *εβολ* in *sah* in line below.

5. *αυτη* (*pro αυτης*). 300.

45. *και η καρδια* (*pro και μακαρια*) *init. vers.* Clearly from *sah.* *Sah* ends verse 44 with $\overline{N}ZHT$ or $Z\overline{N}$ *ZHT*, for *εν τη κοιλια*, as M$^{\text{gr}}$ *εν τη καρδια.* [M$^{\text{gr}}$ shows relationship to *Ev.* 28 in Mark.]

68. *του λαου, ex lat. genet.*, but not *e.*

70. *αυτου προφητων.* Cf. *latt* and *copt.*

77. — *του* (*ante δουναι*). All *latt* have *ad dandam* including *e*, but *d* = *dare* against "*του δουναι.*" Cf. *copt.*

ii. 7. — *τον πρωτοτοκον.* This is rather vicious. Only support *Auct de prom.*

26. — τον. 570 = *Lat.*; and cf. *boh* "Christ the Lord," but *sah* "*the* Christ of the Lord."

37. + ην. *Moling gat r* with *sah* and *boh*. No others. See how with *gat* μ this proves the Coptic base for this Irish school.

Ibid. νηστιαις τε και δεησεσιν. Cf. *copt* **NEM** "with." As at Matt. xxii. 10, πονηρους τε και αγαθους the τε και becomes **NEM** in *copt*.

49. — μου. *syr cu* only; not *syr sin* nor *latt* nor *Greek*.

ii. 51. ετηρει (*pro* διετηρει). 435 (our old friend in Mark). Possibly due to proximity of the word for "all," **THPOY** in *copt*.

iii. 11. ειπεν (*pro* λεγει). *Latt e goth*; ελεγεν BLX fam. 1, fam. 13, 33, 892 *latt. c*, etc. dicebat. *Om. boh.*

iv. 4. — μονω. *Tertull* ½; *syr pesh* (13) *aeth.*

5. γης (*pro* οικουμενης) = terrae W^{lat} and *Vigil.* του κοσμου D 5 245, *f Orig.*$^{com.}$ [*Copt. sah* **OIKOYMENH**.]

After even this very brief and fragmentary exhibition, I do not think I shall be blamed any more for my tendency to see polyglot influences intruding everywhere. But I hope it will stimulate others to take up W and go through it carefully, not being content with the say-so of any one as to its date or its character.

H. C. Hoskier.

SOME TEXTUAL CONJECTURES IN VERIFIABLE MATERIAL

THE layman is apt to imagine that the Classical or Biblical critic exercises the art of textual conjecture in circumstances of pleasing irresponsibility. He can take what liberties he chooses with the text, and there is no one to say him nay. Certainly, he is not likely to be confronted—unless perchance he be a member of the Psychical Research Society—with any absolutely indisputable authority. But the critic himself of course knows only too well that the supposed irresponsibility is illusory. For when he has evolved and elaborated his conjecture, and based it upon argument, and flanked it with analogies, and sent it forth under the escort of a magazine article, or entrenched it in the apparatus of a new edition, then there comes :—

> "Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom,
> The judgment of his peers!"

A conjecture which has run the gauntlet of expert criticism, and is finally approved by a consensus of scholarship, acquires, indeed, something not very remote from certainty. Still, it is not to be denied that the discovery of a manuscript, superior in age or pedigree to those previously known, which actually confirmed his conjecture, would give the critic a peculiar thrill of pleasure, and the public, at any rate, a new respect for his skill. Now, a perfectly definite confirmation, so rare in Classical or Biblical matters, is open to any critic who has occasion to exercise the art of conjecture on the works of a living author. It is not often perhaps worth any one's while to seek it. Conjectural emendation is no doubt practised, as the margins of library books bear painful witness, but it is rarely, one fancies, that the critic thinks any confirmation of his superior wisdom

necessary. It so happens, however, that lately, in the course of translating two German books, I have had occasion both to make some conjectures, and to seek confirmation of them. Any interest that belongs to the examples which I am about to give arises from this fact, that they have been put to the test, proved right or wrong. Some of the least certain-seeming were right, some of the most plausible were wrong; that is perhaps not the least instructive feature of the case. There is just one thing more to be said before we come to the examples. As there seems perhaps a certain presumption in assuming the presence of misprints in a scholar's book, I ought to premise that I knew from the author of one of the books that the final stages of its preparation had taken place under great pressure of other work, and in the case of the other, one or two quite unmistakable printers' errors—reversal of letters and so forth—showed that the printer, at any rate, was not impeccable. When, therefore, in one of these works, I came on the following statement, I was not prepared to accept it without question as conveying the author's meaning.

"Reuss lässt die juridischen Gedanken hinter den ethischen ganz zurücktreten; bei Ménégoz kommen die letzteren stärker zur Geltung als die ersteren."

(Reuss makes the juridical ideas entirely subordinate to the ethical; in Ménégoz the latter are more strongly emphasised than the former.)

Now the statement as it stands is perfectly intelligible. It amounts to this—that the second author's views coincide in general with those of the first. But if that is the meaning, it is expressed with an extraordinary amount of verbiage; the second part of the sentence is a paraphrase of the first in the style of a penny-a-liner. And our author—such general considerations become of extreme importance in a case of this kind—is a peculiarly trenchant and vigorous

writer. It is hardly possible that he can have said anything so inept. Moreover the form of the sentence is at variance with its meaning. The semicolon, the paratactic arrangement of the clauses, suggest an antithesis; and the contrast of two directly opposite views would have just the right touch of literary crispness. To restore the antithesis it is only necessary to suppose that 'former' and 'latter' have changed places—a notoriously easy slip to make. Supposing a study of the facts to show that the antithesis between the two authors' views actually exists, as it does, the case would, I think, be beyond doubt, even in the absence of external verification. The author, as a matter of fact, confirmed.

Our next example, from the other author, is also a case of a "miss-fire" antithesis.

"So ferne man nun nach *objecktiven* Normen und Sicherstellungen gegen die blosse *objective* Willkür suchte, bot sich als einziges Mittel die Wissenschaft dar."

(When objective standards and fixed points were sought, to purely objective caprice, science offered itself as the only resource.)

Here "subjective" caprice at once suggests itself as the natural correlative of "objective standards." Moreover, an "objective caprice" hardly conveys any intelligible meaning. The only thing that gave me pause was that the passage occurred on an early page, of a small book, which had reached a second *and revised* edition. Was it possible that, if the word was wrong, author and proof-reader could twice have overlooked it? The case was parallel to that where a manuscript bears traces of having been gone through by a *diorthotes*, and yet where what would seem a very obvious error has been left uncorrected. But if you catch your *diorthotes* tripping in one simple instance he may do it again, and, as I have said, there were elsewhere in the

book one or two small but quite unmistakable printer's errors. On the whole I thought that, in spite of its having shown such powers of survival, there was very little doubt that " objective " was out of place in its environment ; and so it turned out to be on application to the author.

The next instance is of a different character, and the main interest lies in the method of provisional verification adopted. Referring to the cult of Serapis, the author says:

" Seine Anhänger fanden sich hauptsächlich unter Sklaven und *Freigeborenen*."

(Its adherents were found chiefly among (the) slaves and free-born.) At first sight one is inclined to say that " slaves and free-born " includes the whole population, and that the remark is, therefore, as it stands, quite pointless. This has to be modified to the extent that there was at Rome a third class, that of the freedmen ; but that does not make the text any easier, for it is hardly conceivable that this particular form of expression has been deliberately adopted in order to exclude that class. In fact what we expect is precisely " slaves and freedmen "—these were the classes which in such a connexion would be likely to be associated. There was still a possibility, however, which had to be considered before the text was definitely rejected. ' Freigeborene ' might conceivably be used in a special technical sense—the sons of freedmen, born after their fathers' enfranchisement. But (1) I could find no trace of such a usage, and (2) it would be very strange that this class should be associated with the slaves, while the intervening class of freedmen was omitted. These probabilities being excluded, we naturally conjecture " freigelassene," freedmen ; and it would not be difficult for a printer to make a carelessly written " freigelassene " into the more familiar " freigeborene." But we feel, I think, the need of some further confirmation. Fortunately this was procurable. From certain indications

in the context it appeared probable that the author, who does not pretend to write on these matters from first-hand research, was here following Cumont's *Les Religions Orientales dans le Paganisme Romain*. I turned up the passage about the cult of Serapis in Cumont, and sure enough, I found the statement that its adepts were chiefly to be found among the "foule mélée d'esclaves et d'affranchis (freedmen)." I said a moment ago that the finding of this confirmation was fortunate; for it happened that in answering my queries the author overlooked this one, and his letter arrived too late to admit of further correspondence. But I felt no conscientious scruples about inserting freedmen in the translation.

We come now to a pair of closely parallel instances, one from each of our two authors.

In each case there is, between text and conjecture, the mere difference of a letter. In each case the text gave quite a good sense, but had some slight "uncomfortableness" about it, while the change seemed, to the present writer at least, a distinct improvement. In the one case, however, the conjecture was right, in the other wrong. Let us take the latter first.

Speaking of St. Paul's relation to the Jewish Hellenistic theology, the author says: "Ihre Probleme, ihre Spekulationen über Logos, Geist und Weisheit, ihre Ethik, interessieren ihn nicht, ihre *Lösungen* benutzt er nicht."

(Its problems, its speculations regarding Logos, Spirit, Wisdom, its Ethic, do not interest him, its *solutions* are not used by him.)

It certainly seems a little odd to introduce "solutions" absolutely, like this; one expects a nearer connexion with problems or difficulties. Moreover the statement is logically otiose; if "its problems and speculations" do not interest him, it is hardly likely that he would have any

use for its solutions, for his own problems must have been different.

Now there is another word differing from Lösungen only by what is typographically less than a letter—a mere modification—which would have given a very natural sense here. That is " Losungen," " watchwords," which is freely used by German writers in the metaphorical sense of party cries or catch-words. " Its catch-words were not used by him "—one sees that it would go admirably. Nevertheless this plausible conjecture was wrong. Lösungen, not Losungen was what the author wrote.

Now for our parallel case. This is the passage : " Für den Protestantismus selber aber in allen seinen *Lagen* ist die ethische Stellung zu den durch Kapitalismus geschaffenen Verhältnissen ein schweres Problem geworden." (For Protestantism itself in all its *situations*, its ethical attitude towards the conditions created by Capitalism has become a difficult problem.)

Now *Lagen* (positions, situations) strikes one as a little strange. Still, if you take it in the slightly generalised sense of " local circumstances." " environments," it seems quite possible. On the other hand a distinctly more natural meaning would be given by the insertion of one letter—" in allen seinen Lag*e*rn," in all its camps, i.e. sections, parties.

This metaphorical use of *Lager* being very common, it seemed to me distinctly probable here, so I ventured—though rather tentatively, after my experience with Losungen—to suggest it, and it turned out to be right. I do not feel competent to draw any lesson—except the general one of caution—from a comparison of these two conjectures and their differing fate. One seems to me *a priori* as justifiable as the other.

Our last pair of instances is again closely parallel. In both cases the text is difficult—in one paradoxical. In both

cases an easy emendation suggests itself. In neither case is the emendation correct, the difficulty really arising from the fact that the meaning is not quite clearly expressed. Here is the first passage.

"Sowie man das Naturrecht verstand . . . konnte man dieses Strafrecht zugleich als Ausfluss des Naturrechts betrachten und mit den biblisch-alttestamentlichen Exempeln des ja auch im Alten Testament bezeugten Naturrechts belegen."

(In view of the way in which they understood the Law of Nature (*Lex Naturae*), they could also regard this Criminal Law as issuing from the Law of Nature, and support it by the Biblical Old Testament examples of the Law of Nature, which is indeed itself (or, also) witnessed to in the Old Testament).

Apart from its context, the whole sentence is rather obscure, and it should perhaps be explained that "Law of Nature"—the reference to jurisprudence is unambiguous in the German—means "the order which, under the Divine providence, issues from reason and the natural course of things." The appointments of Saul and of David to the kingship were regarded, the author explains later on, as examples of the working of this "Law of Nature." The present passage means, generally, that punitive justice was regarded as a department of this Law of Nature, and therefore shared the support which Scripture gives to the latter. From the textual point of view what attracts attention is the curious repetition of "Old Testament." When, in conjunction with this, we take the fact that the words "ja auch," which the repetition of "Old Testament" forces us to refer to the subject of the clause, would more naturally belong to the predicate, with the meaning "which is indeed *also* testified to in (something else than the Old Testament), it becomes very tempting to conjecture "which is indeed

also testified to in the *New* Testament." This would be quite in accordance with the facts ; cf. Rom. xiii. 1 f., " The powers that are ordained of God," etc. And yet the conjecture is not correct. The author, with a fine modesty reminiscent of Dr. Johnson's famous answer when challenged about a mistake in his Dictionary, replied to my query, " This is not a Druckfehler (printer's error) but a Stilfehler (fault of style)," and requested me to omit, in translating, the first " Old Testament."

We come now to our final and, I think, most curious example.

" Die Apostelgeschichte . . . weiss nichts von einer Schriftstellerei des Paulus. Sie berichtet auch nichts von den Kämpfen *die durch diese Briefe*, wenn man ihrem Selbstzeugnis glauben will, hervorgerufen sein sollen."

(The Book of Acts knows nothing of any literary activity on the part of Paul. Nor does it tell us anything of the struggles which were called forth by these letters, if we are to believe their own evidence.)

Here it is internal probability of a general character which is against the text. I am inclined to think that nine out of ten New Testament scholars, reading the above sentence in a translation, would come to the conclusion that some one—probably the translator—had blundered. For, of course the prevailing impression is that it was the struggles which called forth the letters and not *vice versa*. Think of 1 Corinthians for example. Is it not quite evident that the controversy between the Paul, Apollos, and " Christ " parties was fully alight when Paul wrote ? And is not Galatians avowedly written to oppose an attack of the Judaisers ?

This being so, what are the *textual* probabilities of slip or misprint ? Is there any simple alteration which would change the meaning ? It is at once obvious that there is.

We have only to reverse the words " die durch " into " durch die " to get the meaning " the struggles by which these letters, if we are to believe their own evidence, were called forth." On internal grounds there is, it must be said, just one objection to the alteration. Grammatically it is unexceptionable, but stylistically it is not quite satisfactory ; I believe I am right in saying that cultured Germans give themselves some trouble to avoid " tautophonies " such as " durch *die diese.*" Still, even with a careful writer an accidental awkwardness will occasionally slip through. On the whole it was with a good deal of confidence that I submitted the passage to the author as probably in some way unsound. Nevertheless the text was correct. I was about to say, the text represents the author's meaning, but that would not be strictly accurate. In confirming the text, he wrote me that, according to his view, in the case, for instance, of the Galatian troubles, it was the letter which " die Kontroverse erst recht entfacht hat " (which first set the controversy fully ablaze). This is no doubt an intelligible view, but it is not quite what the text says, for " hervorgerufen " points, just as definitely as the English " called forth," to the actual beginning of the matter, whereas the " erst recht " is a distinct admission that the controversy was already smouldering.

It would, of course, be absurd to generalise from a pair of instances. They may, however, perhaps serve as a text for a general reflection which has been borne in upon my mind from various quarters. I shall express it tentatively, thus : Are we not, in all historical criticism, too prone to rest content with the assumption that the logical thing is right ? As a " methodological assumption " it is no doubt justified ; but one feels that we ought to keep in the background of our minds a more vivid sense of that *subtilitas naturae* which so frequently evades formulated laws. And,

to close with a more particular application, it is probable that the writers of antiquity, like those of modern times, did not always express their meaning with the strictest possible accuracy.

W. Montgomery

LOVE THAT COVERS SINS

We read in i Peter iv. 8, that "Love covereth a multitude of sins." The source whence these words are taken is Prov. x. 12, "Hatred stirreth up strifes, but love covereth all transgressions." The expression "cover a multitude of sins" occurs again as the closing words of the Epistle of James (v. 20), "He which converteth a sinner from the error of his way shall save a soul from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins."

The form in which *Peter* and *James* present the saying differs slightly from the original Hebrew and still more markedly from the LXX; and this suggests that we have here not a conscious quotation from the Book of Proverbs, but a saying in common use taken from an independent Greek translation of a text differing slightly from that of the Masora.

We need not spend time in refuting a common misunderstanding of the A.V. rendering in *Peter*,—"charity shall cover the mulititude of sins"—as though it meant that amiability compensates for a great many moral shortcomings; though it is fair to say that the future tense "shall cover" for "covereth," read in the Received Text, which comes from *James*, rather favours this false exegesis.

Again, it is sufficient to mention, without elaborate refutation, a wrong turn that has been given to the passage just cited from *James*, "He which converteth a sinner from

the error of his way shall save a soul from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins." This has been thought by some to mean that the merit gained by the conversion of a sinner will, in the Day of Judgment, outweigh the discredit due for a multitude of sins committed by the converter. We are not now concerned immediately with the passage in *James*; but a brief consideration of the expression "to cover sins," as there used, will help us to a right understanding of the saying in *Peter*, "Love covereth a multitude of sins."

The commonest Hebrew word for "to atone for" sin, or "pacify," "or propitiate," means literally "to cover over," *kipper* (hence *kopher*, a ransom; *kapporeth*, propitiatory, mercy seat). The following passages illustrate this use of the verb:—Nehemiah (iv. 5) prays against the enemies of Israel, "Cover not their iniquity, and let not their sin be blotted out from before thee"; the Psalmist says, "Blessed is he whose transgression is forgiven, whose sin is covered" (Ps. xxxii. 1); and again, "Thou hast forgiven the iniquity of thy people, thou hast covered all their sin" (Ps. lxxxv. 2). And there are many places in which man is said to "cover over" the sins of others by providing an atonement for them; though the English versions naturally avoid in these cases a literal translation of the Hebrew term. We have, then, in *James*, the consequence of the conversion of a sinner presented in two aspects, the particular and the general: the soul of the individual sinner is saved, and there is at the same time a demonstration of the working in the moral sphere, through the agency of the converter, of that power which covers over a multitude of sins; and that power is love.

I suggest that we should interpret these passages of the New Testament, especially the text from *Peter*, in the light of what we know about the operation of love, God's cosmic moral force, which works with most intense power in the

Church of Christ, and which God now uses to check the growth of sin, and which will finally eliminate evil altogether from the universe. It is always best to take large views, to look at things in relation to the whole of which they are a part; and it is allowable, as it is certainly practically helpful, to think of the "multitude of sins," of which the apostles James and Peter speak, not as the sins of any particular person or persons, but as the volume or mass of sin in general, "the sin of the world" which "the Lamb of God taketh away."

But we must, of course, take note in the first place of the working of the force of love in detail. "Love," says the apostle Paul (1 Cor. xiii. 5), "taketh not account of evil." That is to say, a man who puts himself under the control of the love of God acts, when a private personal injury has been done to him, as though nothing had occurred. In this way, by simply ignoring the unkind act or the insulting word, he does not merely conceal from view something that is there all the time, as we put a screen or curtain to hide what we do not wish seen, but he brings the evil thing to an end; it dies and leaves no seed. "Hatred," as the Wise Man says, "stirreth up strifes"; because hatred is like one of those germs familiar to pathologists, which, in a favourable environment, propagate themselves a million-fold in an incredibly short space of time. "Love covereth transgressions," not so much by the act of ignoring them, as by the result of ignoring them, the consequent cutting away from the transgression all that would nourish it, and enable it to live, and be fruitful and multiply; love makes an end of transgression much in the same way as sunshine destroys the germs of disease. Thus evil is overcome by good. The class of sin which is most obviously overcome by love is peculiarly of the self-propagating kind. I may quote in this connexion a suggestive passage from Bishop Butler's sermon

on the Forgiveness of Injuries: "Malice or resentment towards any man hath plainly a tendency to beget the same passion in him who is the object of it; and this again increases it in the other. It is of the very nature of this vice to propagate itself, not only by way of example, which it does in common with other vices, but in a particular way of its own; for resentment itself, as well as what is done in consequence of it, is the object of resentment; hence it comes to pass, that the first offence, even when so slight as presently to be dropped and forgotten, becomes the occasion of entering into a long intercourse of ill offices." He concludes: "Put the case then, that the law of retaliation was universally received, and allowed, as an innocent rule of life, by all . . . there is no going on to represent this scene of rage and madness; it is manifest there would be no bounds, nor any end."

We can now see that St. James, in the closing words of his epistle, holds out as an incentive to efforts for the conversion of a sinner, that the man who succeeds in effecting this not only saves alive the soul of another, but he also helps forward the accomplishment of the great cosmic purpose of God, by diminishing, ever so little, the sum total of evil. Nay, the experience of the Christian centuries assures us that the conversion of a sinner transmutes, by a divine alchemy, that which is evil, and a source of evil, into a source of good. John Newton, the slave-dealer, becomes John Newton, the evangelist and hymn writer.

The context in *Peter* is even more plainly favourable to the large, and almost cosmic, reference of the saying which I am seeking to establish. The apostle is urging upon the Christian society the duty of self-preparation—the preparation of the Church by itself—for the Second Coming of Christ:—"But the end of all things is at hand; be ye therefore of sound mind, and be sober unto prayer; above

all things being fervent in your love among yourselves ; for love covereth a multitude of sins ; using hospitality one to another without murmuring ; according as each hath received a gift, ministering it among yourselves." The notion of mutual help is here very emphatically reiterated :— " among yourselves . . . one to another . . . among yourselves." The love here spoken of, like the exercise of hospitality and the generous use of spiritual gifts, affects the common life of the church, her self-education, under the influence of the Holy Spirit, for the fuller life in Christ which will be hers. And so, " the common salvation," as St. Jude terms it, is worked out not merely by the salvation of souls one by one, but by each Christian taking his part, co-operating with Christ in His age-long purpose of " presenting the church to Himself a glorious church, not having a spot or wrinkle or any such thing ; but . . . holy and without blemish."

And when we look back over the past, even that short stretch of the past which we can see with any distinctness, we find solid grounds for our belief that the apostle was no vain dreamer when he projected the golden age into a future, distant indeed, but certainly coming. " The vision is yet for the appointed time . . . " though it tarry, wait for it." Pessimism is due to forgetfulness of the past, and it is nourished by a disregard of the past. For when we compare the present with what we know of the past, we must perceive that progress has been made.

Christianity is essentially an optimistic religion ; it does not deny the reality of evil, or seek to explain it away ; but it does claim to possess in the fullest degree a power, a force, an influence which is a solvent of evil, and which will one day cause evil and sin to cease ; and that force is love.

We may state the Christian theory of the relation of love to sin briefly thus :—Sin is a by-product of that free-will

which is an essential quality of human nature ; the abuse of free-will brought disorder into the moral order which is God's ideal ; " sin is lawlessness " (1 John iii. 4). On the other hand, the divine remedy to restore order, and make disorder cease, is love ; " love is the fulfilment of law " R.V. m.) ; love, that is, which, in the nature of man, is the emotional personal expression of harmony as opposed to discord. What order is in the world of physical nature that love is in the moral world of human society ; a force ever-prevailing in spite of set-backs, increasingly dominant notwithstanding defeats here and there, the only effectual solvent of evil ; and in the application of this force to human needs man works with God and God works with man.

This consideration gives dignity and worth inestimable to the feeble efforts of the most insignificant of us to make love the controlling principle in our daily lives. We measure the worth and importance of human actions, not by what the eye sees and the ear hears, but by the worth and importance of the whole transaction in which the men and women are taking part. The eye sees a man writing : it may be a tourist writing his name in a visitors' book, or it may be King John signing the Great Charter of English liberty ; the ear hears a man speaking : it may be the empty conventionalities of polite conversation, or it may be the Sermon on the Mount. Is it not stimulating to know that when we " check the hasty word " and " give gentle answers back again," we are not only making peace in our own narrow environment, but we are working out with God the accomplishment of His beneficent plans for the whole creation. The love of God is the supreme example of that love which covereth a multitude of sins ; for " God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself, not reckoning unto them their trespasses " (1 Cor. v. 18).

" Our God is marching on . . . He has sounded forth the

trumpet that shall never call retreat." But "His banner over us is love."

It is as in some great funeral march. The notes that tell of hope and triumph are low at first, almost overpowered by sounds of loss and everlasting farewells; yet as the music goes on, we hear joy and victory growing on the ear, ever more and more predominant, until at last sorrow and sighing quite pass away in one triumphal crash of sound.

Even so they to whom "the love of God" and "the love of Christ" are not the empty phrases of an outworn speculative system, but living and active realities, they hear the persistent melody of that love through the confused noise of bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and clamour and railing, and malice; and they go quietly on, in sure and certain hope that these things will pass out of being when God Who is love shall be all in all.

NEWPORT J. D. WHITE.

TWO NEW TESTAMENT PROBLEMS.

II.

"The Riddle of the Epistle to the Hebrews."

Professor John Dickie, of Dunedin, in the April number of this Magazine raises afresh the "literary riddle of the Epistle to the Hebrews," and invites comments upon his suggestions. May I be allowed to state my large measure of agreement with his conception of the character of the Epistle and its readers, and try to carry the matter a little farther towards a more probable identification of the exact locality of those readers, the authorship of the letter, and its date? I can do this the more briefly that Professor Dickie, and any whom it may concern, can find a fuller exposition of these points elsewhere in print.[1]

I accept, then, in the main his statement as to the spiritual condition of the readers, "Hebrews" or Jewish Christians, whose immediate danger was drifting "away from all vital religion" (though I believe the writer saw present also the danger of apostasy from Christianity in any distinctive sense); also the view that they formed a "house-church" amid a larger local Christian community (cf. xiii. 24, "Salute *all* them that have the rule over you, and *all* the saints"); and that they were a homogeneous group as regards superior social status and that idealistic culture which is known as "Alexandrine" Judaism. But I do not think it probable that they are to be sought in Rome. The Epistle's early use by Clement of Rome does not prove this any more than do the words "they of Italy salute you." This clause may equally well, to say the least, point to the

[1] In the article "Hebrews, Epistle to," in the last edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

writer's presence in Italy at the time of writing, as I believe to have been the case.

Our best clue seems to be the reference to Timothy (xiii. 23) as having just been set at liberty, and as possibly soon to join the writer himself; in which case he hopes that Timothy will accompany him when he comes, with as little delay as circumstances allow, to advise his readers in person in the critical situation which had suddenly arisen. Now where was Timothy most likely to go after release from imprisonment, in Italy as it seems? Where but to Ephesus? And where, more than in Ephesus, should we be prepared for the exact state of affairs presupposed in the Epistle? When we put it into the background which Acts xix. suggests, it seems to take on new life and actuality. Not only do we find there traces of a non-Pauline type of Jewish Christians, knowing originally only John the Baptist's baptism, like Apollos in the section immediately preceding; but we may infer also from Paul's having to "separate the disciples" from all connexion with the synagogue (xix. 9), owing to the strength of Jewish feeling which he encountered, that there probably continued to exist a rather conservative type of Jewish Christians in Ephesus, such as Apollos had appealed to on his first coming thither (xviii. 25). When Apollos returned from his mission to Corinth, would he not be likely to give his special attention to such, in view of his distinctive gifts? Accordingly, we may well imagine that there was at Ephesus a sort of Apollos group, analogous to the "party" that gloried in him at Corinth, though it continued in communion with the Pauline group in the one local Christian Community, under its one set of "elders" (Acts xx. 17) or "leaders" (Heb. xiii. 7, 24). Yet Paul's address to these elders at Miletus suggests that he saw special dangers ahead (xx. 29 f.), possibly mainly owing to the persistence of a strongly Judaic type of local

piety. This is what 1 Timothy i. 5 ff. (cf. Titus i. 14 f.) seems to me also to imply. Thus a recrudescence of Judaic tendencies, owing to a faith that was not spiritually vital and morally progressive, would be very likely to occur in some such Ephesian "house-church," especially under the stress of the growing trials and dangers incident to the success of the Jewish attack upon Christianity in the person of Paul in 62 A.D., the very date when it had been able to break out into lawless violence against James and others in Jerusalem itself.

Now this is just the epoch to which the reference to Timothy in Heb. xiii. 23 points, if we infer, as is most natural, that he had become involved in Paul's case on coming to Rome in obedience to 2 Timothy iv. 9. Perhaps "Alexander the coppersmith" (2 Tim. iv. 14 f.), probably the same as the Ephesian Jew of that name (Acts xix. 33 f.), had achieved this, but had been unable to secure the death of a relatively minor "troubler of the peace" in Roman eyes. If this be so, we should date the Epistle (which no doubt works up the substance of many a spoken address on such themes) c. 62, a date which would allow it or its author to influence 1 Peter (e.g. i. 2, "sprinkling of the blood of Christ"), if that be considered probable. Thus, the persecution of some sort implied as having begun before Heb. xiii. 2 was penned, may well be part of the same reflex action of the Jewish successes against leading Christians first referred to, as appears at a somewhat later stage (c. 63–64) in 1 Peter (e.g., i. 6, iv. 1, 12 ff.).

If this line of suggestion be in substance correct, a most probable authorship will already have suggested itself to our minds. If Apollos worked specially among the Jewish Christian wing of the Ephesian Church, who so likely as he to write to a "house-church" of this type in Ephesus, promising to bring with him Timothy, should he reach his side in time

to start from the place in Italy where the writer himself expected to set out, say Brindisi ? But is there any trace of Apollos ever having been in Italy ? There is, unless a most self-authenticating personal notice in Titus iii. 13 be set aside. If, then, Apollos had been once with Paul in Rome, why should he not have returned after carrying out the mission with which he was no doubt intrusted by the Apostle ? Thus we have a situation, soon after Paul's martyrdom c. 62 A.D., which seems in all respects to clear up the "literary riddle" of this great epistle. I have responded to Professor Dickie's invitation to continue the discussion he has so usefully opened ; and shall be glad if he will return to it with any further comments he has to offer.

VERNON BARTLET

THE FORMS OF HEBREW POETRY.

II. Parallelism : a Re-statement.

The literature of the Old Testament is divided into two classes by the presence or absence of what since Lowth has been known as *parallelismus membrorum*, or parallelism. The occurrence of parallelism characterises the books of Psalms, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes (in part), Lamentations, Canticles, the larger part of the prophetical books, and certain songs and snatches that are cited and a few other passages that occur in the historical books. Absence of parallelism characterises the remainder of the Old Testament, i.e. the Pentateuch and the books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings and Chronicles (with slight exceptions in all these books as just indicated), Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Ruth, and part of the prophetical books, including most of Ezekiel, the biographical parts of Jeremiah, Jonah (except the Psalm) and some other passages. It had become customary to distinguish these two divisions of Hebrew literature as poetry and prose respectively : parallelism had come to be regarded as a mark of poetry, its absence as a mark of prose ; and by the application of the same test the non-canonical literature of the Jews from the second century B.C. to the second century A.D. was likewise coming to be distinguished into its prose and poetical elements.

The validity of parallelism as a test to distinguish between prose and poetry in Hebrew literature might be, and has been, either actually or virtually challenged on two grounds : (1) that parallelism actually occurs in prose ; and (2) that parts of the Old Testament from which parallelism is absent are metrical and, therefore, poetical in form.

Parallelism is not a feature peculiar to Hebrew litera-

ture : [1] it is characteristic of parts of Babylonian literature, such as the epics of Creation (the *Enuma eliš* and others),

[1] Nor even to Semitic literature. Many interesting illustrations from folk-songs and English literature are given by Dr. G. A. Smith in *The Early Poetry of Israel*, pp. 14–16. Yet in most of these there is more simple repetition without variation of terms than is common in Hebrew, and an even more conspicuous difference is the much less sustained use of parallelism. In view of the great influence of the Old Testament on English literature and the ease with which parallelism can be used in any language (cp. p. 440 above), it is rather surprising that parallelism, and even sustained parallelism, is not more conspicuous in English. But abundant illustrations of this sustained use may be found in the Finnish Epic, *The Kalevala*, if Mr. Crawford's translation keeps in this respect at all close to the original, with which I have no acquaintance. Even here there are differences, as for example in the absence of the tendency, so marked in Hebrew, for parallelism to produce distichs. I cite a sufficiently long passage to illustrate what is a frequent, though not a constant, characteristic of the style of *The Kalevala* :—

Listen, bride, to what I tell thee :
In thy home thou wert a jewel,
Wert thy father's pride and pleasure.
" Moonlight," did thy father call thee,
And thy mother called thee " Sunshine,"
" Sea-foam " did thy brother call thee,
And thy sister called thee " Flower."
When thou leavest home and kindred,
Goest to a second mother,
Often she will give thee censure,
Never treat thee as her daughter,
Rarely will she give thee counsel,
Never will she sound thy praises.
" Brush-wood," will the father call thee,
" Sledge of Rags," thy husband's brother,
" Flight of Stairs," thy stranger brother,
" Scare-crow," will the sister call thee,
Sister of thy blacksmith husband ;
Then wilt think of my good counsels,
Then wilt wish in tears and murmurs,
That as steam thou hadst ascended,
That as smoke thy soul had risen,
That as sparks thy life had vanished.
As a bird thou canst not wander
From thy nest to circle homeward,
Canst not fall and die like leaflets,
As the sparks thou canst not perish,
Like the smoke thou canst not vanish.

J. M. Crawford, *The Kalevala*, i. 341, 2.

the Gilgamesh epic and the hymns to the gods.[1] It is as apparent in translations from Babylonian as in the English versions of the Psalms or the prophets; as examples from Babylonian literature it may suffice to cite the well-known opening lines of *Enuma eliš* [2]—

When above the heaven was not named,
And beneath the earth bore no name,
And the primeval Apsu, the begetter of them,
And Mumma and Tiâmat, the mother of them all—

And these lines from a hymn to the god Sin.[3]

When Thy word in heaven is proclaimed, the Igigi prostrate themselves;
When Thy word on earth is proclaimed, the Anunaki kiss the ground.
When Thy word on high travels like a storm-wind, food and drink abound;
When Thy word on earth settles down, vegetation springs up.
Thy word makes fat stall and stable, and multiplies living creatures;
Thy word causes truth and righteousness to arise, that men may speak the truth.

Whether these passages are prose or poetry, and whether if poetry they are such primarily because of the presence of parallelism, turns on the same considerations as the corresponding questions with reference to parallelistic passages in Hebrew: and further discussion of these must be postponed.

But parallelism is characteristic not only of much in Babylonian and Hebrew literature: it is characteristic also of much in Arabic literature. And the use of parallelism in Arabic literature is such as so give some, at least apparent, justification to the claim that parallelism is no true *differentia* between prose and poetry; for parallel-

[1] A convenient collection of all of these (transliterated text and translation) will be found in R. W. Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament.*

[2] Cp. Rogers, pp. 3 ff.

[3] Cp. Rogers, pp. 144, 145.

ism in Arabic accompanies *prose*—prose, it is true, of a particular kind, but at all events not poetry, according to the general opinion of Arabic grammarians and prosodists. Not only is parallelism present in much Arabic prose: it is commonly absent from Arabic poetry, i.e. from the rhymed and carefully regulated metrical poetry of the Arabs. In illustration of this, two passages may be cited from the *Maḳâmât* of Ḥarîri. The translations here given are based on Chenery's [1] but I have modified them here and there in order to bring out more clearly the regularity of the parallelism in the original: for the same reason I give the translation with line divisions corresponding to the parallel members. The first passage, which consists of part of the opening address of Abu Zayd in the first Maḳâmah, is from the prose fabric of Ḥarîri's work; the second is one of the many metrical poems which are wrought into the prose fabric. The parallelism of the prose passage, as of innumerable other passages which might equally well have served as examples, is as regular and as sustained as that of any passage in Hebrew or Babylonian literature, and indeed in some respects it is even more monotonously regular: it is complex too, for at times there is a double parallelism—a parallelism between the longer periods, the lines of the translation, and also between the parts of each of these (the half lines of the translation). This prose passage is as follows [2]:—

O-thou-reckless in petulance, trailing the garment of vanity!
O-thou-headstrong in follies, turning-aside to idle-tales!

[1] T. Chenery, *The Assemblies of Al Ḥarîri*, i. 109 f. and 192.

[2] In order that parallelism may be better studied I have hyphened together word groups in English that correspond to a single word (combined in some cases with inseparable particles) in Arabic. But I have generally omitted to hyphen the article, "of" (before a genitive), pronouns and the copulative particle ("and"), though these do not form separate words in Arabic.

How long wilt-thou-persevere in thine error, and eat-sweetly-of the pasture of thy wrong ?
And how far wilt-thou-be-extreme in thy pride, and not abstain from thy wantonness ?
Thou provokest by-thy-rebellion the Master of thy forelock ;
And thou goest-boldly in-the-foulness of thy behaviour against the knower of thy secret ;
And thou hidest-thyself from thy neighbour, but thou-art in sight of thy watcher ;
And thou concealest-thyself from thy slave, but nothing is-concealed from thy Ruler.
Thinkest thou that thy state will-profit-thee when thy departure draweth-near ?
Or-that thy wealth will-deliver-thee, when thy deeds destroy-thee ?
Or-that thy repentance will-suffice for thee when thy foot slippeth ?
Or-that thy kindred will-lean to thee in-the-day-that thy judgment-place gathereth-thee ?
How-is-it thou-hast-walked not in-the-high-road of thy guidance, and hastened the treatment of thy disease ?
And blunted the edge of thine iniquity, and restrained thyself —thy worst enemy.
Is-not death thy doom ? What-then-is thy preparation ?
And is-not-grey-hair thy warning ? What-then-is thy excuse ?
And is-not-in the grave's-niche thy sleeping-place ? What-then-is thy speech ?
And is-not-to God thy going ? Who-then-is thy defender ?
Oft the time hath-awakened-thee, but-thou-hast-set-thyself-to-slumber :
And admonition hath-drawn-thee, but-thou-hast-strained-against-it ;
And warnings have-been-manifested to thee, but-thou-hast-made-thyself-blind ;
And truth hath-been-established to thee, but-thou-hast-disputed-it;
And death hath-bid-thee-remember, but-thou-hast-sought-to-forget.
And it-hath-been-in-thy-power to impart, and thou-imparted'st not.

The poem I select as an example is translated by Chenery as follows :—

1 Say to him who riddles questions that I am the discloser of the secret which he hides.
Know that the deceased, in whose case the law preferred the brother of his spouse to the son of his father,

Was a man who, of his free consent, gave his son in marriage to his own mother-in-law : nothing strange in it.
Then the son died, but she was already pregnant by him, and gave birth to a son like him :
And he was the son's son without dispute, and brother of the grandfather's spouse without equivocation.
6 But the son of the true-born son is nearer to the grandfather, and takes precedence in the inheritance over the brother ;
And therefore when he died, the eighth of the inheritance was adjudged to the wife for her to take possession ;
And the grandson, who was really her brother by her mother, took the rest ;
And the full brother was left out of the inheritance, and we say thou hast only to bewail him.
This is my decision which every judge who judges will pattern by, every lawyer.

Nothing could be more prosaic than this last passage : and the only approximation in it to parallelism is line 5 ; nevertheless it is, so far as form goes, a perfect poem in the original : the rhymes are correct, and the well-known metrical form called *khatîf* is maintained throughout.

So far, then, as Arabic literature is concerned, it is an unquestionable fact that sustained and regular parallelism is a frequent characteristic of prose, while the absence of parallelism is frequently characteristic of metrical poems. And yet this is not of course the whole truth even in regard to Arabic literature. Most literatures consist of poetry and prose : and what in them is not poetical in form is prose, and *vice versa.* But in Arabic there are *three* forms of composition : (1) *nathr* ; (*a*) *nazm*, or *šiʿr* ; (3) *sajʿ*. The usual English equivalents for these three Arabic terms are (1) prose, (2) poetry, (3) rhymed prose ; but " rhymed prose " is not, of course, a *translation* of *sajʿ* : that word signifies primarily a cooing noise such as is made by a pigeon ; and its transferred use of a form of literary composition does not, as the English equivalent suggests, represent this form as a subdivision of prose. We should perhaps do more justice to some Arabic discussions or descrip-

tions of *saj'* by terming it in English "unmetrical poetry"; [1] and in some respects this "rhymed prose" or "unmetrical poetry" is more sharply marked off from ordinary prose than from the metrical poetry between which and itself the simplest form of metrical verse, termed *rejez*,[2] may be regarded as a transitional style.

To the Arabic *saj'*, as *rhymed* prose, Hebrew literature has certainly little or nothing analogous to show; to *saj'* as *unmetrical* poetry possibly, and certainly in the opinion of some writers, much. Certainly, if we disregard the rhyme, such passages as that cited above from Ḥarîri have, in respect of parallelism of terms and the structure of the corresponding clauses, much that is similar alike in Hebrew Psalms and Hebrew prophecy. And to some of these we may return.

At this point I raise this question with reference to Hebrew, and a similar question might be raised with reference to Babylonian literature: ought we to recognise *three* forms of composition as in Arabic, or two only as in most literatures? Since rhyme is so conspicuous in Arabic, and so inconspicuous in Hebrew, this may at first seem a singularly ill-considered question: and yet it is not; for however prominent rhyme may be in Arabic poetry, it is perfectly possible to think the rhyme away without affecting the essential form of Arabic poetry, or of the Hebrew mediæval poetry that was modelled on it. It would have

[1] "The oldest form of poetical speech was the *saj'*. Even after this stage of poetical form had long been surpassed and the metrical schemes had already been fully developed, the *saj'* ranked as a kind of *poetical* expression. Otherwise his opponents would certainly never have called Mohammed *šâ'ir* (poet), for he never recited metrical poems, but only spoke sentences of *saj'*. In a saying attributed to Mohammed in the Tradition, too, it is said: 'This poetry is saj'.'"—Goldziher, *Abhandlungen zur arabischen Philologie*, p. 59.

[2] "Fundamentally *rejez* is nothing but rhythmically disciplined saj'." "Many Arabic prosodists do not admit that *rejez* possesses the character of *šiʿr*."—Goldziher, *ib.*, pp. 76, 78.

been as easy for an Arabic poet, had he wished it, as it was for Milton, to dispense with rhyme: his poetry would have remained sufficiently distinguished from prose by its rigid obedience to metrical laws. So, again, it is possible to think away rhyme from the rhymed prose without reducing that form of composition to plain prose; the parallelism, and a certain balance of the clauses, would still remain; and as a matter of fact much early parallelistic composition existed from which regular rhyme was absent.[1]

Had then the ancient Hebrew three forms of composition —metrical poetry and plain prose, and an intermediate type differing from poetry by the absence of metre, and from prose by obedience to certain laws governing the mutual relations between its clauses—a type for which we might as makeshifts employ the terms unmetrical poetry or parallelistic prose?

I am not going to answer that question immediately, nor, perhaps, at all directly. But it seems to me to be one of those worth formulating, even if no certain answer to them can be obtained. They help to keep possibilities before us: and, perhaps, they may help also to prevent a fruitless conflict over terms. In the present instance it is not of the first importance to determine whether it is an abuse of language to apply the term poetry to any part of Hebrew literature that does not follow well-defined metrical laws simply on the ground that it is marked by parallelism; what is of importance is to determine if possible whether any parts of the Old Testament are in the strictest sense of the term metrical, and, alike whether that can be determined or not, to recognise the real distinction between

[1] Goldziher (*op. cit.*, pp. 62 ff.) argues that rhyme first began to be employed in the formal public discourses or sermons (*khuṭba*) from the third century of the Hejira onwards. "The rhetorical character of such discourses in old time was concerned only with the parallelism of which use was made" (p. 64).

what is parallelistic and what is not, to determine so far as possible the laws of this parallelism, and to recognise all parts of the ancient Hebrew literature that are distinguished by parallelism as related to one another in respect of form.

It is because I approach the question thus that I treat of parallelism before metre: parallelism is unmistakable, metre in Hebrew literature is obscure: the laws of Hebrew metre have been and are matters of dispute, and at times the very existence of metre in the Old Testament has been questioned. But let us suppose that Sievers, to whose almost overwhelming contributions to this subject we owe so much, whatever our final judgment as to some even of his main conclusions may be, is right in detecting metre not only in what have commonly been regarded as the poetical parts of the Old Testament, but also throughout such books as Samuel and Genesis;[1] even then the importance and value of the question formulated above remains. It is true that some questions may require resetting: if Samuel and Genesis are metrical throughout, if even the genealogies in Genesis v. and xxxvi. are, so far as form goes, no less certainly poems than the very prosaic Arabic poem cited above, it will become less a question whether the Old Testament contains metrical poems than whether it contains any plain prose at all. But the distinction between what is parallelism and what is not will remain as before: we shall still have to distinguish between parallelistic prose and prose that is not parallelistic, or, if the entire Old Testament be metrical, between parallelistic and non-parallelistic poetry.

The general description and the fundamental analysis of parallelism as given by Lowth, and adopted by innumerable subsequent writers, are so well known that they need

[1] Ed. Sievers, *Metrische Studien*, ii. *Die hebräische Genesis*, and *Metrische Studien*, iii. *Samuel*.

not be referred to at length here: nor will it be necessary to give illustrations of the familiar types of parallelism known as synonymous and antithetic. But I may recall Lowth's own general statement in the Preliminary Dissertation (*Isaiah*, ed. 3, p. xiv.):—"The correspondence of one verse, or line, with another, I call parallelism. When a proposition is delivered, and a second is subjoined to it, or drawn under it, equivalent, or contrasted with it, in sense; or similar to it in the form of grammatical construction; these I call parallel lines, and the words or phrases, answering one to another in the corresponding lines, parallel terms. Parallel lines may be reduced to three sorts: parallels synonymous, parallels antithetic and parallels synthetic."

The vulnerable point in Lowth's exposition of parallelism as the law of Hebrew poetry lies in what he found it necessary to comprehend under the term synthetic parallelism: his examples include, indeed, many couplets to which the term parallelism can with complete propriety be applied; for they really are a subdivision of synonymous or antithetic parallelism and might with more convenience be described as *incomplete* synonymous parallelism, or incomplete antithetic parallelism, as the case might be. In these cases the second line repeats by means of a synonymous term or terms *part* of the sense of the first, and is thus in part strictly parallel; but it also adds to the sense of the first line by another term or other terms parallel to nothing in the previous line, and by reason of this addition the second line in its entirety may, if we prefer, be regarded as a synthetic parallel to the first. But there are other examples of what Lowth calls synthetic parallelism in which the second line is pure addition to the first, and not even parallel to that line by the correspondence of similar grammatical terms: in this case the use of the term parallel-

ism surely covers an important difference with a mere semblance of similarity. Two such lines are certainly synthetic, but they are parallel to one another merely in the way that the continuation of the same straight line is parallel to its beginning; whereas synonymous and antithetic parallelisms, even of the incomplete kind, do really correspond to two separate and, strictly speaking, parallel lines. It should be added that Lowth seems himself to have been at least half-conscious of the weakness of this part of his case when he wrote, "The variety in the form of this synthetic parallelism is very great, and the degrees of resemblance almost infinite; so that sometimes the scheme of the parallelism is very subtile and obscure" (*Lectures*, ii. 52); he very fairly adds in illustration a really test couplet, viz.—

> I also have anointed my king on Sion,
> The mountain of my sanctity (Psa. ii. 6),

and he perceives, though he does not dwell on the point, that this couplet marks zero among "the degrees of resemblance almost infinite"; he says, "The general form and nature of the Psalm requires that it should be divided into two parts or versicles; as if it were,

> 'I also have anointed my king;
> I have anointed him in Sion, the mountain of my sanctity',"

where it will be observed that Lowth supplies the only point of resemblance by repeating the words "I have anointed."

Not only did Lowth thus experience some doubt whether parallelism as analysed by himself was the one law of Hebrew poetry, he expressly concludes his discussion of these "subtile and obscure" examples of synthetic parallelism with a suggestion that behind and accompanying parallelism there may be some *metrical* principle, though he judged that principle undiscovered and probably undiscoverable.

In spite of the general soundness of Lowth's exposition of parallelism, then, there is, perhaps, sufficient reason for a re-statement; and that I shall now attempt.

The extreme simplicity of Hebrew narrative has often been pointed out: the principle of attaching clause to clause by means of the waw conversive construction allows the narrative to flow on often for long periods uninterrupted, and, so to speak, in one continuous straight line. Now and again, and in certain cases more often, the line of successive events is broken to admit of some circumstance being described; but the same single line is quickly resumed. An excellent example of this is found in Genesis i.: with the exception of verse 2, which describes the conditions existing at the time of the creative act mentioned in verse 1, the narrative runs on in a single continuous line down to verse 26; thus,—

1 — 2 — 3 26

The continuity of a single line of narrative is in parts of Genesis ii. nearly as conspicuous: as to other parts of Genesis ii. something will have to be said in a later article. But if we turn to certain other descriptions of creation elsewhere in the Old Testament, we immediately discern a difference. Thus we read in Psalm xxxiii. 6, 7, 9:—

> By the word of Yahweh the heavens were made,
> And by the breath of his mouth all their host.
> He gathered as into a flask the waters of the sea,
> He put into treasure-houses the deeps.
> For *he* spake and it came to pass,
> *He* commanded and it stood;

and in Isaiah xlv. 12 the words of Yahweh run as follows:—

> *I* made the earth,
> And man upon it I created;
> *My* hands stretched out the heavens,
> And all their host I commanded.

And again in Proverbs viii. 24–29 creation is described in a series of subordinate periods :—

When there were no depths . . .
  When there were no fountains abounding with water ;
Before the mountains were settled,
  Before the hills . . .
While as yet he had not made the earth, nor the fields,
  Nor the beginning of the dust of the world ;
When he established the heavens . . .
  When he set a circle upon the face of the deep ;
When he made firm the skies above,
  When the fountains of the deep became strong,
When he gave to the sea its bound,
  That the waters should not transgress his commandment,
  When he marked out the foundations of the earth.

Now whether, as Sievers maintains, Genesis i. is as strictly metrical as Psalms, Proverbs or Isaiah xl.–lxvi., or whether, as has been commonly assumed, Genesis i. is plain, unadorned and unmetrical prose, between Genesis i. on the one hand and the passages just cited from Psalm xxxiii., Isaiah xlv. and Proverbs viii. there are these differences: (1) whereas Genesis i. is carried along a *single* line of narrative, the other passages are, in the main at least, carried forward along *two* lines, parallel to one another in respect of their meaning, and of the terms in which that meaning is expressed ; (2) whereas Genesis i. consists in the main of connected clauses so that the whole may be represented by a single line *rarely* broken, the other passages consist of a number of independent clauses or sentences, so that they must be represented by lines *constantly* broken, and at fairly *regular* intervals ; thus :—

Stated otherwise, as contrasted with the simpler style of Genesis i., these other passages are characterised by the *independence* of their successive *clauses* or short sentences, and the *repetition* of the same thought or statement *by means of corresponding terms* in successive short clauses

or sections. Where repetition and what may be termed parallelism in its fullest and strictest sense occur, a constant breaking of the line of narrative or statement is the necessary consequence: a thought is expressed, or a statement made, but the writer, instead of proceeding at once to express the natural sequel to his thought or the next statement, breaks off and harks back to repeat in a different form the thought or statement which he has already expressed, and only after this break and repetition pursues the line of his thought or statement; that is to say, one line is, as it were, forsaken to pursue the parallel line up to a corresponding point, and then after the break the former line is resumed. But the break in the line and the independence of clauses may occur even where there is no repetition of thought or correspondence of terms; just as breaks necessarily occur *occasionally* in such simple narratives as that of Genesis i. The differences between the two styles here shade off into one another; and everything ultimately depends on the frequency and *regularity* with which the breaks occur. Where the breaks occur with as much regularity as when the successive clauses are parallel to one another, we may, even though parallelisms of terms or thought between the clauses are absent, term the style parallelistic, as preserving one of the necessary consequences of actual parallelism.

But not only is the question whether a passage belongs to the one style or the other, so far as it depends on the recurrence of breaks and the consequent independence of the clauses, one of degree; the question whether two such independent lines are correspondent or parallel to one another is also at times a question both of degree and of exact interpretation. To return to the passages already cited: when the Psalmist writes—

> He gathered as into a flask the waters of the sea,

and then adds—

He put into treasure-houses the deeps,

it is clear that at the end of the first line he breaks the straight line of continuous statement: the second line adds nothing to the bare sense, and it carries the writer no further forward than the first; the two sentences thus correspond strictly to two *equal* and parallel lines: where the first begins the second also begins, and where the first ends there also the second ends: each line records exactly the same fact and the same amount of fact by means of different but synonymous terms. And the same is true of the two lines—

For he spake and it was done,
He commanded and it stood sure.

We can without difficulty and with perfect propriety represent these two couplets thus:—

But what are we to say of,

I made the earth,
And man upon it I created?

This is certainly not the simplest form of putting the thought to be expressed: the terms "made" and "created" are synonymous, and the whole thought could have been fully expressed in the briefer form, "I made the earth, and man upon it." But have we, even so, completely delimited substance and form, the thought to be expressed and the art used in its expression? Probably not; the writer continues:—

My hands stretched out the heavens,
And all their host I commanded.

Here we cannot simply drop a term as in the previous lines and leave the sense unimpaired; but the correspondence of thought between the two sets of statements may yield a clue to the essential thought of the whole; as the first

two lines mean no more than this : I created the earth and its inhabitants ; so the second means simply this : I created the heavens and their inhabitants. But have we even yet determined the fundamental thought of the passage ? Did the writer really mean to express two distinct thoughts in each set of lines ? Was he thinking of the creation of man as something independent of the creation of the earth ? Did he mean to refer first to one creative act and then to a second and independent creative act ? Or did he regard the creation of man as part of the creation of the earth, so that his lines are really *parallel* statements, a parallelism, to wit, of the part with the whole, and not *successive* statements ? This seems to me most probable ; his thought was : Yahweh created the heavens and the earth ; but instead of expressing this in its simplest form by a sentence that would have been represented by a single continuous line, he has artistically expressed it in a form that may once again, though with less complete propriety, perhaps, than in the case of the couplet from Psalm xxxiii., be expressed by two groups of parallel and broken lines :—

If the thought of man and the host of heaven had a greater independence than this view recognises, we must still treat the statement (which is not, like Genesis i., the continuous statement of successive acts) not as a continuous line, but as a line broken at very regular intervals—

and, if we wished diagrammatically to bring out the similarity in the verbal cast or grammatical build of the clauses rather than the independence of the thought, we might still adopt the form—

Before leaving this diagrammatic description I merely add, without illustrating the statement, that a poem rarely

proceeds far along two parallel lines each broken at the same regular intervals, thus—



Either the two lines are broken at different points, or one is for the time being followed to the neglect of the other, thus—

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(To be continued.)

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